Concepts such as “symbolism” and “symbolic cognition” often remain unspecified in discussions the symbolic capacities of earlier hominins. In this paper, I use conceptual tools from phenomenology to reflect on the origins of early symbolic cognition. In particular, I discuss the possible early use of pointing gestures around the time of the earliest known stone tool industries. I argue that unlike more basic social acts such as expression, gaze following, and attention-getters, which are used by extant non-human great apes, communicative pointing involves key elements that are characteristic of symbolic cognition. In particular, it involves “third order intentionality” as well as “shared practice horizons”: shared frameworks of understanding which are required for the interpretation of communicative acts whose meaning is not codified indexically or iconically in the signaling behavior. In the final part, I briefly review some indications for the use of pointing gestures around the time of the Lomekwian and Oldowan industries, as a way to sustain cooperation and possibly learning by instruction. It is suggested that pointing is more complex than is standardly acknowledged, and that it may have been an important communicative act for Early Stone Age hominins in transitioning to more fully symbolic speech capacities.

在讨论早期人类的象征能力时，诸如“象征主义”和“象征认知”之类的概念常常没有得到明确说明。在本文中，我使用现象学的概念工具来反思早期符号认知的起源。我特别讨论了在已知最早的石器工业时代可能早期使用指向手势的情况。我认为，与现存的非人类类人猿所使用的更基本的社会行为（例如表达、目光跟随和吸引注意力）不同，交流指向涉及象征认知特征的关键要素。特别是，它涉及“第三阶意向性”以及“共享实践视野”：解释交际行为所需的共享理解框架，而这些交际行为的含义并未在信号行为中以索引或图像方式编码。在最后一部分中，我简要回顾了 Lomekwian 和 Oldowan 工业时代使用指向手势的一些迹象，作为维持合作和可能通过指导学习的一种方式。有人认为，指向比标准承认的更为复杂，并且对于早期石器时代的人类来说，指向更全面的象征性言语能力可能是一种重要的交流行为。