Industrial integrated energy systems (IESs) and electric vehicles (EVs) provide new solutions for addressing the increasing challenges of the energy crisis and environmental pollution. With the increasing number of EVs and smart charging stations in industrial IES, the uncoordinated charging load of EVs imposes significant pressure on IES. Therefore, a well-designed dispatch scheme is crucial for reducing the economic cost for both parties, alleviating the energy supply pressure on IES, and promoting the development of a low-carbon society. To this end, given the load characteristics of EVs in industrial IES, we propose a dispatch framework based on the Stackelberg game theory, which includes the leader and the follower. The leader IES is responsible for formulating both unit dispatch and demand response plans, as well as determining the charging pricing for the smart charging station. The follower smart charging station optimizes EVs charging power by minimizing the charging cost in order to protect the interest of EV owners. Additionally, we introduce the carbon emission flow model into charging station pricing to shift the responsibility for carbon emissions from the generation side to the EV load side. Considering that the two-layer game model is difficult to solve, we use the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker condition and duality theorem to transform it into an equivalent single-layer optimization problem, which is easily solved. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed game framework effectively reduces the economic cost of IES and the charging cost of EVs, alleviates the pressure from charging load, and reduces the carbon emissions of industrial IES.

中文翻译：

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基于Stackelberg博弈框架的电动汽车负载工业综合能源系统经济低碳调度

工业综合能源系统（IES）和电动汽车（EV）为应对能源危机和环境污染日益严峻的挑战提供了新的解决方案。随着工业IES中电动汽车和智能充电站数量的不断增加，电动汽车充电负荷的不协调给工业IES带来了巨大的压力。因此，设计良好的调度方案对于降低双方经济成本、缓解工业企业能源供应压力、促进低碳社会发展至关重要。为此，考虑到工业IES中电动汽车的负载特性，我们提出了一种基于Stackelberg博弈论的调度框架，其中包括领导者和跟随者。领导者IES负责制定机组调度和需求响应计划，并确定智能充电站的充电定价。随动智能充电站通过最小化充电成本来优化电动汽车充电功率，以保护电动汽车车主的利益。此外，我们将碳排放流量模型引入充电站定价中，将碳排放责任从发电侧转移到电动汽车负载侧。考虑到双层博弈模型较难求解，我们利用Karush-Kuhn-Tucker条件和对偶定理将其转化为等价的单层优化问题，很容易求解。仿真结果表明，所提出的博弈框架有效降低了工业IES的经济成本和电动汽车的充电成本，缓解了充电负荷的压力，减少了工业IES的碳排放。