Virtual assistants (VAs), like Amazon’s Alexa, Google’s Assistant, and Apple’s Siri, are on the rise. However, despite allegedly being ‘assistants’ to users, they ultimately help firms to maximise profits. With more and more tasks and leeway bestowed upon VAs, the severity as well as the extent of conflicts of interest between firms and users increase. This article builds on the common law field of fiduciary law to argue why and how regulators should address this phenomenon. First, the functions of VAs resemble established fiduciaries, namely mandataries when they perform tasks on behalf of users, and increasingly advisors whenever they provide recommendations or suggestions. Second, users grant firms deploying VAs ever more discretion over their economic, and more and more significant non-economic interests, such as their health or finances. This delegation of power renders users vulnerable to abuse of power and inadequate performance by firms deploying VAs. Moreover, neither specification or monitoring nor market forces are alternatives that can sufficiently protect users. Thus, regulation is needed, departing from the recognition of the relationship between firms deploying VAs and users as a fiduciary relationship. In the EU, this could be realised through fiduciary requirements for VAs. First and foremost, to adequately protect users from abuse of power by firms deploying VAs, the core fiduciary duty of loyalty should be converted into corresponding fiduciary requirements for VAs, obliging firms to align VAs with their users.

虚拟助理 (VA)，如亚马逊的 Alexa、谷歌的 Assistant 和苹果的 Siri，正在兴起。然而，尽管据称他们是用户的“助手”，但他们最终还是帮助企业实现利润最大化。随着VA被赋予的任务和余地越来越多，企业和用户之间的利益冲突的严重性和程度也在增加。本文以信托法的普通法领域为基础，探讨监管机构为何以及如何应对这一现象。首先，VA 的职能类似于既定的受托人，即代表用户执行任务时的委托人，以及每当他们提供推荐或建议时越来越多的顾问。其次，用户赋予部署虚拟资产的公司更多的经济自由裁量权，以及越来越重要的非经济利益，例如他们的健康或财务。这种权力授权使用户很容易受到部署 VA 的公司滥用权力和绩效不足的影响。此外，无论是规范、监控还是市场力量都无法充分保护用户。因此，需要进行监管，而不是承认部署虚拟资产的公司与用户之间的信托关系。在欧盟，这可以通过对 VA 的信托要求来实现。首先也是最重要的，为了充分保护用户免受部署虚拟资产的公司滥用权力的影响，忠诚的核心信托义务应转化为对虚拟资产的相应信托要求，迫使公司将虚拟资产与其用户保持一致。