The transition to low-carbon agriculture is seen as essential for accelerating the implementation of ecologically friendly and climate-smart agricultural supply chain management strategies. Success in these efforts depends on robust policy frameworks, effective stakeholder participation, and the availability of agricultural products to customers. This study introduces a conceptual and operational structure for the incorporation and management of an agricultural supply chain with a low-carbon scheme through the establishment of a collaborative market environment involving farmers, agricultural enterprises, and consumers. Within this framework, agricultural enterprises and farmers engage in a cooperative Nash game to determine the extent to which they are willing to employ low-carbon practices in response to collaborative market prices and government policies, including subsidies and carbon taxes. The Nash game yields a unique Nash equilibrium, suggesting the possibility of cooperative negotiations among the parties with the goal of improving their financial gains. The proposed model is applied in two Brazilian sugarcane supply chain case studies, integrating with traditional biorefinery mills to produce and market ethanol as a gasoline alternative. Our results suggest that (1) successfully allocating government subsidies and taxes motivates low-carbon adoption; (2) the government taxation policy stabilizes the low-carbon supply chain, improving stakeholder market pricing and consumer affordability; and (3) reduced cost gaps between low-carbon and non-low-carbon alternatives increase low-carbon adoption. As a result, this study provides fresh insights on the Nash collaboration of stakeholders in accordance with government policies to create a cleaner and more affordable agricultural supply chain market.

中文翻译：

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基于纳什的新型农业供应链管理低碳实施

向低碳农业转型被认为对于加快实施生态友好型和气候智能型农业供应链管理战略至关重要。这些努力的成功取决于强有力的政策框架、利益相关者的有效参与以及向客户提供农产品。本研究介绍了通过建立涉及农民、农业企业和消费者的协作市场环境，以低碳方案整合和管理农业供应链的概念和操作结构。在此框架内，农业企业和农民参与合作纳什博弈，以确定他们愿意在多大程度上采用低碳实践，以应对合作市场价格和政府政策，包括补贴和碳税。纳什博弈产生了独特的纳什均衡，表明各方之间以提高财务收益为目标进行合作谈判的可能性。所提出的模型应用于两个巴西甘蔗供应链案例研究，与传统生物炼油厂整合，生产和销售乙醇作为汽油替代品。我们的研究结果表明：（1）成功分配政府补贴和税收可以激励低碳采用； （2）政府税收政策稳定低碳供应链，提高利益相关者市场定价和消费者承受能力； (3) 低碳和非低碳替代品之间成本差距的缩小增加了低碳的采用。因此，本研究为利益相关者根据政府政策创建更清洁、更实惠的农业供应链市场的纳什合作提供了新的见解。