We show that delegating tax collection duties to large firms can bolster tax capacity in weak-enforcement settings. We exploit two reforms in Argentina that dramatically and subsequently turnover tax withholding by firms. Combining firm-to-firm data with regression discontinuity and difference-in-differences methods centered on revenue eligibility thresholds, we find that: (i) appointing large firms as collection agents (CAs) does not hinder their economic activity, (ii) it leads to a significant increase in self-reported sales and tax payments among CAs’ business partners, (iii) these effects are primarily concentrated among downstream firms that lack a traceable paper trail, and (iv) reductions in withholding lead to a decrease in self-reported sales, albeit to a lesser extent. Tax-collecting firms can thus help boost tax compliance and revenue.

中文翻译：

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企业作为收税人

我们表明，将税收职责下放给大企业可以增强执法薄弱环境下的税收能力。我们利用了阿根廷的两项改革，这些改革极大地促进了企业预扣营业税。将企业间数据与以收入资格阈值为中心的回归不连续性和双重差分法相结合，我们发现：(i) 指定大企业作为催收代理 (CA) 不会阻碍其经济活动，(ii)导致 CA 业务合作伙伴自我报告的销售额和纳税额显着增加，(iii) 这些影响主要集中在缺乏可追溯的书面记录的下游公司，(iv) 预扣税的减少导致自我报告的减少- 报告的销售额，尽管程度较小。因此，征税公司可以帮助提高税收合规性和收入。