I apply a Tiebout model of multiple local jurisdictions to study the political economy and welfare effects of state limitations on the taxing powers of local governments, investigating the effects of such restrictions on housing markets, community composition, and the types of expenditures undertaken by local governments. The Tiebout model in this paper is distinguished by voters choosing values of multiple local policy (tax and expenditure) instruments, a mixture of renters and owners residing in each community, and different degrees of household mobility. I characterize and provide sufficient conditions for voting equilibrium even with multiple policy instruments and varying housing tenure by developing a novel application of the model of representative democracy. The different degrees of household mobility following the introduction of tax limits have significant impacts on equilibrium values, the predicted level of political support, and the welfare effects associated with these tax limits. In addition, almost none of the tax limits increase overall welfare, even though many gain majority support. The only case that is predicted to have majority support and increases welfare is when all households are mobile, head and income taxes have previously been constrained, and property taxes are then limited. These results accord well with the hypothesis of —that much political support for tax limits comes from a desire by individuals to limit taxes in localities other than their own.

中文翻译：

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家庭流动性以及地方税收限制的政治经济和福利影响

我应用多个地方司法管辖区的蒂伯特模型来研究国家对地方政府征税权的限制的政治经济和福利影响，调查这种限制对住房市场、社区构成以及地方政府承担的支出类型的影响。本文中的蒂伯特模型的特点是选民选择多种地方政策（税收和支出）工具的价值、居住在每个社区的租户和业主的混合以及不同程度的家庭流动性。通过开发代议制民主模式的新颖应用，即使在多种政策工具和不同的住房保有权的情况下，我也描述并提供了投票均衡的充分条件。引入税收限制后不同程度的家庭流动性对均衡价值、政治支持的预测水平以及与这些税收限制相关的福利效应具有重大影响。此外，尽管许多税收限制获得了多数人的支持，但几乎没有一项税收限制会增加整体福利。预计获得多数支持并增加福利的唯一情况是所有家庭都是流动的，人头税和所得税之前受到限制，财产税也受到限制。这些结果非常符合这样的假设：对税收限制的大量政治支持来自于个人在自己以外的地方限制税收的愿望。