A novel axiomatization of relative utilitarianism is provided using the single-profile setting used in Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem. Harsanyi’s axioms are supplemented with an impartiality axiom that requires social alternative lotteries p and q to be socially indifferent when (i) two individuals have conflicting preferences for them and everybody else is indifferent and (ii) the concerned individuals’ strengths of preference for p over q have the same magnitude. This axiomatization shows that equality of the social weights can be obtained in a single-profile setting and that no interprofile condition is needed to obtain profile-independent weights in a multi-profile setting.

使用 Harsanyi 的社会聚合定理中使用的单一配置文件设置，提供了相对功利主义的新颖公理化。 Harsanyi 的公理补充了一个公正性公理，该公理要求社会替代彩票p和q在以下情况下在社会上是无差异的：(i) 两个人对它们有冲突的偏好，而其他人都无动于衷；(ii) 相关个人对p的偏好强度超过q具有相同的大小。该公理化表明，可以在单配置文件设置中获得社会权重的相等，并且不需要配置文件间条件即可在多配置文件设置中获得与配置文件无关的权重。