We consider a model of collective persuasion, in which members of an advisory committee with private continuous signals vote on a policy change. A decision maker then decides whether to adopt the change upon observing each vote. Information transmission between the committee and the decision maker is possible if and only if there exists an informative equilibrium in which the decision maker only adopts the policy change after a unanimous vote. Similarly, full information aggregation is achievable if and only if such an equilibrium exists when the size of the committee is large enough. We further discuss why our continuous-signal model produces results different from discrete-signal models.

中文翻译：

---

投票说服

我们考虑一种集体说服模型，其中具有私人连续信号的咨询委员会成员对政策变更进行投票。然后，决策者在观察每次投票后决定是否采用更改。当且仅当存在信息均衡，即决策者仅在一致投票后才采用政策变更时，委员会和决策者之间的信息传递才有可能。类似地，当且仅当委员会规模足够大时存在这种平衡时，完整的信息聚合才是可以实现的。我们进一步讨论为什么我们的连续信号模型产生的结果与离散信号模型不同。