Green finance provides important economic support for environmental protection and carbon reduction. However, some financial institutions engage in greenwashing behaviors (GWBs), which raise funds through green finance products (GFPs) without investing in green projects and falsely disclosing environmental information. The GWBs of financial institutions result in tremendous pressure on governmental regulation. From the perspective of information disclosure, under incomplete information, we constructed a signaling game between governments and financial institutions to explore the formation mechanism of financial institutions' GWBs. Subsequently, the separating equilibrium, pooling equilibrium, and hybrid equilibrium are investigated. The corresponding conditions for financial institutions choosing positive information disclosure were derived. We also evaluated the effects of different regulatory measures, including rewards, penalties, standards, and certifications on curbing GWBs. Finally, countermeasures to shape financial institutions to undertake their environmental responsibilities and conduct positive information disclosure are proposed. This study provides a theoretical explanation for GWBs and sheds new light on an effective governance model in green finance.

中文翻译：

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绿色还是不绿色：政府监管如何影响金融机构在绿色金融中的洗绿行为

绿色金融为环境保护和碳减排提供重要的经济支撑。然而，一些金融机构却存在洗绿行为（GWB），即通过绿色金融产品（GFP）筹集资金，但不投资绿色项目，并虚假披露环境信息。金融机构的GWB给政府监管带来了巨大的压力。从信息披露的角度出发，在不完全信息条件下，构建政府与金融机构之间的信号博弈，探讨金融机构GWB的形成机制。随后，研究了分离平衡、汇集平衡和混合平衡。推导出金融机构选择积极信息披露的相应条件。我们还评估了不同监管措施（包括奖励、处罚、标准和认证）对遏制 GWB 的影响。最后提出了引导金融机构承担环境责任、积极信息披露的对策。这项研究为全球银行提供了理论解释，并为绿色金融的有效治理模式提供了新的启示。