This article explores the problem that both modern private equity (PE) firms, and collateralised loan obligation (CLO) lenders to PE portfolio companies, have incentives to avoid a formal restructuring of PE portfolio companies in financial distress. The author is concerned that this may lead to negative social costs for suppliers, employees, customers and even government agencies... She explores how and why the problem arises, and the ways in which corporate and corporate insolvency law might be able to respond to it. Some suggestions are made, but it is accepted that any solution involves a sensitive balance that needs to be approached with considerable care.

中文翻译：

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陷入困境的私募股权和抵押贷款债务的激励

本文探讨了现代私募股权 (PE) 公司和私募股权投资组合公司的抵押贷款债券 (CLO) 贷款人都有动机避免对陷入财务困境的私募股权投资组合公司进行正式重组的问题。作者担心这可能会给供应商、员工、客户甚至政府机构带来负面的社会成本……她探讨了问题如何以及为何出现，以及公司和公司破产法可能采取的应对方式它。虽然提出了一些建议，但人们普遍认为，任何解决方案都涉及敏感的平衡，需要非常小心地对待。