PinFi is a class of novel protocols for decentralized pricing of dissipative assets, whose value naturally declines over time. Central to the protocol's functionality and its market efficiency is the role of liquidity providers (LPs). This study addresses critical stability and sustainability challenges within the protocol, namely: the propensity of LPs to prefer selling in external markets over participation in the protocol; a similar inclination towards selling within the PinFi system rather than contributing as LPs; and a scenario where LPs are disinclined to sell within the protocol. Employing a game-theoretic approach, we explore PinFi's mechanisms and its broader ramifications. Our findings reveal that, under a variety of common conditions and with an assumption of participant integrity, PinFi is capable of fostering a dynamic equilibrium among LPs, sellers, and buyers. This balance is maintained through a carefully calibrated range of block rewards for LPs, ensuring the protocol's long-term stability and utility.

中文翻译：

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诚实 PinFi 系统中区块奖励的界限

PinFi 是一类用于耗散资产去中心化定价的新颖协议，其价值会随着时间的推移而自然下降。该协议功能及其市场效率的核心是流动性提供者（LP）的角色。本研究解决了协议内关键的稳定性和可持续性挑战，即： 有限合伙人更喜欢在外部市场销售而不是参与协议的倾向；类似的倾向是在 PinFi 系统内进行销售，而不是作为 LP 做出贡献；以及有限合伙人不愿意在协议内出售的情况。我们采用博弈论方法，探索 PinFi 的机制及其更广泛的影响。我们的研究结果表明，在各种常见条件下，在参与者诚信的假设下，PinFi 能够在有限合伙人、卖家和买家之间促进动态平衡。这种平衡是通过精心调整的有限合伙人区块奖励范围来维持的，确保了协议的长期稳定性和实用性。