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Economic analysis of ridesourcing markets considering driver order cancellation and platform subsidy
Travel Behaviour and Society ( IF 5.850 ) Pub Date : 2024-04-03 , DOI: 10.1016/j.tbs.2024.100795
Kai Xu , Meead Saberi , Tian-Liang Liu , Wei Liu

This paper models the ridesourcing market with an explicit consideration of driver order cancellation, and examines the impacts of driver order cancellation on the market. The operation strategy (service pricing, fleet sizing, subsidy to drivers) of the ridesourcing platform has been examined in the presence of driver order cancellation, where the operator maximizes platform profit or social welfare. It is found that the maximum platform profit and/or rider demand after considering driver order cancellation will be smaller than those when order cancellation from drivers is not considered (baseline scenario), i.e., ignoring driver order cancellation will overestimate profit and social welfare. Our results also show that subsidy to drivers to avoid driver order cancellation should be properly set, while compensating the drivers for the whole pickup distance may indeed reduce platform profit when demand is excessive or supply is insufficient.

中文翻译:

考虑司机订单取消和平台补贴的乘车市场经济分析

本文对拼车市场进行了建模,明确考虑了司机订单取消的情况,并研究了司机订单取消对市场的影响。在司机取消订单的情况下,对网约车平台的运营策略(服务定价、车队规模、司机补贴)进行了审查,其中运营商最大化平台利润或社会福利。研究发现,考虑司机取消订单后的最大平台利润和/或乘客需求将小于不考虑司机取消订单时的最大平台利润和/或乘客需求(基线情景),即忽略司机取消订单将高估利润和社会福利。我们的研究结果还表明,应该合理设置对司机的补贴,以避免司机取消订单,而在需求过多或供应不足时,对司机进行整个取货距离的补偿确实可能会降低平台利润。
更新日期:2024-04-03
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