Since a licensee does not always fully absorb technology in the process of technology licensing, based on the consideration of incomplete absorption, this paper establishes a game model consisting of a technology research and development firm and two licensee firms, to explore the most licensing strategies of the licensing firms as well as the optimal social welfare of the licensee under different fee scenarios. The results of the study show that (1) under the flat fee scenario, technology R&D enterprises will choose royalty licensing in most cases, but when the gap in the absorptive capacity of the licensed enterprise is small and the difference in the quality of the products between the two licensing parties is large, fixed‐fee licensing is a more preferable option;(2)in the differential fee scenario, technology R&D firms prefer differential fixed fee licenses;(3)when technological empowerment occurs, local social welfare is enhanced;(4)technology development firms prefer firms with high absorptive capacity, but also charge higher fees;(5)differential fees charged by technology R&D firms to authorized firms do not always lead to a relative decline in local social welfare; they can lead to a greater enhancement of social welfare within a certain interval, and the enhancement is even greater than the enhancement of social welfare brought about by uniform fees.

中文翻译：

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不同收费场景下的吸收能力、产品异质性和技术许可

由于技术许可过程中被许可人并不总是完全吸收技术，基于不完全吸收的考虑，本文建立了由一个技术研发企业和两个被许可人企业组成的博弈模型，探索被许可人最有可能采取的许可策略。不同收费方案下的许可公司以及被许可人的最优社会福利。研究结果表明：(1)在固定费用场景下，技术研发企业大多数情况下会选择特许权使用费许可，但当被许可企业吸收能力差距较小且产品质量存在差异时两个许可方之间规模较大，固定费用许可是更可取的选择；（2）在差别费用场景下，技术研发企业更倾向于差别固定费用许可；（3）当技术赋能发生时，当地社会福利得到提高； (4)技术研发企业更青睐吸收能力高的企业，但收费也较高；(5)技术研发企业向授权企业收取的差别化费用并不一定会导致当地社会福利的相对下降；它们可以在一定区间内带来更大的社会福利提高，而且这种提高甚至大于统一收费带来的社会福利的提高。