Utilizing firms in the S&P 500, we study whether greater transparency in the reporting of other comprehensive income (OCI) items, as mandated by ASU 2011-05, resulted in a reduction in information asymmetry, a change in the value relevance of this information, or a change in hedging practice. Our results show that while transparent reporting reduced information asymmetry, firms that engage in cash flow hedging do have greater information asymmetry than their counterparts that do not hedge. We find evidence that investors penalize firm value for greater volatility of OCI relative to net income volatility when reported transparently. When permitted, managers were able to mitigate the negative impact by reporting OCI only in the Statement of Shareholders’ Equity. We conclude that managers’ concerns regarding potential confusion surrounding OCI volatility following more prominent reporting led to changes in hedging behavior. After transparent reporting, we find a reduced likelihood of foreign currency cash flow (FXCF) hedges and a reduced level of FXCF hedging among firms experiencing the greatest volatility of unrealized hedging gains and losses.

利用标准普尔 500 指数中的公司，我们研究了 ASU 2011-05 规定的其他综合收益 (OCI) 项目报告的更大透明度是否会导致信息不对称的减少、该信息的价值相关性的变化、或对冲做法的改变。我们的研究结果表明，虽然透明的报告减少了信息不对称，但从事现金流对冲的公司确实比不进行对冲的同行存在更大的信息不对称。我们发现有证据表明，在透明报告的情况下，投资者会因为 OCI 相对于净利润波动性更大的波动性而惩罚公司价值。如果允许，管理人员可以通过仅在股东权益表中报告 OCI 来减轻负面影响。我们得出的结论是，在更突出的报告发布后，管理者对 OCI 波动性潜在混乱的担忧导致了对冲行为的变化。在透明报告之后，我们发现，在未实现对冲收益和损失波动性最大的公司中，外币现金流 (FXCF) 对冲的可能性降低，而且 FXCF 对冲水平也降低。