Charges of hypocrisy are usually thought to be to be damning. Yet when a hypocrisy charge is made, there often remains disagreement about whether or not its target really is a hypocrite. Why? Three pre-registered experiments ( = 2599) conceptualize and test the role of in evaluating hypocrisy. Calling someone a hypocrite typically entails invoking a comparison—one meant to highlight internal contradiction and cast moral character into question. Yet there is ambiguity about which sorts of comparisons are valid in the first place. We argue that disagreements about moral hypocrisy often boil down to disagreements about comparability. Although the comparability of two situations should not depend on whose behavior is being scrutinized, observers shift comparability judgments in line with social motives to criticize or defend. In short, we identify a cognitive factor that can help to explain why, for similar patterns of behavior, people see hypocrisy in their enemies but consistency in themselves and their allies.

中文翻译：

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是什么导致了关于道德虚伪的分歧？感知的可比性以及人们如何利用它来批评敌人和捍卫盟友

虚伪的指控通常被认为是令人厌恶的。然而，当提出伪善指控时，人们往往对其目标是否真的是伪善者存在分歧。为什么？三个预先注册的实验 (= 2599) 概念化并测试了评估虚伪的作用。称某人为伪君子通常需要进行比较——旨在突出内部矛盾并使道德品质受到质疑。然而，哪些类型的比较首先是有效的还存在模糊性。我们认为，关于道德虚伪的分歧常常归结为关于可比性的分歧。尽管两种情况的可比性不应该取决于谁的行为受到审查，但观察者会根据批评或辩护的社会动机来改变可比性判断。简而言之，我们发现了一个认知因素，可以帮助解释为什么对于类似的行为模式，人们会看到敌人的虚伪，而看到自己和盟友的一致性。