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U.S. Political corruption and labor investment (in)efficiency
Global Finance Journal ( IF 2.853 ) Pub Date : 2024-03-28 , DOI: 10.1016/j.gfj.2024.100962
Hasibul Chowdhury , Timothy Estreich , Ashrafee Hossain , Jiayi Zheng

This study examines the impact of political corruption on firm labor investment efficiency. We find that firms headquartered in areas with higher levels of corruption have more inefficient levels of labor investment. Firms in more corrupt environments have weaker monitoring brought about by information opacity as well as a need to shield their assets, which prompts them to adopt inefficient labor investment policies. These results are robust to considerations of omitted variable bias, selection bias, and other endogeneity concerns. The present research has broad implications for society, particularly employees, as it shows that political corruption causes firms to deviate from optimal labor investment decisions.

中文翻译:

美国政治腐败和劳动力投资效率(低)

本研究探讨了政治腐败对企业劳动力投资效率的影响。我们发现,总部位于腐败程度较高地区的公司的劳动力投资效率较低。腐败环境较严重的企业,由于信息不透明以及保护资产的需要而导致监管较弱,这促使它们采取低效的劳动力投资政策。这些结果对于忽略变量偏差、选择偏差和其他内生性问题的考虑是稳健的。目前的研究对社会,特别是对雇员具有广泛的影响,因为它表明政治腐败导致企业偏离最佳的劳动力投资决策。
更新日期:2024-03-28
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