Many blockchain platforms use committee-based consensus for scalability, finality, and security. In this consensus scheme, a committee decides which blocks get appended to the chain, typically through several voting phases. Platforms typically leverage the committee members' recorded votes to reward, punish, or detect failures. A common approach is to let the block proposer decide which votes to include, opening the door to possible attacks. For example, a malicious proposer can omit votes from targeted committee members, resulting in lost profits and, ultimately, their departure from the system. This paper presents Iniva, an inclusive and incentive-compatible vote aggregation scheme that prevents such vote omission attacks. Iniva relies on a tree overlay with carefully selected fallback paths, making it robust against process failures without needing reconfiguration or additional redundancy. Our analysis shows that Iniva significantly reduces the chance to omit individual votes while ensuring that omitting many votes incurs a significant cost. In addition, our experimental results show that Iniva enjoys robustness, scalability, and reasonable throughput.

中文翻译：

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Iniva：包容性和激励兼容的投票聚合

许多区块链平台使用基于委员会的共识来实现可扩展性、最终性和安全性。在这个共识方案中，委员会通常通过几个投票阶段来决定将哪些区块附加到链上。平台通常利用委员会成员的记录投票来奖励、惩罚或检测失败。一种常见的方法是让区块提议者决定要包含哪些选票，从而为可能的攻击打开了大门。例如，恶意提案者可能会忽略目标委员会成员的投票，从而导致利润损失，并最终导致他们离开系统。本文提出了 Iniva，一种包容性且与激励兼容的投票聚合方案，可以防止此类投票遗漏攻击。 Iniva 依赖于具有精心选择的后备路径的树覆盖，使其能够抵御流程故障，而无需重新配置或额外的冗余。我们的分析表明，Iniva 显着减少了遗漏个人投票的机会，同时确保遗漏许多选票会产生巨大的成本。此外，我们的实验结果表明，Iniva 具有鲁棒性、可扩展性和合理的吞吐量。