This paper examines price markups at the upstream and downstream levels of a bilateral vertical structure in which firms provide essential inputs to one another and engage in price competition in the downstream market. We show that the ratios of noncooperative equilibrium markups are primarily determined by the price elasticities of demand and the retail pass-through rates and, moreover, that coordination on input prices leads to a collusive equilibrium outcome in the final-product market.

中文翻译：

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双边垂直承包下的双倍加价

本文研究了双边垂直结构的上游和下游层面的价格加成，在这种结构中，企业相互提供必要的投入，并在下游市场进行价格竞争。我们表明，非合作均衡加价率主要由需求的价格弹性和零售传递率决定，此外，投入价格的协调会导致最终产品市场的共谋均衡结果。