On the dominant contemporary accounts of how practical considerations affect what we ought to believe, practical considerations either encroach on epistemic rationality by affecting whether a belief is epistemically justified, or constitute distinctively practical reasons for belief which can only affect what we ought to believe by conflicting with epistemic rationality. This paper argues that Søren Kierkegaard offers a promising alternative view on which practical considerations can affect what we ought to believe without either encroaching on or (necessarily) conflicting with epistemic rationality by determining which among the epistemically permitted outright doxastic attitudes one should all-things-considered adopt.

中文翻译：

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克尔凯郭尔论信仰的实践理由与认知理由之间的关系

根据当代关于实际考虑如何影响我们应该相信的内容的主流解释，实际考虑要么通过影响一个信念在认识论上是否合理来侵犯认知理性，要么构成信念的独特实践理由，而它只能通过相互冲突来影响我们应该相信的东西。具有认知理性。本文认为，索伦·克尔凯郭尔提供了一种有希望的替代观点，即实际考虑可以影响我们应该相信的东西，而不会侵犯或（必然）与认知理性相冲突，通过确定在认知上允许的彻底的信仰态度中，我们应该对一切事物——考虑采纳。