We examine the welfare effects of the endogenous decision and release timing of weight placed on the rival's profits under relative performance evaluation with quantity competition and asymmetric marginal costs. We find that when the advantaged firm decides and releases the weight as the leader, it always chooses a negative weight on relative performance evaluation, whereas the disadvantaged firm may choose a positive or negative weight depending on the degree of product substitution. Furthermore, we demonstrate that while all firms prefer to release weights early, this situation does not improve social welfare in several economic environments.

中文翻译：

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数量竞争和成本不对称下相对绩效评价发布时机的福利效应

我们在数量竞争和不对称边际成本的相对绩效评估下，研究了内生决策的福利效应和对竞争对手利润的权重释放时机。我们发现，优势企业在决定并发布领导者权重时，总是在相对绩效评价上选择负权重，而劣势企业则可能根据产品替代程度选择正权重或负权重。此外，我们证明，虽然所有公司都喜欢尽早释放权重，但这种情况并不能改善某些经济环境中的社会福利。