Isaiah Berlin’s account of freedom is more useful for feminists than is generally recognized, especially when seen in the context of his value pluralism. Focusing on the work of Nancy Hirschmann and Sharon Krause, I argue, first, that Berlin’s concept of negative liberty can be used to resist patriarchy when his notion of the ‘conditions’ of negative liberty is taken into account. Second, positive liberty is also useful to feminists, but Berlin does not, as some feminist (and other) writers suppose, simply reject positive liberty; on the contrary, he sees it as a fundamental human value of great importance. Third, Berlin’s value pluralism makes a crucial contribution. It explains why he distinguishes negative liberty from its conditions and why he does not reject positive liberty as a value. It also explains how feminists can see the value in both negative and positive liberty without trying, paradoxically, to fit them both into a single concept. Further, my liberal-pluralist extension of Berlin’s pluralism locates all these insights within a complex but coherent political outlook which provides a sympathetic resource for feminism.

以赛亚·伯林对自由的阐述对女权主义者来说比人们普遍认为的更有用，特别是从他的价值观多元化的背景来看。围绕南希·赫希曼和莎朗·克劳斯的工作，我首先认为，当考虑到伯林的消极自由“条件”概念时，他的消极自由概念可以用来抵制父权制。其次，积极自由对女权主义者也有用，但柏林并不像一些女权主义者（和其他）作家所认为的那样，简单地拒绝积极自由；相反，他认为这是非常重要的人类基本价值观。第三，柏林的价值多元化做出了至关重要的贡献。它解释了为什么他将消极自由与其条件区分开来，以及为什么他不拒绝积极自由作为一种价值观。它还解释了女权主义者如何看待消极自由和积极自由的价值，而不是自相矛盾地试图将它们纳入一个概念。此外，我对柏林多元主义的自由多元主义延伸将所有这些见解置于复杂但连贯的政治观点中，这为女权主义提供了同情的资源。