In this article, we consider the presence of what appear to be true contradictions in the Talmud. We consider and reject a glut-theoretic response. We argue these apparently contradictory Talmudic passages should be understood not as ordinary propositions, but as being given under an operator. This allows us to understand these rulings as genuinely conflicting, but not genuinely contradictory. We illustrate the broad shape of such a view through consideration of Hans Kelsen's late-period philosophy of law. We also consider and reject responses to this issue given by Rashi, R. Kook, and R. Feinstein. We close by considering why a system of Jewish law which allows for jointly affirmed conflicting propositions is desirable. We claim that if, as Maimonides suggests, the fundamental project of Jewish law is the eradication of idolatry, then the law itself should remind us that God's ways are higher than our ways. One way of doing so is to resist capture by a transparent set of principles, by allowing for conflicting rulings to be affirmed. This article does not presuppose familiarity with the Talmudic corpus or Jewish tradition.

中文翻译：

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塔木德中真正的“矛盾”和冲突

在这篇文章中，我们考虑了《塔木德》中看似真实的矛盾的存在。我们考虑并拒绝过剩理论的反应。我们认为，这些明显矛盾的《塔木德》段落不应被理解为普通命题，而应被理解为在运算符下给出的。这使我们能够将这些裁决理解为真正相互冲突，但并非真正矛盾。我们通过考虑汉斯·凯尔森的晚期法哲学来说明这种观点的大致形式。我们还考虑并拒绝 Rashi、R. Kook 和 R. Feinstein 对此问题的回应。最后，我们考虑为什么允许共同确认相互冲突的主张的犹太法律体系是可取的。我们声称，如果像迈蒙尼德所暗示的那样，犹太法律的基本目标是根除偶像崇拜，那么法律本身就应该提醒我们，上帝的道路高于我们的道路。这样做的一种方法是通过允许相互冲突的裁决得到确认，来抵制一套透明原则的束缚。本文并不预设您熟悉塔木德语料库或犹太传统。