Martin Heidegger’s view of conformity comes in his description and understanding of Das Man or “the One”. There is controversy within Heidegger scholarship regarding the interpretation of Das Man as an existential mode. Most scholars interpret Das Man to mean the existential mode of inauthenticity and delineate the two modes of authenticity and inauthenticity in Heideggerian existentialism. Less popularly, scholars like Hubert Dreyfus and Michael Zimmerman interpret the positive and negative aspects of Das Man and suggest the third mode of indifference in Heidegger’s Being and Time. This paper follows Dreyfus’ understanding of Das Man to posit indifference as a third mode of being that is structurally similar to inauthenticity but motivationally different from it. It then uses this difference to categorize two forms of moral conformity in Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the difference between a morality of custom and a morality of conviction. The problematic of this paper concerns the distinction between these two forms of moral conformity and the moral status of people like Adolf Eichmann whose actions Arendt describes as the banality of evil. Usually seen as preservative of morality, Arendt shows how conformity may be a site for moral conflict.

马丁·海德格尔的从众观源于他对Das Man或“the One”的描述和理解。海德格尔学术界关于将达斯人解释为存在主义模式存在争议。大多数学者将“达斯人”解释为非真实性的存在模式，并界定了海德格尔存在主义的真实性和非真实性两种模式。休伯特·德雷福斯（Hubert Dreyfus）和迈克尔·齐默尔曼（Michael Zimmerman）等学者不太受欢迎，他们解释了《达斯人》的积极和消极方面，并提出了海德格尔《存在与时间》中的第三种冷漠模式。本文遵循德雷福斯对达斯曼的理解，将冷漠视为第三种存在模式，其在结构上与不真实相似，但在动机上与之不同。然后，在汉娜·阿伦特对习惯道德和信念道德之间差异的分析中，它利用这种差异对两种形式的道德一致性进行了分类。本文的问题涉及这两种形式的道德一致性之间的区别，以及像阿道夫·艾希曼这样的人的道德地位，阿伦特将其行为描述为平庸的邪恶。阿伦特通常被视为道德的保护者，他展示了从众如何可能成为道德冲突的场所。