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Political conflict, political polarization, and constitutional compliance Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-04-20 Jacek Lewkowicz, Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska, Jan Fałkowski
While the economic approach to constitutions highlights their contribution to resolving conflict, recent work on the de jure–de facto distinction in relation to various constitutional rules suggests that political conflict and polarization could play a role in explaining the size and evolution of the gap between constitution text and constitutional practice. In this paper, we are interested in the
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Dred Scott and Gettysburg in Tullock’s constitutional mythology and Civil War memory Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-04-08 Daniel Kuehn
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Public reason, democracy, and the ideal two-tier social choice model of politics Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-04-05 Cyril Hédoin
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The Economy of Classical Athens. Organization, Institutions and Society by Emmanouil, Marios, L. Economou Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-03-04 George Tridimas
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Correction to: The best Condorcet-compatible election method: Ranked Pairs Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-02-26
Abstract An error is corrected in the paper by Charles T. Munger, Jr., The best Condorcet-compatible election method: Ranked Pairs, Const Polit Econ (2022).
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The nation-state foundations of constitutional compliance Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-01-04 Peter Grajzl, Jerg Gutmann, Stefan Voigt
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Does satisfaction with amenities and environment influence the taste for revolt in the middle east? Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-12-14
Abstract The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between individuals’ satisfaction with amenities and environmental quality and taste for revolt in the Middle East. Using recent World Value Survey data (WVS7, 2017–2021) from Egypt and Iraq (which have been experiencing severe environmental degradation and inadequate and mismanagement of public infrastructure) and applying Probit regressions
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Hume’s liberalism based on Scottish jurisprudence Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-11-29 Takafumi Nakamura
This study develops a view of Hume’s is/ought distinction as an extension of Scottish jurisprudence that, in turn, was influenced by Pufendorf’s discussion of entia moralia. Further, it investigates the unique role that Hume’s sentimentalism played in the production of elements in the context of liberalism under the rule of law, independently of previous philosophical traditions. First, we observe
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Clubbing in trade policies: How much a threat to the multilateral constitution? Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-10-19 Barbara Dluhosch, Daniel Horgos
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The pure logic of discrimination Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-10-17 Louis Corriveau
The paper expounds a simple non-cooperative game, which can model discrimination in market and non-market transactions. The model has two equilibriums where individuals do not discriminate and several where they do. One non-discriminatory equilibrium dominates in the sense of Pareto all discriminatory equilibriums. The second non-discriminatory equilibrium is dominated by all other equilibriums. While
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Endogenous preferences: a challenge to constitutional political economy’s normative foundation? Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-09-15 Malte Dold
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Comment on Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-09-13 Markus Schulze
In recent papers, Darlington identifies minimax‑TD as the best single-winner voting method. He mentions two criteria allegedly met by minimax‑TD and violated by the Schulze method. In this comment, however, I will show that also minimax‑TD violates these criteria.
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Comment on “The best Condorcet‑compatible election method: Ranked Pairs” Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-08-21 Markus Schulze
In the paper “The best Condorcet‑compatible election method: Ranked Pairs” (Munger in Const Polit Econ 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-022-09382-w), the author identifies Tideman's ranked pairs method as the best single-winner voting method, while the Schulze method (Schulze in Soc Choice Welf 36(2):267–303, 2011; The Schulze method of voting, 2018. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.02973v12.pdf) comes
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How the structure of legal authority affects political inequality Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-08-16 Joseph Warren
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Much ado about nothing: voting in sixteenth-century Republic of Genoa Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-08-14 M. Cristina Molinari
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Checkmate: What was a King's worth in nineteenth-century Latin America? Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-08-06 Daniel Sánchez-Piñol Yulee
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The renaissance of ordoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s* Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-07-21 Tim Krieger, Daniel Nientiedt
The economic tradition of ordoliberalism, understood as the theoretical and policy ideas of the Freiburg School, emerged in 1930s and 1940s Germany. In the years thereafter, it was quickly superseded by Keynesianism and other theories imported from the English-speaking world. The crisis in Keynesian economics in the mid-1970s led to what has been described as a “renaissance of ordoliberal reasoning”
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Civic associations and polycentric approaches to environmental justice in Louisiana Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-07-15 Siobhain Lash
Louisiana has problems. It is corrupt and inefficient. Louisiana’s corruption creates, and makes it difficult to solve, important environmental problems that are harming Louisianans. Though Louisiana is not alone in having a corrupt and inefficient political institution, its endemic and entrenched corruption make Louisiana valuable for an environmental justice case study that has broader implications
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Environmentalism, a flirt with eco-authoritarianism and the robustness of ordoliberalism Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-07-05 Justus Enninga
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Ballooning bureaucracy? Stylized facts of growing administration in Swedish higher education Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-06-25 Fredrik W. Andersson, Henrik Jordahl, Anders Kärnä
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Publication trends in political economy scholarship 2011–2020 Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-06-15 Robert F. Mulligan
Political economy occupies a unique place at the intersection of economics and political science, being an essential part of both disciplines, as well as an area that offers special insight into issues of continuing importance in public finance and policy. This article uses journal publications to rank institutions by research productivity in political economy. An incidental byproduct is a ranking
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The case for score voting Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-05-15 Warren D. Smith
Score voting (also called range voting) uses a ratings ballot. Each voter assigns (to as many candidates as she wishes) a number in a specified range. Greatest average score wins. Two main lines of evidence show score voting is a good decision-making method: biology and computer simulation. Honeybees achieved evolutionary success by annually deciding their new hive location via score voting. Some ants
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Deeds, not words? Speech and re-election of Japan’s local legislators Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-05-04 Akihiko Kawaura, Yasutomo Kimura, Yuzu Uchida
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STAR Voting, equality of voice, and voter satisfaction: considerations for voting method reform Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-03-20 Sara Wolk, Jameson Quinn, Marcus Ogren
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U.S. Antitrust Policy in the Age of Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Apple, Netflix and Facebook Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-03-20 Thomas W. Hazlett
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The different facets of the proportionality principle as applied by the supreme court in India Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-03-17 Navin Sinha, Fakkiresh S. Sakkarnaikar
The evolution of the proportionality principle in India has, at best been an experiment of sorts. Its incorporation as a review tool was initially confined to the deciding the legality of the administrative decision-making. At this stage, it was used more as an alternative to the Wednesbury standard of reasonableness rather than an independent review procedure. Over the years, however, as the principle
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Fake marriages, asylum, and gas station robberies: institutional determinants of migrants' strategies Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-03-16 Joshua Bedi
I study institutional and political determinants of migrants’ immigration strategies using the United States’ immigration system as a case study. Drawing from work that theoretically connects decisions to immigrate legally vs. illegally as well as theoretical insights from literature on the economics of crime, I show how relative probabilities of successful migration using different strategies and
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Natural amenities and Neo-Hobbesian local public finance Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-03-15 Luke Petach
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Stable Voting Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-03-14 Wesley H. Holliday, Eric Pacuit
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The Maltese single transferable vote experience: a case study of gerrymandering? Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-02-25 Serhat Hasancebi
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Hayek on labor unions and restraint of trade Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-02-12 Shigeki Kusunoki
Friedrich A. Hayek thoroughly criticizes labor unions in Sect. 18 of The Constitution of Liberty published in 1960 and insists in the same section that closed-shop contracts should be illegal. He also views yellow-dog contracts, which were designed as countermeasures against the labor unions, as illegal. However, it has been pointed out that, according to Hayek’s social philosophy, neither the closed-shop
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A Dodgson-Hare synthesis Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-02-04 James Green-Armytage
In 1876, Charles Dodgson (better known as Lewis Carroll) proposed a committee election procedure that chooses the Condorcet winner when one exists and otherwise eliminates candidates outside the Smith set, then allows for re-votes until a Condorcet winner emerges. The present paper discusses Dodgson’s work in the context of strategic election behavior and suggests a “Dodgson-Hare” method: a variation
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Implications of strategic position choices by candidates Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-02-02 Robbie Robinette
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Coalitional manipulation of voting rules: simulations on empirical data Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-02-03 François Durand
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The case for minimax-TD Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-01-31 Richard B. Darlington
In spatial-model computer simulations with artificial voters and candidates, the well-known minimax single-winner voting system far outperformed 10 other systems at picking the best winners. It essentially tied with two others (Schulze and ranked pairs), both of which are far more complex than minimax. Minimax’s other advantages include Condorcet consistency, simplicity, monotonicity, and ease of voting
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What difference does a voting rule make? Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-01-31 Chang Geun Song
Using data from Politbarometer surveys and from local American elections in which voters ranked candidates, this paper estimates the frequencies with which different pairs of voting rules yield different outcomes from the same ballots. The frequencies vary widely over pairs of rules, from 0.39% for the pair Minimax and STAR to 24.41% for the pair Plurality and Approval. The paper also checked for Condorcet
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The case for Instant Runoff Voting Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-01-30 Rob Richie, Jeremy Seitz-Brown, Lucy Kaufman
Instant runoff voting (IRV) is an electoral system that produces better elections and more representative outcomes in races with three or more candidates. Used by over 50 American jurisdictions, IRV addresses the challenges of plurality voting in crowded candidate fields. It upholds majority rule, promotes voter engagement, discourages personal attacks, and minimizes strategic voting. IRV is preferable
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The case for the five in final five voting Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-01-27 Katherine Gehl
My central concern is not, which electoral system would elect the best winner, but rather: which electoral system would be most likely to elect a Congress that would deliver optimal democratic outcomes? I use a theory of politics as an industry, first presented in Gehl & Porter (2017), that analyzes incentives and behaviors through the lens of competition. I argue that the optimal system is Final Five
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Individual accountability, collective decision-making Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-01-23 Daniel Gibbs
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Choosing among the Variety of proposed Voting Reforms Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-01-16 Nicolaus Tideman
A wide variety of voting reforms are offered for consideration in this special issue. This paper draws connections among them and identifies the beliefs that make particular proposals more attractive than others.
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The failure of Instant Runoff to accomplish the purpose for which it was adopted: a case study from Burlington Vermont Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2023-01-10 Robert Bristow-Johnson
Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV) has been marketed to “guarantee that the majority candidate is elected,” to “eliminate the spoiler effect,” and to empower voters, particularly those supporting third-party or independent candidates, to “vote your hopes, not your fears,” which is meant to level the playing field between such candidates and those from the major-party duopoly. This paper shows that in Burlington
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Electoral reform: the case for majority judgment Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2022-12-28 Rida Laraki
The majority judgment (MJ) voting method works well in theory and in practice. Not only does MJ avoid the classical Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, but it also overcomes the domination paradox, from which paired comparisons by majority rule, approval voting, and all Condorcet consistent methods suffer. This article also shows why MJ best reduces the impact of strategic manipulation and minimizes ties
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Classification of preferential ballot voting methods Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2022-12-24 Amir Babak Aazami, Hubert Lewis Bray
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Testing public reaction to constitutional fiscal rules violations Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2022-12-24 Jaroslaw Kantorowicz
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The best Condorcet-compatible election method: Ranked Pairs Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2022-12-23 Charles T. Munger
Condorcet-compatible election methods are examined and compared. The Ranked Pairs method proves significantly better than Beatpath; that both are clone-free, and have other desirable properties, makes them much better than any alternative.
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The case for approval voting Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2022-12-19 Aaron Hamlin, Whitney Hua
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Election cycles and corruption perception in Africa Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2022-12-17 Abdul Ganiyu Iddrisu
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Selecting a voting method: the case for the Borda count Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2022-12-16 Donald G. Saari
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Covid-19 and the 2020 presidential election Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2022-10-31 David M. Mitchell
Whether deserved on not, US Presidents often receive the blame or the credit for the nature of the economy and direction of the country. Therefore, the status of the economy and the country in an election year can be a very important factor in election success for an incumbent President (or his party if an incumbent is not running). This is especially true in ‘battleground states’ due to the presence
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State capacity, economic freedom, and classical liberalism Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2022-10-07 Ryan H. Murphy
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The effects of economic development on democratic institutions and repression in non-democratic regimes: theory and evidence Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2022-09-27 Alexander Kemnitz, Martin Roessler
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Political polarization in the UK: measures and socioeconomic correlates Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2022-08-24 Daryna Grechyna
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Bureaucratic rent creation: the case of price discrimination in the market for postsecondary education Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2022-06-15 Peter K. Hazlett, Chandler S. Reilly
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How cooperative is “cooperative federalism”? The political limits to intergovernmental cooperation under a de facto concurrency rule Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2022-06-07 Christa Scholtz, Andrei Munteanu
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Building inclusive institutions in polarized scenarios Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2022-05-17 Lina Restrepo-Plaza, Enrique Fatas
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On the structure of the political party system in Indian states, 1957–2018 Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2022-01-27 J. Stephen Ferris, Bharatee Bhusana Dash
We develop and test an equilibrium model of party structure to account for the large and ever-changing number of political parties that contest Indian state elections. The analysis finds that the number of parties increases with the voting density of state constituencies, the heterogeneity of the state’s electorate, state per capita income and literacy levels, falls with average age while responding
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Branching on the bench: quantifying division in the supreme court with trees Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2022-01-22 Noah Giansiracusa
The popular method of ideal point estimation provides empirical legal scholars with spatial representations of the Supreme Court justices that help elucidate ideological inclinations and voting behavior. This is done primarily in one dimension, where politics dominates, though recent work details a second dimension capturing differing attitudes on the authority of various legal actors. This paper explores
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A classification of the methodology of James M. Buchanan from a multidisciplinary perspective Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2022-01-16 Gustavo Nunes Mourão, Eduardo Angeli
James M. Buchanan (1919–2013) was notable for his contributions to different fields of Economics, being awarded with the Nobel Memorial Prize in this area in 1986. His methodology is characterized by three fundamental aspects: methodological individualism, a constitutional approach, and a contractarian political philosophy. In this paper, we explore the development of these features in Buchanan’s works