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The Second Glass Ceiling: Women’s Role in Supervisory Boards of German Firms

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Schmalenbach Business Review Aims and scope

Abstract

This study analyzes the role of women on supervisory boards of German companies. In particular, we investigate the likelihood of women to hold senior positions such as (vice) chair of the board and their membership in standing committees. Based on the logic of the lack of fit model, we argue that once women overcome the first glass ceiling and become board members, they still face a second glass ceiling preventing them from gaining senior board positions. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 103 parity co-determined and publicly quoted companies from 2009 to 2016. We find that women directors are underrepresented in senior board positions. This gap is particularly large and even increasing for the position of the board chair. It is also present for the position of the vice chair and (in the case of shareholder representatives) for memberships in standing committees except for the nomination committee. These findings are consistent with the presence of a second glass ceiling. Our study contributes to the literature on the prevalence of women in senior board positions. In particular, we provide novel evidence on the progress of women on boards in a two-tier system with co-determination. One potential implication of our study is that women’s influence on board decision-making might still be limited despite the recent increase of the number of women on boards.

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Notes

  1. Norway and Sweden have a semi two-tier system. That means that companies have the choice whether the board includes only non-executive directors or both non-executive and executive directors. In Norway, the CEO may not be part of the board. In Sweden, only one executive director, usually the CEO, may be part of the board. Furthermore, Norway requires that one third of board members are employee representatives and Sweden requires two or three employee representatives on the board. Therefore, Norway and Sweden share similarities with the German two-tier system with employee representatives being required on the board for companies with more than 500 employees.

  2. Relatedly, Hoyt and Murphy (2016) mention a masculine environment as an additional factor mediating gender stereotype threat—a condition applicable to supervisory boards in Germany. For example, a study of German top executives revealed the existence of a mentality pattern supporting role incongruity of women in leadership (BMFSFJ 2010).

  3. Closely related, the study of Beamen et al. (2009) shows that exposure to female leadership reduces gender-based bias.

  4. Appendix Table 5 contains a full list of all companies included in the analysis.

  5. The difference in the number of observations between shareholder and employee representatives arises from the non-availability of age information in the sub-sample of employee representatives.

  6. While shareholder representatives are appointed to the board at the annual general meeting, employee representatives are elected by the employees of the firm (e. g., Plessis et al. 2017).

  7. There is considerable variation of board members in committee participation. For example, some shareholder representatives work in six committees, while almost 30% of shareholder representatives are not member of any committee.

  8. Adding up these six dummies yields the value for the variable number of committees.

  9. This procedure ensures an equal sample size across committees. Note that this procedure does not affect the variable number of committees.

  10. Note that summing up the displayed coefficients for shareholder representatives (respectively for employee representatives) yields the coefficient on the female dummy in the regression with the number of committees as the dependent variable, reported in Table 2.

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Laura Bilavski, Manuel Denzer, Christoph Eschenfelder, Christina Hentrich, Vera Steitz, and Jan Welsch for collecting the data. In addition, we are thankful for the comments of two anonymous reviewers, of seminar participants at the University of Mainz and the University of Tübingen as well as the participants of the XIX. Symposium zur Ökonomischen Analyse der Unternehmung in Frankfurt.

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Correspondence to Christopher Koch.

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V. Bozhinov, C. Koch and T. Schank declare that they have no competing interests.

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Bozhinov, V., Koch, C. & Schank, T. The Second Glass Ceiling: Women’s Role in Supervisory Boards of German Firms. Schmalenbach Bus Rev 71, 385–411 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41464-018-0063-1

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