Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Cabinet size, power-sharing and ethnic exclusion in Africa

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Economics of Governance Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

While it is often pointed out that African countries have large government cabinets that underpin economic performance, lesser is known about the factors behind the size of government cabinets in Africa. Using an original database of the number of ministerial appointments in government offices in 35 African states, this paper establishes a robust negative relationship between the size of the government cabinet and the exclusion based on ethnicity. This result suggests that the governments that are more inclusive tend to be the largest, independent to the number of ethnic groups present in the country, namely, the state of the ethno-linguistic fractionalization. However, the results also show that this inclusion is in favor of powerless positions, suggesting that inclusion might be less about power-sharing than it is about resource-sharing, since the incumbent controls the key positions, while the included ethnic groups have peripheral positions with, however, an access to public rents. The results are robust to various sensitivity analyses.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1

Source: Authors’ construction, data from Government Agency and the World Factbook (2016)

Fig. 2

Source: Authors, from data base and WDI (2016, 2018)

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See Hamed-Assaleh (2016).

  2. See Indridason and Bowler (2014) who find a positive correlation between cabinet size and government finances in a sample of 17 West-European parliamentary democracies.

  3. Because of missing data on control variables, most of our regressions include only 35 countries. However, the full sample includes 40 countries.

References

  • Acemoglu D, Johnson S, Robinson J (2001) The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation. Am Econ Rev 91(5):1369–1401

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ahlerup P, Olsson O (2012) The roots of ethnic diversity. J Econ Growth 17(2):71–102

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alesina A, Devleeschauwer A, Easterly W, Kurlat S, Wacziarg R (2003) Fractionalization. Econ. Growth 8(2):155–194

    Google Scholar 

  • Arriola L (2009) Patronage and political stability in Africa. Comp Political Stud 42(10):1339–1362

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Asal V, Findley M, Piazza J, Walsh J (2016) Political exclusion, oil, and ethnic armed conflict. J Confl Resolut 60(8):1343–1367

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Asimakopoulos S, Karavias Y (2015) The impact of government size on economic growth: a threshold analysis. Econ Lett 139:65–68

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Azam J-P (2001) The redistributive state and conflicts in Africa. J Peace Res 38(4):429–444

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bahar D, Santos MA (2018) One more resource curse: dutch disease and export concentration. J Dev Econ 132:102–114

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bandolo H (1986) La Flamme et la fumée, Sopecam editions

  • Boone C (1990) The making of a rentier class: wealth accumulation and political control in Senegal. J Dev Stud 26(3):425–449

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bormann N-C, Cederman L-E, Vogt M (2017) Language, religion, and ethnic civil war. J Confl Resolut 61(4):744–771

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cederman L-E, Girardin L (2007) Beyond fractionalization: mapping ethnicity onto nationalist insurgencies. Am Political Sci Rev 101(1):173–185

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cederman L-E, Wimmer A, Min B (2010) Why do ethnic groups rebel? New data and analysis. World Politics 62:87–119

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Easterly W, Levine R (1997) Africa’s growth tragedy: policies and ethnic divisions. Q J Econ 112:1203–1250

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eifert B, Gelb A, Tallroth N (2003) Fiscal policy formulation and implementation in oil-producing countries. In: Davis J, Ossowski R, Fedelino A (eds) The political economy of fiscal policy and economic management in oil-exporting countries, DC: International Monetary Fund, Washington, pp 82–122

  • Eterovic DS, Eterovic NA (2012) Political competition versus electoral participation: effects on government’s size. Econ Gov 13:333–363

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Facchini F, Melki M (2013) Efficient government size: France in the 20th century. Eur J Political Econ 31:1–14

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Francois P, Rainer I, Trebbi F (2015) How is power shared in Africa? Econometrica 83:465–503

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gyimah-Brempong K (2002) Corruption, economic growth, and income inequality in Africa. Econ Gov 3:183–209

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haass F, Ottmann M (2017) Profits from peace: the political economy of power-sharing and corruption. World Dev 99:60–74

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hajamini M, Ali Falahi M (2018) Economic growth and government size in developed European countries: a panel threshold approach. Econ Anal Policy 58:1–13

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hamed-Assaleh R (2016) Nouveau gouvernement au Niger: une composition qui fait débat. Publication RFI

  • Indridason I, Bowler S (2014) Determinants of cabinet size. Eur J Political Res 53(2):381–403

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lindemann S (2011) Inclusive elite bargains and the dilemma of unproductive peace: a Zambian case study. Third World Quarterly 32(10):1843–1869

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • L'Oeil du Sahel (2012) Journal editions, May 2012

  • Marshall M, Jaggers K (2002) Polity IV Project: political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2002, 2016 edition available on http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

  • Mauro P (1995) Corruption and growth. Q J Econ 110(3):681–712

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mkandawire T (2010) On tax efforts and colonial heritage in Africa. J Dev Stud 46(10):1647–1669

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • OECD (2013) African Economic Outlook 2013: structural transformation and natural resources, Editions OCDE, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1787/aeo-2013-en

  • Omgba LD (2009) On the duration of political power in Africa: the role of oil rent. Comp Political Stud 42:416–436

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ram R (2009) Openness, country size, and government size: additional evidence from a large cross-country panel. J Public Econ 93:213–218

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rodrik D, Subramanian A, Trebbi F (2004) Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development. J Econ Growth 9(2):131–165

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rüegger S, Bohnet H (2018) The ethnicity of refugees (ER): a new dataset for understanding flight patterns. Confl Manag Peace Sci 35(1):65–88

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sarr M, Wick K (2010) Resources, conflict and development choices: public good provision in resource rich economies. Econ Gov 11:183–205

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sekeris PG (2011) Endogenous elites: power structure and patron-client relationships. Econ Gov 12:237–258

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sylla L (1981) Le tribalisme, stratégie de participation au dans les États africains ou de la démocratie médiatisée à l’illusion. Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer, tome 68(250–253):311–324

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sylla L (1985) Genèse et fonctionnement de l’État clientéliste en Côte d’Ivoire. Eur J Sociol 26(1):29–57

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • van de Walle N (2001) African economies and the politics of permanent crisis, 1979–1999. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Vogt M, Bormann N-C, Rüegger S, Cederman L-E, Hunziker P, Girardin L (2015) Integrating data on ethnicity, geography, and conflict: the ethnic power relations data set family. J Confl Resolut 59(7):1327–1342

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • World Bank (2016) World development indicators. The World Bank, Washington, D.C

    Google Scholar 

  • World Factbook (2016) Information about the countries in the world. CIA Publication, Langley

    Google Scholar 

  • Wucherpfennig J, Weidmann NB, Girardin L, Cederman LE, Wimmer A (2011) Politically relevant ethnic groups across space and time: introducing the GeoEPR dataset. Confl Manag Peace Sci 28(5):423–437

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wucherpfennig J, Metternich NW, Cederman L-E, Skrede Gleditsch K (2012) Ethnicity, the state, and the duration of civil war. World Politics 64:79–115

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the editor Marko Koethenbuerger, an anonymous referee, Fatih Karanfil, Rachidi Kotchoni, Dramane Coulibaly, and the participants at the Paris X seminar for their valuable comments and suggestions.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. BETA-CNRS, University of Lorraine, 13 Place Carnot CO No 70026, 54035, Nancy Cedex, France

    Luc Désiré Omgba

  2. University of Yaoundé II, Soa, Cameroon

    Désiré Avom & Dieudonné Mignamissi

Authors
  1. Luc Désiré Omgba
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Désiré Avom
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Dieudonné Mignamissi
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Luc Désiré Omgba.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Appendix

Appendix

See Tables 5 and 6.

Table 5 Hausman–Taylor model
Full size table
Table 6 Summary statistics
Full size table

1.1 List of the countries

Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina-Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Omgba, L.D., Avom, D. & Mignamissi, D. Cabinet size, power-sharing and ethnic exclusion in Africa. Econ Gov 22, 47–64 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-021-00248-9

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-021-00248-9

Keywords

JEL Classification

Search

Navigation