Abstract
Recently, it has been shown that networks with an arbitrary degree sequence may be a stable solution to a network formation game. Further, in recent years there has been a rise in the number of firms participating in collaborative efforts. In this paper, we show conditions under which a graph with an arbitrary degree sequence is admitted as a stable firm collaboration graph.
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Notes
Each firm is not explicitly placed on the transport network, but its location may be implied through the \(s_{li}\) values
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Lichter, S., Friesz, T., Griffin, C. et al. Collaborative Network Topologies in Spatial Economies. Netw Spat Econ 22, 439–459 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11067-022-09564-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11067-022-09564-x