Abstract
We study hours worked by drivers in the peer-to-peer transportation sector with cross-side network effects. Medallion lease (regulated market), commission-based (Uber-like pay) and profit-sharing (“pure” taxi coop) compensation schemes are compared. Our static model shows that network externalities matter, depending on the number of active drivers. When the number of drivers is limited, in the presence of positive network effects, a regulated system always induces more hours worked, while the commission fee influences the comparative incentives towards working time of Uber-like pay versus profit-sharing. When the number of drivers is infinite (or close to it), the influence of network externalities on optimal working time vanishes. Our model helps identifying which is the pay scheme that best remunerates longer working times and offers insights to regulators seeking to improve the intensive margin of coverage by taxi services.
Acknowledgments
The content of this paper previously circulated as part of a larger working paper titled “Why isn’t Uber Worker-Managed?”, which was presented at the 2019 CESifo Workshop on the Gig Economy (San Servolo – Venice). I wish to thank the participants to this Workshop for valuable suggestions. I am also grateful to participants at the 2018 IAFEP Conference (Lubjiana), the 2018 SIE Conference (Bologna), the 2019 STILE Workshop (Rome) and participants at the Economic Seminar Series at the University of Parma. The usual disclaimers apply.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
As for the first part of Proposition 1, by comparing Equations (4) and (6) and manipulating, it is straightforward to observe that, for any φ > 0,
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Manipulating Equation (10),
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Denote again
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
As for the first part of Proposition 4, it is sufficient to notice that Equations (11)–(13) do not include
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