Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Partial Relationships and Epistemic Injustice

  • Regular Paper
  • Published:
The Journal of Value Inquiry Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. We might easily imagine agents defending what might plausibly be taken as an instance of epistemic injustice by way of protests like “I know him, and he would never do something like that” or “I don’t believe my friend would say that.” Similarly, one who is perpetuating or complicit in some form of epistemic injustice might defend themselves by appealing to the same kinds of excuses.

References

  • Brighouse, Harry and Swift, Adam. (2009) ‘Legitimate Parental Partiality,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs, 37 (1), p43–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Byskov, M. F. (2020) ‘What Makes Epistemic Injustice an “Injustice”?’, Journal of Social Philosophy (early view). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12348. Accessed 1 November 2020.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carel, Havi. and Gyorffy, Gita. (2014) ‘Seen but not heard: children and epistemic injustice’, The Lancet, 384, p1256–1257.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carel, H. H. and Kidd, I. J. (2014) ‘Epistemic injustice in healthcare: a philosophical analysis,’ Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 17(4), p529–540.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crisp, Roger. (2018) Against Partiality. http://hdl.handle.net/1808/26747. Accessed 1 November 2020.

  • Douglas, Thomas. (2015) ‘Parental partiality and the intergenerational transmission of advantage’, Philosophical Studies, 172, p2735–2756.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Feltham, Brian. (2010) Introduction: Partiality and impartiality in ethics. In Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World, eds. Brian Felthman and John Cottingham, 1–25. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic Injustice. In Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy. Available at: https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0274.xml. Accessed 7 November 2020.

  • Fricker, Miranda. (2007) Epistemic Injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, Marilyn. (1991) ‘The practice of partiality,’ Ethics, 101, p818–835.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, Alvin. (2009) ‘Social Epistemology: Theory and Applications’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 64, p1–18. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246109000022

  • Hooker, Brad. (2013) Egoism, partiality, and impartiality. In The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp, 710–728. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Keller, Simon. (2013) Partiality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kleingeld, Pauline. and Anderson, Joel. (2014) ‘Justice as a family value: How a commitment to fairness is compatible with love’, Hypatia, 29, 320–336.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kolodny, Niko. (2010) Which Relationships Justify Partiality? General Considerations and Problem Cases. In Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World, eds. Brian Felthman and John Cottingham, 169–193. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Langton, Rae. (2010) Review, Hypatia, 25(2), p459–64.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Medina, José. 2013. The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and The Social Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Miller, David. (2005) ‘Reasonable Partiality Towards Compatriots’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 8, p63–81.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mills, Charles W. (1988) ‘Alternative Epistemologies’, Social Theory and Practice, 14(3), p.237–263.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nguyen, C. Thi. (2020) ‘Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles’, Episteme, 17(2), p141–161.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Paul, Sarah, and Morton, Jennifer. (2018) ‘Believing in Others’, Philosophical Topics, 46(1), p75–95.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Quinton, Anthony. (2004) ‘Two kinds of social epistemology’, Episteme, 1(1), p7–9.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Radzik, Linda. (2005) ‘Justice in the family: A defence of feminist contractarianism’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 22(1), p45–54.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rolin, Kristina. (2006) ‘The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology’, Episteme, 3(1), p125–136.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scheffler, Samuel. (2010) Morality and Reasonable Partiality. In Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World, eds. Brian Felthman and John Cottingham, 98–130. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Spear, Andrew D. (2019) ‘Epistemic dimensions of gaslighting: peer-disagreement, self-trust, and epistemic injustice,’ Inquiry, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2019.1610051.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spiekermann, Kai. (2020) ‘Epistemic Network Injustice’, Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 19(1), p83–101.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stark, Cynthia A. (2019) ‘Gaslighting, Misogyny, and Psychological Oppression’, The Monist, 102, p221–235.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stoetzler, Marcel, Yuval-Davis, Nira. (2002) ‘Standpoint theory, situated knowledge and the situated imagination’, Feminist Theory, 3(3), p315–333.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stroud, Sarah. (2006) ‘Epistemic partiality in friendship,’ Ethics, 116, p498–524.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stroud, Sarah. (2010) ‘Permissible Partiality, Projects, and Plural Agency’ In Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World, eds. Brian Felthman and John Cottingham, 131–149. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Sullivan, Emily, Sondag, Max, Rutter, Ignaz, Meulemans, Wouter, Cunningham, Scott, Speckmann, Bettina and Alfano, Mark. (2020) ‘Vulnerability in Social Epistemic Networks’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 28(5), p731–753.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Toole, Briana. (2019) ‘From Standpoint Epistemology to Epistemic Oppression’, Hypatia, 34(4), p598–618.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tronto, Joan C. (2012) ‘Partiality Based on Relational Responsibilities: Another Approach to Global Ethics’, Ethics and Social Welfare 6(3), p303–316.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wolf, Susan. (1992) ‘Morality and Partiality’, Philosophical Perspectives, 6, p243–259.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Funding

Funding was provided by Velux Fonden. The project number is: 00026589

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Copenhagen, Øster farimagsgade 5, Copenhagen K, Denmark

    J. Y. Lee

Authors
  1. J. Y. Lee
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to J. Y. Lee.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Lee, J.Y. Partial Relationships and Epistemic Injustice. J Value Inquiry 57, 543–556 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-021-09842-w

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-021-09842-w

Search

Navigation