Psychological Consciousness of Non-Psychological Contents
Aspects of a Phenomenology of Sensations and Thoughts
Abstract
Abstract. This article phenomenologically contrasts the experience of sensations and concepts as two forms of psychological awareness of non-psychological content. While the contents of sensations inform us about physical states and processes, concepts inform us about essences and essential structures. In conscious awareness, thus, the fields of physics, psychology, and logic become intertwined. This article uses phenomenology to distinguish between these different fields based on the way we experience them. While investigating the experiences of the related act types of sensing and thinking, parallels are discovered between sensing and thinking and between imagining and judging. The article concludes with a closer examination of the conscious awareness of essences.
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