Abstract
An extension of
1 INTRODUCTION
The tight connection between logic and games has been acknowledged since the sixties, when first Lorenzen [54] and later Lorenz [53] and Hintikka [34] proposed game-theoretic semantics for first-order logic [36, 39]. In this approach, the meaning of a sentence is given in terms of a zero-sum game played by two agents: the verifier, whose objective is to show the sentence true, and the falsifier, with the dual objective of showing the sentence false. Satisfiability of a sentence, then, becomes a game between these two players and the sentence is satisfiable (resp., unsatisfiable) iff verifier (resp., falsifier) has a strategy to win the game. This tight connection can clearly be viewed in the other direction as well: logic can be used to reason about games, i.e., we can encode the problem of solving a game into a decision problem, such as satisfiability or model-checking, of some logic. The idea is to describe the game and the winning condition with a formula of the logic and exploit the game-theoretic interpretation to reduce the solution of the game to a specific decision problem for that logic. Essentially, the winning strategy for the game can be extracted from the winning strategy for the decision game.
Suppose we have a formula \(\psi (x, y)\), expressing a required relation between the choice y made by a player, from now on called Eloise, and a choice x made by the adversary, namely Abelard, i.e., \(\psi (x, y)\) encodes the objective of a two-player game. We say that the game is won by Eloise if there exists a strategy for her such that, for each choice x made by Abelard, the corresponding response y of Eloise using that strategy guarantees that the resulting play satisfies the requirement \(\psi (x, y)\). This condition can clearly be expressed by a sentence of the form \(\forall x.\exists y.\psi (x, y)\). We could then solve the game by solving the satisfiability problem for this sentence. In other words, solving the game reduces to checking whether there exists a Skolem function \({\sf f}\) such that \(\forall x.\psi (x, {\sf f}(x))\) is satisfied. This function basically dictates the response of Eloise to the choice of Abelard, thereby encoding her strategy.
The above approach works pretty well when we consider single-round games, a.k.a., normal-form games [85], and can easily be extended to finite-rounds games, a.k.a., extensive-form games [49, 50, 84], by extending the quantification prefix to a sequence of alternations of quantifiers, one for each round. Things, however, get much more complicated when infinite-rounds games come into play [22, 86]. For such a class of extensive-form games, indeed, plays are induced by infinite sequences of choices made by the players over time and a strategy dictates how a player at a given stage of a play responds to the choices made by the adversary up to that stage. Extending the quantification prefix to match the rounds would immediately lead to infinitary logics, such as the one proposed by Kolaitis [46] and further studied by Heikkilä and Väänänen [30] (see also [37]). This technique has some interesting applications in logic [31], computer science [44], and even philosophy [21]. Besides its infinitary nature, however, this approach has also the drawback of heavily departing from the standard Tarskian viewpoint, as only non-compositional game-theoretic semantics have been provided.
A more viable route, instead, is to make the quantified variables x and y range over sequences of choices. For example, when the choices are simply Boolean values, iterated Boolean games are to be considered [28, 29]. Then, first-order extensions of temporal logics, such as Quantified Propositional Temporal Logic (
One way to reconcile quantifications and strategies in a temporal setting would be to extend the game-theoretic interpretation of the quantifiers, and of the logic in general, to account for the underlying temporal dynamics. This would imply allowing the players in the satisfiability game to play with partial information on the choices of the adversary, namely the players have no information about the future and can only choose based on the moves played so far in the game. Previous attempts to address the issue typically involve resorting to ad hoc Skolem semantics [40] for the specific logic. In the case of
Following Tarski’s approach, each choice for a quantified variable in a sentence is made with complete information about, hence it is (potentially) completely dependent on, the values of variables quantified before it in the sentence. This idiosyncrasy of the classic interpretation of quantifiers is well known and attempts have been made to overcome the linear dependence of quantifiers dictated by their relative position in a sentence [5, 32, 35, 75]. Most notably, Hintikka and Sandu [38] proposed Independence-Friendly Logic (
Taking inspiration from Hodges’ work, the goal of this work is to devise a compositional semantic framework that can account for a game-theoretic interpretation of quantification over (possibly infinite) sequences of choices. The framework is specifically tailored to deal with quantifications in a linear time setting and applied to the logic
In this article we propose a novel semantics for
On the technical side, the novel semantics under the behavioral interpretation of the quantifiers leads to 2Exp Time decision procedures for both the satisfiability and model-checking problems. On the other hand, it does not give up expressiveness, as we show that the vanilla and behavioral semantics turn out to be expressively equivalent. These results also show that the high complexity of the decision problems for vanilla
2 ALTERNATING HODGES SEMANTICS
2.1 Quantified Propositional Temporal Logic
For convenience, we provide a syntax for
Definition 1 (
The classic semantics is given in terms oftemporal assignments(simplyassignments, from now on), which are functions associating each proposition with atemporal valuationmapping each time instant to a Boolean value, i.e., infinite sequences of truth assignments. Let \({\rm Asg}\triangleq \text{AP}\rightharpoonup ({\mathbb {N}}\rightarrow {\mathbb {B}})\) be the set of assignments over arbitrary subsets of \(\text{AP}\), with \({\mathbb {B}}\triangleq \lbrace \bot , \top \rbrace\), where the notation \({\sf A}\rightharpoonup {\sf B}\) stands for the set of partial functions with potential domain \({\sf A}\) and codomain \({\sf B}\).
For convenience, we also introduce the set of assignments defined exactly over the propositions in \({\rm P}\subseteq \text{AP}\), i.e., \({\rm Asg}({\rm P}) \triangleq \lbrace \chi \in {\rm Asg}| {\sf dom}{\chi } = {\rm P}\rbrace\) and the set \({\rm Asg}_{\subseteq }({\rm P}) \triangleq \lbrace \chi \in {\rm Asg}| {\rm P}\subseteq {\sf dom}{\chi } \rbrace\) of assignments defined at least over \({\rm P}\). Thesatisfaction relation\(\models\) between an assignment \(\chi\) and a
Definition 2 (Tarski Semantics) The Tarski-semantics relation\(\chi \models \varphi\) is inductively defined as follows, for all
2.2 A New Semantics for QPTL
We now introduce a novel compositional semantics for
To give semantics to a
For any pair of hyperassignments \({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2 \in {\rm HAsg}\), we write \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \sqsubseteq {\mathfrak{X}} _2\) to express the fact that, for all sets of assignments \({\rm X}_1 \in {\mathfrak{X}} _1\), there is a set of assignments \({\rm X}_2 \in {\mathfrak{X}} _2\) with \({\rm X}_2 \subseteq {\rm X}_1\). Obviously, \({{\mathfrak{X}} _1} \subseteq {\mathfrak{X}} _2\) implies \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \sqsubseteq {\mathfrak{X}} _2\), which, in turn, implies \(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} _1} = \text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} _2}\). Figure 1 reports a graphical representation of the relation \(\sqsubseteq\). As usual, we write \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \equiv {\mathfrak{X}} _2\) if both \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \sqsubseteq {\mathfrak{X}} _2\) and \({\mathfrak{X}} _2 \sqsubseteq {\mathfrak{X}} _1\) hold true. It is clear that the relation \(\sqsubseteq\) is both reflexive and transitive, hence it is a preorder. Consequently, \(\equiv\) is an equivalence relation. In particular, we shall show (see Corollary 1) that \(\equiv\) captures the intuitive notion of equivalence between hyperassignments, in the sense that two equivalent hyperassignments w.r.t. \(\equiv\) do satisfy the same formulae.
Our goal is to define a semantics for
We break down the presentation of the semantics by introducing three operations: thedualisationswaps the role of the two players in a hyperassignment, allowing for connecting the two satisfaction relations and a symmetric treatment of quantifiers later on; thepartitioningdeals with disjunction and conjunction; finally, theextensiondirectly handles quantifications.
Let us consider the dualisation operator first. The idea is that, given a hyperassignment \({\mathfrak{X}}\), the dual hyperassignment \(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\) exchanges the role of the two players w.r.t. \({\mathfrak{X}}\). This means that, if Eloise is the first to choose in \({\mathfrak{X}}\), then her choice will be postponed in \(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\) after that of Abelard. To ensure that, in exchanging the order of choice for the two players, we do not alter the semantics of the underlying game, we need to reshuffle the assignments in \({\mathfrak{X}}\) so as to simulate the original dependencies between the choices of the players. To this end, we introduce the set of choice functions for \({\mathfrak{X}}\) as follows, whose definition implicitly assumes the axiom of choice: \(\begin{equation*} {\sf Chc}({{\mathfrak{X}} }) \triangleq \{ { \Gamma :{\mathfrak{X}} \rightarrow {\rm Asg}} \ | \ { \forall {\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}} .\Gamma ({\rm X}) \in {\rm X}}\}. \end{equation*}\) \({\sf Chc}{{\mathfrak{X}} }\) contains all the functions \(\Gamma\) that, for every set of assignments \({\rm X}\) in \({\mathfrak{X}}\), pick a specific assignment \(\Gamma ({\rm X})\) in that set. Each such function simulates a possible choice of the second player of \({\mathfrak{X}}\) depending on the choice of (the set of assignments chosen by) its first player. The dual hyperassignment \(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\), then collects the images of the choice functions in \({\sf Chc}{{\mathfrak{X}} }\). We thus obtain a hyperassignment in which the choice order of the two players is inverted: \(\begin{equation*} \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \triangleq \{ { {\sf img}({\Gamma }) }|{ \Gamma \in {\sf Chc}{{\mathfrak{X}} } }\}. \end{equation*}\)
Consider the hyperassignment \({\mathfrak{X}}\) of Figure 2, where \({{\rm X}[1]}= \lbrace {\chi [11]}, {\chi [12]} \rbrace\), \({{\rm X}[2]}= \lbrace {\chi [21]}, {\chi [22]} \rbrace\), and \({{\rm X}[3]}= \lbrace {\chi [3]} \rbrace\). Every set of assignments in \(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\) is obtained as the image of one of the four choice functions \(\Gamma _i \in {\sf Chc}{{\mathfrak{X}} }\), each choosing exactly one assignment from \({{\rm X}[1]}\), one from \({{\rm X}[2]}\), and one from \({{\rm X}[3]}\). Intuitively, in \({\mathfrak{X}}\) the strategy of the first player, say Eloise, can only choose the colour of the final assignments (either red forX[1], blue forX[2], or green forX[3]), while the one for Abelard decides which assignment of each colour will be picked. After dualisation, the two players exchange the order in which they choose. Therefore, Abelard, starting first in \(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\), will select one of the four choice functions, which picks an assignment for each colour. Eloise, choosing second, by using her strategy that selects the colour will give the final assignment. In other words, the original strategies of the players encoded in the hyperassignment, as well as their dependencies, are preserved, regardless of the swap of their role in the dual hyperassignment.
The following proposition ensures that the dualisation operator enjoys aninvolution property, similarly to the Boolean negation: by applying the dualisation twice, we obtain a hyperassignment equivalent to the original one.
Proposition 1 \({\mathfrak{X}} \subseteq \bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }}\) and \({\mathfrak{X}} \equiv \bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }}\), for all \({\mathfrak{X}} \in {\rm HAsg}\).
Note that there is a clear analogy between the structure of hyperassignments with alternation flag \(\exists \forall\) ( resp., \(\forall \exists\)) and the structure of DNF ( resp., CNF) formulae, where the dualisation swaps between two equivalent forms. The following lemma formally states that the dualisation swaps the role of the two players while still preserving the original dependencies among their choices.
Lemma 1 (Dualization) The following equivalences hold true, for all
(1) | Statements 1a and 1b are equivalent:
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(2) | Statements 2a and 2b are equivalent:
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Thepartition operatordecomposes hyperassignments and is instrumental in capturing the semantics of Boolean connectives. Given a hyperassignment \({\mathfrak{X}}\), the following set \(\begin{equation*} {\sf par}({{\mathfrak{X}} }) \triangleq \{ { ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2) \in 2^{ {{\mathfrak{X}} }{\cdot }} \times 2^{ {{\mathfrak{X}} }{\cdot }} }|{ {\mathfrak{X}} _1 \uplus {\mathfrak{X}} _2 = {\mathfrak{X}} }\} \end{equation*}\) collects all the possible partitions of \({\mathfrak{X}}\) into two disjoint parts, where \(\uplus\) denotes the disjoint-union operator. Assume that the two players of \({\mathfrak{X}}\) are interpreted according to the alternation flag \(\forall \exists\): Abelard chooses first and Eloise chooses second. The game-theoretic interpretation of the disjunction requires Eloise to choose one of two disjuncts to be proven true. In our setting, then, in order to satisfy \(\varphi _{1} \vee \varphi _{2}\), Eloise has to show that, for each set of assignments chosen by Abelard, she has a way to select one of the disjuncts \(\varphi _{i}\) in such a way that \(\varphi _{i}\) is satisfied by some assignment in that set. This selection is summarised by one of the pairs \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2)\) in \({\sf par}({{\mathfrak{X}} })\), where \({\mathfrak{X}} _i\) collects the sets of assignments for which the i-th disjunct is selected, with \(i \in \lbrace 1, 2 \rbrace\). A similar argument, with the role of the two players reversed and switching the quantifications throughout, leads to a dual interpretation for conjunction, where it is Abelard who chooses one of the two conjuncts to be proven false. Observe that \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2)\) might not be a pair of hyperassignments, as one of them could be empty. This case is, however, properly taken care of by the semantics rules of the connectives. The above intuition is made precise by the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Boolean Connectives) The following equivalences hold true, for all
(1) | Statements 1a and 1b are equivalent:
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(2) | Statements 2a and 2b are equivalent:
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Quantifications are taken care of by theextension operator. Let \({\rm Fnc}({\rm P}) \triangleq {\rm Asg}({\rm P}) \rightarrow ({\mathbb {N}}\rightarrow {\mathbb {B}})\) be the set offunctorsthat maps assignments over \({\rm P}\) to temporal valuations. Essentially, these objects play the role of Skolem functions in the non-compositional semantics. Theextension of an assignment\(\chi \in {\rm Asg}({\rm P})\)w.r.t. a functor \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}({\rm P})\) for an atomic proposition \(p\in \text{AP}\) is defined as \({\sf ext}{\chi , {\sf F}, p} \triangleq {\chi }[p\mapsto {\sf F}(\chi)]\), which extends \(\chi\) with p by assigning to it the value \({\sf F}(\chi)\) prescribed by the functor \({\sf F}\). Theextension operationcan then be lifted to sets of assignments \({\rm X}\subseteq {\rm Asg}({\rm P})\) in the obvious way, i.e., we set \({\sf ext}{{\rm X}, {\sf F}, p} \triangleq \lbrace {\sf ext}{\chi , {\sf F}, p} | \chi \in {\rm X}\rbrace\). This operation embeds into \({\rm X}\) the entire player strategy encoded by \({\sf F}\). Finally, theextension of a hyperassignment\({\mathfrak{X}} \in {\rm HAsg}({\rm P})\) with p is simply the set of extensions with p of all its sets of assignments w.r.t. all possible functors over the atomic propositions of \({\mathfrak{X}}\): \(\begin{equation*} {\sf ext}({{\mathfrak{X}} , p}) \triangleq \{ { {\sf ext}({{\rm X}, {\sf F}, p} })|{ {\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}(\text {ap} ({{\mathfrak{X}} })) }\}. \end{equation*}\) Intuitively, this operation embeds into \({\mathfrak{X}}\) all possible strategies, each one encoded by a functors \({\sf F}\) in \({\rm Fnc}(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} })\), for choosing the value of p at each time instant. The following lemma states that the extension operator provides an adequate semantics for quantifications, where statement 1 considers Eloise’s choices, when the player interpretation of the hyperassignment is \(\exists \forall\), and statement 2 takes care of Abelard’s choices, when the player interpretation is \(\forall \exists\).
Lemma 3 (Hyperassignment Extensions) The following equivalences hold true, for all
(1) | Statements 1a and 1b are equivalent:
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(2) | Statements 2a and 2b are equivalent:
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We can finally introduce the semantics for
Definition 3 (Alternating Hodges Semantics) Thealternating-Hodges-semantics relation\({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\alpha } \varphi\) is inductively defined as follows, for all
(1) | whenever \(\psi\) is an
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(2) | \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\alpha } \lnot \phi\) if \({\mathfrak{X}} {⊭} ^{\bar{\alpha }} \phi\), i.e., it is not the case that \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\bar{\alpha }} \phi\); | ||||||||||||||||
(3) |
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(4) |
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(5) | for all atomic propositions \(p\in \text{AP}\):
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(6) | for all atomic propositions \(p\in \text{AP}\):
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The base case (Item 1) for
Theorem 1 (Semantics Adequacy) For all
(1) | \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \varphi\) iff there exists a set of assignments \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) such that \(\chi \models \varphi\), for all assignments \(\chi \in {\rm X}\); | ||||
(2) | \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \varphi\) iff, for all sets of assignments \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\), it holds that \(\chi \models \varphi\), for some assignment \(\chi \in {\rm X}\). |
From now on, as usual, we assume the Boolean connectives \(\rightarrow\) and \(\leftrightarrow\) to be defined as \(\varphi _{1} \rightarrow \varphi _{2} \triangleq \lnot \varphi _{1} \vee \varphi _{2}\) and \(\varphi _{1} \leftrightarrow \varphi _{2} \triangleq (\varphi _{1} \wedge \varphi _{2}) \vee (\lnot \varphi _{1} \wedge \lnot \varphi _{2})\).
The following two examples may help familiarise with the new semantics.
Example 1 Let us consider the
(1) | \(\lbrace \lbrace {⦰} \rbrace \rbrace \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \varphi\); | ||||
(2) | \(\lbrace \lbrace \chi _{p} \rbrace , \lbrace \chi _{\bar{p}} \rbrace , \ldots \rbrace \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \psi _{p} \rightarrow \exists p.(\psi _{p} \wedge (p\leftrightarrow {\sf X}p))\); | ||||
(3) | \(\lbrace \ldots \rbrace \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \lnot \psi _{p}\) and \(\lbrace \lbrace \chi _{p} \rbrace , \lbrace \chi _{\bar{p}} \rbrace \rbrace \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \exists p.(\psi _{p} \wedge (p\leftrightarrow {\sf X}p))\); | ||||
(4) | \(\lbrace \lbrace \chi _{p}, \chi _{\bar{p}} \rbrace \rbrace \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \exists p.(\psi _{p} \wedge (p\leftrightarrow {\sf X}p))\); | ||||
(5) | \(\lbrace \lbrace \chi _{pp}, \chi _{\bar{p}p} \rbrace , \lbrace \chi _{pp}, \chi _{\bar{p}\bar{p}} \rbrace , \lbrace \chi _{p\bar{p}}, \chi _{\bar{p}p} \rbrace , \lbrace \chi _{p\bar{p}}, \chi _{\bar{p}\bar{p}} \rbrace , \ldots \rbrace \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \psi _{p} \wedge (p\leftrightarrow {\sf X}p)\). |
where Step (3), according to the semantics of disjunction, derives from one of the possible, existentially quantified, partitioning of the hyperassignment in Step 2. The steps above go as follows. Being \(\varphi\) a sentence, it is satisfiable iff Step (1) holds true. By Rule 6a of Definition 3 on universal quantifications, we derive Step (2), where \(\chi _{p} \triangleq \lbrace p\mapsto \bot \top ^{\omega } \rbrace\) and \(\chi _{\bar{p}} \triangleq \lbrace p\mapsto \bot ^{\omega } \rbrace\) are the only two assignments satisfying the precondition \(\psi _{p}\). The first assignment is obtained by extending \({⦰}\) by means of the constant functor \({\sf F}_{\!\bot \top }\) which returns false at time 0 and true at every future instant, i.e., \(\chi _{p} = {\sf ext}{{⦰} , {\sf F}_{\!\bot \top }, p}\). Similarly, the second one is obtained by the constant functor \({\sf F}_{\bot }\) returning false at any time. The assignments obtained by the uncountably many remaining functors are summarised by the ellipsis. Applying Rule 4a, one can choose to split the hyperassignment into the following two parts: \(\lbrace \ldots \rbrace\) containing all the singleton sets of those assignments violating \(\psi _{p}\) and its complement \(\lbrace \lbrace \chi _{p} \rbrace , \lbrace \chi _{\bar{p}} \rbrace \rbrace\). On the first hyperassignment we need to check \(\lnot \psi _{p}\), while on the second one the remaining part of the formula, as stated in Step (3). Since \(\lbrace \ldots \rbrace \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \lnot \psi _{p}\) holds by construction, Rule 5b applied to the second part leads to Step (4), where we use the equality \(\lbrace \lbrace \chi _{p}, \chi _{\bar{p}} \rbrace \rbrace = \bar{\lbrace \lbrace \chi _{p} \rbrace , \lbrace \chi _{\bar{p}} \rbrace \rbrace }\). Rule 5a on existential quantifications allows, then, to derive Step (5), where \(\chi ^{\flat p} \triangleq {\chi ^{\flat }}[p\mapsto \top ^{\omega }]\) and \(\chi ^{\flat \bar{p}} \triangleq {\chi ^{\flat }}[p\mapsto \bot ^{\omega }]\), with \(\flat \in \lbrace p, \bar{p}\rbrace\). The relevant sets of assignments in the hyperassignment at Step (5) are obtained as follows:
(a) | \(\lbrace \chi _{pp}, \chi _{\bar{p}p} \rbrace = {\sf ext}{\lbrace \chi _{p}, \chi _{\bar{p}} \rbrace , {\sf F}^{\top }, p}\), where \({\sf F}^{\top }\) is the constant functor returning true at every time; | ||||
(b) | \(\lbrace \chi _{pp}, \chi _{\bar{p}\bar{p}} \rbrace = {\sf ext}{\lbrace \chi _{p}, \chi _{\bar{p}} \rbrace , {\sf F}_{p}, p}\), where \({\sf F}_{p}(\chi)\) returns at time i the value of p in \(\chi\) at \(i + 1\); | ||||
(c) | \(\lbrace \chi _{p\bar{p}}, \chi _{\bar{p}p} \rbrace = {\sf ext}{\lbrace \chi _{p}, \chi _{\bar{p}} \rbrace , {\sf F}_{\bar{p}}, p}\), where \({\sf F}_{\bar{p}}(\chi)\) returns at time i the dual value of p in \(\chi\) at \(i + 1\); | ||||
(d) | \(\lbrace \chi _{p\bar{p}}, \chi _{\bar{p}\bar{p}} \rbrace = {\sf ext}{\lbrace \chi _{p}, \chi _{\bar{p}} \rbrace , {\sf F}_{\bot }, p}\), where \({\sf F}_{\bot }\) is the constant functor returning false at every time. |
At this point, since \(\psi _{p} \wedge (p\leftrightarrow {\sf X}p)\) is an
Example 2 The simple game in the previous example can equivalently be expressed by the following prenex-form sentence \(\varphi ^{\prime } \triangleq \forall p.\exists p.(\psi _{p} \rightarrow (\psi _{p} \wedge (p\leftrightarrow {\sf X}p)))\), where an
(1) | \(\lbrace \lbrace {⦰} \rbrace \rbrace \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \varphi ^{\prime }\); | ||||
(2) | \(\lbrace \lbrace \chi _{p} \rbrace , \lbrace \chi _{\bar{p}} \rbrace , \ldots \rbrace \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \exists p.(\psi _{p} \rightarrow (\psi _{p} \wedge (p\leftrightarrow {\sf X}p)))\); | ||||
(3) | \(\lbrace \lbrace \chi _{p}, \chi _{\bar{p}}, \ldots \rbrace \rbrace \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \exists p.(\psi _{p} \rightarrow (\psi _{p} \wedge (p\leftrightarrow {\sf X}p)))\); | ||||
(4) | \(\lbrace \lbrace \chi _{pp}, \chi _{\bar{p}p}, \ldots \rbrace , \lbrace \chi _{pp}, \chi _{\bar{p}\bar{p}}, \ldots \rbrace , \lbrace \chi _{p\bar{p}}, \chi _{\bar{p}p}, \ldots \rbrace , \lbrace \chi _{p\bar{p}}, \chi _{\bar{p}\bar{p}}, \ldots \rbrace , \ldots \rbrace \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \psi _{p} \rightarrow (\psi _{p} \!\wedge \! (p\!\leftrightarrow \! {\sf X}p))\). |
As in Example 1, \(\varphi ^{\prime }\) is satisfiable iff Step (1) holds true and Step (2) is obtained by applying Rule 6a of Definition 3 on universal quantifications, where the ellipsis in the hyperassignment is in place of all those singletons of assignments not satisfying \(\psi _{p}\). Steps (3) and (4) are due to Rules 5b and 5a on existential quantifications. In particular, the innermost ellipses in the hyperassignment at Step (4) are again in place of assignments not satisfying \(\psi _{p}\), while the outermost ellipsis stands for all those sets of assignments not satisfying \(\psi _{p}\). Finally, it is clear that \(\lbrace \chi _{pp}, \chi _{\bar{p}\bar{p}}, \ldots \rbrace\) is the only set of assignments universally satisfying the
3 GOOD-FOR-GAME QPTL
The semantic framework introduced in the previous section allows us to encode behavioural independence constraints among the quantified variables of
3.1 Adding Behavioural Dependencies to QPTL
Given a set of assignments \({\rm Asg}({\rm P})\) over some \({\rm P}\subseteq \text{AP}\), abehavioural quantification w.r.t. a proposition \(p\in {\rm P}\) should choose, for each assignment \(\chi \in {\rm Asg}({\rm P})\), a temporal valuation \({\sf f}:{\mathbb {N}}\rightarrow {\mathbb {B}}\) in such a way that, intuitively, at each instant of time \(k \in {\mathbb {N}}\), the value \({\sf f}(k)\) of \({\sf f}\) at k only depends on the values \(\chi (p)(t)\) of the temporal valuation \(\chi (p)\) at the instants of time \(t \le k\); this means that \({\sf f}(k)\) is independent of the values \(\chi (p)(t)\) at any future instant \(t \gt k\). To be more precise, consider two assignments \(\chi _1, \chi _2 \in {\rm Asg}({\rm P})\) that may differ only on p strictly after k. Then, the functor \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}({\rm P})\) interpreting a quantification behavioural w.r.t. p must return the same value at k as a reply to both \(\chi _1\) and \(\chi _2\), i.e., \({\sf F}(\chi _1)(k) = {\sf F}(\chi _2)(k)\); in other words, \({\sf F}(\chi)(k)\) cannot exploit the knowledge of the values \(\chi (p)(t)\), with \(t \gt k\). An analogous concept has been introduced in
Definition 4 (Assignment Distinguishability) Let \(\chi _1, \chi _2 \in {\rm Asg}({\rm P})\) be two assignments over some set \({\rm P}\subseteq \text{AP}\) of propositions, \(p\in {\rm P}\) one of these propositions, and \(k \in {\mathbb {N}}\) a number. Then, \(\chi _1\) and \(\chi _2\) are \((p, k)\)-strict distinguishable(resp.,\((p, k)\)-distinguishable), in symbols \(\chi _1 \approx _{p}^{\gt k} \chi _2\) (resp., \(\chi _1 \approx _{p}^{\ge k} \chi _2\)), if the following properties hold:
(1) | \(\chi _1(p) = \chi _2(p)\), for all atomic propositions \(p\in {\rm P}\) with \(p\ne p\); | ||||
(2) | \(\chi _1(p)(t) = \chi _2(p)(t)\), for all time instants \(t \le k\) ( resp., , \(t \lt k\)). |
The notion of \((p, k)\)-strict distinguishability ( resp., \((p, k)\)-distinguishability) allows us to identify all the assignments that can only differ on the proposition p at some time instant \(t \gt k\) ( resp., \(t \ge k\)). Indeed, \(\approx _{p}^{\gt k}\) ( resp., \(\approx _{p}^{\ge k}\)) is an equivalence relation on \({\rm Asg}({\rm P})\), whose equivalence classes identify those assignments precisely. Abehavioural(resp., strongly-behavioural) functor must reply at time k uniformly to all \(\approx _{p}^{\gt k}\)-equivalent (resp., \(\approx _{p}^{\ge k}\)-equivalent) assignments.
Definition 5 (Behavioural Functor) Let \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}({\rm P})\) be a functor over some set \({\rm P}\subseteq \text{AP}\) of propositions and \(p\in {\rm P}\) one of these propositions. Then, \({\sf F}\) isbehavioural(resp., strongly behavioural)w.r.t. p if \({\sf F}(\chi _1)(k) = {\sf F}(\chi _2)(k)\), for all numbers \(k \in {\mathbb {N}}\) and pairs of \(\approx _{p}^{\gt k}\)-equivalent (resp., \(\approx _{p}^{\ge k}\)-equivalent) assignments \(\chi _1, \chi _2 \in {\rm Asg}({\rm P})\).
Example 3 Let \(\chi _1\) and \(\chi _2\) be two assignments over the singleton \(\lbrace p\rbrace\) defined as reported in Figure 3. It is clear that \(\chi _1 \!\approx _{p}^{\gt 3}\! \chi _2\), but \(\chi _1 \!\not\approx _{p}^{\gt 4}\! \chi _2\), and so \(\chi _1 \!\approx _{p}^{\ge 4}\! \chi _2\), but \(\chi _1 \!\not\approx _{p}^{\ge 5}\! \chi _2\). Also, consider the three functors \({\sf F}_{{\sf A}}, {\sf F}_{{\rm {B}} }, {\sf F}_{{\rm {S}} } \in {\rm Fnc}(\lbrace p\rbrace)\) defined as follows, for all hyperassignments \({\mathfrak{X}} \in {\rm Asg}(\lbrace p\rbrace)\) and time instants \(t \in {\mathbb {N}}\): \({\sf F}_{{\sf A}}(\chi)(t) \triangleq \chi (p)(t + 1)\); \({\sf F}_{{\rm {B}} }(\chi)(t) \triangleq \bar{\chi (p)(t)}\); \({\sf F}_{{\rm {S}} }(\chi)(t) \triangleq \top\), if \(t = 0\), and \({\sf F}_{{\rm {S}} }(\chi)(t) \triangleq \chi (p)(t - 1)\), otherwise. It is immediate to see that \({\sf F}_{{\rm {B}} }\) is behavioural, while \({\sf F}_{{\rm {S}} }\) is strongly behavioural. However, \({\sf F}_{{\sf A}}\) does not enjoy any behavioural property, being defined as a future-dependent functor. Indeed, \({\sf F}_{{\sf A}}(\chi _1)(3) \ne {\sf F}_{{\sf A}}(\chi _2)(3)\), even though \(\chi _1 \approx _{p}^{\gt 3} \chi _2\).
To capture in the logic the behavioural constraints on the functors, we extend
Definition 6 (
A propositional quantifier of the form \({\rm {Q}} p:\! {\langle^{\mathrm{B:P_{B}}}_{S:P_{S}}\rangle}\), with \({\rm {Q}} \in \lbrace \exists , \forall \rbrace\), explicitly expresses a \({\rm {Q}}\)-quantification over p, i.e., a choice of a functor to interpret p that is also behavioural w.r.t. all the propositions in \({\rm P}_{\rm {B}}\) and strongly-behavioural w.r.t. those in \({\rm P}_{\rm {S}}\).
To ease the notation, we may write \({\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.\varphi\) instead of \({\rm {Q}} p:\! {\Theta} .\varphi\), write \(\left\lt {\rm {B}} : {\rm P}_{\rm {B}} \right\gt\) and \(\left\lt {\rm {S}} : {\rm P}_{\rm {S}} \right\gt\) for \({\langle^{\mathrm{B:P_{S}}}_{\mathrm {S:\emptyset}}\rangle}\) and \(\langle^{\mathrm{B:\emptyset}}_{\mathrm {S:\emptyset}}\rangle\), respectively, and \({\rm {B}}\) and \({\rm {S}}\) instead of \(\left\lt {\rm {B}} : \text{AP} \right\gt\) and \(\left\lt {\rm {S}} : \text{AP} \right\gt\). We also omit the quantifier specification \(\langle^{\mathrm{B:\emptyset}}_{\mathrm {S:\emptyset}}\rangle\), using \({\rm {Q}} p.\varphi\) to denote \({\rm {Q}} p:\! \langle^{\mathrm{B:\emptyset}}_{\mathrm {S:\emptyset}}\rangle .\varphi\). Observe that the quantifier \({\rm {Q}} p\), which is not restricted, is equivalent to the corresponding
We say that a
Given assignments \(\chi _1, \chi _2 \in {\rm Asg}({\rm P})\), we write \(\chi _1 \sim _{{\Theta} }^{k} \chi _2\), for some \({\Theta} = {\langle^{\mathrm{B:P}_{B}}_{\mathrm{S:P}_{S}}\rangle} \in {\Theta}\) and \(k \in {\mathbb {N}}\), if one of the following conditions holds: (1) \(\chi _1 = \chi _2\); (2) \(\chi _1 \approx _{p}^{\gt k} \chi _2\), for some \(p\in {\rm P}_{\rm {B}}\); (3) \(\chi _1 \approx _{p}^{\ge k} \chi _2\), for some \(p\in {\rm P}_{\rm {S}}\). We use \(\approx _{{\Theta} }^{k}\) to denote the transitive closure of the reflexive and symmetric relation \(\sim _{{\Theta} }^{k}\).
Proposition 2 Let \({\rm P}\subseteq \text{AP}\) be a set of atomic propositions, \(\chi _1, \chi _2 \in {\rm Asg}({\rm P})\) two assignments, \({\Theta} \in {\Theta}\) a quantifier specification, and \(k \in \mathbb {N}\) a time instant. Then, \(\chi _1 \approx _{{\Theta} }^{k} \chi _2\) iff the following hold true:
(1) | \(\chi _1(p) = \chi _2(p)\), for all \(p\in {\rm P}\setminus ({\rm P}_{\rm {B}} \cup {\rm P}_{\rm {S}})\); | ||||
(2) | \(\chi _1(p)(t) = \chi _2(p)(t)\), for all \(t \le k\) and \(p\in ({\rm P}_{\rm {B}} \cap {\rm P}) \setminus {\rm P}_{\rm {S}}\); | ||||
(3) | \(\chi _1(p)(t) = \chi _2(p)(t)\), for all \(t \lt k\) and \(p\in {\rm P}_{\rm {S}} \cap {\rm P}\). |
Example 4 Consider the three assignments \(\chi _1\), \(\chi _2\), and \(\chi _3\) over the doubleton \(\lbrace p, p\rbrace\) depicted in Figure 4. It is easy to see that \(\chi _1 \approx _{p}^{\gt 3} \chi _2\), as \(\chi _1(p) = \chi _2(p)\) and the first position at which the two assignments differ on p is 4; in addition, \(\chi _2 \approx _{p}^{\ge 3} \chi _3\), since \(\chi _2(p) = \chi _3(p)\) and the first position at which the two assignments differ on p is 3. Therefore, taking \({\Theta} \triangleq {\langle^{\mathrm{B:}{p}}_{\mathrm{S:}{q}}\rangle}\), we have \(\chi _1 \sim _{{\Theta} }^{3} \chi _2 \sim _{{\Theta} }^{3} \chi _3\), which implies \(\chi _1 \approx _{{\Theta} }^{3} \chi _3\).
Given a set of propositions \({\rm P}\subseteq \text{AP}\) and a quantifier specification \({\Theta} \triangleq {\langle^{\mathrm{B:P}_{B}}_{\mathrm{S:P}_{S}}\rangle} \in {\Theta}\), we introduce the set of \({\Theta}\)-functors\({\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }({\rm P}) \subseteq {\rm Fnc}({\rm P})\) containing exactly those \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}({\rm P})\) that are behavioural w.r.t. all the propositions in \({\rm P}_{\rm {B}} \cap {\rm P}\) and strongly behavioural w.r.t. those in \({\rm P}_{\rm {S}} \cap {\rm P}\).
Example 5 Any \({\langle^{\mathrm{B:}{p}}_{\mathrm{S:}{q}}\rangle}\)-functor \({\sf F}\) replies to all assignments of Figure 4 uniformly, for all time instants between 0 and 3 included. Indeed, \({\sf F}(\chi _1)(3) = {\sf F}(\chi _2)(3)\), since \(\chi _1 \approx _{p}^{\gt 3} \chi _2\), being \({\sf F}\) behavioural w.r.t. p. Similarly, \({\sf F}(\chi _2)(3) = {\sf F}(\chi _3)(3)\), since \(\chi _2 \approx _{p}^{\ge 3} \chi _3\), being \({\sf F}\) strongly-behavioural w.r.t. p. Hence, \({\sf F}(\chi _1)(3) = {\sf F}(\chi _3)(3)\).
The following proposition ensures that the above example highlights a general phenomenon.
Proposition 3 If \(\chi _1 \approx _{{\Theta} }^{k} \chi _2\) then \({\sf F}(\chi _1)(k) = {\sf F}(\chi _2)(k)\), for all assignments \(\chi _1, \chi _2 \in {\rm Asg}({\rm P})\), quantifier specifications \({\Theta} \in {\Theta}\), time instants \(k \in {\mathbb {N}}\), and \({\Theta}\)-functors \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }({\rm P})\).
A compositional semantics for
Definition 7 (Alternating Hodges Semantics Revisited) The alternating-Hodges-semantics relation \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\alpha } \varphi\) is inductively defined as in Definition 3, for all but Items 5a and 6a that are modified, respectively, as follows, for all propositions \(p\in \text{AP}\) and quantifier specifications \({\Theta} \in {\Theta}\):
5a) | \(^\prime\)) \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \exists p:\! {\Theta} .\phi\) if \({\sf ext}_{{\Theta} }{{\mathfrak{X}} , p} \models ^{\exists \forall } \phi\); | ||||
6a) | \(^\prime\)) \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \forall p:\! {\Theta} .\phi\) if \({\sf ext}_{{\Theta} }{{\mathfrak{X}} , p} \models ^{\forall \exists } \phi\). |
Note that one could easily extend both the syntax and semantics of the quantifier specification \({\langle^{\mathrm{B:P}_{B}}_{\mathrm{S:P}_{S}}\rangle}\) of
For every
At this point, let us consider some examples to provide insights on the expressive power of the new logic.
Example 6 Let us consider again the
\(\lbrace \chi _{pp}, \chi _{\bar{p}p}, \ldots \rbrace = {\sf ext}{\lbrace \chi _{p}, \chi _{\bar{p}}, \ldots \rbrace , {\sf F}^{\top }, p}\);
\(\lbrace \chi _{p\bar{p}}, \chi _{\bar{p}\bar{p}}, \ldots \rbrace = {\sf ext}{\lbrace \chi _{p}, \chi _{\bar{p}}, \ldots \rbrace , {\sf F}_{\bot }, p}\);
the outer ellipsis \(\ldots = \lbrace {\sf ext}{\lbrace \chi _{p}, \chi _{\bar{p}}, \ldots \rbrace , {\sf F}, p} | {\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\rm {B}} } \setminus \lbrace {\sf F}^{\top }, {\sf F}_{\bot }\rbrace \rbrace\) contains all the extensions of \(\lbrace \chi _{p}, \chi _{\bar{p}}, \ldots \rbrace\) w.r.t. the remaining behavioural functors.
Clearly, each set of assignments in the outer ellipsis contains no assignment satisfying \(\psi _{p}\). Each such set also contains at least one assignment that does not satisfy \(\psi _{p}\). As a consequence, no set in the outer ellipsis universally satisfies \(\psi _{p} \rightarrow (\psi _{p} \wedge (p\leftrightarrow {\sf X}p))\). Moreover, in the first set of assignments \(\lbrace \chi _{pp}, \chi _{\bar{p}p}, \ldots \rbrace\), the assignment \(\chi _{\bar{p}p}\) satisfies both \(\psi _{p}\) and \(\psi _{p}\), but not \(p\leftrightarrow {\sf X}p\). In the second set \(\lbrace \chi _{p\bar{p}}, \chi _{\bar{p}\bar{p}}, \ldots \rbrace\), instead, the unsatisfying assignment is \(\chi _{p\bar{p}}\), for the same reason. This shows that \(\varphi _{{\rm {B}} }^{\prime }\) is unsatisfiable.
The previous example shows a satisfiable
Example 7 Consider the
Example 8 Information leaks via quantification of unused variables is a well-known phenomenon in
The following example expands on the connection between
Example 9 It is well known that
3.2 Model-Theoretic Analysis
Let us proceed with an elementarymodel-theoretic analysisof
We start by observing themonotonicityof both the dualisation and extension operators w.r.t.the preorder \(\sqsubseteq\), a simple property that is a key tool in all subsequent statements.
Proposition 4 Let \({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2 \in {\rm HAsg}\) be two hyperassignments with \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \sqsubseteq {\mathfrak{X}} _2\). Then, the following properties hold true:
(1) | \(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} _2} \sqsubseteq \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} _1}\); | ||||
(2) | for every \(({\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime }, {\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime \prime }) \in {\sf par}{{\mathfrak{X}} _2}\), there exists \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime }, {{\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime \prime }}) \in {\sf par}{{\mathfrak{X}} _1}\) such that \({\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime } \sqsubseteq {\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime }\) and \({{\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime \prime }} \sqsubseteq {\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime \prime }\), and, in addition, \({\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime }={\emptyset}\) implies \({\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime }={\emptyset}\) and \({\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime \prime }={\emptyset}\) implies \({{\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime \prime }}={\emptyset}\); | ||||
(3) | \({\sf ext}_{{\Theta} }{{\mathfrak{X}} _1, p} \sqsubseteq {\sf ext}_{{\Theta} }{{\mathfrak{X}} _2, p}\), for every \({\Theta} \in {\Theta}\) and \(p\in \text{AP}\). |
The preorder \(\sqsubseteq\) between hyperassignments captures the intuitive notion of satisfaction strength w.r.t.
Theorem 2 (Hyperassignment Refinement) Let \(\varphi\) be a
As an immediate consequence, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1 (Hyperassignment Equivalence) Let \(\varphi\) be a
A fundamental feature of the proposed alternating semantics is thedualitybetween swapping the players of a hyperassignment \({\mathfrak{X}}\), i.e., swapping the alternation flag, and swapping the choices of the players, i.e., dualising \({\mathfrak{X}}\). Indeed, the following result states that dualising both the alternation flag \(\alpha\) and the hyperassignment preserves the truth of any formula. This also implies, as one might expect, that double dualization has no effect either. The latter fact is also a consequence of the previous corollary, since \({\mathfrak{X}} \equiv \bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }}\), due to Proposition 1. The proof can be found in Electronic Appendix B.
Theorem 3 (Double Dualization) Let \(\varphi\) be a
The duality property also grants that formulae satisfiability and equivalence do not depend on the specific interpretation \(\alpha\) of hyperassignments: a positive answer for \(\alpha\) implies the same for \(\bar{\alpha }\). Thisinvariancecorresponds to the intuition that Eloise and Abelard both agree on the true and false formulae. Similarly, if \(\varphi\) is considered to be equivalent to, or to imply, some other property \(\phi\) by Eloise, the same equivalence, or implication, holds for Abelard as well, and vice versa.
Corollary 2 (Interpretation Invariance) Let \(\varphi\) and \(\phi\) be
Thanks to this invariance, the following Boolean laws hold.
Lemma 4 (Boolean Laws) Let \(\varphi\), \(\varphi _{1}\), \(\varphi _{2}\) be
(1) | |||||
(2) | \(\varphi _{1} \wedge \varphi _{2} \Rightarrow \varphi _{1}\); | ||||
(3) | \(\varphi _{1} \Rightarrow \varphi _{1} \vee \varphi _{2}\); | ||||
(4) | \(\varphi _1 \wedge \varphi _2 \equiv \varphi _2 \wedge \varphi _1\); | ||||
(5) | \(\varphi _1 \vee \varphi _2 \equiv \varphi _2 \vee \varphi _1\); | ||||
(6) | \(\varphi _{1} \wedge (\varphi \wedge \varphi _{2}) \equiv (\varphi _{1} \wedge \varphi) \wedge \varphi _{2}\); | ||||
(7) | \(\varphi _{1} \vee (\varphi \vee \varphi _{2}) \equiv (\varphi _{1} \vee \varphi) \vee \varphi _{2}\); | ||||
(8) | \(\varphi _{1} \wedge \varphi _{2} \equiv \lnot (\lnot \varphi _{1} \vee \lnot \varphi _{2})\); | ||||
(9) | \(\varphi _{1} \vee \varphi _{2} \equiv \lnot (\lnot \varphi _{1} \wedge \lnot \varphi _{2})\); | ||||
(10) | \(\exists ^{{\Theta} } p.\varphi \equiv \lnot (\forall ^{{\Theta} } p.\lnot \varphi)\); | ||||
(11) | \(\forall ^{{\Theta} } p.\varphi \equiv \lnot (\exists ^{{\Theta} } p.\lnot \varphi)\). |
At present, it is not clear whether
Example 10 Consider the formulae \((\exists p.\phi) \wedge \varphi\) and \(\exists p.(\phi \wedge \varphi)\), where \(\phi \triangleq \top\) and \(\varphi \triangleq \exists ^{{\rm {B}} } r.(r\leftrightarrow {\sf X}p)\) and the hyperassignment \(\lbrace \!\lbrace \chi _{p}, \chi _{\bar{p}} \rbrace \!\rbrace\), where \(\chi _{p} \triangleq \lbrace p\mapsto \bot \top ^{\omega } \rbrace\) and \(\chi _{\bar{p}} \triangleq \lbrace p\mapsto \bot ^{\omega } \rbrace\). Obviously, \(\lbrace \!\lbrace \chi _{p}, \chi _{\bar{p}} \rbrace \!\rbrace {⊭} ^{\exists \forall } \varphi\). Indeed, every behavioral functor \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\rm {B}} }(\lbrace p\rbrace)\) for r would reply uniformly at time 0 to both assignments, i.e., \({\sf F}(\chi _{p})(0) = {\sf F}(\chi _{\bar{p}})(0)\). As a consequence, since \(\chi _{p{\sf F}}(r)(0) = \chi _{\bar{p}{\sf F}}(r)(0)\), but \(\chi _{p{\sf F}}(p)(1) \ne \chi _{\bar{p}{\sf F}}(p)(1)\), either \(\chi _{p{\sf F}} \triangleq {\sf ext}{\chi _{p}, {\sf F}, r}\) falsifies \(r\leftrightarrow {\sf X}p\) or \(\chi _{\bar{p}{\sf F}} \triangleq {\sf ext}{\chi _{\bar{p}}, {\sf F}, r}\) does. This immediately implies that \(\lbrace \!\lbrace \chi _{p}, \chi _{\bar{p}} \rbrace \!\rbrace {{⊭} ^{\exists \forall }} (\exists p.\phi) \wedge \varphi\).
On the other hand, \(\lbrace \!\lbrace \chi _{p}, \chi _{\bar{p}} \rbrace \!\rbrace \models ^{\exists \forall } \exists p.(\phi \wedge \varphi)\). To see this, let us consider a non-behavioral functor \({\sf F}_{p} \in {\rm Fnc}(\lbrace p\rbrace)\) such that \({\sf F}_{p}(\chi)(0) = \chi (p)(1)\). By the semantics of the existential quantifier, \(\lbrace \!\lbrace \chi _{p}, \chi _{\bar{p}} \rbrace \!\rbrace \models ^{\exists \forall } \exists p.(\phi \wedge \varphi)\) iff \(\lbrace {\rm X}_{{{\sf F}_{p}}}, \ldots \rbrace \models ^{\exists \forall } \phi \wedge \varphi\), where \({\rm X}_{{{\sf F}_{p}}} \triangleq {\sf ext}{\lbrace \chi _{p}, \chi _{\bar{p}} \rbrace , {\sf F}_{p}, p}\) and the ellipsis corresponds to set of assignments obtained by means of other functors. It is easily seen that \({\rm X}_{{{\sf F}_{p}}} = \lbrace \chi _{pp}, \chi _{\bar{p}\bar{p}} \rbrace\), for the two assignments \(\chi _{pp}\) and \(\chi _{\bar{p}\bar{p}}\) such that \(\chi _{pp}(p)(0) = \chi _{pp}(p)(1) = \top\) and \(\chi _{\bar{p}\bar{p}}(p)(0) = \chi _{\bar{p}\bar{p}}(p)(1) = \bot\). By the semantics of conjunction, every bipartition \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2)\) of \(\lbrace {\rm X}_{{{\sf F}_{p}}}, \ldots \rbrace\) must be such that: \(\phi\) must be satisfied by \({\mathfrak{X}} _1\) and \({\mathfrak{X}} _1\not={\emptyset}\) or \(\varphi\) is satisfied by \({\mathfrak{X}} _2\) and \({\mathfrak{X}} _2\not={\emptyset}\). Since \(\phi = \top\), this condition is equivalent to requiring that the entire hyperassignment satisfies \(\varphi\), i.e., \(\lbrace {\rm X}_{{{\sf F}_{p}}}, \ldots \rbrace \models ^{\exists \forall } \varphi\). Consider now the behavioral functor \({\sf F}_{r} \in {\sf F}(\lbrace p, p\rbrace)\) that copies the value of p in r at each time instant, i.e., \({\sf F}_{r}(\chi) = \chi (p)\). Again by the semantics of existential quantifications, we have that \(\lbrace {\rm X}_{{{\sf F}_{p}}}, \ldots \rbrace \models ^{\exists \forall } \varphi\) iff \(\lbrace {\rm X}_{{{\sf F}_{r}}}, \ldots \rbrace \models ^{\exists \forall } r\leftrightarrow {\sf X}p\), where \({\rm X}_{{{\sf F}_{r}}} \triangleq {\sf ext}{{\rm X}_{{{\sf F}_{p}}}, {\sf F}_{r}, r} = \lbrace \chi _{ppr}, \chi _{\bar{p}\bar{p}\bar{r}} \rbrace\), with \(\chi _{ppr}(r)(0) = \chi _{pp}(p)(1) = \top\) and \(\chi _{\bar{p}\bar{p}\bar{r}}(r)(0) = \chi _{\bar{p}\bar{p}}(p)(1) = \bot\). Since both assignments satisfy \(r\leftrightarrow {\sf X}p\), we obtain that \(\lbrace \!\lbrace \chi _{p}, \chi _{\bar{p}} \rbrace \!\rbrace \models ^{\exists \forall } \exists p.(\phi \wedge \varphi)\). Hence, \((\exists p.\phi) \wedge \varphi \not\equiv \exists p.(\phi \wedge \varphi)\).
A similar problem arises in
We now introduce an operator on quantifier prefixes, calledevolution, that, given an arbitrary hyperassignment \({\mathfrak{X}}\) and one of its two interpretations \(\alpha\), computes the result \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp})\) of the application to \({\mathfrak{X}}\) of all quantifiers \({\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p\) occurring in a prefix \({\wp}\) in that specific order. To this aim, we need to introduce the notion ofcoherenceof a quantifier symbol \({\rm {Q}} \in \lbrace \exists , \forall \rbrace\)w.r.t. an alternation flag \(\alpha \in \lbrace \exists \forall , \forall \exists \rbrace\) as follows: \({\rm {Q}}\) is\(\alpha\)-coherentif either \(\alpha = \exists \forall\) and \({\rm {Q}} = \exists\) or \(\alpha = \forall \exists\) and \({\rm {Q}} = \forall\). Essentially, the evolution operator iteratively applies the semantics of quantifiers, as defined by Items 5a’ and 6a’ of Definition 7 and Items 5b and 6b of Definition 3, for all the quantifiers \({\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p\) in the input prefix \({\wp}\). For a single quantifier, \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\) just corresponds to the \({\Theta}\)-extension of \({\mathfrak{X}}\) with p, when \({\rm {Q}}\) is \(\alpha\)-coherent. On the contrary, when \({\rm {Q}}\) is \(\bar{\alpha }\)-coherent, we need to dualise the \({\Theta}\)-extension with p of the dual of \({\mathfrak{X}}\). \(\begin{equation*} {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p) \triangleq {\left\lbrace \begin{array}{ll} {{\sf ext}_{{\Theta} }{{\mathfrak{X}} , p}}, & \text{ if } {{\rm {Q}} } \text{ is } \alpha \text{-coherent}; \\ {\bar{{\sf ext}_{{\Theta} }{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, p}}}, & \text{ otherwise}. \end{array}\right.} \end{equation*}\) The operator lifts naturally to an arbitrary quantification prefix \({\wp} \in {\rm Qn}\) as follows: (a) \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \epsilon) \triangleq {\mathfrak{X}}\); (b) \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.{\wp}) \triangleq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p), {\wp})\). We also set \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\wp}) \triangleq {\sf evl}_\alpha (\lbrace \lbrace {⦰} \rbrace \rbrace , {\wp})\).
It is easy to show that the evolution operator is monotone w.r.t. \(\sqsubseteq\), by simply exploiting the monotonicity of the dualisation and extension operators given in Proposition 4.
Proposition 5 Let \({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2 \in {\rm HAsg}\) be two hyperassignments with \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \sqsubseteq {\mathfrak{X}} _2\) and \({\wp} \in {\rm Qn}\). Then, the following holds true: \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\wp}) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, {\wp})\).
By simple structural induction on a quantifier prefix \({\wp} \in {\rm Qn}\), we can show that a hyperassignment \({\mathfrak{X}}\) \(\alpha\)-satisfies a formula \({\wp} \phi\) iff its \(\alpha\)-evolution w.r.t. \({\wp}\) \(\alpha\)-satisfies \(\phi\).
Lemma 5 (Prefix Evolution) Let \({\wp} \phi\) be a
4 QUANTIFICATION GAMES
The satisfiability problem for the behavioural fragment of
4.1 Quantification Game for Sentences
To define the quantification game, we first need a few preliminary notions.
Given a set S, we use as usual \(S^*\) (resp., \(S^\omega\)) to denote the set of finite (resp. infinite) sequences over the alphabet S, and \(S^\infty = S^* \cup S^\omega\). For \(\pi \in S^*\) and \(i \in {\mathbb {N}}\), we use \((\pi)_i\), \((\pi)_{\le i}\), \({\sf {fst}} {\pi }\), and \({\sf {lst}} {\pi }\), to denote, respectively, the i-th element of \(\pi\), the prefix of \(\pi\) up to index i included, the first (0-th) element of \(\pi\), and, finally, the last element of \(\pi\).
A two-player turn-based arena\({\mathcal {A}}= {\langle {{\rm P}_{{\rm S}_{\sf E}}}, {{\rm Ps}_{\sf A}}, {v_I} ,{Mv}\rangle }\) is a tuple where (1) \({\rm P}_{{\rm S}_{\sf E}}\) and \({\rm Ps}_{\sf A}\) are the disjoint sets (i.e. \({\rm P}_{{\rm S}_{\sf E}}\cap {\rm Ps}_{\sf A}= {\emptyset}\)) ofpositionsofEloiseandAbelard,a.k.a., PlayerandOpponent, respectively, with \({\rm {Ps}} \triangleq {\rm P}_{{\rm S}_{\sf E}}\cup {\rm Ps}_{\sf A}\) denoting the set of all positions, (2) \(v_I\in {\rm {Ps}}\) is theinitial position, and (3) \(Mv\subseteq {\rm {Ps}} \times {\rm {Ps}}\) is the binary relation describing all possiblemovessuch that \({\langle {{\rm {Ps}} },{Mv}\rangle }\) is a sinkless directed graph. A path\({\pi} \in {\rm {Pth}} \subseteq {\rm {Ps}} ^{\infty }\) is a finite or infinite sequence of positions compatible with the move relation, i.e., \((({\pi})_{i}, ({\pi})_{i + 1}) \in Mv\), for all \(i \in {[0,|{\pi} | - 1)}\); it isinitialif \(|{\pi} | \gt 0\) and \({\rm {fst}} {{\pi} } = v_I\). A history for player \(\alpha \in \lbrace {\sf E}, {\sf A}\rbrace\) is a finite initial path \({\rho} \in {{\rm {Hst}} _\alpha } \subseteq {\rm {Pth}} \cap ({\rm {Ps}} ^* \cdot {\rm {Ps}} [\alpha ])\) terminating in an \(\alpha\)-position. Aplay\({\pi} \in {\sf {Play}} \subseteq {\rm {Pth}} \cap {\rm {Ps}} ^\omega\) is just an infinite initial path. Astrategyfor player \(\alpha \in \lbrace {\sf E}, {\sf A}\rbrace\) is a function \(\sigma _\alpha \in {\sigma _{\alpha }}[\alpha ] \subseteq {{\rm {Hst}} _\alpha } \rightarrow {\rm {Ps}}\) mapping each \(\alpha\)-history \({\rho} \in {{\rm {Hst}} _\alpha }\) to a position \(\sigma _\alpha ({\rho}) \in {\rm {Ps}}\) compatible with the move relation, i.e., \(({\sf {lst}} {{\rho} }, \sigma _\alpha ({\rho})) \in Mv\). A path \({\pi} \in {\rm {Pth}}\) iscompatible with a pair of strategies\(({\sigma _{\sf E}} , {\sigma _{\sf A}}) \in {\rm Str}_{\sf E}\times {\rm Str}_{\sf A}\) if, for all \(i \in {[0,|{\pi} | - 1)}\), it holds that \(({\pi})_{i + 1} = {\sigma _{\sf E}} (({\pi})_{\le i})\), if \(({\pi})_{i} \in {\rm P}_{{\rm S}_{\sf E}}\), and \(({\pi})_{i + 1} = {\sigma _{\sf A}}(({\pi})_{\le i})\), otherwise. As one may expect, we say that a path iscompatible with a strategy\({\sigma _{\sf E}} \in {\rm Str}_{\sf E}\) if it is compatible with the pair of strategies \(({\sigma _{\sf E}} , {\sigma _{\sf A}}) \in {\rm Str}_{\sf E}\times {\rm Str}_{\sf A}\), for some strategy \({\sigma _{\sf A}}\in {\rm Str}_{\sf A}\). Theplay function\({\sf play}:{\rm Str}_{\sf E}\times {\rm Str}_{\sf A}\rightarrow {\sf {Play}}\) returns, for each pair of strategies \(({\sigma _{\sf E}} , {\sigma _{\sf A}}) \in {\rm Str}_{\sf E}\times {\rm Str}_{\sf A}\), the unique play \({\sf play}({\sigma _{\sf E}} , {\sigma _{\sf A}}) \in {\sf {Play}}\) compatible with them.
A game\({⅁} = {\langle {{\mathcal {A}}}, {{\rm Ob}}, {{\rm Wn}}\rangle }\) is a tuple where \({\mathcal {A}}\) is an arena, \({\rm Ob}\subseteq {\rm {Ps}}\) is the set ofobservable positions, and \({\rm Wn}\subseteq {\rm Ob}^{\omega }\) is the set ofobservable sequencesthat arewinningfor Eloise; the complement \(\bar{{\rm Wn}} \triangleq {\rm Ob}^{\omega } \setminus {\rm Wn}\) iswinningfor Abelard. Theobservation function\({\sf obs}:{\rm {Pth}} \rightarrow {\rm Ob}^\infty\) associates with each path \({\pi} \in {\rm {Pth}}\) the ordered sequence \(w\triangleq {\sf obs}({\pi}) \in {\rm Ob}^\infty\) of all observable positions occurring in it. In other words, w is the maximal subsequence of \({\pi}\) that contains only positions in \({\rm Ob}\). Formally, there exists a monotone bijection \({\sf f}:{[0,|w|)} \rightarrow \lbrace j \in {[0,|{\pi} |)} | ({\pi})_{j} \in {\rm Ob}\rbrace\) satisfying the equality \((w)_{i} = ({\pi})_{{\sf f}(i)}\), for all \(i \in {[0,|w|)}\). Eloise (resp., Abelard)winsthe game if she (resp., he) has a strategy \({\sigma _{\sf E}} \in {\rm Str}_{\sf E}\) (resp, \({\sigma _{\sf A}}\in {\rm Str}_{\sf A}\)) such that, for all adversary strategies \({\sigma _{\sf A}}\in {\rm Str}_{\sf A}\) (resp., \({\sigma _{\sf E}} \in {\rm Str}_{\sf E}\)), the corresponding play \({\sf play}({\sigma _{\sf E}} , {\sigma _{\sf A}})\) induces an observation sequence \({\sf obs}({\sf play}({\sigma _{\sf E}} , {\sigma _{\sf A}}))\) belonging (resp., not belonging) to \({\rm Wn}\). Notice that, even if the winning conditions are defined on a subset of observable positions, here we only consider perfect-information games, since strategies have, instead, full knowledge of the entire set of histories.
Martin’s determinacy theorem [56, 57] states that all games whose winning condition is a Borel set in the Cantor topological space of infinite words [68] are determined, i.e., one of the two players necessarily wins the game. To ensure that the quantification game we are about to define is indeed determined, we require a form of Borelian condition that can be applied to sets of assignments. This determinacy requirement is crucial here, since it is tightly connected with the fact that
Given a behavioural sentence \({\wp} \psi\), let \({\sf L}(\psi) \subseteq {\rm Asg}(\text {ap} {{\wp} })\) denote the set of assignments satisfying the
Construction 1 (Quantification Game I) For every behavioral quantifier prefix \({\wp} \in {\rm Qn}_{{\rm {B}} }\) and property \(\Psi \subseteq {\rm Asg}(\text {ap} {{\wp} })\), the game \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\Psi ] \, \triangleq \, {\langle {{\mathcal {A}}_{{\wp} }},{{\rm Ob}}, {{\rm Wn}}\rangle }\) with arena \({\mathcal {A}}_{{\wp} } \triangleq {\langle {{\rm P}_{{\rm S}_{\sf E}}},{{\rm Ps}_{\sf A}}, {v_I}, {Mv}\rangle }\) is defined as prescribed in the following:
the set of positions \({\rm {Ps}} \subset {\rm Val}\) contains exactly those valuations \({\chi} \in {\rm Val}\) of the propositions in \(\text {ap} {{\wp} }\) that are quantified in the prefix \(({\wp})_{\lt \#({\chi})}\) of \({\wp}\) having length \(\#({\chi})\) i.e., \({\sf dom}{{\chi} } = \text {ap} {({\wp})_{\lt \#({\chi})}}\);
the set of Eloise’s positions \({\rm P}_{{\rm S}_{\sf E}}\subseteq {\rm {Ps}}\) only contains the valuations \({\chi} \in {\rm {Ps}}\) for which the proposition quantified in \({\wp}\) at index \(\#({\chi})\) is existentially quantified, i.e., \(({\wp})_{\#({\chi})} = \exists ^{{\rm {B}} } p\), for some \(p\in \text {ap} {{\wp} }\);
the initial position \(v_I\triangleq {⦰}\) is just the empty valuation;
the move relation \(Mv\subseteq {\rm {Ps}} \times {\rm {Ps}}\) contains exactly those pairs of valuations \(({\chi} _1, {\chi} _2) \in {\rm {Ps}} \times {\rm {Ps}}\) such that:
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\({{\chi} _1} \subseteq {\chi} _2\) 2 and \(\#({{\chi} _2}) = \#({{\chi} _1}) + 1\), or
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\({{\chi} _1} \in {\rm Val}(\text {ap} {{\wp} })\) and \({\chi} _2 = {⦰}\);
the set of observable positions \({\rm Ob}\triangleq {\rm Val}(\text {ap} {{\wp} })\) precisely contains the valuations of all the propositions in \({\wp}\);
the winning condition induced by the property \(\Psi\) is the language of infinite words \({\rm Wn}\triangleq \texttt{wrd} (\Psi)\) over \({\rm Val}(\text {ap} {{\wp} })\).
The game \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\) above essentially provides a game-theoretic version of the semantics of behavioural quantifications. The correctness of the game is established by the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Game-Theoretic Semantics I) A behavioural
The proof of this result is split into the following three steps. First, for an arbitrary behavioural quantifier prefix \({\wp}\), we provide two syntactic transformations, \({\sf C}_{\exists \forall }({\wp})\) and \({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp})\), calledcanonicalisations, which allow one to reduce a behavioural
Let us start with the definition of the two prefix canonicalisations based on the following syntactic quantifier-swap operations. Consider, e.g., the formula \(\forall ^{{\rm {B}} } p.\exists ^{{\rm {B}} } p.\phi\). A \(naïve\) quantifier-swap operator would simply swap the two quantifiers that, in game-theoretic terms, corresponds to swapping the choices of the two players, which allows Abelard to see Eloise’s move at the current round. To balance this additional power, we restrict the universal quantifier to be strictly behavioural, thus preventing Abelard from reading Eloise’s choice. This leads to the formula \(\exists ^{{\rm {B}} } p.\forall ^{{\langle^{\mathrm{B:AP}}_{\mathrm{S:}{q}}\rangle}} p.\psi\). A symmetric swap operation would transform the formula \(\exists ^{{\rm {B}} } p.\forall ^{{\rm {B}} } p.\phi\) into \(\forall ^{{\rm {B}} } p.\exists ^{{\langle^{\mathrm{B:AP}}_{\mathrm{S:}{q}}\rangle}} p.\phi\). Essentially, the swap operation exchanges the positions of two adjacent dual behavioural quantifiers and restricts the inner one to be strongly behavioural w.r.t. the proposition of the outer one. By iteratively swapping adjacent quantifiers and adjusting the quantifier specification accordingly, we can reduce the quantifier alternation to at most one, still preserving the dependencies in the quantifications at each instant of time.
For technical convenience we use a vector notation for the quantifier prefixes: \(\begin{equation*} {\rm {Q}} ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{p} .\phi \triangleq {\rm {Q}} ^{(\vec{{\Theta} })_{0}} (\vec{p})_{0} .\cdots {\rm {Q}} ^{(\vec{{\Theta} })_{k}} (\vec{p})_{k} .\phi , \end{equation*}\) where \(|\vec{p}| = |\vec{{\Theta} }| = k + 1\). We omit the vector symbol in \(\vec{{\Theta} }\) if this is just a sequence of \({\rm {B}}\) or \({\rm {S}}\) specifications and consider \(\vec{p}\) as sets of propositions when convenient. We also define in a natural way the union of two quantifier specifications as follows: \(\begin{equation*} \Big\langle^{\mathrm{B:P}_\mathrm {B1}}_{\mathrm {S:P}_\mathrm {S1}}\Big\rangle \cup \Big\langle^{\mathrm{B:P}_\mathrm {B2}}_{\mathrm{S:P}_\mathrm S2}\Big\rangle \triangleq \Big\langle^{\mathrm{B:P}_\mathrm{B1}\cup\mathrm {P_{B2}}}_{\mathrm {S: P_{S1}}\cup \mathrm{P}_{\mathrm S2}}\Big\rangle \end{equation*}\)
Given a behavioural quantifier prefix \({\wp} \in {\rm Qn}_{{\rm {B}} }\), the two syntactic transformations \({\sf C}_\exists \forall (\cdot)\) and \({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }(\cdot)\) yield the single-alternation prefixes \({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp})\) and \({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp})\), by applying all the quantifier swap operations at once. More specifically, the function \({\sf C}_\exists \forall (\cdot)\) provides an \(\exists \forall\)-prefix, where all existential quantifiers precede the universal ones, while \({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }(\cdot)\) gives us the the dual\(\forall \exists\)-prefix.
For the definition of \({\sf C}_\exists \forall (\cdot)\), we observe that every behavioural quantifier prefix \({\wp}\) can be written in the following form: \(\begin{equation*} {\wp} = \exists ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p}[0] .(\forall ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p}[i] . \exists ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p}[i])_{i = 1}^{k} .\forall ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p}[k + 1], \end{equation*}\) for some \(k \in {\mathbb {N}}\) and vectors \(\vec{p}[i]\), with \(i \in [0,k]\), and \(\vec{p}[i]\), with \(i \in [1,k + 1]\), where \(|\vec{p}[i]|, |\vec{p}[i]| \ge 1\), for all \(i \in [1,k]\). For a quantifier prefix \({\wp}\) we then define \(\begin{equation*} {\sf C}_{\exists \forall }({\wp}) \triangleq (\exists ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p}[i])_{i = 0}^{k} .(\forall ^{\vec{{\Theta} }[i]} \vec{p}[i])_{i = 1}^{k + 1}, \end{equation*}\) where \(\vec{{\Theta} }[i]\) is a vector, for every \(i \in [1,k+1]\), whose components are defined as \((\vec{{\Theta} }[i])_{j} \triangleq {\rm {B}} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : \vec{p}[i] \cdots \vec{p}[k] \right\gt\), for all \(j \in {[0,|\vec{p}[i]|)}\).
The definition of \({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }(\cdot)\) is analogous. First, we write a prefix \({\wp}\) in the form: \(\begin{equation*} {\wp} = \forall ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p}[0] .(\exists ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p}[i] .\forall ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p}[i])_{i = 1}^{k} .\exists ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p}[k + 1], \end{equation*}\) for some \(k \in {\mathbb {N}}\) and vectors \(\vec{p}[i]\), with \(i \in [0,k]\), and \(\vec{p}[i]\), with \(i \in [1,k + 1]\), where \(|\vec{p}[i]|, |\vec{p}[i]| \ge 1\), for all \(i \in [1,k]\). Then, we define \(\begin{equation*} {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \triangleq (\forall ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p}[i])_{i = 0}^{k} .(\exists ^{\vec{{\Theta} }[i]} \vec{p}[i])_{i = 1}^{k + 1}, \end{equation*}\) where \(\vec{{\Theta} }[i]\) is a vector, for every \(i \in [1,k+1]\), whose components are defined as \((\vec{{\Theta} }[i])_{j} \triangleq {\rm {B}} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : \vec{p}[i] \cdots \vec{p}[k] \right\gt\), for all \(j \in {[0,|\vec{p}[i]|)}\).
Example 11 Consider the behavioural quantifier prefix \({\wp} = \forall ^{{\rm {B}} } p. \exists ^{{\rm {B}} } p\, r.\forall ^{{\rm {B}} } s.\exists ^{{\rm {B}} } y\). The corresponding \(\exists \forall\) canonical-form is \({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) = \exists ^{{\rm {B}} } p\, r\, y.\forall ^{{\Theta} ^{p}} p.\forall ^{{\Theta} ^{s}} s\), where \({\Theta} ^{p} \triangleq \langle^{\mathrm{B:AP}}_{\mathrm {S:}{q \ r \ t}}\rangle\) and \({\Theta} ^{s} \triangleq \langle^{\mathrm{B:AP}}_{\mathrm {S:}{t }}\rangle\). The \(\forall \exists\) canonical-form prefix is, instead, \({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) = \forall ^{{\rm {B}} } p\, s.\exists ^{{\Theta} } p\, r.\exists ^{{\rm {B}} } y\), where \({\Theta} \triangleq \langle^{\mathrm{B:AP}}_{\mathrm {S:}{s }}\rangle\).
For the second part of the proof of Theorem 4, we need to connect the winner of \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\) with the satisfiability of (one among) \({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\) and \({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi\). This also corresponds to showing that \({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi \Rightarrow {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi\). To this end, we exploit the \(\omega\)-regularity of
Theorem 5 (Quantification Game I) For each behavioural quantification prefix \({\wp} \in {\rm Qn}_{{\rm {B}} }\) and Borelian property \(\Psi \subseteq {\rm Asg}(\text {ap} {{\wp} })\), the game \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\Psi ]\) satisfies the following two properties:
(1) | if Eloise wins then \(E\subseteq \Psi\), for some \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}))\); | ||||
(2) | if Abelard wins then \(E\not\subseteq \Psi\), for all \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))\). |
The idea of the proof is to extract from a winning strategy of Eloise ( resp., Abelard) a vector \(\vec{{\sf F}}\) of functors, one for each proposition associated with that player, witnessing the existence ( resp., non-existence) of a set E of assignments that satisfies the property \(\Psi\). More precisely, assume Eloise has a strategy \(\sigma\) to win the game and let \(\forall ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p} .\exists ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{p} = {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp})\) be the \(\forall \exists\) canonical-form of \({\wp}\). Then, thanks to the bijection between plays \({\pi}\) and assignments \(\chi\), we can operate as follows, for every round k and existential proposition \(p[i]\) in \(\vec{p}\): given Abelard’s choices up to round k in \({\pi}\), we can extract, from Eloise’s response for \(p[i]\) in \(\sigma\), the response to \(\chi\) at time k of the functor \({\sf F}_i\) in \(\vec{{\sf F}}\). As a consequence, for all \(\chi \in {\rm Asg}(\vec{p})\) chosen by Abelard, Eloise’s response corresponding to the extension of \(\chi\) with \(\vec{{\sf F}}\) on \(\vec{p}\) satisfies, i.e., belongs to, the property \(\Psi\). The witness E is precisely the set of all those extensions. An analogous argument applies to Abelard for the \(\exists \forall\) canonical-form. Notice that \(\vec{{\sf F}}\) meets the specification \(\vec{{\Theta} }\) thanks to the alternation of the players prescribed by \({\wp}\) in each round of \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\Psi ]\). A detailed proof is provided in Electronic Appendix C. The following result is now immediate.
Corollary 3 (Quantification Game I) For every behavioural
(1) | if Eloise ( resp., Abelard) wins then \({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi\) is satisfiable ( resp., \({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\) is unsatisfiable); | ||||
(2) | if \({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\) is satisfiable ( resp., \({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi\) is unsatisfiable) then Eloise ( resp., Abelard) wins. |
Item 3 immediately follows from Item 1 of Definition 3, Lemma 5 and the two items of Theorem 5. For Item 3, instead, let us assume that \({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\) is satisfiable ( resp., \({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi\) is unsatisfiable). Thanks to Item 1 of Definition 3 and Lemma 5, if \(\lbrace \!\lbrace {⦰} \rbrace \!\rbrace \models ^{\exists \forall } {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\) ( resp., \(\lbrace \!\lbrace {⦰} \rbrace \!\rbrace {{⊭} ^{\exists \forall }} {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi\)), then \(E\subseteq \Psi \triangleq {\sf L}(\psi)\), for some \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp})) = {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\lbrace \!\lbrace {⦰} \rbrace \!\rbrace , {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))\) ( resp., \(E\not\subseteq \Psi\), for all \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp})) = {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\lbrace \!\lbrace {⦰} \rbrace \!\rbrace , {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}))\)). Thus, by Item 5 ( resp., Item 5) of Theorem 5, it follows that Abelard ( resp., Eloise) loses the game \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\), which means, by determinacy, that Eloise ( resp., Abelard) wins. Recall that \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\) is determined, since its winning condition is Borelian [56].□
The final step establishes the equisatisfiability of a behavioural
Theorem 6 (Sentence Canonical Forms) For every behavioural
Towards the proof, we can derive the chain of implications \({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi \Rightarrow {\wp} \psi \Rightarrow {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\) by exploiting the following property of the evolution function. Specifically, this asserts a total ordering w.r.t. the preorder \(\sqsubseteq\) between a behavioural quantifier prefix \({\wp}\) and its two canonical forms \({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp})\) and \({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp})\), which can be proved by induction on the structure of \({\wp}\).
Proposition 6 \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp})) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp}) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp}))\), for all hyperassignments \({\mathfrak{X}} \in {\rm HAsg}\) and behavioral quantifier prefixes \({\wp} \in {\rm Qn}_{{\rm {B}} }\), with \(\text {ap} {{\wp} } \cap \text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } = {\emptyset}\).
From Proposition 6, Lemma 5, and Theorem 2, the chain of implications \({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi \Rightarrow {\wp} \psi \Rightarrow {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\) easily follows. Indeed, by Lemma 5, we have that (1) \({\wp} \psi\) is satisfiable iff \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\wp}) \models ^{\exists \forall } \psi\), (2) \({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\) is satisfiable iff \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp})) \models ^{\exists \forall } \psi\), and (3) \({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi\) is satisfiable iff \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp})) \models ^{\exists \forall } \psi\). Now, by Proposition 6, it holds that \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp})) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\wp}) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))\). Therefore, by Theorem 2, we have that if \({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi\) is satisfiable then \({\wp} \psi\) is satisfiable too, which, in turn, implies that \({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\) is satisfiable as well. To complete the proof, we need to show that, if \({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\) is satisfiable, then also \({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi\) is satisfiable. This fact is, however, a direct consequence of Corollary 3.□
We can finally prove of the main result of this subsection, namely Theorem 4.
We want to prove that \({\wp} \psi\) is satisfiable ( resp., unsatisfiable) iff Eloise ( resp., Abelard) wins \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\). For theif-direction, by Item 3 of Corollary 3, if Eloise (resp, Abelard) wins the game then \({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi\) is satisfiable (resp., \({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\) is unsatisfiable). However, this implies that \({\wp} \psi\) is satisfiable (resp., unsatisfiable), thanks to Theorem 6. For theonly-if-direction, if \({\wp} \psi\) is satisfiable (resp., unsatisfiable) then \({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\) is satisfiable (resp., \({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi\) is unsatisfiable), again due to Theorem 6. However, this implies, in turn, that Eloise (resp., Abelard) wins the game, thanks to Item 3 of Corollary 3.□
4.2 Quantification Game for Formulae
The game defined in the previous section can easily be adapted to deal with the satisfiability problem for behavioural
To formalise the two assumptions above, we introduce the notion of generator for a hyperassignment \({\mathfrak{X}} \in {\rm HAsg}\) as a pair \({\langle {{\sim} {{\wp} }},{{\rm X}}\rangle }\) consisting of (1) a behavioural quantification prefix \({\sim} {{\wp} } \in {\rm Qn}_{{\rm {B}} }\) and (2) a Borelian set of assignments \({\emptyset} \ne {\rm X}\subseteq {\rm Asg}(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \setminus \text {ap} {{\sim} {{\wp} }})\) such that \({\mathfrak{X}} = {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\lbrace {\rm X}\rbrace , {\sim} {{\wp} })\). A hyperassignment \({\mathfrak{X}} \in {\rm HAsg}\) isBorelian behaviouralif there is a generator for it.
The new quantification game is defined w.r.t. aquantification-game schemathat comprises the input hyperassignment \({\mathfrak{X}}\), the quantification prefix \({\wp}\) describing how the players alternate in the game, and the Borelian property \(\Psi\) corresponding to the desired goal.
Definition 8 (Quantification-Game Schema) Aquantification-game schemais a tuple \({\mathfrak{Q}} \triangleq {\langle {{\mathfrak{X}} },{{\wp} },{\Psi }\rangle }\), where (1) \({\mathfrak{X}} \in {\rm HAsg}\) is Borelian behavioural, (2) \({\wp} \in {\rm Qn}_{{\rm {B}} }\) is a behavioural quantification prefix, (3) \(\Psi \subseteq {\rm Asg}(\text {ap} {{\wp} } \cup \text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} })\) is Borelian, and (4) \(\text {ap} {{\wp} } \cap \text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } = {\emptyset}\).
The idea behind the game-theoretic construction reported below is quite simple. Given a generator \({\langle {{\sim} {{\wp} }}, {{\rm X}}\rangle }\) for a behavioural hyperassignment \({\mathfrak{X}}\), we force the two players to simulate the given \({\mathfrak{X}}\) by playing according to the prefix \({\sim} {{\wp} }\), once Abelard has arbitrarily chosen the values of the atomic propositions \(\vec{p}\) over which the set of assignments \({\rm X}\) is defined. Since \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\forall \vec{p}\,) = \lbrace {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}) \rbrace\) and \({\rm X}\subseteq {\rm Asg}(\vec{p})\), it is clear that \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\forall \vec{p}) \sqsubseteq \lbrace {\rm X}\rbrace\) and, by the monotonicity property stated in Proposition 5, we have that \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\forall \vec{p} .{\sim} {{\wp} }) \sqsubseteq {\mathfrak{X}} = {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\lbrace {\rm X}\rbrace , {\sim} {{\wp} })\). Thus, if Eloise wins the game, she can ensure a given temporal property, i.e., \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\wp} \psi\). Notice, however, that we gave Abelard the freedom to cheat and choose arbitrary values for \(\vec{p}\). Thus, in principle, Eloise could be able to satisfy the property while losing the game, since Abelard can choose assignments over \(\vec{p}\) that do not belong to \({\rm X}\). To remedy this, we add all those assignments to Eloise’s winning set, thus deterring Abelard from cheating.
Construction 2 (Quantification Game II) For a quantification-game schema \({\mathfrak{Q}} \triangleq {\langle {{\mathfrak{X}} }, {{\wp} }{\Psi }\rangle }\), we say that \({⅁}\) is a \({\mathfrak{Q}}\)-game if there is a generator \({\langle {{\sim} {{\wp} }}, {{\rm X}}\rangle }\) for \({\mathfrak{X}}\) such that \({⅁} \triangleq {⅁} [\widehat{{\wp} }][\widehat{\Psi }]\), where
\(\widehat{{\wp} } \triangleq \forall \vec{p} .{\sim} {{\wp} } .{\wp}\) and
\(\widehat{\Psi } \triangleq \Psi \cup \lbrace \chi \in {\rm Asg}({\rm P}) | \chi \upharpoonright [\vec{p}] \,\not\in {\rm X}\rbrace\),
with \(\vec{p} \triangleq \text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \setminus \text {ap} {{\sim} {{\wp} }}\) and \({\rm P}\triangleq \text {ap} {{\wp} } \cup \text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} }\).
The quantification-game schema for a formula \({\wp} \psi\), with \(\psi \in {\sf LTL}\), and a hyperassignment \({\mathfrak{X}}\) is the tuple \({\mathfrak{Q}} [{\wp} \psi ][{\mathfrak{X}} ] \triangleq {\langle {{\mathfrak{X}} }, {{\wp} }, {{\sf L}(\psi)}\rangle }\). We can now generalise Theorem 4 to formulae.
Theorem 7 (Game-Theoretic Semantics II) \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\wp} \psi\) ( resp., \({\mathfrak{X}} {{⊭} ^{\exists \forall }} {\wp} \psi\)) iff Eloise ( resp., Abelard) wins every \({\mathfrak{Q}} [{\wp} \psi ][{\mathfrak{X}} ]\)-game, for all behavioural
The proof of the above result follows an approach similar to the one described in the previous subsection for Theorem 4 and uses the following result, proven in Electronic Appendix C, which generalises Theorem 5 to formulae.
Theorem 8 (Quantification Game II) Every \({\mathfrak{Q}}\)-game \({⅁}\), for some quantification-game schema \({\mathfrak{Q}} \triangleq {\langle {{\mathfrak{X}} }, {{\wp} }, {\Psi }\rangle }\), satisfies the following two properties:
(1) | if Eloise wins then \(E\subseteq \Psi\), for some \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}))\); | ||||
(2) | if Abelard wins then \(E\not\subseteq \Psi\), for all \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))\). |
The connection between the quantification game and the satisfaction problem w.r.t. a hyperassignment is stated by the following result.
Corollary 4 (Quantification Game II) For every behavioural
(1) | if Eloise ( resp., Abelard) wins then \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi\) ( resp., , \({\mathfrak{X}} {{⊭} ^{\exists \forall }} {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\)); | ||||
(2) | if \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\) ( resp., , \({\mathfrak{X}} {{⊭} ^{\exists \forall }} {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi\)) then Eloise ( resp., , Abelard) wins. |
Let \({⅁}\) be an arbitrary \({\mathfrak{Q}} [{\wp} \psi ][{\mathfrak{X}} ]\)-game. Item 4 immediately follows from Item 1 of Definition 3, Lemma 5 and the two items of Theorem 8. For Item 4, instead, let us assume that \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\) ( resp., \({\mathfrak{X}} {{⊭} ^{\exists \forall }} {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi\)). Thanks to Item 1 of Definition 3 and Lemma 5, it holds that \(E\subseteq \Psi \triangleq {\sf L}(\psi)\), for some \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))\) ( resp., \(E\not\subseteq \Psi\), for all \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}))\)). Thus, by Item 8 ( resp., Item 8) of Theorem 8, it follows that Abelard ( resp., Eloise) loses the game \({⅁}\), which means, by determinacy, that Eloise ( resp., Abelard) wins.□
Corollary 4, together with Proposition 6, lifts Theorem 6 to formulae as follows.
Theorem 9 (Formula Canonical Forms) For every behavioural
We focus on the statement for \(\alpha = \exists \forall\), as the case \(\alpha = \forall \exists\) can be easily derived from the previous one by observing that, thanks to the Boolean laws of Lemma 4, (a) \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\forall \exists } {\wp} \psi\) iff \({\mathfrak{X}} \not\models ^{\exists \forall } \bar{{\wp} } \lnot \psi\), (b) \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\) iff \({\mathfrak{X}} \not\models ^{\forall \exists } {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }(\bar{{\wp} }) \lnot \psi\), and (c) \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\forall \exists } {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\) iff \({\mathfrak{X}} \not\models ^{\exists \forall } {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }(\bar{{\wp} }) \lnot \psi\).
As done in the proof of Theorem 6, one chain of implication – if \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi\) then \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\wp} \psi\) and if \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\wp} \psi\) then \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\) – is an immediate consequence of Proposition 6, Lemma 5, and Theorem 2. Indeed, by Lemma 5, we have that (1) \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\wp} \psi\) iff \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp}) \models ^{\exists \forall } \psi\), (2) \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\) iff \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp})) \models ^{\exists \forall } \psi\), and (3) \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi\) iff \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp})) \models ^{\exists \forall } \psi\). Now, by Proposition 6, it holds that \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp})) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp}) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))\). Therefore, by Theorem 2, we have that \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi\) implies \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\wp} \psi\), which, in turn, implies \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\). The converse implication – if \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\) then \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi\) – is a direct consequence of Corollary 4.□
The previous theorem allows us to obtain a proof for Theorem 7.
Given an arbitrary \({\mathfrak{Q}} [{\wp} \psi ][{\mathfrak{X}} ]\)-game \({⅁}\), we want to prove that \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\wp} \psi\) ( resp., \({\mathfrak{X}} {{⊭} ^{\exists \forall }} {\wp} \psi\)) holds true iff Eloise ( resp., Abelard) wins \({⅁}\). For theif-direction, by Item 4 of Corollary 4, if Eloise (resp, Abelard) wins \({⅁}\) then \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi\) (resp., \({\mathfrak{X}} {{⊭} ^{\exists \forall }} {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\)). However, this implies that \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\wp} \psi\) (resp., \({\mathfrak{X}} {{⊭} ^{\exists \forall }} {\wp} \psi\)), thanks to Theorem 9. For theonly-if-direction, if \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\wp} \psi\) (resp., \({\mathfrak{X}} {{⊭} ^{\exists \forall }} {\wp} \psi\)) then \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) \psi\) (resp., \({\mathfrak{X}} {{⊭} ^{\exists \forall }} {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) \psi\)) holds true, again due to Theorem 9. This implies, in turn, that Eloise (resp., Abelard) wins \({⅁}\), thanks to Item 4 of Corollary 4.□
5 Decision Problems, Expressiveness & Succinctness
The results of the previous section can be exploited to solve optimally the decision problems for behavioural
5.1 Decision Procedures
The first step in deciding the satisfiability problem is to derive from a behavioral sentence \(\varphi = {\wp} \psi\) aparity game [14, 65] that is won by Eloise iff\(\varphi\) is satisfiable. To do that, we first construct a deterministic parity automaton \({\mathcal {D}} [\psi ]\) for the
Theorem 10 (Satisfiability Game) For every behavioral
We can then obtain an upper bound on the complexity of the problem from the fact that parity games can be solved in time polynomial in the number of positions and exponential in that of the priorities [13, 15, 87]. For the lower bound, instead, we observe that thereactive synthesis problem [72] of an
Theorem 11 (Satisfiability Complexity) The satisfiability problem for behavioral
As to the (universal)model-checking problem, given a Kripke structure \({\mathcal {K}}\), we ask whether \({\mathcal {K}} \models \varphi\), in the sense that \({\mathfrak{X}} _{{\mathcal {K}} } \models ^{\exists \forall } \varphi\) holds, where \({\mathfrak{X}} _{{\mathcal {K}} } \triangleq \lbrace \lbrace \chi \in {\rm Asg}(\text {ap} {{\mathcal {K}} }) | \texttt{wrd} (\chi) \in {\sf L}({\mathcal {K}}) \rbrace \rbrace\) is the hyperassignment obtained by collecting all the assignments \(\chi \in {\rm Asg}(\text {ap} {{\mathcal {K}} })\) over the propositions of \({\mathcal {K}}\) for which the infinite word \(\texttt{wrd} (\chi)\) belongs to the \(\omega\)-language \({\sf L}({\mathcal {K}})\) generated by \({\mathcal {K}}\). Since \({\sf L}({\mathcal {K}})\) is an \(\omega\)-regular language, \({\mathfrak{X}} _{{\mathcal {K}} }\) is clearly a Borelian behavioral hyperassignment. As a consequence, Construction 2 applies. Thus, we can adopt the same synchronous product described above between the arena of the game and the union of the two automata \({\mathcal {D}} [\psi ]\) and \({\mathcal {N}}_{\bar{{\mathcal {K}} }}\), where \({\mathcal {D}} [\psi ]\) is obtained from the formula \(\psi\), while \({\mathcal {N}}_{\bar{{\mathcal {K}} }}\) is a co-safety automaton of size linear in \(|{\mathcal {K}} |\), recognising the complement of \({\sf L}({\mathcal {K}})\). Observe that one may also consider the dual notion ofexistential model-checking, which asks whether \({\mathcal {K}} \models \varphi\) in the sense of \({\mathfrak{X}} _{{\mathcal {K}} } \models ^{\forall \exists } \varphi\), which can be solved analogously.
Theorem 12 (Model-Checking Game) For every Kripke structure \({\mathcal {K}}\) and behavioral
Upper bounds w.r.t. both formula and model complexity, and the lower bound w.r.t. formula complexity, are proved as in the case of the satisfiability problem. As far as the model complexity is concerned, the lower bound can be naturally derived by reducing from reachability games [43].
Theorem 13 (Model-Checking Complexity) The model-checking problem for behavioral
5.2 Expressive Power
We conclude the work by discussing the expressive power of the behavioral fragment of
Via a standard encoding of the transition function and the acceptance condition, we can construct an
Theorem 14 (Expressiveness)
Clearly,
Theorem 15 (Succinctness)
6 DISCUSSION
We have introduced a novel semantics for
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to provide a compositional account of behavioral constraints. We believe the generality and flexibility of the semantic settings opens up the possibility of a systematic investigation of the impact of this type of constraints in quantified temporal logics, such as \({\sf QCTL}\) [20, 52], Substructure Temporal Logic [3, 4], Hyper
ELECTRONIC APPENDICES
A PROOFS OF SECTION 2
Proposition 1. \({\mathfrak{X}} \subseteq \bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }}\) and \({\mathfrak{X}} \equiv \bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }}\), for all \({\mathfrak{X}} \in {\rm HAsg}\).
To begin with, we show that \({\mathfrak{X}} \subseteq \bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }}\). By definition of \(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\), for every \(\bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\) there is a function \(\Gamma _{\bar{{\rm X}}} \in {\sf Chc}{{\mathfrak{X}} }\) such that \(\bar{{\rm X}} = \lbrace \Gamma _{\bar{{\rm X}}}({\rm X})| {\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}} \rbrace\). Now, consider an arbitrary \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) and define \(\Gamma\) as: \(\Gamma (\bar{{\rm X}}) = \Gamma _{\bar{{\rm X}}}({\rm X})\) for every \(\bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\). Notice that \(\Gamma (\bar{{\rm X}}) \in \bar{{\rm X}}\), for every \(\bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\), and thus \(\Gamma \in {\sf Chc}{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }}\). Therefore, we have that \(\lbrace \Gamma (\bar{{\rm X}}) | \bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \rbrace \in \bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }}\). To conclude the proof, we are left to show that \(\lbrace \Gamma (\bar{{\rm X}}) | \bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \rbrace = {\rm X}\) holds as well. First, observe that \(\Gamma (\bar{{\rm X}}) = \Gamma _{\bar{{\rm X}}}({\rm X}) \in {\rm X}\) holds for every \(\bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\), implying \(\lbrace \Gamma (\bar{{\rm X}}) | \bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \rbrace \subseteq {\rm X}\). In order to show the converse inclusion (\(\lbrace \Gamma (\bar{{\rm X}}) | \bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \rbrace \supseteq {\rm X}\)), consider an arbitrary \(\chi \in {\rm X}\) and a function \(\Gamma _{{\rm X}_{\chi }} \in {\sf Chc}{{\mathfrak{X}} }\) such that \(\Gamma _{{\rm X}_{\chi }}({\rm X}) = \chi\). Let \({\rm X}_{\chi } \triangleq \lbrace \Gamma _{{\rm X}_{\chi }}({\rm X}) | {\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}} \rbrace\). It holds that \({\rm X}_{\chi } \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\). Since \(\Gamma ({\rm X}_{\chi }) = \Gamma _{{\rm X}_{\chi }}({\rm X}) = \chi\), we have that \(\chi \in \lbrace \Gamma (\bar{{\rm X}}) | \bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \rbrace\) and, since \(\chi\) was chosen arbitrarily, we conclude \(\lbrace \Gamma (\bar{{\rm X}}) | \bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \rbrace \supseteq {\rm X}\).
Observe that, straightforwardly, \({\mathfrak{X}} \subseteq \bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }}\) implies \({\mathfrak{X}} \sqsubseteq \bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }}\).
Let us turn now to proving \(\bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }} \sqsubseteq {\mathfrak{X}}\). Let \(\bar{\bar{{\rm X}}} \in \bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }}\). By definition of \(\bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }}\), there is a function \(\Gamma _{\bar{\bar{{\rm X}}}} \in {\sf Chc}{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }}\) such that \(\bar{\bar{{\rm X}}} = \lbrace \Gamma _{\bar{\bar{{\rm X}}}}(\bar{{\rm X}}) | \bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \rbrace\). Towards a contradiction, assume that for every \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) there is \(\chi _{{\rm X}} \in {\rm X}\setminus \bar{\bar{{\rm X}}}\). Let us define \(\Gamma\) as \(\Gamma ({\rm X}) = \chi _{{\rm X}}\) for every \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\). Notice that \(\Gamma \in {\sf Chc}{{\mathfrak{X}} }\). Thus, \(\bar{{\rm X}}\, \triangleq \, \lbrace \chi _{{\rm X}} | {\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}} \rbrace \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\) and \(\bar{{\rm X}} \cap \bar{\bar{{\rm X}}} = {\emptyset}\). However, \(\Gamma _{\bar{\bar{{\rm X}}}}(\bar{{\rm X}}) \in \bar{\bar{{\rm X}}} \cap \bar{{\rm X}}\), thus rising a contradiction.□
Lemma 1. The following equivalences hold true, for all
(1) | Statements 1a and 1b are equivalent:
| ||||||||||||||||
(2) | Statements 2a and 2b are equivalent:
|
Proof.
(\(1a \Rightarrow 1b\)) By 1a, there is \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) such that \(\chi \models \varphi\) holds for every \(\chi \in {\rm X}\). By definition of \(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\), for every \(\bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\) there is \(\Gamma _{\bar{{\rm X}}}\) such that \(\Gamma _{\bar{{\rm X}}}({\rm X}) \in {\rm X}\) and \(\bar{{\rm X}} = \lbrace \Gamma _{\bar{{\rm X}}}({\rm X}) : {\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}} \rbrace\); by 1a, \(\Gamma _{\bar{{\rm X}}}({\rm X}) \models \varphi\); since, in addition, \(\Gamma _{\bar{{\rm X}}}({\rm X}) \in \bar{{\rm X}}\), the thesis holds.
(\(1b \Rightarrow 1a\)) By 1b, for every \(\bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\) there is \(\chi _{\bar{{\rm X}}} \in \bar{{\rm X}}\) such that \(\chi _{\bar{{\rm X}}} \models \varphi\). Consider the function \(\Gamma \in {\sf Chc}{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }}\) defined as: \(\Gamma (\bar{{\rm X}}) = \chi _{\bar{{\rm X}}}\), for every \(\bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\). By definition of \(\bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }}\), we have that \(\lbrace \Gamma (\bar{{\rm X}}) : \bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \rbrace \in \bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }}\). By Proposition 1, it holds \(\bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }} \sqsubseteq {\mathfrak{X}}\), which means that there is \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\), with \({\rm X}\subseteq \lbrace \Gamma (\bar{{\rm X}}) : \bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \rbrace\). Since, by construction, \(\Gamma (\bar{{\rm X}}) \models \varphi\) for every \(\bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\), the thesis holds.
(\(2a \Leftrightarrow 2b\)) By statement 1 of this lemma, we have that 1a is false if and only if 1b is false (\(\mathit {not} \ 1a \Leftrightarrow \mathit {not} \ 1b\), for short). By instantiating, in this last equivalence, \(\varphi\) with \(\lnot \varphi\), we have \(1a^{\prime } \Leftrightarrow 1b^{\prime }\), where \(1a^{\prime }\) and \(1b^{\prime }\) are abbreviations for, respectively:
–
for all sets of assignments \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\), there exists an assignment \(\chi \in {\rm X}\) such that \(\chi \not\models \lnot \varphi\);
–
there exists a set of assignments \({\rm X}\in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\) such that, for all assignments \(\chi \in {\rm X}\), it holds that \(\chi \not\models \lnot \varphi\).
By applying semantics of negation, it is straightforward to see that \(1a^{\prime }\) and \(1b^{\prime }\) correspond to 2a and 2b, respectively, hence the thesis follows.\(\Box\)
Lemma 2 (Boolean Connectives). The following equivalences hold true, for all
(1) | Statements 1a and 1b are equivalent:
| ||||||||||||||||
(2) | Statements 2a and 2b are equivalent:
|
Proof.
(\(1a \Rightarrow 1b\)) Let \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) be such that \(\chi \models \varphi _{1} \wedge \varphi _{2}\) holds for every \(\chi \in {\rm X}\) and consider an arbitrary pair \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2) \in {\sf par}({{\mathfrak{X}} })\). Since \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2)\) is a partition of \({\mathfrak{X}}\), either \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}} _1\) or \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}} _2\): in the former case, let \(i=1\); in the latter, let \(i = 2\). Since \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}} _i\) and \(\chi \models \varphi _{i}\) holds for every \(\chi \in {\rm X}\), the thesis holds.
(\(1b \Rightarrow 1a\)) Consider \(\mathring{{\mathfrak{X}} } = \lbrace {\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}} : \forall \chi \in {\rm X}\ . \ \chi \models \varphi _1 \rbrace\) and the pair \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \triangleq {\mathfrak{X}} \setminus \mathring{{\mathfrak{X}} }, {\mathfrak{X}} _2 \triangleq \mathring{{\mathfrak{X}} }) \in {\sf par}({{\mathfrak{X}} })\). Observe that, by definition of \({\mathfrak{X}} _1\), there is no \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}} _1\) such that \(\chi \models \varphi _{1}\) holds for every \(\chi \in {\rm X}\). Thus, by 1b, there must exist \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}} _2\) such that \(\chi \models \varphi _{2}\) holds for every \(\chi \in {\rm X}\). By definition of \({\mathfrak{X}} _2\), it also holds that \(\chi \models \varphi _{1}\) for every \(\chi \in {\rm X}\), hence the thesis.
By statement 1 of this lemma, we have that 1a is false if and only if 1b is false (\(\mathit {not} \ 1a \Leftrightarrow \mathit {not} \ 1b\), for short). By instantiating, in this last equivalence, \(\varphi _1\) with \(\lnot \varphi _1\) and \(\varphi _2\) with \(\lnot \varphi _2\), we have \(1a^{\prime } \Leftrightarrow 1b^{\prime }\), where \(1a^{\prime }\) and \(1b^{\prime }\) are abbreviations for, respectively:
–
for all sets of assignments \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\), there exists an assignment \(\chi \in {\rm X}\) such that \(\chi \not\models \lnot \varphi _{1} \wedge \lnot \varphi _{2}\);
–
there exists a pair of hyperassignments \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2) \in {\sf par}({{\mathfrak{X}} })\) such that, for all indexes \(i \in \lbrace 1, 2 \rbrace\) and sets of assignments \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}} _i\), there exists an assignment \(\chi \in {\rm X}\) for which it holds that \(\chi \not\models \lnot \varphi _{i}\).
By applying the semantics of negation and the classical De Morgan’s laws on the semantic rules, it is straightforward to see that \(1a^{\prime }\) and \(1b^{\prime }\) correspond to 2a and 2b, respectively, hence the thesis.\(\Box\)
Lemma 3 (Hyperassignment Extensions) The following equivalences hold true, for all
(1) | Statements 1a and 1b are equivalent:
| ||||||||||||||||
(2) | Statements 2a and 2b are equivalent:
|
Proof.
(\(1a \Rightarrow 1b\)) Let \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) be such that \(\chi \models \exists p. \varphi\) holds for every \(\chi \in {\rm X}\). By semantics (Def. 2, item 3a), for every \(\chi \in {\rm X}\), there is a temporal function \({\sf f}_{\chi } \in {\mathbb {N}}\rightarrow {\mathbb {B}}\) such that \({\chi }[p\mapsto {\sf f}_{\chi }] \models \varphi\). Let \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} })\) be such that \({\sf F}(\chi) = {\sf f}_{\chi }\) for every \(\chi \in {\rm X}\) and let \({\rm X}_{{\sf F}} = \lbrace {\chi }[p\mapsto {\sf F}(\chi)] : \chi \in {\rm X}\rbrace\). Since \({\rm X}_{{\sf F}} \in {\sf ext}({{\mathfrak{X}} , p})\) and \(\chi \models \varphi\) holds for every \(\chi \in {\rm X}_{{\sf F}}\), the thesis holds.
(\(1b \Rightarrow 1a\)) Let \({\rm X}_{{\sf F}} \in {\sf ext}({{\mathfrak{X}} , p})\) be such that \(\chi \models \varphi\) holds for every \(\chi \in {\rm X}_{{\sf F}}\). By definition of \({\sf ext}({{\mathfrak{X}} , p})\), there are \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) and \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} })\) such that \({\rm X}_{{\sf F}} = \lbrace {\chi }[p\mapsto {\sf F}(\chi)] : \chi \in {\rm X}\rbrace\). Clearly, by semantics (Def. 2, item 3a), \(\chi \models \exists p. \varphi\) holds for every \(\chi \in {\rm X}\), hence the thesis follows.
(2a ⇔ 2b) By statement 1 of this lemma, we have that 1a is false if and only if 1b is false (\(\mathit {not} \ 1a \Leftrightarrow \mathit {not} \ 1b\), for short). By instantiating, in this last equivalence, \(\varphi\) with \(\lnot \varphi\), we have \(1a^{\prime } \Leftrightarrow 1b^{\prime }\), where \(1a^{\prime }\) and \(1b^{\prime }\) are abbreviations for, respectively:
–
for all sets of assignments \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\), there exists an assignment \(\chi \in {\rm X}\) such that \(\chi \not\models \exists p. \lnot \varphi\);
–
for all sets of assignments \({\rm X}\in {\sf ext}({{\mathfrak{X}} , p})\), there exists an assignment \(\chi \in {\rm X}\) such that \(\chi \not\models \lnot \varphi\).
By applying semantics of negation and duality of \(\exists\) and \(\forall\), it is straightforward to see that \(1a^{\prime }\) and \(1b^{\prime }\) correspond to 2a and 2b, respectively, hence the thesis. \(\Box\)
Next, we prove Theorem 1. Here is the graph of dependency presenting the lemmata and propositions used for this proof, an edge meaning that the source is directly cited in the proof of the target.
Theorem 1 (Semantics Adequacy) For all
(1) | \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \varphi\) iffthere exists a set of assignments \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) such that \(\chi \models \varphi\), for all assignments \(\chi \in {\rm X}\); | ||||
(2) | \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \varphi\) iff, for all sets of assignments \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\), it holds that \(\chi \models \varphi\), for some assignment \(\chi \in {\rm X}\). |
Proof. Both claims 1 and 2 are proved together, by induction on the structure of the formula.
(base case) | If \(\varphi \in {\sf LTL}\), then the claims immediately follows from the semantics (Definition 3, item 1). | ||||
(inductive step) | If \(\varphi = \lnot \psi\), then we have, by semantics, \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\alpha }\: \varphi\) if and only if \({\mathfrak{X}} {⊭} ^{\bar{\alpha }}\: \psi\). If \(\alpha = \exists \forall\), then, by inductive hypothesis, it is not the case that for every \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) there is \(\chi \in {\rm X}\) such that \(\chi \models \psi\), which amounts to say that there is \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) such that for every \(\chi \in {\rm X}\) it holds \(\chi {⊭} \psi\), from which the thesis follows. If, instead, \(\alpha = \forall \exists\), then, by inductive hypothesis, there is no \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) such that for every \(\chi \in {\rm X}\) it holds \(\chi \models \psi\), which amounts to say that for every \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) there is \(\chi \in {\rm X}\) such that \(\chi {⊭} \psi\), from which the thesis follows. If \(\varphi = \varphi _1 \wedge \varphi _2\) and \(\alpha = \exists \forall\), then we have, by semantics, \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\alpha }\: \varphi\) if and only if for every \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2) \in {\sf par}({{\mathfrak{X}} })\) it holds true that \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \ne {\emptyset}\) and \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \models ^{\alpha } \varphi _{1}\) or it holds true that \({\mathfrak{X}} _2 \ne {\emptyset}\) and \({\mathfrak{X}} _2 \models ^{\alpha } \varphi _{2}\). By inductive hypothesis, this amounts to say that for every \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2) \in {\sf par}({{\mathfrak{X}} })\) there is \(i \in \lbrace 1,2 \rbrace\) and \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}} _i\) such that for every \(\chi \in {\rm X}\) it holds \(\chi \models \varphi _{i}\). The thesis follows from Lemma 2, item 1. If \(\varphi = \varphi _1 \wedge \varphi _2\) and \(\alpha = \forall \exists\), then we have, by semantics, \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\alpha }\: \varphi\) if and only if \(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \models ^{\bar{\alpha }}\: \varphi\). By proceeding as before, i.e., by applying semantics, inductive hypothesis, and Lemma 2, item 1, we have that there is \(\bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\) such that for every \(\bar{\chi } \in \bar{{\rm X}}\) it holds \(\bar{\chi } \models \varphi\). The thesis follows from Lemma 1, item 2. If \(\varphi = \varphi _1 \vee \varphi _2\) and \(\alpha = \forall \exists\), then we have, by semantics, \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\alpha }\: \varphi\) if and only if there is \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2) \in {\sf par}({{\mathfrak{X}} })\) such that \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \ne {\emptyset}\) implies \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \models ^{\alpha } \varphi _{1}\) and \({\mathfrak{X}} _2 \ne {\emptyset}\) implies \({\mathfrak{X}} _2 \models ^{\alpha } \varphi _{2}\). By inductive hypothesis, this amounts to say that there is \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2) \in {\sf par}({{\mathfrak{X}} })\) such that for every \(i \in \lbrace 1,2 \rbrace\) and \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}} _i\) there is \(\chi \in {\rm X}\) for which it holds \(\chi \models \varphi _{i}\). The thesis follows from Lemma 2, item 2. If \(\varphi = \varphi _1 \vee \varphi _2\) and \(\alpha = \exists \forall\), then we have, by semantics, \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\alpha }\: \varphi\) if and only if \(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \models ^{\bar{\alpha }}\: \varphi\). By proceeding as before, i.e., by applying semantics, inductive hypothesis, and Lemma 2, item 2, we have that for every \(\bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\) there is \(\bar{\chi } \in \bar{{\rm X}}\) such that \(\bar{\chi } \models \varphi\). The thesis follows from Lemma 1, item 1. If \(\varphi = \exists p. \psi\) and \(\alpha = \exists \forall\), then we have, by semantics, \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\alpha }\: \varphi\) if and only if \({\sf ext}({{\mathfrak{X}} , p}) \models ^{\alpha } \psi\). By inductive hypothesis, this amounts to say that there is \({\rm X}\in {\sf ext}({{\mathfrak{X}} , p})\) such that for every \(\chi \in {\rm X}\) it holds \(\chi \models \psi\). The thesis follows from Lemma 3, item 1. If \(\varphi = \exists p. \psi\) and \(\alpha = \forall \exists\), then we have, by semantics, \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\alpha }\: \varphi\) if and only if \(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \models ^{\bar{\alpha }}\: \varphi\). By proceeding as before, i.e., by applying semantics, inductive hypothesis, and Lemma 3, item 1, we have that there is \(\bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\) such that for every \(\bar{\chi } \in \bar{{\rm X}}\) it holds \(\bar{\chi } \models \varphi\). The thesis follows from Lemma 1, item 2. If \(\varphi = \forall p. \psi\) and \(\alpha = \forall \exists\), then we have, by semantics, \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\alpha }\: \varphi\) if and only if \({\sf ext}({{\mathfrak{X}} , p}) \models ^{\alpha } \psi\). By inductive hypothesis, this amounts to say that for every \({\rm X}\in {\sf ext}({{\mathfrak{X}} , p})\) there is \(\chi \in {\rm X}\) such that \(\chi \models \psi\). The thesis follows from Lemma 3, item 2. If \(\varphi = \forall p. \psi\) and \(\alpha = \exists \forall\), then we have, by semantics, \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\alpha }\: \varphi\) if and only if \(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \models ^{\bar{\alpha }}\: \varphi\). By proceeding as before, i.e., by applying semantics, inductive hypothesis, and Lemma 3, item 2, we have that for every \(\bar{{\rm X}} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\) there is \(\bar{\chi } \in \bar{{\rm X}}\) such that \(\bar{\chi } \models \varphi\). The thesis follows from Lemma 1, item 1. \(\Box\) |
B PROOFS OF SECTION 3
Proposition 2. Let \({\rm P}\subseteq \text{AP}\) be a set of atomic propositions, \(\chi _1, \chi _2 \in {\rm Asg}({\rm P})\) two assignments, \({\Theta} \in {\Theta}\) a quantifier specification, and \(k \in \mathbb {N}\) a time instant. Then, \(\chi _1 \approx _{{\Theta} }^{k} \chi _2\) iffthe following hold true:
(1) | \(\chi _1(p) = \chi _2(p)\), for all \(p\in {\rm P}\setminus ({\rm P}_{\rm {B}} \cup {\rm P}_{\rm {S}})\); | ||||
(2) | \(\chi _1(p)(t) = \chi _2(p)(t)\), for all \(t \le k\) and \(p\in ({\rm P}_{\rm {B}} \cap {\rm P}) \setminus {\rm P}_{\rm {S}}\); | ||||
(3) | \(\chi _1(p)(t) = \chi _2(p)(t)\), for all \(t \lt k\) and \(p\in {\rm P}_{\rm {S}} \cap {\rm P}\). |
Assume \(\chi _1 \approx _{{\Theta} }^{k} \chi _2\). Because \(\approx _{{\Theta} }^{k}\) is the transitive closure of \(\sim _{{\Theta} }^{k}\), we have \(\chi _1 = \chi ^{(1)} \sim _{{\Theta} }^{k} \chi ^{(2)} \sim _{{\Theta} }^{k} \ldots \sim _{{\Theta} }^{k} \chi ^{(r)} = \chi _2\), for some \(\chi ^{(1)}, \ldots , \chi ^{(r)}\), with \(r \in \mathbb {N} \setminus \lbrace 0 \rbrace\) (observe that \(\chi _1 = \chi _2\) if \(r=1\)).
We prove, by induction on r, that items 1–3 hold. If \(r=1\), then the claim follows trivially. Let \(r\gt 1\). Since \(\chi ^{(1)} \sim _{{\Theta} }^{k} \chi ^{(2)}\), we have that 1–3 hold when instantiated with \(\chi ^{(1)}\) and \(\chi ^{(2)}\), by Definition 4. Moreover, by inductive hypothesis, 1–3 hold when instantiated with \(\chi ^{(2)}\) and \(\chi ^{(r)}\). The claim follows by transitivity of 1–3.
Now, in order to prove the converse direction, assume that items 1–3 hold. Let \(\lbrace |p_1, \ldots , p[r]\rbrace\) be an enumeration of \({\rm P}_{\rm {B}} \cup {\rm P}_{\rm {S}}\) and define \(\chi ^{(1)} \triangleq \chi _1\) and \(\chi ^{(i+1)} \triangleq \chi ^{(i)}[p[i] \mapsto \chi _2(p[i])]\) for \(i \in [1, \ldots , r]\). It is not difficult to convince oneself that \(\chi _1 = \chi ^{(1)} \sim _{{\Theta} }^{k} \chi ^{(2)} \sim _{{\Theta} }^{k} \ldots \sim _{{\Theta} }^{k} \chi ^{(r+1)} = \chi _2\) holds, hence \(\chi _1 \approx _{{\Theta} }^{k} \chi _2\).□
Proposition 3. If \(\chi _1 \approx _{{\Theta} }^{k} \chi _2\) then \({\sf F}(\chi _1)(k) = {\sf F}(\chi _2)(k)\), for all assignments \(\chi _1, \chi _2 \in {\rm Asg}({\rm P})\), quantifier specifications \({\Theta} \in {\Theta}\), time instants \(k \in {\mathbb {N}}\), and \({\Theta}\)-functors \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }({\rm P})\).
Assume \(\chi _1 \approx _{{\Theta} }^{k} \chi _2\), i.e., \(\chi _1 = \chi ^{(1)} \sim _{{\Theta} }^{k} \chi ^{(2)} \sim _{{\Theta} }^{k} \ldots \sim _{{\Theta} }^{k} \chi ^{(r)} = \chi _2\), for some \(\chi ^{(1)}, \ldots , \chi ^{(r)}\), with \(r \in \mathbb {N} \setminus \lbrace 0 \rbrace\) (observe that \(\chi _1 = \chi _2\) if \(r=1\)).
We prove, by induction on r, that \({\sf F}(\chi _1)(k) = {\sf F}(\chi _2)(k)\). If \(r=1\), then the claim follows trivially. Let \(r\gt 1\). Since \(\chi ^{(1)} \sim _{{\Theta} }^{k} \chi ^{(2)}\) and \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }({\rm P})\), we have that \({\sf F}(\chi ^{(1)})(k) = {\sf F}(\chi ^{(2)})(k)\). Moreover, by inductive hypothesis, \({\sf F}(\chi ^{(2)})(k) = {\sf F}(\chi ^{(r)})(k)\). The claim follows by transitivity.□
Proposition 4. Let \({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2 \in {\rm HAsg}\) be two hyperassignments with \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \sqsubseteq {\mathfrak{X}} _2\). Then, the following properties hold true:
(1) | \(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} _2} \sqsubseteq \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} _1}\); | ||||
(2) | for every \(({\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime }, {\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime \prime }) \in {\sf par}{{\mathfrak{X}} _2}\), there exists \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime }, {{\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime \prime }}) \in {\sf par}{{\mathfrak{X}} _1}\) such that \({\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime } \sqsubseteq {\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime }\) and \({{\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime \prime }} \sqsubseteq {\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime \prime }\), and, in addition, \({\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime }={\emptyset}\) implies \({\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime }={\emptyset}\) and \({\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime \prime }={\emptyset}\) implies \({{\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime \prime }}={\emptyset}\); | ||||
(3) | \({\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} _1, p} \sqsubseteq {\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} _2, p}\), for every \({\Theta} \in {\Theta}\) and \(p\in \text{AP}\). |
Proof of point \((1)\). Assume \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \!\sqsubseteq \! {\mathfrak{X}} _2\!\) and let \(\bar{{\rm X}_2} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} _2}\). We have to show that there exists \(\bar{{\rm X}_1} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} _1}\) such that \(\bar{{\rm X}_1} \subseteq \bar{{\rm X}_2}\). By \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \sqsubseteq {\mathfrak{X}} _2\), there is a function \(f : {\mathfrak{X}} _1 \rightarrow {\mathfrak{X}} _2\), such that \(f({\rm X}_1) \subseteq {\rm X}_1\). By definition of \(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} _2}\), we have that \(\bar{{\rm X}_2} = {\sf img}{\Gamma _2}\) for some \(\Gamma _2 \in {\sf Chc}{{\mathfrak{X}} _2}\).
Now, define \(\Gamma _1\) as \(\Gamma _1({\rm X}_1) \triangleq \Gamma _2(f({\rm X}_1))\) for every \({\rm X}_1 \in {\mathfrak{X}} _1\). Clearly, \(\Gamma _1 \in {\sf Chc}{{\mathfrak{X}} _1}\), as \(\Gamma _1({\rm X}_1) = \Gamma _2(f({\rm X}_1)) \in f({\rm X}_1) \subseteq {\rm X}_1\), for each \({\rm X}_1 \in {\mathfrak{X}} _1\), and thus \({\sf img}{\Gamma _1} \in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} _1}\). The thesis follows from the fact that \({\sf img}{\Gamma _1} \subseteq {\sf img}{\Gamma _2} = \bar{{\rm X}_2}\).
Proof of point \((2)\). Assume \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \sqsubseteq {\mathfrak{X}} _2\!\) and let \(({{\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime }}\ ,{\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime \prime })\in {\sf par}{{\mathfrak{X}} _2}\). We have to show that there exists \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime }\ , {\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime \prime }) \in {\sf par}({{\mathfrak{X}} _1})\) such that \({\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime } \!\sqsubseteq \! {{\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime }}\!\) and \({\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime \prime } \!\sqsubseteq \! {\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime \prime }\!\) . By \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \sqsubseteq {\mathfrak{X}} _2\), there is a function \(f : {\mathfrak{X}} _1 \rightarrow {\mathfrak{X}} _2\), such that \(f({\rm X}_1) \subseteq {\rm X}_1\) for each \({\rm X}_1 \in {\mathfrak{X}} _1\). Consider \({\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime } \triangleq \lbrace {\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}} _1|f({\rm X}) \in {{\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime }}\rbrace\) and \({\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime \prime } \triangleq \lbrace {\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}} _1|f({\rm X}) \in {\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime \prime }\rbrace\). For any \({\rm X}_1[^{\prime }]\in {\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime }\) , it holds that \(f({\rm X}_1[^{\prime }])\subseteq {\rm X}_1[^{\prime }]\) . By definition of \({\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime }\), it also holds that \(f({\rm X}_1[^{\prime }])\in {{\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime }}\) . Hence, \({\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime } \!\sqsubseteq \! {{\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime }}\!\) . Furthermore, it is immediate to see that \({{\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime }}\!={\emptyset} \Rightarrow {\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime }\!={\emptyset}\). The same reasoning holds for \({\mathfrak{X}} _1^{\prime \prime } \!\sqsubseteq \! {\mathfrak{X}} _2^{\prime \prime }\). Thus, the thesis is proven.
Proof of point \((3)\). Assume \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \!\sqsubseteq \! {\mathfrak{X}} _2\!\) and let \({\rm X}_1[^{\prime }] \in {\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} _1, p}\). We have to show that there exists \({\rm X}_2[^{\prime }] \in {\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} _2, p}\) such that \({\rm X}_2[^{\prime }] \subseteq {\rm X}_1[^{\prime }]\). By definition of \({\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} _1, p}\), we have that \({\rm X}_1[^{\prime }] = {\sf ext}{{\rm X}_1, {\sf F}, p}\) for some \({\rm X}_1 \in {\mathfrak{X}} _1\) and \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} _1})\). By \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \sqsubseteq {\mathfrak{X}} _2\) and \({\rm X}_1 \in {\mathfrak{X}} _1\), we have that there is \({\rm X}_2 \in {\mathfrak{X}} _2\) such that \({\rm X}_2 \subseteq {\rm X}_1\).
It clearly holds that \({\sf ext}{{\rm X}_2, {\sf F}, p} \subseteq {\sf ext}{{\rm X}_1, {\sf F}, p}\). The thesis follows, since \({\sf ext}{{\rm X}_2, {\sf F}, p} \in {\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} _2, p}\).□
Next, we prove Theorem 2. Here is the graph of dependency presenting the only proposition used for this proof.
Theorem 2 (Hyperassignment Refinement). Let \(\varphi\) be a
Proof. Assume \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \!\sqsubseteq \! {\mathfrak{X}} _2\). Thus, there is a function \(f : {\mathfrak{X}} _1 \rightarrow {\mathfrak{X}} _2\), such that \(f({\rm X}_1) \subseteq {\rm X}_1\) for every \({\rm X}_1\in {\mathfrak{X}} _1\). The claim is proved by induction on the structure of the formula and the alternation flags. More precisely, we consider, as a basis for the induction, a well-founded preorder \(\preceq\) over the set of pairs \(\lbrace \langle \varphi , \alpha \rangle |\varphi \text{ is a} {\sf GFG}-{\sf QPTL} \text{formula and } \alpha \in \lbrace \exists \forall , \forall \exists \rbrace \rbrace\), such that \(\langle \varphi , \alpha \rangle \preceq \langle \varphi ^{\prime }, \alpha ^{\prime } \rangle\) if and only if \(\varphi\) is a subformula of \(\varphi ^{\prime }\) or one of the following holds:
\(\varphi = \varphi ^{\prime } = \psi _1 \wedge \psi _2\), \(\alpha = \exists \forall\), and \(\alpha ^{\prime } = \forall \exists\),
\(\varphi = \varphi ^{\prime } = \psi _1 \vee \psi _2\), \(\alpha = \forall \exists\), and \(\alpha ^{\prime } = \exists \forall\),
\(\varphi = \varphi ^{\prime } = \exists p:\! {\Theta} .\psi\), \(\alpha = \exists \forall\), and \(\alpha ^{\prime } = \forall \exists\),
\(\varphi = \varphi ^{\prime } = \forall p:\! {\Theta} .\psi\), \(\alpha = \forall \exists\), and \(\alpha ^{\prime } = \exists \forall\).
(base case) | If \(\varphi \in {\sf LTL}\), then the claim immediately follows from the semantics (Definition 3, item 1). | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Next, we prove Theorem 3. Here is the graph of dependency presenting the lemma, proposition, corollary, and theorem used for this proof. The ellipsis symbolizing dependencies is already presented in a previous graph.
Theorem 3 (Double Dualization) Let \(\varphi\) be a
Proof. The fact that \(\begin{equation*} {\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\alpha } \varphi { {iff} } \bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }} \models ^{\alpha } \varphi \text{Thm. 3a} \end{equation*}\) immediately follows from \({\mathfrak{X}} \equiv \bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }}\) (Proposition 1) and Corollary 1.
We now turn to proving that \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\alpha } \varphi\) iff\(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \models ^{\bar{\alpha }} \varphi\), for all \({\mathfrak{X}} \in {\rm HAsg}_{\subseteq }({\sf free}{\varphi })\). The proof is done by structural induction on the formula.
If \(\varphi \in {\sf LTL}\), then the claim follows immediately from the semantics and Lemma 1.
If \(\varphi = \lnot \psi\), then we have: \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\alpha }\: \varphi \mathrel {\stackrel{\text{sem.}}{\Leftrightarrow }} {\mathfrak{X}} {{⊭} ^{\bar{\alpha }}}\: \psi \mathrel {\stackrel{\text{ind.hp.}}{\Leftrightarrow }} \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } {⊭} ^{\alpha }\: \psi \mathrel {\stackrel{\text{sem.}}{\Leftrightarrow }} \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \models ^{\bar{\alpha }}\: \varphi\).
If \(\varphi = \varphi _1 \wedge \varphi _2\), then we have:
–
\(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \models ^{\bar{\exists \forall }}\: \varphi \mathrel {\stackrel{\text{sem.}}{\Leftrightarrow }} \bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }} \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \varphi \mathrel {\stackrel{\text{{Thm. 3a}}}{\Leftrightarrow }} {\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \varphi\); and
–
\({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \varphi \mathrel {\stackrel{\text{sem.}}{\Leftrightarrow }} \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \varphi\).
If \(\varphi = \varphi _1 \vee \varphi _2\), then we have:
–
\({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \varphi \mathrel {\stackrel{\text{sem.}}{\Leftrightarrow }} \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \varphi\); and
–
\(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \models ^{\bar{\forall \exists }}\: \varphi \mathrel {\stackrel{\text{sem.}}{\Leftrightarrow }} \bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }} \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \varphi \mathrel {\stackrel{\text{{Thm. 3a}}}{\Leftrightarrow }} {\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \varphi\).
If \(\varphi = \exists p:\! {\Theta} .\psi\), then we have:
–
\(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \models ^{\bar{\exists \forall }}\: \varphi \mathrel {\stackrel{\text{sem.}}{\Leftrightarrow }} \bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }} \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \varphi \mathrel {\stackrel{\text{{Thm. 3a}}}{\Leftrightarrow }} {\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \varphi\); and
–
\({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \varphi \mathrel {\stackrel{\text{sem.}}{\Leftrightarrow }} \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \varphi\).
If \(\varphi = \forall p:\! {\Theta} .\psi\), then we have:
–
\({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \varphi \mathrel {\stackrel{\text{sem.}}{\Leftrightarrow }} \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \varphi\);
–
\(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \models ^{\bar{\forall \exists }}\: \varphi \mathrel {\stackrel{\text{sem.}}{\Leftrightarrow }} \bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }} \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \varphi \mathrel {\stackrel{\text{{Thm. 3a}}}{\Leftrightarrow }} {\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \varphi\). \(\Box\)
Lemma 4 (Boolean Laws). Let \(\varphi\), \(\varphi _{1}\), \(\varphi _{2}\) be
(1) | |||||
(2) | \(\varphi _{1} \wedge \varphi _{2} \Rightarrow \varphi _{1}\); | ||||
(3) | \(\varphi _{1} \Rightarrow \varphi _{1} \vee \varphi _{2}\); | ||||
(4) | \(\varphi _1 \wedge \varphi _2 \equiv \varphi _2 \wedge \varphi _1\); | ||||
(5) | \(\varphi _1 \vee \varphi _2 \equiv \varphi _2 \vee \varphi _1\); | ||||
(6) | \(\varphi _{1} \wedge (\varphi \wedge \varphi _{2}) \equiv (\varphi _{1} \wedge \varphi) \wedge \varphi _{2}\); | ||||
(7) | \(\varphi _{1} \vee (\varphi \vee \varphi _{2}) \equiv (\varphi _{1} \vee \varphi) \vee \varphi _{2}\); | ||||
(8) | \(\varphi _{1} \wedge \varphi _{2} \equiv \lnot (\lnot \varphi _{1} \vee \lnot \varphi _{2})\); | ||||
(9) | \(\varphi _{1} \vee \varphi _{2} \equiv \lnot (\lnot \varphi _{1} \wedge \lnot \varphi _{2})\); | ||||
(10) | \(\exists ^{{\Theta} } p.\varphi \equiv \lnot (\forall ^{{\Theta} } p.\lnot \varphi)\); | ||||
(11) | \(\forall ^{{\Theta} } p.\varphi \equiv \lnot (\exists ^{{\Theta} } p.\lnot \varphi)\). |
Proof.
Thanks to Corollary 2, it suffices to prove the equivalence for \(\equiv ^{\alpha }\) for some \(\alpha \in \lbrace \exists \forall , \forall \exists \rbrace\). Let \(\varphi\) be a
(1) | From \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \lnot \lnot \varphi\), applying the semantics twice leads to \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \varphi\). | ||||
(2) | If \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \varphi _{1}\wedge \varphi _{2}\) then by semantics, the partition \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1\triangleq {\mathfrak{X}} ,{\mathfrak{X}} _2\triangleq {\emptyset})\) proves that \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \varphi _{1}\). | ||||
(3) | If \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \varphi _{1}\) then, by considering the partition \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1\triangleq {\mathfrak{X}} , {\mathfrak{X}} _2\triangleq {\emptyset})\) it follows that \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \varphi _{1} \vee \varphi _{2}\). | ||||
(4-5) | Remark that if \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1,{{}} {\mathfrak{X}} _2) \in {\sf par}{{\mathfrak{X}} }\), then \(({\mathfrak{X}} _2,{{}} {\mathfrak{X}} _1) \in {\sf par}{{\mathfrak{X}} }\). | ||||
(6-7) | Remark that every 3-partition can be obtained by bi-partitioning twice. Furthermore, the second partitioning can be performed on the first part or the second part equivalently. Thus, by applying this idea to the semantics rules, the two points hold. | ||||
(8) | By semantics, \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \varphi _1 \wedge \varphi _2\) means that for all partition \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2) \in {\sf par}({{\mathfrak{X}} })\) it holds \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \ne {\emptyset}\) and \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \models ^{\exists \forall } \varphi _{1})\) or \(({\mathfrak{X}} _2 \ne {\emptyset}\) and \({\mathfrak{X}} _2 \models ^{\exists \forall } \varphi _{2})\). Then, by applying 1) and the semantics rule of negation consecutively in each term of the disjunction, it results that for all \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2) \in {\sf par}({{\mathfrak{X}} })\) it holds \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \ne {\emptyset}\) and \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 {⊭} ^{\forall \exists } \lnot \varphi _{1})\) or \(({\mathfrak{X}} _2 \ne {\emptyset}\) and \({\mathfrak{X}} _2 {⊭} ^{\forall \exists } \lnot \varphi _{2})\) which is the semantic of \({\mathfrak{X}} {⊭} ^{\forall \exists }\: \lnot \varphi _1 \vee \lnot \varphi _2\), hence \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \lnot (\lnot \varphi _1 \vee \lnot \varphi _2)\). Since all transformations are equivalences, the reverse path holds. | ||||
(9) | By semantics, \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \varphi _1 \vee \varphi _2\) means that there is a partition \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2) \in {\sf par}({{\mathfrak{X}} })\) such that \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \ne {\emptyset}\) implies \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \models ^{\forall \exists } \varphi _{1})\) and \(({\mathfrak{X}} _2 \ne {\emptyset}\) implies \({\mathfrak{X}} _2 \models ^{\forall \exists } \varphi _{2})\). Then, by applying 1) and the semantics rule of negation consecutively in each term of the conjunction, it results that there is \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2) \in {\sf par}({{\mathfrak{X}} })\) such that \(({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \ne {\emptyset}\) implies \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 {{⊭} ^{\exists \forall }} \lnot \varphi _{1})\) and \(({\mathfrak{X}} _2 \ne {\emptyset}\) implies \({\mathfrak{X}} _2 {{⊭} ^{\exists \forall }} \lnot \varphi _{2})\) which is the semantics for \({\mathfrak{X}} {{⊭} ^{\exists \forall }}\: \lnot \varphi _1 \wedge \lnot \varphi _2\), hence \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \lnot (\lnot \varphi _1 \wedge \lnot \varphi _2)\). Since all transformations are equivalences, the reverse path holds. | ||||
(10) | By semantics, \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall } \: \exists p:\! {\Theta} .\psi\) means that \({\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} , p} \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \psi\). Then by applying the point 1) and the semantics rule for negation consecutively, it results that \({\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} , p} {⊭} ^{\forall \exists }\: \lnot \psi\). We now introduce the universal quantifier using the semantics rule associated and obtain \({\mathfrak{X}} {⊭} ^{\forall \exists }\: \forall p:\! {\Theta} .\lnot \psi\) which is the semantics for \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\exists \forall }\: \lnot \forall p:\! {\Theta} .\lnot \psi\). Since all transformations are equivalences, the reverse path holds. | ||||
(11) | By semantics, \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \forall p:\! {\Theta} .\psi\) means that \({\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} , p} \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \psi\). Then by applying the point 1) and the semantics rule for negation consecutively, it results that \({\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} , p} {{⊭} ^{\exists \forall }}\: \lnot \psi\). We now introduce the existential quantifier using the semantics rule associated and obtain \({\mathfrak{X}} {{⊭} ^{\exists \forall }}\: \exists p:\! {\Theta} .\lnot \psi\) which is the semantics for \({\mathfrak{X}} \models ^{\forall \exists }\: \lnot \exists p:\! {\Theta} .\lnot \psi\). Since all transformations are equivalences, the reverse path holds.\(\Box\) |
Proposition 5.
Let \({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2 \in {\rm HAsg}\) be two hyperassignments with \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \sqsubseteq {\mathfrak{X}} _2\) and \({\wp} \in {\rm Qn}\). Then, the following holds true: \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\wp}) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, {\wp})\).
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the quantification prefix .
(base case) | If \({\wp} = \varepsilon\), then we have \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\wp}) = {\mathfrak{X}} _1 \sqsubseteq {\mathfrak{X}} _2 = {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, {\wp})\). | ||||||||||||||||
(inductive step) | If \({\wp} = {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p. {\wp} ^{\prime }\) , then we distinguish two cases.
|
Lemma 5 (Prefix Evolution). Let \({\wp} \phi\) be a
Proof. The proof is done by induction on the quantifier prefix \({\wp}\).
(base case) | |||||||||||||||||
(inductive step) | If \({\wp} = \exists ^{{\Theta} }p.{\wp} ^{\prime }\):
If \({\wp} = \forall ^{{\Theta} }p.{\wp} ^{\prime }\), the proofs when \(\alpha\) is coherent with the first quantifier and when it is not are the same as the first inductive case (by replacing \(\forall \exists\) with \(\exists \forall\) and vice versa).\(\Box\) |
C PROOFS OF SECTION 4
Now, we showcase the graph of dependency for Theorem 4, presenting the lemma, corollary, and theorem used for the proof in the main paper.
In order to provide the missing proofs of Theorems 5 and 8 and Proposition 6, in this appendix we shall also need to prove the auxiliary Propositions 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 and to introduce, later on, the notion of normal evolution function and a refinement of the order between hyperassignments.
Let \({\mathfrak{X}} \in {\rm HAsg}({\rm P})\) be a hyperassignment over \({\rm P}\subseteq \text{AP}\), \({\Theta} \in {\Theta}\) a quantifier specification, \(p\in \text{AP}\setminus {\rm P}\) an atomic proposition, and \(\Psi \subseteq {\rm Asg}({\rm P}\cup \lbrace p\rbrace)\) a set of assignments. There exists a set of assignments \({\sf {W}} \in {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\) such that \({\sf {W}} \subseteq \Psi\) iffthe following conditions hold true:
(1) | there exist \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }({\rm P})\) and \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) such that \({\sf ext}{{\rm X}, {\sf F}, p} \subseteq \Psi\), whenever \(\alpha\) and \({\rm {Q}}\) are coherent; | ||||
(2) | for all \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }({\rm P})\), there is \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) such that \({\sf ext}{{\rm X}, {\sf F}, p} \subseteq \Psi\), whenever \(\alpha\) and \({\rm {Q}}\) are not coherent. |
Proof. We consider the two conditions separately.
[1] If \(\alpha\) and \({\rm {Q}}\) are coherent, by definition of evolution function, we have \(\begin{equation*} {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \rm{Q} ^{{\Theta} } p) = {\sf ext}_{\Theta} ({{\mathfrak{X}} , p}) = \{ { {\sf ext}({{\rm X}, {\sf F}, p} })|{ {\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {({\mathfrak{X}} })) }\}. \end{equation*}\) Thus, for every set of assignments \({\sf {W}} \subseteq {\rm Asg}({\rm P}\cup \lbrace p\rbrace)\), it holds that \({\sf {W}} \in {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\) iffthere exists a \({\Theta}\)-functor \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }({\rm P})\) and a set of assignments \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) such that \({\sf {W}} = {\sf ext}{{\rm X}, {\sf F}, p}\). Hence, Condition 7 immediately follows.
[2] If \(\alpha\) and \({\rm {Q}}\) are not coherent, by definition of evolution function, we have \(\begin{equation*} {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p) = \bar{{\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, p}} = \{ { {\sf img}{\Gamma } }{ \Gamma \in {\sf Chc}{{\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, p}} }\}. \end{equation*}\) Thus, for every set of assignments \({\sf {W}} \subseteq {\rm Asg}({\rm P}\cup \lbrace p\rbrace)\), it holds that \({\sf {W}} \in {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\) iffthere exists a choice function \(\Gamma \in {\sf Chc}{{\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, p}}\) such that \({\sf {W}} = {\sf img}{\Gamma } = \lbrace \Gamma (Z) | Z\in {\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, p}\rbrace\). This means that \({\sf {W}} \subseteq \Psi\) iff\(\Gamma (Z) \in \Psi\), for all \(Z\in {\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, p}\). Now, it is clear that there exists a choice function \(\Gamma \in {\sf Chc}{{\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, p}}\) such that \(\Gamma (Z) \in \Psi\), for all \(Z\in {\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, p}\) iff, for every \(Z\in {\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, p} = \lbrace {\sf ext}{{\rm Y}, {\sf F}, p} | {\rm Y}\in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, {\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }({\rm P}) \rbrace\), there exists \(\chi _{Z} \in Z\) such that \(\chi _{Z} \in \Psi\). The latter property, however, means that, for every \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }({\rm P})\) and \({\rm Y}\in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } = \lbrace {\sf img}{\Lambda } | \Lambda \in {\sf Chc}{{\mathfrak{X}} } \rbrace\), there exists \(\chi _{{\sf F}, {\rm Y}} \in {\sf ext}{{\rm Y}, {\sf F}, p}\) such that \(\chi _{{\sf F}, {\rm Y}} \in \Psi\), which in turn can be written as, for every \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }({\rm P})\) and \(\Lambda \in {\sf Chc}{{\mathfrak{X}} }\), there exists \(\chi _{{\sf F}, \Lambda } \in {\sf ext}{{\sf img}{\Lambda }, {\sf F}, p} = {\sf ext}{\lbrace \Lambda ({\rm X}) | {\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}} \rbrace , {\sf F}, p}\) such that \(\chi _{{\sf F}, \Lambda } \in \Psi\). Now, notice that \(\chi _{{\sf F}, \Lambda } \in {\sf ext}{\lbrace \Lambda ({\rm X}) | {\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}} \rbrace , {\sf F}, p}\) iffthere exists \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) such that \(\chi _{{\sf F}, \Lambda } = {\sf ext}{\Lambda ({\rm X}), {\sf F}, p}\).
Thus, up to this point, we have shown that the following two properties are equivalent:
–
there exists \({\sf {W}} \in {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\) such that \({\sf {W}} \subseteq \Psi\);
–
for all \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }({\rm P})\) and \(\Lambda \in {\sf Chc}{{\mathfrak{X}} }\), there exists \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) such that \({\sf ext}{\Lambda ({\rm X}), {\sf F}, p} \in \Psi\).
Now, by deHerbrandizing3 the universal quantification of \(\Lambda\) w.r.t.the existential quantification of \({\rm X}\) in the last item and recalling that \(\Lambda ({\rm X}) \in {\rm X}\), we obtain that, for all \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }({\rm P})\), there exists \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) such that \({\sf ext}{\chi , {\sf F}, p} \in \Psi\), for all \(\chi \in {\rm X}\). But this means that, for all \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }({\rm P})\), there exists \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) such that \({\sf ext}{{\rm X}, {\sf F}, p} \subseteq \Psi\), as required by Condition 7.\(\Box\)
Next, we prove Theorem 5. Here is the graph of dependency presenting the proposition used for the proof in the main paper.
Theorem 5 (Quantification Game I)
For each behavioural quantification prefix \({\wp} \in {\rm Qn}_{{\rm {B}} }\) and Borelian property \(\Psi \subseteq {\rm Asg}(\text {ap} {{\wp} })\), the game \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\Psi ]\) satisfies the following two properties:
(1) | if Eloise wins then \(E\subseteq \Psi\), for some \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}))\); | ||||
(2) | if Abelard wins then \(E\not\subseteq \Psi\), for all \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))\). |
Proof. Let \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\Psi ]\) be the game defined as prescribed in Construction 1. Obviously, this is a Borelian game, due to the hypothesis on the property \(\Psi\).
Before continuing, first observe that, thanks to the specific structure of the game, every history \({\rho} \cdot v\in {{\rm {Hst}} _\alpha }\) is bijectively correlated with the sequence of positions \({\sf obs}({\rho}) \cdot v\in {\rm Ob}^{*} \cdot {\rm {Ps}} [\alpha ]\), for any player \(\alpha \in \lbrace {\sf E}, {\sf A}\rbrace\). In other words, the functions \(J_\alpha :{{\rm {Hst}} _\alpha } \rightarrow {\rm Ob}^{*} \cdot {\rm {Ps}} [\alpha ]\) defined as \(J_\alpha ({\rho} \cdot v) \triangleq {\sf obs}({\rho}) \cdot v\) are bijective. Thanks to this observation, it is thus immediate to show that, for each strategy \({\sigma _{\sf E}} \in {\rm Str}_{\sf E}\), there is a unique function \(\widehat{{\sigma _{\sf E}} } :{\rm Ob}^{*} \cdot {\rm P}_{{\rm S}_{\sf E}}\rightarrow {\rm {Ps}}\) and, vice versa, for each function \(\widehat{{\sigma _{\sf E}} } :{\rm Ob}^{*} \cdot {\rm P}_{{\rm S}_{\sf E}}\rightarrow {\rm {Ps}}\), there is a unique strategy \({\sigma _{\sf E}} \in {\rm Str}_{\sf E}\) such that \(\begin{equation*} \widehat{{\sigma _{\sf E}} }(J_{\sf E}({\rho})) = {\sigma _{\sf E}} ({\rho}), \text{ for all histories } {\rho} \in {\rm Hst}_{\sf E}. \end{equation*}\) Similarly, for each strategy \({\sigma _{\sf A}}\in {\rm Str}_{\sf A}\), there is a unique function \(\widehat{{\sigma _{\sf A}}} :{\rm Ob}^{*} \cdot {\rm Ps}_{\sf A}\rightarrow {\rm {Ps}}\) and, vice versa, for each function \(\widehat{{\sigma _{\sf A}}} :{\rm Ob}^{*} \cdot {\rm Ps}_{\sf A}\rightarrow {\rm {Ps}}\), there is a unique strategy \({\sigma _{\sf A}}\in {\rm Str}_{\sf A}\) satisfying the equality \(\begin{equation*} \widehat{{\sigma _{\sf A}}}(J_{\sf A}({\rho})) = {\sigma _{\sf A}}({\rho}), \text{ for all histories } {\rho} \in {\rm Hst}_{\sf A}. \end{equation*}\)
We can now proceed with the proof of the two properties.
[1] Since Eloise wins the game, she has a winning strategy, i.e., there is \({\sigma _{\sf E}} \in {\rm Str}_{\sf E}\) such that \({\sf obs}({\sf play}({\sigma _{\sf E}} , {\sigma _{\sf A}})) \in {\rm Wn}\), for all \({\sigma _{\sf A}}\in {\rm Str}_{\sf A}\). We want to prove that there exists \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}))\) such that \(E\subseteq \Psi\).
First, recall that \({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) = \forall ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p} .\exists ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{p}\), for some vectors of atomic propositions \(\vec{p}, \vec{p} \in \text{AP}^{*}\) and quantifier specifications \(\vec{{\Theta} } \in {\Theta} ^{|\vec{p}|}\). Moreover, thanks to Proposition 7, the following claim can be proved by induction on the number of existential variables.
\(E\subseteq \Psi\), for some \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}))\), iffthere exists a vector of functors \(\vec{{\sf F}} \in {\rm Fnc}_{\vec{{\Theta} }}(\vec{p})\) such that \({\sf ext}{\chi , \vec{{\sf F}}, \vec{p}} \in \Psi\), for all assignments \(\chi \in {\rm Asg}(\vec{p})\).
As previously observed, \({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}) = \forall ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p} .\exists ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{p}\), for some vectors \(\vec{p}, \vec{p} \in \text{AP}^{*}\) and \(\vec{{\Theta} } \in {\Theta} ^{|\vec{p}|}\). Thus, \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp})) = {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\forall ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p} .\exists ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{p}) = {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\forall ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p}), \exists ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{p}) = {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\lbrace {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}) \rbrace , \exists ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{p})\). At this point, the proof proceeds by induction on the length of the vector \(\vec{p}\). If \(|\vec{p}| = 0\), there is nothing really to prove, as the thesis follows immediately from the fact that \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp})) = \lbrace {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}) \rbrace\). Let us now consider the case \(|\vec{p}| \gt 0\) and split both \(\vec{p}\) and \(\vec{{\Theta} }\) as follows: \(\vec{p} = \vec{p}^{\prime } \cdot p\) and \(\vec{{\Theta} } = \vec{{\Theta} }^{\prime } \cdot {\Theta}\). Obviously, \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp})) = {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\lbrace {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}) \rbrace , \exists ^{\vec{{\Theta} }^{\prime }} \vec{p}^{\prime }), \exists ^{{\Theta} } p)\). Now, by Item 7 of Proposition 7, \(E\subseteq \Psi\), for some \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}))\), iffthere exist a functor \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\vec{p} \cdot \vec{p}^{\prime })\) and a set \({\rm X}\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\lbrace {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}) \rbrace , \exists ^{\vec{{\Theta} }^{\prime }} \vec{p}^{\prime })\) such that \({\sf ext}{{\rm X}, {\sf F}, p} \subseteq \Psi\). The latter inclusion can be rewritten as \({\rm X}\subseteq {\sf prj}{\Psi , {\sf F}, p}\), where \({\sf prj}{\Psi , {\sf F}, p} \triangleq \, \lbrace \chi \in {\rm Asg}(\vec{p} \cdot \vec{p}^{\prime }) | {\sf ext}{\chi , {\sf F}, p} \in \Psi \rbrace\). At this point, by the inductive hypothesis applied to the inclusion \({\rm X}\subseteq {\sf prj}{\Psi , {\sf F}, p}\), for some \({\rm X}\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\lbrace {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}) \rbrace , \exists ^{\vec{{\Theta} }^{\prime }} \vec{p}^{\prime })\), we obtain that \(E\subseteq \Psi\), for some \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}))\), iffthere exist a functor \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\vec{p} \cdot \vec{p}^{\prime })\) and a vector of functors \(\vec{{\sf F}}^{\prime } \in {\rm Fnc}_{\vec{{\Theta} }^{\prime }}(\vec{p})\) such that \({\sf ext}{ {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}), \vec{{\sf F}}^{\prime }, \vec{p}^{\prime }} \subseteq {\sf prj}{\Psi , {\sf F}, p}\). The latter inclusion can now be rewritten as \({\sf ext}{{\sf ext}{ {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}), \vec{{\sf F}}^{\prime }, \vec{p}^{\prime }}, {\sf F}, p} \subseteq \Psi\). To conclude the proof, the vector of functors \(\vec{{\sf F}} \in {\rm Fnc}_{\vec{{\Theta} }}(\vec{p})\) is obtained by juxtaposing the vector \(\vec{{\sf F}}^{\prime }\) with the functor \({\sf F}^* \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\vec{p})\) obtained by composing \({\sf F}\) with \(\vec{{\sf F}}^{\prime }\) as follows: \({\sf F}^*(\chi) \triangleq {\sf F}({\sf ext}{\chi , \vec{{\sf F}}^{\prime }, \vec{p}^{\prime }})\).□
Due to the above characterisation of the existence of a set \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}))\) such that \(E\subseteq \Psi\), the thesis can be proved by defining a suitable vector of functors \(\vec{{\sf F}} \in {\rm Fnc}_{\vec{{\Theta} }}(\vec{p})\).
Consider an arbitrary assignment \(\chi \in {\rm Asg}(\vec{p})\) and define the function \(\widehat{{\sigma _{\sf A}}}^{\chi } :{\rm Ob}^{*} \cdot {\rm Ps}_{\sf A}\rightarrow {\rm {Ps}}\) as follows, for all finite sequences of observable positions \(w\in {\rm Ob}^{*}\) and Abelard’s positions \({\chi} \in {\rm Ps}_{\sf A}\): \(\begin{equation*} \widehat{{\sigma _{\sf A}}}^{\chi }(w\cdot {\chi}) \triangleq {\left\lbrace \begin{array}{ll} {{⦰} }, & \text{if } {{\chi} \in {\rm Ob}}; \\ {{{\chi} }[{x}\mapsto \chi ({x})(|w|)]}, & \text{otherwise}; \end{array}\right.} \end{equation*}\) where \({x}\in \vec{p}\) is the atomic proposition at position \(\#({\chi})\) in the prefix \({\wp}\), i.e., \(({\wp})_{\#({\chi})} = \forall ^{{\rm {B}} } {x}\). Due to the bijective correspondence previously described, there is a unique strategy \({\sigma _{\sf A}}^{\chi } \in {\rm Str}_{\sf A}\) such that \({\sigma _{\sf A}}^{\chi }({\rho}) = \widehat{{\sigma _{\sf A}}}^{\chi }(J_{\sf A}({\rho}))\), for all histories \({\rho} \in {\rm Hst}_{\sf A}\). Obviously, the induced play \({\pi} ^{\chi } \triangleq {\sf play}({\sigma _{\sf E}} , {\sigma _{\sf A}}^{\chi })\) is won by Eloise, i.e., \(w^{\chi } \triangleq {\sf obs}({\pi} ^{\chi }) \in {\rm Wn}\).
Thanks to all the infinite sequences \(w^{\chi }\), one for each assignment \(\chi \in {\rm Asg}(\vec{p})\), we can now define every component \((\vec{{\sf F}})_{i}\) of the vector of functors \(\vec{{\sf F}} \in ({\rm Fnc}(\vec{p}))^{|\vec{p}|}\) as follows, for all instants of time \(t \in {\mathbb {N}}\), where \(i \in {[0,|\vec{p}|)}\): \(\begin{equation*} (\vec{{\sf F}})_{i}(\chi)(t) \triangleq \, (w^{\chi })_{t}((\vec{p})_{i}). \end{equation*}\) It is not too hard to show that, by construction, this functor complies with the vector \(\vec{{\Theta} }\) of quantifier specifications.
At this point, for all assignments \(\chi \in {\rm Asg}(\vec{p})\), let \(\chi _{\vec{{\sf F}}} \triangleq {\sf ext}{\chi , \vec{{\sf F}}, \vec{p}}\). We can argue that \(\chi _{\vec{{\sf F}}} \in \Psi\). Indeed, by construction of the strategy \({\sigma _{\sf A}}^{\chi }\) and the vector of functors \(\vec{{\sf F}}\), it holds that \(\chi _{\vec{{\sf F}}}({x})(t) = (w^{\chi })_{t}({x})\), for all instants of time \(t \in {\mathbb {N}}\) and atomic propositions \({x}\in \vec{p} \cdot \vec{p}\). Hence, \(\texttt{wrd} (\chi _{\vec{{\sf F}}}) = w^{\chi }\), which implies \(\chi _{\vec{{\sf F}}} \in \Psi\), since \(w^{\chi } \in {\rm Wn}\).
[2] Since Abelard wins the game, he has a winning strategy, i.e., there is \({\sigma _{\sf A}}\in {\rm Str}_{\sf A}\) such that \({\sf obs}({\sf play}({\sigma _{\sf E}} , {\sigma _{\sf A}})) \not\in {\rm Wn}\), for all \({\sigma _{\sf E}} \in {\rm Str}_{\sf E}\). We want to prove that, for all \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))\), it holds that \(E\not\subseteq \Psi\).
First, recall that \({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) = \exists ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p} .\forall ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{p}\), for some vectors of atomic propositions \(\vec{p}, \vec{p} \in \text{AP}^{*}\) and quantifier specifications \(\vec{{\Theta} } \in {\Theta} ^{|\vec{p}|}\). Moreover, thanks to Proposition 7, the following claim can be proved by induction on the number of universal variables.
\(E\not\subseteq \Psi\), for all \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))\), iffthere exists a vector of functors \(\vec{{\sf G}} \in {\rm Fnc}_{\vec{{\Theta} }}(\vec{p})\) such that \({\sf ext}{\chi , \vec{{\sf G}}, \vec{p}} \not\in \Psi\), for all assignments \(\chi \in {\rm Asg}(\vec{p})\).
For technical convenience, we prove the counter-positive version of the statement: \(E\subseteq \Psi\), for some \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))\), iff, for all vectors of functors \(\vec{{\sf G}} \in {\rm Fnc}_{\vec{{\Theta} }}(\vec{p})\), it holds that \({\sf ext}{{\rm Asg}(\vec{p}), \vec{{\sf G}}, \vec{p}} \cap \Psi \ne {\emptyset}\). As previously observed, \({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}) = \exists ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p} .\forall ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{p}\), for some vectors \(\vec{p}, \vec{p} \in \text{AP}^{*}\) and \(\vec{{\Theta} } \in {\Theta} ^{|\vec{p}|}\). Thus, \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp})) = {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\exists ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p} .\forall ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{p}) = {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\exists ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p}), \forall ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{p}) = {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\lbrace \lbrace \chi \rbrace | \chi \!\in \! {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}) \rbrace \!, \forall ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{p})\). At this point, the proof proceeds by induction on the length of the vector \(\vec{p}\). If \(|\vec{p}| = 0\), there is nothing really to prove, as the thesis follows immediately from the fact that \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp})) = \lbrace \lbrace \chi \rbrace | \chi \in {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}) \rbrace\). Let us now consider the case \(|\vec{p}| \gt 0\) and split both \(\vec{p}\) and \(\vec{{\Theta} }\) as follows: \(\vec{p} = \vec{p}^{\prime } \cdot p\) and \(\vec{{\Theta} } = \vec{{\Theta} }^{\prime } \cdot {\Theta}\). Obviously, \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp})) = {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\lbrace \lbrace \chi \rbrace | \chi \in {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}) \rbrace , \forall ^{\vec{{\Theta} }^{\prime }} \vec{p}^{\prime }), \forall ^{{\Theta} } p)\). Now, by Item 7 of Proposition 7, \(E\subseteq \Psi\), for some \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))\), iff, for all functors \({\sf G}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\vec{p} \cdot \vec{p}^{\prime })\), there exists a set \({\rm X}\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\lbrace \lbrace \chi \rbrace | \chi \in {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}) \rbrace , \forall ^{\vec{{\Theta} }^{\prime }} \vec{p}^{\prime })\) such that \({\sf ext}{{\rm X}, {\sf G}, p} \subseteq \Psi\). The latter inclusion can be rewritten as \({\rm X}\subseteq {\sf prj}{\Psi , {\sf G}, p}\), where \({\sf prj}{\Psi , {\sf G}, p} \triangleq \, \lbrace \chi \in {\rm Asg}(\vec{p} \cdot \vec{p}^{\prime }) | {\sf ext}{\chi , {\sf G}, p} \in \Psi \rbrace\). At this point, by the inductive hypothesis applied to the inclusion \({\rm X}\subseteq {\sf prj}{\Psi , {\sf G}, p}\), for some \({\rm X}\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\lbrace \lbrace \chi \rbrace | \chi \in {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}) \rbrace , \forall ^{\vec{{\Theta} }^{\prime }} \vec{p}^{\prime })\), we obtain that \(E\subseteq \Psi\), for some \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))\), ifffor all functors \({\sf G}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\vec{p} \cdot \vec{p}^{\prime })\) and vectors of functors \(\vec{{\sf G}}^{\prime } \in {\rm Fnc}_{\vec{{\Theta} }^{\prime }}(\vec{p})\), it holds that \({\sf ext}{{\rm Asg}(\vec{p}), \vec{{\sf G}}^{\prime }, \vec{p}^{\prime }} \cap {\sf prj}{\Psi , {\sf G}, p} \ne {\emptyset}\). The latter inequality can now be rewritten as \({\sf ext}{{\sf ext}{{\rm Asg}(\vec{p}), \vec{{\sf G}}^{\prime }, \vec{p}^{\prime }}, {\sf G}, p} \cap \Psi \ne {\emptyset}\). To conclude the proof, it is enough to observe that the vectors of functors \(\vec{{\sf G}} \in {\rm Fnc}_{\vec{{\Theta} }}(\vec{p})\) can always be obtained by juxtaposing the vectors \(\vec{{\sf G}}^{\prime }\) with the functors \({\sf G}^* \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\vec{p})\) obtained by composing \({\sf G}\) with \(\vec{{\sf G}}^{\prime }\) as follows: \({\sf G}^*(\chi) \triangleq {\sf G}({\sf ext}{\chi , \vec{{\sf G}}^{\prime }, \vec{p}^{\prime }})\).□
Due to the above characterisation of non-existence of a set \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))\) such that \(E\subseteq \Psi\), the thesis can be proved by defining a suitable vector of functors \(\vec{{\sf G}} \in {\rm Fnc}_{\vec{{\Theta} }}(\vec{p})\).
Consider an arbitrary assignment \(\chi \in {\rm Asg}(\vec{p})\) and define the function \(\widehat{{\sigma _{\sf E}} }^{\chi } :{\rm Ob}^{*} \cdot {\rm P}_{{\rm S}_{\sf E}}\rightarrow {\rm {Ps}}\) as follows, for all finite sequences of observable positions \(w\in {\rm Ob}^{*}\) and Eloise’s positions \({\chi} \in {\rm P}_{{\rm S}_{\sf E}}\): \(\begin{equation*} \widehat{{\sigma _{\sf E}} }^{\chi }(w\cdot {\chi}) \triangleq {{\chi} }[{x}\mapsto \chi ({x})(|w|)], \end{equation*}\) where \({x}\in \vec{p}\) is the atomic proposition at position \(\#({\chi})\) in the prefix \({\wp}\), i.e., \(({\wp})_{\#({\chi})} = \exists ^{{\rm {B}} } {x}\). Due to the bijective correspondence previously described, there is a unique strategy \({\sigma _{\sf E}} ^{\chi } \in {\rm Str}_{\sf E}\) such that \({\sigma _{\sf E}} ^{\chi }({\rho}) = \widehat{{\sigma _{\sf E}} }^{\chi }(J_{\sf E}({\rho}))\), for all histories \({\rho} \in {\rm Hst}_{\sf E}\). Obviously, the induced play \({\pi} ^{\chi } \triangleq {\sf play}({\sigma _{\sf E}} ^{\chi }, {\sigma _{\sf A}})\) is won by Abelard, i.e., \(w^{\chi } \triangleq {\sf obs}({\pi} ^{\chi }) \not\in {\rm Wn}\).
Thanks to all the infinite sequences \(w^{\chi }\), one for each assignment \(\chi \in {\rm Asg}(\vec{p})\), we can now define every component \((\vec{{\sf G}})_{i}\) of the vector of functors \(\vec{{\sf G}} \in ({\rm Fnc}(\vec{p}))^{|\vec{p}|}\) as follows, for all instants of time \(t \in {\mathbb {N}}\), where \(i \in {[0,|\vec{p}|)}\): \(\begin{equation*} (\vec{{\sf G}})_{i}(\chi)(t) \triangleq \, (w^{\chi })_{t}((\vec{p})_{i}). \end{equation*}\) It is not too hard to show that, by construction, this functor complies with the vector \(\vec{{\Theta} }\) of quantifier specifications.
At this point, for all assignments \(\chi \in {\rm Asg}(\vec{p})\), let \(\chi _{\vec{{\sf G}}} \triangleq {\sf ext}{\chi , \vec{{\sf G}}, \vec{p}}\). We can argue that \(\chi _{\vec{{\sf G}}} \not\in \Psi\). Indeed, by construction of the strategy \({\sigma _{\sf E}} ^{\chi }\) and the vector of functors \(\vec{{\sf G}}\), it holds that \(\chi _{\vec{{\sf G}}}({x})(t) = (w^{\chi })_{t}({x})\), for all instants of time \(t \in {\mathbb {N}}\) and atomic propositions \({x}\in \vec{p} \cdot \vec{p}\). Hence, \(\texttt{wrd} (\chi _{\vec{{\sf G}}}) = w^{\chi }\), which implies \(\chi _{\vec{{\sf G}}} \not\in \Psi\), since \(w^{\chi } \not\in {\rm Wn}\).\(\Box\)
The two conditions stated in Proposition 7 allow us to introduce a different, but equivalent (in terms of the equivalence relation \(\equiv\) between hyperassignments), definition of evolution function that we call normal, in symbols \({\sf nevl}\). This new notion will be useful to show important properties that would be, otherwise, much more cumbersome to prove by appealing directly to the original definition of the evolution function \({\sf evl}\). \(\begin{equation*} {{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p) \triangleq {\left\lbrace \begin{array}{ll} {{\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} , p}}, & \text{ if } {{\rm {Q}} } \text{ is } \alpha \text{-coherent}; \\ {\{ { {\sf ext}{\eth , p} }{ \eth \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} }) \rightarrow {\mathfrak{X}} }}\}, & \text{ otherwise}; \end{array}\right.} \end{equation*}\) where \({\sf ext}{\eth , p} \triangleq \bigcup \lbrace {\sf ext}{\eth ({\sf F}), {\sf F}, p} | {\sf F}\in {\sf dom}{\eth } \rbrace\). Intuitively, w.r.t.\({\sf evl}\), we just modified the non \(\alpha\)-coherent case, in order to avoid the double application of the dualization function, by replacing this with a choice of a selection map \(\eth \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} }) \rightarrow {\mathfrak{X}}\) selecting, in fact, for each \({\Theta}\)-functor \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} })\), a set of assignments \(\eth ({\sf F}) \in {\mathfrak{X}}\).
The new evolution operator lifts naturally to an arbitrary quantification prefix \({\wp} \in {\rm Qn}\) as follows: (1) \({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \epsilon) \triangleq {\mathfrak{X}}\); (2) \({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.{\wp}) \triangleq {{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p), {\wp})\). As we have done for \({\sf evl}\), we also set \({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\wp}) \triangleq {{\sf nevl}}_\alpha (\lbrace \!\lbrace {⦰} \rbrace \!\rbrace , {\wp})\).
Consider the quantifier \(\exists p\) and the hyperassignment \({\mathfrak{X}} = \lbrace {\rm X}_1, {\rm X}_2\rbrace\) with \({\rm X}_i = \lbrace \chi _i \rbrace\), where \(i \in \lbrace 1, 2 \rbrace\) and \(\chi _1 \triangleq \lbrace p\mapsto \top ^\omega \rbrace\) and \(\chi _2 \triangleq \lbrace p\mapsto \bot ^\omega \rbrace\). Since \(\exists p\) is \(\exists \forall\)-coherent, we have \(\begin{equation*} {\sf nevl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , \exists q) = {\sf ext}({{\mathfrak{X}} , q}). \end{equation*}\) On the other hand, \(\exists p\) is not \(\forall \exists\)-coherent, thus \(\begin{equation*} {\sf nevl}_{\forall \exists }({\mathfrak{X}} , \exists p) = \{ { {{\sf ext}({\eth ,{p}})} }{ \eth \in { {\rm Fnc}} ({\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} }}) \rightarrow {\mathfrak{X}} }\}. \end{equation*}\) For instance, consider \(\eth _{0}: {\rm Fnc}_{{{\Theta} }}(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} }) \rightarrow {\mathfrak{X}}\) defined as follows: \(\begin{equation*} \eth _{0}({\sf F}) \triangleq {\left\lbrace \begin{array}{ll} {{\rm X}_1}, \text{if } {{\sf F}(\chi _1)(0) = \top } \\ {{\rm X}_2}, \text{otherwise.} \end{array}\right.} \end{equation*}\) Intuitively, the selection function \(\eth _{0}\) bipartitions the functors according to the value that they assign to \(\chi _1\) at time 0, by associating each functor with one of the two sets of assignments, \({\rm X}_1\) or \({\rm X}_2\). We thus have \(\begin{align*} {{\sf ext}{\eth _{0}, p}} & = {\bigcup \{{ {\sf ext}{\eth _{0}({\sf F}), {\sf F}, p} }{ {\sf F}\in { {\rm Fnc}_{{{\Theta} }}}(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} }) }}\} \\ & = {\bigcup \{ { {\sf ext}{{\rm X}_1, {\sf F}, p} }{ {\sf F}\in { {\rm Fnc}_{{{\Theta} }}}(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} }), {\sf F}(\chi _1)(0) = \top }\} \,\cup } \\ & \hspace{11.49994pt} {\bigcup \{ { {\sf ext}{{\rm X}_2, {\sf F}, p} }{ {\sf F}\in { {\rm Fnc}_{{{\Theta} }}}(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} }), {\sf F}(\chi _1)(0) = \bot }}\}. \end{align*}\)
If \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \equiv {\mathfrak{X}} _2\) then \({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p) \equiv {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\), for all hyperassignments \({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2 \in {\rm HAsg}\), quantifier symbols \({\rm {Q}} \in \lbrace \exists , \forall \rbrace\), quantifier specifications \({\Theta} \in {\Theta}\), and atomic propositions \(p\in \text{AP}\setminus \text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} }\).
Proof. The proof proceeds by a case analysis on the coherence of \(\alpha\) and \({\rm {Q}}\).
[\({\rm {Q}}\) is \(\alpha\)-coherent] By definition, \({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} }\! p) \!=\! {\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} _1, p}\) and \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} }\! p) \!=\! {\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} _2, p}\). Since \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \equiv {\mathfrak{X}} _2\), by Proposition 4, it holds that \({\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} _1, p} \equiv {\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} _2, p}\), which conclude this case of the proof.
[\({\rm {Q}}\) is not \(\alpha\)-coherent] By definition, \({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p) = \lbrace {\sf ext}{\eth , p} | \eth \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} _1}) \rightarrow {\mathfrak{X}} _1 \rbrace\) and \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p) = \bar{{\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} _2}, p}}\). We now prove the two inclusions \({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\) and \({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p) \sqsupseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\) separately.
–
[\(\sqsubseteq\)] To prove \({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\), we need to show that, for any \(\Psi \in {{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\) there is \({\sf {W}} [\Psi ] \in {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\) such that \({\sf {W}} [\Psi ] \subseteq \Psi\). Obviously, for any \(\Psi \in {{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\), it holds that \(\Psi = {\sf ext}{\eth , p} = \bigcup \lbrace {\sf ext}{\eth ({\sf F}), {\sf F}, p} | {\sf F}\in {\sf dom}{\eth } \rbrace\), for some selection function \(\eth \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} _1}) \rightarrow {\mathfrak{X}} _1\). This means that, for every \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} _1})\), there is \({\rm X}_{{\sf F}} \triangleq \eth ({\sf F}) \in {\mathfrak{X}} _1\) such that \({\sf ext}{{\rm X}_{{\sf F}}, {\sf F}, p} \subseteq \Psi\). Now, by Item 7 of Proposition 7, there exists \({\sf {W}} _1 \in {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\) such that \({\sf {W}} _1 \subseteq \Psi\). Since, thanks to Proposition 5, \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \equiv {\mathfrak{X}} _2\) implies \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p) \equiv {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\), we have that there is \({\sf {W}} _2 \in {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\) such that \({{\sf {W}} _2} \subseteq {\sf {W}} _1 \subseteq \Psi\). Finally, by setting \({\sf {W}} [\Psi ] \triangleq {\sf {W}} _2\), we obtain what is required.
–
[\(\sqsupseteq\)] To prove \({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p) \sqsupseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\), we need to show that, for any \(\Psi \in {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\) there is \({\sf {W}} [\Psi ] \in {{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\) such that \({\sf {W}} [\Psi ] \subseteq \Psi\). By instantiating \({\sf {W}}\) with \(\Psi\) in Proposition 7, since \({\sf {W}} = \Psi \in {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\), from Item 7 we derive that, for all \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} _2})\), there is \({\rm X}_{{\sf F}2} \in {\mathfrak{X}} _2\) such that \({\sf ext}{{\rm X}_{{\sf F}2}, {\sf F}, p} \subseteq \Psi\). Now, since \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \equiv {\mathfrak{X}} _2\), there is \({\rm X}_{{\sf F}1} \in {\mathfrak{X}} _1\) such that \({\rm X}_{{\sf F}1} \subseteq {\rm X}_{{\sf F}2}\), which in turn implies \({\sf ext}{{\rm X}_{{\sf F}1}, {\sf F}, p} \subseteq {\sf ext}{{\rm X}_{{\sf F}2}, {\sf F}, p} \subseteq \Psi\). At this point, define the selection map \(\eth \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} _1}) \rightarrow {\mathfrak{X}} _1\) as follows: \(\eth ({\sf F}) \triangleq {\rm X}_{{\sf F}1}\), for every \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} _1}) = {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} _2})\). Clearly, by setting \({\sf {W}} [\Psi ] \triangleq {\sf ext}{\eth , p}\), both \({\sf {W}} [\Psi ] = \bigcup \lbrace {\sf ext}{\eth ({\sf F}), {\sf F}, p} | {\sf F}\in {\sf dom}{\eth } \rbrace \subseteq \Psi\) and \({\sf {W}} [\Psi ] \in {{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\) holds true, as required.
This concludes the proof of the second and last case.\(\Box\)
The following examples are meant to show how the normal \(\alpha\)-evolution function for non-coherent quantifier simulates the \(\alpha\)-evolution function for the same quantifier.
The function \(\eth _0\) of Example 12 can be viewed as a choice function on \({\sf ext}({\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, p})\). First, recall that \(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } = \lbrace {\rm X}_{12} \rbrace\) with \({\rm X}_{12} = \lbrace \chi _1, \chi _2 \rbrace\) and let \(\mathring{{\rm X}} \in {\sf ext}({\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, p})\). Then, there is \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} })\) such that \(\mathring{{\rm X}} = {\sf ext}{{\rm X}_{12}, {\sf F}, p}\). If we define a choice function \(\Gamma \in {\sf Chc}{{\sf ext}({\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} },p})}\) so that \(\begin{equation*} \Gamma (\mathring{{\rm X}}) = \Gamma ({\sf ext}{{\rm X}_{12}, {\sf F}, p}) = {\left\lbrace \begin{array}{ll} {{\chi _1}[p\mapsto {\sf F}(\chi _1)]}, & \text{if } {{\sf F}(\chi _1)(0) = \top }, \\ {{\chi _2}[p\mapsto {\sf F}(\chi _2)]}, & \text{otherwise}, \end{array}\right.} \end{equation*}\) it is straightforward to see that \({\sf ext}{\eth _0, q} = {\sf img}{\Gamma } \in {\sf evl}_{\forall \exists }({\mathfrak{X}} , \exists p)\).
If \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \equiv {\mathfrak{X}} _2\) then \({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\wp}) \equiv {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, {\wp})\), for all hyperassignments \({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2 \in {\rm HAsg}\) and quantifier prefixes \({\wp} \in {\rm Qn}\), with \(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cap \text {ap} {{\wp} } = {\emptyset}\).
Proof. The proof proceeds by simple induction on the length of the quantification prefix \({\wp}\).
[Base case \({\wp} = \varepsilon\)] \({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, \varepsilon) = {\mathfrak{X}} _1 \equiv {\mathfrak{X}} _2 = {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, \varepsilon)\).
[Inductive case \({\wp} = {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.{\wp} ^{\prime }\)] By definition, we have \({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.{\wp} ^{\prime }) = {{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p), {\wp} ^{\prime })\) and \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.{\wp} ^{\prime }) = {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p), {\wp} ^{\prime })\). Now, by Proposition 8, \({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p) \equiv {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\), since \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \equiv {\mathfrak{X}} _2\). Thus, the thesis follows by a straightforward application of the inductive hypothesis.\(\Box\)
In the following, by \({\Theta} _{{\rm {B}} }\) we denote the set of behavioural quantifier specifications, i.e., quantifier specifications of the form \({\rm {B}} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : {\rm P}_{\rm {S}} \right\gt\) for some set of atomic propositions \({\rm P}_{\rm {S}} \subseteq \text{AP}\).
\({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p.{\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt } p) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p)\), for all hyperassignments \({\mathfrak{X}} \in {\rm HAsg}\), \(\alpha\)-coherent quantifier symbols \({\rm {Q}} \in \lbrace \exists , \forall \rbrace\), quantifier specifications \({\Theta} \in {\Theta} _{{\rm {B}} }\), and atomic propositions \(p, p\in \text{AP}\setminus \text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} }\).
Due to the specific definition of the normal evolution function \({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp})\), and by exploiting Proposition 9, the following claim can be shown.
The following two properties are equivalent:
\({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p.{\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt } p) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p)\);
for all \(({\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt)\)-functors \({\sf J}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cup \lbrace p\rbrace)\), functions \(\eth \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\rm {B}} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} }) \rightarrow {\mathfrak{X}}\), and behavioural functors \({\sf G}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\rm {B}} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cup \lbrace p\rbrace)\), there exists a \({\Theta}\)-functor \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} })\) and a set of assignments \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) such that \({\sf ext}{{\sf ext}{{\rm X}, {\sf F}, p}, {\sf G}, p} \subseteq {\sf ext}{{\sf ext}{\eth , p}, {\sf J}, p}\).
By Proposition 9, the inclusion \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p.{\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt } p) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p)\) is equivalent to the inclusion \({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p.{\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt } p) \sqsubseteq {{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p)\), which in turn means that, for all sets \({\sf {W}} _1 \in {{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p.{\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt } p)\), there exists a set \({\sf {W}} _2 \in {{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p)\) such that \({{\sf {W}} _2} \subseteq {\sf {W}} _1\). Now, by definition of normal evolution function, we have that \(\begin{equation*} {{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p.{\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt } p) = {\sf ext}[{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt ]{\{ { {\sf ext}{\eth , p} }{ \eth \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\rm {B}} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} }) \rightarrow {\mathfrak{X}} \}}, p} \end{equation*}\) and \(\begin{equation*} {{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p) = \{ { {\sf ext}{\eth , p} }{ \eth \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\rm {B}} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cup \lbrace p\rbrace) \rightarrow {\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}}\} , p} }. \end{equation*}\) Thus, every set \({\sf {W}} _1\) is equal to \({\sf ext}{{\sf ext}{\eth , p}, {\sf J}, p}\), for some \(({\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt)\)-functor \({\sf J}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cup \lbrace p\rbrace)\) and selection function \(\eth \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\rm {B}} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} }) \rightarrow {\mathfrak{X}}\), while every set \({\sf {W}} _2\) is equal to \({\sf ext}{\eth ^{\prime }, p}\), for some selection function \(\eth ^{\prime } \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\rm {B}} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cup \lbrace p\rbrace) \rightarrow {\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} , p}\). As a consequence, the previous property concerning the inclusion \({{\sf {W}} _2} \subseteq {\sf {W}} _1\) can be equivalently rewritten as follows: for all \(({\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt)\)-functors \({\sf J}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cup \lbrace p\rbrace)\) and selection functions \(\eth \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\rm {B}} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} }) \rightarrow {\mathfrak{X}}\), there exists a selection function \(\eth ^{\prime } \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\rm {B}} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cup \lbrace p\rbrace) \rightarrow {\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} , p}\) such that \({\sf ext}{\eth ^{\prime }, p} \subseteq {\sf ext}{{\sf ext}{\eth , p}, {\sf J}, p}\). Since, \({\sf ext}{\eth ^{\prime }, p} = \bigcup \lbrace {\sf ext}{\eth ^{\prime }({\sf G}), {\sf G}, p} | {\sf G}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\rm {B}} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cup \lbrace p\rbrace) \rbrace\), the inclusion \({\sf ext}{\eth ^{\prime }, p} \subseteq {\sf ext}{{\sf ext}{\eth , p}, {\sf J}, p}\) is equivalent to \({\sf ext}{\eth ^{\prime }({\sf G}), {\sf G}, p} \subseteq {\sf ext}{{\sf ext}{\eth , p}, {\sf J}, p}\), for all behavioural functors \({\sf G}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\rm {B}} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cup \lbrace p\rbrace)\). Hence, up to this point, we have proved that the following two properties are equivalent:
\({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p.{\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt } p) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p)\);
for all \(({\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt)\)-functors \({\sf J}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cup \lbrace p\rbrace)\) and functions \(\eth \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\rm {B}} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} }) \rightarrow {\mathfrak{X}}\), there exists a function \(\eth ^{\prime } \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\rm {B}} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cup \lbrace p\rbrace) \rightarrow {\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} , p}\) such that, for all behavioural functors \({\sf G}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\rm {B}} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cup \lbrace p\rbrace)\), it holds that \({\sf ext}{\eth ^{\prime }({\sf G}), {\sf G}, p} \subseteq {\sf ext}{{\sf ext}{\eth , p}, {\sf J}, p}\).
Now, by deSkolemizing the existential quantification of \(\eth ^{\prime }\) w.r.t.the universal quantification of \({\sf G}\), the second point is equivalent to the following: for all \(({\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt)\)-functors \({\sf J}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cup \lbrace p\rbrace)\), functions \(\eth \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\rm {B}} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} }) \rightarrow {\mathfrak{X}}\), and behavioural functors \({\sf G}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\rm {B}} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cup \lbrace p\rbrace)\), there exists a set \({\rm Y}\in {\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} , p}\) such that \({\sf ext}{{\rm Y}, {\sf G}, p} \subseteq {\sf ext}{{\sf ext}{\eth , p}, {\sf J}, p}\). Finally, to obtain what is required by the statement of the claim, it is enough to observe that every set \({\rm Y}\) is equal to \({\sf ext}{{\rm X}, {\sf F}, p}\), for some \({\Theta}\)-functor \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} })\) and set \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\).□
Thanks to the given characterisation, we can now show that the inclusion \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p.{\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt } p) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p)\) actually holds true by proving the existence of a suitable functor \({\sf F}\) and set of assignments \({\rm X}\), in dependence of the functors \({\sf J}\) and \({\sf G}\) and the selection map \(\eth\), that satisfy the inclusion \({\sf ext}{{\sf ext}{{\rm X}, {\sf F}, p}, {\sf G}, p} \subseteq {\sf ext}{{\sf ext}{\eth , p}, {\sf J}, p}\). In order to define such a functor \({\sf F}\), let us inductively construct, for every given assignment \(\chi \in {\rm Asg}(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} })\), the following infinite families of assignments \(\lbrace {a}_{t}^\chi \in {\rm Asg}(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cup \lbrace p\rbrace) \rbrace _{t \in {\mathbb {N}}}\), Boolean values \(\lbrace {\mathcal {v}}_{t}^\chi \in {\mathbb {B}}\rbrace _{t \in {\mathbb {N}}}\), and assignments \(\lbrace b_t^\chi [\chi ] \in {\rm Asg}(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cup \lbrace p\rbrace) \rbrace _{t \in {\mathbb {N}}}\), indexed by the time instants:
[Base step \(t = 0\)] as base step, we choose \({a}_{0}^\chi \in {\rm Asg}(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cup \lbrace p\rbrace)\) as an arbitrary assignment for which the equality \({a}_{0}^\chi \upharpoonright \text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } = \chi\) holds true, the Boolean value \({\mathcal {v}}_{0}^\chi \in {\mathbb {B}}\) as \({\sf J}({a}_{0}^\chi)(0)\), i.e., \({\mathcal {v}}_{0}^\chi \triangleq {\sf J}({a}_{0}^\chi)(0)\), and \(b_0^\chi \in {\rm Asg}(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cup \lbrace p\rbrace)\) as an arbitrary assignment with \(b_0^\chi \upharpoonright \text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } = \chi\) such that, at time 0 on the variable p, assumes \({\mathcal {v}}_{0}^\chi\) as value, i.e., \(b_0^\chi (p)(0) = {\mathcal {v}}_{0}^\chi\);
[Inductive step \(t \gt 0\)] as inductive step, we derive the assignment \({a}_{t}^\chi \in {\rm Asg}(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cup \lbrace p\rbrace)\) from \({\sf G}(b_{t-1}^\chi)\), i.e., \({a}_{t}^\chi \triangleq {\chi }[p\mapsto {\sf G}(b_{t-1}^\chi)]\), and the Boolean value \({\mathcal {v}}_{t}^\chi \in {\mathbb {B}}\) from \({\sf J}({a}_{t}^\chi)(t)\), i.e., \({\mathcal {v}}_{t}^\chi \triangleq {\sf J}({a}_{t}^\chi)(t)\); moreover, we choose \(b_t^\chi \in {\rm Asg}(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \cup \lbrace p\rbrace)\) as an arbitrary assignment with \(b_t^\chi \upharpoonright \text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } = \chi\) such that, on the variable p, is equal to \(b_{t-1}^\chi\) up to time t excluded and assumes \({\mathcal {v}}_{t}^\chi\) as value at time t, i.e., \(b_t^\chi (p)(h) = b_{t-1}^\chi (p)(h)\), for all \(h \in {[0,t)}\), and \(b_t^\chi (p)(t) = {\mathcal {v}}_{t}^\chi\).
The above inductive construction can be schematically summarised as follows, where, for every \(t \in {\mathbb {N}}\), both \({\rm g}_t\) and \({{\sf j}}_t\) are temporal assignments, i.e., functions of the form \({\rm g}_t, {{\sf j}}_t \in {\mathbb {N}}\rightarrow {\mathbb {B}}\):
Thanks to the infinite family of Boolean values \(\lbrace {\mathcal {v}}_{t}^\chi \in {\mathbb {B}}\rbrace _{t \in {\mathbb {N}}}\), one for each assignment \(\chi \in {\rm Asg}(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} })\), we can define the functor \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} })\) as follows, for every instant of time \(t \in {\mathbb {N}}\): \(\begin{equation*} {\sf F}(\chi)(t) \triangleq {\mathcal {v}}_{t}^\chi . \end{equation*}\) It is easy to show that this functor complies with the quantifier specification \({\Theta}\), since the functor \({\sf J}\), from which \({\sf F}\) is derived, is compliant with the quantifier specification \({\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt\).
Before continuing, let us first introduce the functor \({\sf H}\in {\rm Fnc}(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} })\) as follows, for every assignment \(\chi \in {\rm Asg}(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} })\): \(\begin{equation*} {\sf H}(\chi) \triangleq {\sf ext}{{\sf ext}{\chi , {\sf F}, p}, {\sf G}, p}(p). \end{equation*}\) It is not hard to verify that such a functor is behavioural, since \({\sf F}\) is \({\Theta}\)-compliant and \({\sf G}\) is behavioural.
At this point, consider the set of assignments \({\rm X}\triangleq \eth ({\sf H})\). Thanks to the specific definitions of the two functors \({\sf F}\) and \({\sf H}\), the following claim can be proved.
\({\sf ext}{{\sf ext}{{\rm X}, {\sf F}, p}, {\sf G}, p} \subseteq {\sf ext}{{\sf ext}{{\rm X}, {\sf H}, p}, {\sf J}, p}\).
Now, it is obvious that \({\sf ext}{{\rm X}, {\sf H}, p} \subseteq {\sf ext}{\eth , p}\), due to the definition of the latter and the choice of the set \({\rm X}\), which immediately implies \({\sf ext}{{\sf ext}{{\rm X}, {\sf H}, p}, {\sf J}, p} \subseteq {\sf ext}{{\sf ext}{\eth , p}, {\sf J}, p}\). Therefore, \({\sf ext}{{\sf ext}{{\rm X}, {\sf F}, p}, {\sf G}, p} \subseteq {\sf ext}{{\sf ext}{\eth , p}, {\sf J}, p}\), which concludes the proof.
\({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! \vec{p} .{\rm {Q}} ^{\vec{{\Theta} } \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : \vec{p} \right\gt } \vec{p}) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{p} .\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! \vec{p})\), for all hyperassignments \({\mathfrak{X}} \in {\rm HAsg}\), \(\alpha\)-coherent quantifier symbols \({\rm {Q}} \in \lbrace \exists , \forall \rbrace\), vectors of quantifier specifications \(\vec{{\Theta} } \in {\Theta} _{{\rm {B}} }^*\) , and vectors of atomic propositions \(\vec{p}, \vec{p} \in (\text{AP}\setminus \text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} })^{*}\), with \(|\vec{p}| = |\vec{{\Theta} }|\).
The proof of the statements proceeds by combining two independent inductions. In particular, we first show, by exploiting Proposition 10 via an induction on the length of the vector of atomic propositions \(\vec{p}\), that \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! \vec{p} .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : \vec{p} \right\gt } p) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! \vec{p})\). Indeed, one can easily verify the correctness of the following chain of equalities/inequalities: (1a) \(\begin{align} {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! \vec{p} .\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p.{\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : \vec{p} p \right\gt } p)} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! \vec{p}), \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p.{\rm {Q}} ^{({\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : \vec{p} \right\gt) \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt } p)} \end{align}\) (1b) \(\begin{align} & \sqsubseteq {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! \vec{p}), {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : \vec{p} \right\gt } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p)} \end{align}\) (1c) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! \vec{p} .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : \vec{p} \right\gt } p), \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p)} \end{align}\) (1d) \(\begin{align} & \sqsubseteq {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! \vec{p}), \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p)} \end{align}\) (1e) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! \vec{p} .\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! p)}. \end{align}\)
Steps (1a), (1c), and (1e) are due to the definition of evolution function of a quantifier prefix, Step (1b) is due to Proposition 10 applied to the outer evolution function, and, finally, Step (1d) is just an application of the inductive hypothesis to the inner evolution function combined with the monotonicity property of Proposition 5.
At this point, by exploiting what we have just derived via an induction on the length of the vector of atomic propositions \(\vec{p}\), we can prove the correctness of the statement by means of the following chain of equalities/inequalities: (2a) \(\begin{align} {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! \vec{p} .{\rm {Q}} ^{\vec{{\Theta} } \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : \vec{p} \right\gt } \vec{p} .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : \vec{p} \right\gt } p)} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! \vec{p} .{\rm {Q}} ^{\vec{{\Theta} } \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : \vec{p} \right\gt } \vec{p}), {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : \vec{p} \right\gt } p)} \end{align}\) (2b) \(\begin{align} & \sqsubseteq {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{p} .\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! \vec{p}), {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : \vec{p} \right\gt } p)} \end{align}\) (2c) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{p}), \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! \vec{p} .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : \vec{p} \right\gt } p)} \end{align}\) (2d) \(\begin{align} & \sqsubseteq {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{p}), {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! \vec{p}}) \end{align}\) (2e) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{p} .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! \vec{p}}). \end{align}\)
Steps (2a), (2c), and (2e) are due to the definition of evolution function of a quantifier prefix, Step (2b) is just an application of the inductive hypothesis to the inner evolution function combined with the monotonicity property of Proposition 5, and, finally, Step (2d) is due to the previously proved inequality \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! \vec{p} .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : \vec{p} \right\gt } p) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} }\! \vec{p})\) applied to the outer evolution function.□
Towards the proof of Proposition 6, we show the following more general result.
Let \({\mathfrak{X}} \in {\rm HAsg}\) be an hyperassignment and \({\wp} , {\wp} _1, {\wp} _2, {\wp} _3 \in {\rm Qn}_{{\rm {B}} }\) behavioral quantifier prefixes, such that \({\wp} = {\wp} _1 .{\wp} _2 .{\wp} _3\) and \(\text {ap} {{\wp} } \cap \text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } = {\emptyset}\). Then, it holds that \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp})) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} _1 .{\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2) .{\wp} _3) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp}) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} _1 .{\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp} _2) .{\wp} _3) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp}))\).
Proof. We separately prove the two chains of inequalities forming the statement, namely \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp})) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} _1 .{\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2) .{\wp} _3) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp})\) and \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp}) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} _1 .{\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp} _2) .{\wp} _3) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp}))\), by using different technical expedients.
[\({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp})) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} _1 .{\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2) .{\wp} _3) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp})\)] To prove that the first chain of inequalities holds, let us fix a well-founded preorder \(\preceq\) over the set of triples of quantifier prefixes \({\mathcal {T}}= \lbrace {\langle {{\wp} _1}, {{\wp} _2}, {{\wp} _3}\rangle } \in {\rm Qn}_{{\rm {B}} } \times {\rm Qn}_{{\rm {B}} } \times {\rm Qn}_{{\rm {B}} } | {\wp} = {{\wp} ^1} .{{\wp} _2} .{\wp} _3\rbrace\) defined as follows: \({\langle {{\wp} ^1} ,{{\wp} _2} ,{{\wp} _3}\rangle } \preceq {\langle {{\wp} {^{1\prime}}}, {{\wp} _{2}^{\prime }}, {{\wp} _{3}^{\prime }}\rangle }\) iff\({\wp} _2^{\prime } = {{\wp} _l} \cdot {\wp} _2 \cdot {\wp} [r]\), for some \({{\wp} _l}, {\wp} [r] \in {\rm Qn}_{{\rm {B}} }\), i.e., \({\wp} _2\) is a (not necessarily proper) infix of \({\wp} _2^{\prime }\). Notice that, given the definition of the set \({\mathcal {T}}\), the relation \({\langle {{\wp} ^1}, {{\wp} _2}, {{\wp} _3}\rangle } \preceq {\langle {{\wp} ^{1\prime }}, {{\wp} _2^{\prime }}, {{{\wp} _3^\prime }}\rangle }\) also implies \({{\wp} ^1} = {\wp} ^{1\prime } \cdot {{\wp} _l}\) and \({\wp} _3 = {\wp} [r] \cdot {{\wp} _3^\prime }\). In addition, let us introduce \({\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T)\) as an abbreviation for \({\wp} ^1 .{\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2) .{\wp} _3\), given an arbitrary triple \(T= {\langle {{\wp} ^1}, {{\wp} _2}, {{\wp} _3}\rangle } \in {\mathcal {T}}\). Now, to show that the chain of inequalities holds true, it is enough to prove that \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T^{\prime })) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T))\), for all \(T, T^{\prime } \in {\mathcal {T}}\) with \(T\preceq T^{\prime }\). The proof shall proceed by structural induction on the preorder \(\preceq\).
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[Base case \(T= T^{\prime }\)] Obviously \({\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T) = {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T^{\prime })\). Thus, the property trivially holds, as \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T^{\prime })) = {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T))\).
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[Inductive case \(T\prec T^{\prime }\)] Since \(T\prec T^{\prime }\), there necessarily exists a triple \(T^{\prime \prime } = {\langle {{{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }}}, {{\wp} _2^{\prime \prime }}, {{\wp} _3^{\prime \prime }}\rangle } \in {\mathcal {T}}\) such that \(T\prec T^{\prime \prime } \preceq T^{\prime }\) and either (a) \({\wp} ^1 = {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }} .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p\), \({\wp} _2^{\prime \prime } = {\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p.{\wp} _2\), and \({\wp} _3 = {\wp} _3^{\prime \prime }\), or (b) \({\wp} ^1 = {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }}\), \({\wp} _2^{\prime \prime } = {\wp} _2 .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p\), and \({\wp} _3 = {\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p.{\wp} _3^{\prime \prime }\), for some quantifier symbol \({\rm {Q}} \in \lbrace \exists , \forall \rbrace\) and atomic proposition \(p\in \text{AP}\). By inductive hypothesis, it holds that \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T^{\prime })) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T^{\prime \prime }))\). Thus, to conclude, we need to show that \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T^{\prime \prime })) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T))\). If \({\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T) = {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T^{\prime \prime })\), there is nothing really to prove, as \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T^{\prime \prime })) = {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T))\). Hence, let us assume \({\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T) \ne {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T^{\prime \prime })\). The proof now proceeds with the following case analysis.
(a)
[\({\wp} ^1 = {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }} .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p\), \({\wp} _2^{\prime \prime } = {\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p.{\wp} _2\), and \({\wp} _3 = {\wp} _3^{\prime \prime }\)] First observe that \({\rm {Q}}\) is \(\alpha\)-coherent. If this were not the case, indeed, we would have had \({\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2^{\prime \prime }) = {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p.{\wp} _2) = {\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p.{\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2)\), which in turn would have implied \({\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T^{\prime \prime }) = {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }} .{\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2^{\prime \prime }) .{\wp} _3^{\prime \prime } = {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }} .{\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p.{\wp} _2) .{\wp} _3^{\prime \prime } = {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }} .{{\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} }} p.{\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2) .{\wp} _3^{\prime \prime } = {\wp} ^1 .{\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2) .{\wp} _3, = {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T)\), contradicting the previous assumption \({\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T) \ne {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T^{\prime \prime })\). Both \({\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2)\) and \({\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2^{\prime \prime })\) are prefix canonicalisation, featuring at most one quantifier alternation starting with a \(\bar{\alpha }\)-coherent quantifier \(\bar{{\rm {Q}} }\). Specifically, these can be written as \({\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2) = \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p} .{\rm {Q}} ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{r}\) and \({\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2^{\prime \prime }) = {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p.{\wp} _2) = \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p} .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : \vec{p} \right\gt } p.{\rm {Q}} ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{r}\), for some vectors of atomic propositions \(\vec{p}\) and \(\vec{r}\), and a vector of quantifiers specifications \(\vec{{\Theta} } \in {\Theta} _{{\rm {B}} }^*\) with \(|\vec{{\Theta} }| = |\vec{r}|\). At this point, the induction proof terminates by checking the following chain of equalities/inequalities: \(\begin{align} {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T^{\prime \prime }))} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }} .{\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2^{\prime \prime }) .{\wp} _3^{\prime \prime })} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }}), {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2^{\prime \prime })), {\wp} _3^{\prime \prime })} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }}), \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p} .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : \vec{p} \right\gt } p.{\rm {Q}} ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{r}), {\wp} _3^{\prime \prime })} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }}), \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p} .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : \vec{p} \right\gt } p), {\rm {Q}} ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{r} .{\wp} _3^{\prime \prime })} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & \sqsubseteq {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }}), {\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p}), {\rm {Q}} ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{r} .{\wp} _3^{\prime \prime })} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }}), {\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p} .{\rm {Q}} ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{r}), {\wp} _3^{\prime \prime })} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }} .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p), \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p} .{\rm {Q}} ^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{r}), {\wp} _3^{\prime \prime })} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} ^1), {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2)), {\wp} _3)} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} ^1 .{\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2) .{\wp} _3)} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T))}. \end{align}\) Step (3e) is due to Proposition 11 applied to \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }}), \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p} .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : \vec{p} \right\gt } p)\) combined with Proposition 5. All the other steps are just immediate consequences of the definition of evolution function and the structure of both the quantifier prefixes \({{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }}\), \({\wp} _2^{\prime \prime }\), and \({\wp} _3^{\prime \prime }\), and the canonical forms \({\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T)\) and \({\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T^{\prime \prime })\).
(b)
[\({\wp} ^1 = {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }}\), \({\wp} _2^{\prime \prime } = {\wp} _2 .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p\), and \({\wp} _3 = {\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p.{\wp} _3^{\prime \prime }\)] Similarly to the previous case, from \({\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T) \ne {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T^{\prime \prime })\), one can derive that \({\rm {Q}}\) is \(\bar{\alpha }\)-coherent. Consequently, \({\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2)\) and \({\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2^{\prime \prime })\) can be written as \({\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2) = {\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p} .\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{r}\) and \({\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2^{\prime \prime }) = {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2 .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p) = {\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p} .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{\vec{{\Theta} }^{\prime }} \vec{r}\), for some vectors of atomic propositions \(\vec{p}\) and \(\vec{r}\), and vectors of quantifiers specifications \(\vec{{\Theta} }, \vec{{\Theta} }^{\prime } \in {\Theta} _{{\rm {B}} }^*\) with \(|\vec{{\Theta} }| = |\vec{{\Theta} }^{\prime }|= |\vec{r}|\) and \(\vec{{\Theta} ^{\prime }} = \vec{{\Theta} } \cup \left\lt {\rm {S}} : p \right\gt\). At this point, the induction proof terminates by checking the following chain of equalities/inequalities: \(\begin{align} {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T^{\prime \prime }))} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }} .{\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2^{\prime \prime }) .{\wp} _3^{\prime \prime })} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }}), {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2^{\prime \prime })), {\wp} _3^{\prime \prime })} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }}), {\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p} .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{\vec{{\Theta} }^{\prime }} \vec{r}), {\wp} _3^{\prime \prime })} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }} .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p}), {\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{\vec{{\Theta} }^{\prime }} \vec{r}), {\wp} _3^{\prime \prime })} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & \sqsubseteq {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }} .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p}), \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{r} .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p), {\wp} _3^{\prime \prime })} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }}), {\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p} .\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{r} .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p), {\wp} _3^{\prime \prime })} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }}), {\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p} .\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{\vec{{\Theta} }} \vec{r}), {\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p.{\wp} _3^{\prime \prime })} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} ^1), {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2)), {\wp} _3)} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} ^1 .{\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2) .{\wp} _3)} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T))}. \end{align}\) Step (4e) is due to Proposition 11 applied to \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }} .{\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } \vec{p}), {\rm {Q}} ^{{\rm {B}} } p.\bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{\vec{{\Theta} }^{\prime }} \vec{r})\) combined with Proposition 5. All the other steps are just immediate consequences of the definition of evolution function and the structure of both the quantifier prefixes \({{\wp} _1^{\prime \prime }}\), \({\wp} _2^{\prime \prime }\), and \({\wp} _3^{\prime \prime }\), and the canonical forms \({\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T)\) and \({\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(T^{\prime \prime })\).
[\({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp}) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} ^1 .{\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp} _2) .{\wp} _3) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp}))\)] In order to show that the second chain of inequalities holds as well, we first state the following two simple auxiliary results, one regarding a duality property between the two syntactic canonicalisations of a quantifier prefix and the other concerning the dualization of the evolution function.
\(\bar{{\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp})} = {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(\bar{{\wp} })\), for all quantifier prefixes \({\wp} \in {\rm Qn}\).
\(\bar{{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp})} \equiv {\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, \bar{{\wp} })\), for all hyperassignments \({\mathfrak{X}} \in {\rm HAsg}\) and quantifier prefixes \({\wp} \in {\rm Qn}\).
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of \({\wp}\).
–
[Base step \({\wp} = \varepsilon\)] \(\bar{{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \varepsilon)} = \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } = {\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, \varepsilon)\).
–
[Inductive step \({\wp} = {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.{\wp} ^{\prime }\)] First notice that \(\bar{{\wp} } = \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\Theta} }\! p.\bar{{\wp} ^{\prime }}\) and observe that, thanks to the definition of evolution function and the inductive hypothesis, the following holds true: \(\begin{equation*} \bar{{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp})} = \bar{{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p), {\wp} ^{\prime })} \equiv {\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)}, \bar{{\wp} ^{\prime }}). \end{equation*}\) Let us now distinguish two cases based on the coherence of \(\alpha\) and \({\rm {Q}}\).
[\({\rm {Q}}\) is \(\alpha\)-coherent] \(\begin{align} {\bar{{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp})}} & \equiv {{\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)}, \bar{{\wp} ^{\prime }})} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} , p}}, \bar{{\wp} ^{\prime }})} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & \equiv {{\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{ \bar{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }}, p} }, \bar{{\wp} ^{\prime }})} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\Theta} }\! p), \bar{{\wp} ^{\prime }})} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\Theta} }\! p.\bar{{\wp} ^{\prime }})} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, \bar{{\wp} })} \end{align}\)
Step (5b) and (5d) are due to the definition of evolution function over a single quantifier, for the cases when \(\alpha\) and \({\rm {Q}}\) are coherent and non-coherent, respectively. Step (5c) is just a simple consequence of Propositions 1, 4, and 5. Finally, Step (5e) is given by the definition of evolution function for quantifier prefixes.
[\({\rm {Q}}\) is not \(\alpha\)-coherent] \(\begin{align} {\bar{{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp})}} & \equiv {{\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)}, \bar{{\wp} ^{\prime }})} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{\bar{{\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, p}}}, \bar{{\wp} ^{\prime }})} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & \equiv {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, p}, \bar{{\wp} ^{\prime }})} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\Theta} }\! p), \bar{{\wp} ^{\prime }})} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, \bar{{\rm {Q}} }^{{\Theta} }\! p.\bar{{\wp} ^{\prime }})} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, \bar{{\wp} })} \end{align}\)
Step (6b) and (6d) are due to the definition of evolution function over a single quantifier, for the cases when \(\alpha\) and \({\rm {Q}}\) are non-coherent and coherent, respectively. Step (6c) is just a simple consequence of Propositions 1 and 5. Finally, Step (6e) is given by the definition of evolution function for quantifier prefixes.\(\Box\)
In the first item of this proof, we have proved that \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp})) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} ^1 .{\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp} _2) .{\wp} _3) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp})\) holds true for every \({\mathfrak{X}} \in {\rm HAsg}\) and \({\wp} , {\wp} ^1, {\wp} _2, {\wp} _3 \in {\rm Qn}_{{\rm {B}} }\), with \({\wp} = {\wp} ^1 .{\wp} _2 .{\wp} _3\). By instantiating \({\mathfrak{X}}\) and \({\wp}\) with \(\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\) and \(\bar{{\wp} }\), and observing that \(\bar{{\wp} } = \bar{{\wp} ^1} .\bar{{\wp} _2} .\bar{{\wp} _3}\), we obtain \({\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(\bar{{\wp} })) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, \bar{{\wp} ^1} .{\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(\bar{{\wp} _2}) .\bar{{\wp} _3}) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, \bar{{\wp} })\). Now, thanks to Claims 9 and 10 above, we obtain \(\bar{{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp}))} \sqsubseteq \bar{{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} ^1 .{\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp} _2) .{\wp} _3)} \sqsubseteq \bar{{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp})}\), as shown in the following two chains of equivalences/inequalities: \(\begin{align} {\bar{{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp}))}} & \equiv {{\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, \bar{{\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp})})} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(\bar{{\wp} }))} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & \sqsubseteq {{\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, \bar{{\wp} ^1} .{\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(\bar{{\wp} _2}) .\bar{{\wp} _3})} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, \bar{{\wp} ^1} .\bar{{\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp} _2)} .\bar{{\wp} _3})} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, \bar{{\wp} ^1 .{\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp} _2) .{\wp} _3})} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & \equiv {\bar{{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} ^1 .{\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp} _2) .{\wp} _3)}}. \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} {\bar{{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} ^1 .{\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp} _2) .{\wp} _3)}} & \equiv {{\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, \bar{{\wp} ^1 .{\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp} _2) .{\wp} _3})} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, \bar{{\wp} ^1} .\bar{{\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp} _2)} .\bar{{\wp} _3})} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, \bar{{\wp} ^1} .{\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}(\bar{{\wp} _2}) .\bar{{\wp} _3})} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & \sqsubseteq {{\sf evl}_\alpha (\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, \bar{{\wp} })} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & \equiv {\bar{{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp})}}. \end{align}\)
At this point, thanks to Propositions 1 and 4, we derive \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp}) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} ^1 .{\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp} _2) .{\wp} _3) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp}))\) from \(\bar{{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp}))} \sqsubseteq \bar{{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} ^1 .{\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp} _2) .{\wp} _3)} \sqsubseteq \bar{{\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp})}\).\(\Box\)
The following proposition is now an immediate consequence of the above result.
Proposition 6. \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\bar{\alpha }}({\wp})) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp}) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\alpha }({\wp}))\), for all hyperassignments \({\mathfrak{X}} \in {\rm HAsg}\) and behavioral quantifier prefixes \({\wp} \in {\rm Qn}_{{\rm {B}} }\), with \(\text {ap} {{\wp} } \cap \text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } = {\emptyset}\).
At this point, we have proven everything used in the proof of Theorem 6 from the main paper. Here is the graph of dependency presenting the propositions used for this proof.
For the next proposition, given a set of assignments \({\rm Y}\) and a set of atomic propositions \({\rm P}\subseteq \text{AP}\), we introduce the notation \({\rm Y}\setminus _{{\rm P}} \triangleq \lbrace \chi \in {\rm Asg}(\text {ap} {{\rm Y}} \setminus {\rm P}) | \exists \chi ^{\prime } \in {\rm Y}.\chi \subseteq \chi ^{\prime }\rbrace\). We also use the notation \({\rm Y}\setminus _{p}\), with \(p\in \text {ap} {{\rm Y}}\), as a shortcut for \({\rm Y}\setminus _{\lbrace p\rbrace }\).
Let \({\mathfrak{X}} \in {\rm HAsg}({\rm P})\) be a hyperassignment over \({\rm P}\subseteq \text{AP}\) and \({\wp} \in {\rm Qn}\) a quantifier prefix, with \(\text {ap} {{\wp} } \cap {\rm P}= {\emptyset}\). Then, for all sets of assignments \({\rm Y}\in {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp})\), it holds that \({\rm Y}\setminus _{\text {ap} {{\wp} }} \subseteq \bigcup {\mathfrak{X}}\).
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the quantification prefix \({\wp}\).
[Base case \({\wp} = \varepsilon\)] \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , \varepsilon) = {\mathfrak{X}}\), thus, the property follows trivially. | |||||
– | [Base case \({\wp} = {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p\) with \({\rm {Q}}\)\(\alpha\)-coherent] Since \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp}) = {\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} , p}\), there exist \({\rm X}\in {\mathfrak{X}}\) and \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} })\) such that \({\rm Y}= {\sf ext}{{\rm X}, {\sf F}, p}\). Thus, \({\rm Y}\setminus _{ p} = {\rm X}\subseteq \bigcup {\mathfrak{X}}\), hence the thesis. | ||||
– | [Base case \({\wp} = {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p\) with \({\rm {Q}}\) not \(\alpha\)-coherent] In this case, we have \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p) = \bar{{\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, p}}\). Let \({\rm Y}\in \bar{{\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, p}}\). By definition of dualization, there is \(\Gamma \in {\sf Chc}{{\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{\bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }, p}}\) such that \({\sf img}{\Gamma } = {\rm Y}\). Then, for every \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} })\) and every \({\rm X}\in {{}} \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\), there is \(\chi _{{\rm X},{\sf F}} \in {\sf ext}{{\rm X}, {\sf F}, p}\) such that \({\rm Y}= \lbrace \chi _{{\rm X},{\sf F}} | {\rm X}\in {{}} \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \wedge {\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} }) \rbrace\). Then for every \(\chi _{{\rm X},{\sf F}}\), there is \(\chi _{{\rm X},{\sf F}}^{\prime } \in {\rm X}\) such that \(\chi _{{\rm X},{\sf F}} = {\chi ^{\prime }_{{\rm X},{\sf F}}}[p\mapsto {\sf F}(\chi ^{\prime }_{{\rm X},{\sf F}})]\). Naturally, \({\rm Y}\setminus _{\text {ap} {{\wp} }} = \lbrace \chi _{{\rm X},{\sf F}}^{\prime } | {\rm X}\in {{}} \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} } \wedge {\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} }) \rbrace\). However, \({\rm X}\in \bar{{\mathfrak{X}} }\) and then \(\chi _{{\rm X},{\sf F}}^{\prime } \in \bigcup {\mathfrak{X}}\). Hence, \({\rm Y}\setminus _{\text {ap} {{\wp} }} \subseteq \bigcup {\mathfrak{X}}\). | ||||
[Inductive case \({\wp} = {\wp} ^{\prime } .{{\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} }} p\)] By the inductive hypothesis, we have that \(Z\setminus _{\text {ap} {{\wp} ^{\prime }}} \subseteq \bigcup {\mathfrak{X}}\), for all \(Z\in {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} ^{\prime })\). Consequently, \((\bigcup {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} ^{\prime })) \setminus _{\text {ap} {{\wp} ^{\prime }}} = \bigcup ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} ^{\prime }) \setminus _{\text {ap} {{\wp} ^{\prime }}}) \subseteq \bigcup {\mathfrak{X}}\). Now, by definition of evolution function, we have that \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp}) = {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} ^{\prime }), {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\). Again by the inductive hypothesis, \({\rm Y}\setminus _{p} \subseteq \bigcup {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} ^{\prime })\), since \({\rm Y}\in {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} ^{\prime }), {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\). Hence, \({\rm Y}\setminus _{\text {ap} {{\wp} }} = ({\rm Y}\setminus _{p}) \setminus _{\text {ap} {{\wp} ^{\prime }}} \subseteq (\bigcup {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} , {\wp} ^{\prime })) \setminus _{\text {ap} {{\wp} ^{\prime }}} \subseteq \bigcup {\mathfrak{X}}\), as expected.\(\Box\) |
We now define a refinement of the order \(\sqsubseteq\) between two hyperassignments \({\mathfrak{X}} _1, {\mathfrak{X}} _2 \in {\rm HAsg}\), with \(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} _1} = \text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} _2}\), w.r.t.a set of assignments \({\rm X}\subseteq {\rm Asg}({\rm P})\) over some \({\rm P}\subseteq \text{AP}\) as follows: \({\mathfrak{X}} _1 \sqsubseteq _{{\rm X}} {{\mathfrak{X}} _2}\) if, for every \({{\rm X}_1} \in {\mathfrak{X}} _1\), there is \({{\rm X}_2} \in {\mathfrak{X}} _2\) such that \({\rm X}_2 \setminus \lbrace \chi \in {\rm Asg}| \chi \upharpoonright _{{\rm P}} \in {\rm X}\rbrace \subseteq {{\rm X}_1}\).
Let \({{\mathfrak{X}} _1}, {\mathfrak{X}} _2 \in {\rm HAsg}\) be two hyperassignments with \({{\mathfrak{X}} _1} \sqsubseteq _{{\rm X}} {{\mathfrak{X}} _2}\), for some set of assignments \({\rm X}\subseteq {\rm Asg}({\rm P})\) over a set of atomic propositions \({\rm P}\subseteq \text{AP}\). Then, the following hold true: \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({{\mathfrak{X}} _1}, {\wp}) \sqsubseteq _{{\rm X}} {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _2, {\wp})\), for all \({\wp} \in {\rm Qn}\) with \(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} _1} \cap \text {ap} {{\wp} } = \text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} _2} \cap \text {ap} {{\wp} } = {\emptyset}\).
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of \({\wp}\).
[Base step \({\wp} = \varepsilon\)] \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({{\mathfrak{X}} _1}, \varepsilon) = {{\mathfrak{X}} _1} \sqsubseteq _{{\rm X}} {{\mathfrak{X}} _2} = {\sf evl}_\alpha ({{\mathfrak{X}} _2}, \varepsilon)\).
[Inductive step \({\wp} = {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p.{\wp} ^{\prime }\)] Let us distinguish two cases based on whether \({\rm {Q}}\) is or not \(\alpha\)-coherent.
–
[\({\rm {Q}}\) is \(\alpha\)-coherent] Since \(\alpha\) and \({\rm {Q}}\) are coherent, \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _i, {\wp}) = {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} _i, p}, {\wp} ^{\prime })\), for all \(i \in \lbrace 1, 2 \rbrace\). We can now focus on showing that \({\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} _1, p} \sqsubseteq _{{\rm X}} {\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{{\mathfrak{X}} _2}, p}\) holds true, as the thesis follows by applying the inductive hypothesis. Since \({\sf ext}[{\Theta} ]{{\mathfrak{X}} _i, p} = \lbrace {\sf ext}{{\rm X}_i, {\sf F}_i, p} | {\rm X}_i \in {\mathfrak{X}} _i, {\sf F}_i \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} _i}) \rbrace\), we have to prove that, for every \({{\rm X}_1} \in {{\mathfrak{X}} _1}\) and \({\sf F}_1 \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{{\mathfrak{X}} _1}})\), there exist \({\rm X}_2 \in {{\mathfrak{X}} _2}\) and \({\sf F}_2 \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{{\mathfrak{X}} _2}})\) such that \({\sf ext}{{\rm X}_2, {\sf F}_2, p} \setminus \lbrace \chi \in {\rm Asg}| \chi \upharpoonright [{\rm P}] \in {\rm X}\rbrace \subseteq {\sf ext}{{{\rm X}_1}, {\sf F}_1, p}\). Now, it is easy to see that such a property can be satisfied by choosing \({\sf F}_2 \triangleq {\sf F}_1\), since \({\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{{\mathfrak{X}} _1}}) = {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{{\mathfrak{X}} _2}})\), and \({{\mathfrak{X}} _2} \triangleq {\sf f}({{\mathfrak{X}} _1})\), where \({\sf f}:{{\mathfrak{X}} _1} \rightarrow {{\mathfrak{X}} _2}\) is a witness for the inclusion \({{\mathfrak{X}} _1} \sqsubseteq _{{\rm X}} {{\mathfrak{X}} _2}\).
–
[\({\rm {Q}}\) is not \(\alpha\)-coherent] Since \(\alpha\) and \({\rm {Q}}\) are not coherent, by Propositions 5 and 9, it holds that \({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _i, {\wp}) = {\sf evl}_\alpha ({\sf evl}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _i, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p), {\wp} ^{\prime }) \equiv {\sf evl}_\alpha ({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _i, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p), {\wp} ^{\prime })\), for all \(i \in \lbrace 1, 2 \rbrace\). As done in the previous case, we can now focus on showing that \({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({{\mathfrak{X}} _1}, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p) \sqsubseteq _{{\rm X}} {{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({{\mathfrak{X}} _2}, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p)\) holds true, as the thesis follows by applying the inductive hypothesis. Since \({{\sf nevl}}_\alpha ({\mathfrak{X}} _i, {\rm {Q}} ^{{\Theta} } p) = \lbrace {\sf ext}{\eth _{i}, p} | \eth _{i} \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} _i}) \rightarrow {\mathfrak{X}} _i \rbrace\), we have to prove that, for every \(\eth _{1} \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{{\mathfrak{X}} _1}}) \rightarrow {{\mathfrak{X}} _1}\), there exists \(\eth _{2} \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{{\mathfrak{X}} _2}}) \rightarrow {{\mathfrak{X}} _2}\) such that \({\sf ext}{\eth _{2}, p} \setminus \lbrace \chi \in {\rm Asg}| \chi \upharpoonright [{\rm P}] \in {\rm X}\rbrace \subseteq {\sf ext}{\eth _{1}, p}\). To this end, let us define a function \({\rm g}:({\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{{\mathfrak{X}} _1}}) \rightarrow {{\mathfrak{X}} _1}) \rightarrow ({\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} _2}) \rightarrow {{\mathfrak{X}} _2})\) as follows: \({\rm g}(\eth _{1})({\sf F}) \triangleq {\sf f}(\eth _{1}({\sf F}))\), for every \(\eth _{1} \in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{{\mathfrak{X}} _1}}) \rightarrow {{\mathfrak{X}} _1}\) and \({\sf F}\in {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{{\mathfrak{X}} _1}}) = {\rm Fnc}_{{\Theta} }(\text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} _2})\), where \({\sf f}:{{\mathfrak{X}} _1} \rightarrow {{\mathfrak{X}} _2}\) is a witness for the inclusion \({{\mathfrak{X}} _1} \sqsubseteq _{{\rm X}} {{\mathfrak{X}} _2}\). Clearly, it holds that \({\rm g}(\eth _{1})({\sf F}) \setminus \lbrace \chi \in {\rm Asg}| \chi \upharpoonright [{\rm P}] \in {\rm X}\rbrace \subseteq \eth _{1}({\sf F})\). Thus, the required property can be satisfied by choosing \(\eth _{2} \triangleq {\rm g}(\eth _{1})\), since \({\sf ext}{{\rm g}(\eth _{1}), p} \setminus \lbrace \chi \in {\rm Asg}| \chi \upharpoonright [{\rm P}] \in {\rm X}\rbrace \subseteq {\sf ext}{\eth _{1}, p}\) holds true.\(\Box\)
Next, we prove Theorem 8. Here is the graph of dependency presenting the theorem and the propositions used for this proof.
Theorem (Quantification Game II). Every \({\mathfrak{Q}}\)-game \({⅁}\), for some quantification-game schema \({\mathfrak{Q}} \triangleq {\langle {{\mathfrak{X}} }, {{\wp} }, {\Psi }\rangle }\), satisfies the following two properties:
(1) | if Eloise wins then \(E\subseteq \Psi\), for some \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}))\); | ||||
(2) | if Abelard wins then \(E\not\subseteq \Psi\), for all \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))\). |
Proof. First of all, recall that the game \({⅁} [{\mathfrak{Q}} ]\) of Construction 2 is obtained directly from the game \({⅁} [\widehat{{\wp} }][\widehat{\Psi }]\) of Construction 1, by defining the set of assignments \(\widehat{{\wp} }\) and the quantifier prefix \(\widehat{\Psi }\) as follows:
\(\widehat{{\wp} } \triangleq \forall \vec{p} .{\sim} {{\wp} } .{\wp}\) and
\(\widehat{\Psi } \triangleq \Psi \cup \lbrace \chi \in {\rm Asg}({\rm P}) | \chi \upharpoonright [\vec{p}] \,\not\in {\rm X}\rbrace\),
with \(\vec{p} \triangleq \text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} } \setminus \text {ap} {{\sim} {{\wp} }}\) and \({\rm P}\triangleq \text {ap} {{\wp} } \cup \text {ap} {{\mathfrak{X}} }\).
We can now proceed with the proof of the two properties.
[1] If Eloise wins the game, by Item 5 of Theorem 5, there exists a set of assignments \(\widehat{E} \in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }(\widehat{{\wp} }))\) such that \(\widehat{E} \subseteq \widehat{\Psi }\). Thanks to Propositions 5 and 12, we can show that \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }(\widehat{{\wp} })) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}))\). Indeed, \(\begin{align} {{\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }(\widehat{{\wp} }))} & = {{\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }(\forall \vec{p} .{\sim} {{\wp} } .{\wp}))} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & \sqsubseteq {{\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\forall \vec{p} .{\sim} {{\wp} } .{\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}))} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\forall \vec{p}), {\sim} {{\wp} }), {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}))} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\lbrace {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}) \rbrace , {\sim} {{\wp} }), {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}))} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & \sqsubseteq {{\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\lbrace {\rm X}\rbrace , {\sim} {{\wp} }), {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}))} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}))}, \end{align}\)
where Step (8b) is due to Proposition 12, Step (8d) to the equality \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\forall \vec{p}) = \lbrace {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}) \rbrace\), and Step (8e) is derived from Proposition 5, thanks to the fact that \(\lbrace {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}) \rbrace \sqsubseteq \lbrace {\rm X}\rbrace\). Now, due to the definition of the ordering \(\sqsubseteq\) between hyperassignments, it follows that \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_{\forall \exists }(\widehat{{\wp} })) \sqsubseteq {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}))\) necessarily implies the existence of a set of assignments \(E\!\in \! {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}))\) such that \(E\subseteq \widehat{E}\). Therefore, \(E\subseteq \widehat{\Psi }\). At this point, we can prove that \(E\subseteq \Psi\), since \(\widehat{\Psi } = \Psi \cup \lbrace \chi \in {\rm Asg}({\rm P}) | \chi \upharpoonright [\vec{p}] \,\not\in {\rm X}\rbrace\) and \(E\cap \lbrace \chi \in {\rm Asg}({\rm P}) | \chi \upharpoonright [\vec{p}] \,\not\in {\rm X}\rbrace = {\emptyset}\). Indeed, \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp})) = {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\lbrace {\rm X}\rbrace , {\sim} {{\wp} } .{\sf C}_{\forall \exists }({\wp}))\) and, by Proposition 13, it follows that \(E\setminus _{\vec{p}} \subseteq {\rm X}\).
[2] If Abelard wins the game, by Item 5 of Theorem 5, it holds that \(\widehat{E} \not\subseteq \widehat{\Psi }\), for all sets of assignments \(\widehat{E} \in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_\exists \forall (\widehat{{\wp} }))\). It is easy to observe that \(\lbrace {\rm X}\rbrace \sqsubseteq _{\bar{{\rm X}}} \lbrace {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}) \rbrace\), since \({\rm Asg}(\vec{p}) \setminus \lbrace \chi \in {\rm Asg}| \chi \upharpoonright _{\vec{p}} \in \bar{{\rm X}} \rbrace = {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}) \setminus \lbrace \chi \in {\rm Asg}| \chi \upharpoonright [\vec{p}] \not\in {\rm X}\rbrace = {\rm X}\). Thus, thanks to Propositions 12 and 14, we can show that \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp})) \sqsubseteq _{\bar{{\rm X}}} {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_\exists \forall (\widehat{{\wp} }))\). Indeed, \(\begin{align} {{\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))} & = {{\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\lbrace {\rm X}\rbrace , {\sim} {{\wp} }), {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & \sqsubseteq _{\bar{{\rm X}}} {{\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\lbrace {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}) \rbrace , {\sim} {{\wp} }), {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\forall \vec{p}), {\sim} {{\wp} }), {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\forall \vec{p} .{\sim} {{\wp} } .{\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & \sqsubseteq {{\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_\exists \forall (\forall \vec{p} .{\sim} {{\wp} } .{\wp}))} \end{align}\) \(\begin{align} & = {{\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_\exists \forall (\widehat{{\wp} }))}, \end{align}\)
where Step (9b) is due to Proposition 14, thanks to the fact that \(\lbrace {\rm X}\rbrace \sqsubseteq _{\bar{{\rm X}}} \lbrace {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}) \rbrace\), Step (9c) to the equality \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }(\forall \vec{p}) = \lbrace {\rm Asg}(\vec{p}) \rbrace\), and Step (9e) is derived from Proposition 12. Now, due to the definition of the ordering \(\sqsubseteq _{\bar{{\rm X}}}\) between hyperassignments, it follows that \({\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp})) \sqsubseteq _{\bar{{\rm X}}} {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_\exists \forall (\widehat{{\wp} }))\) necessarily implies the non existence of a set of assignments \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))\) such that \(E\subseteq \widehat{\Psi }\). Indeed, assume towards a contradiction that there is \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))\) such that \(E\subseteq \widehat{\Psi }\). By the above inclusion, there is \(\widehat{E} \in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\sf C}_\exists \forall (\widehat{{\wp} }))\) such that \(\widehat{E} \setminus \lbrace \chi \in {\rm Asg}| \chi \upharpoonright [\vec{p}] \in \bar{{\rm X}} \rbrace \subseteq E\subseteq \widehat{\Psi }\). Since \(\widehat{E} \cap \lbrace \chi \in {\rm Asg}| \chi \upharpoonright [\vec{p}] \in \bar{{\rm X}} \rbrace \subseteq \lbrace \chi \in {\rm Asg}({\rm P}) | \chi \upharpoonright [\vec{p}] \not\in {\rm X}\rbrace \subseteq \widehat{\Psi }\), we have that \(\widehat{E} \subseteq \widehat{\Psi }\), which contradicts the fact that Abelard wins the game. Hence, \(E\not\subseteq \widehat{\Psi }\) holds, for all \(E\in {\sf evl}_{\exists \forall }({\mathfrak{X}} , {\sf C}_\exists \forall ({\wp}))\), which implies that \(E\not\subseteq \Psi\), being \(\Psi \subseteq \widehat{\Psi }\).\(\Box\)
Now, we have proven everything that is used for the proof of Theorem 9 from the main paper. Here is the graph of dependency presenting the lemma, the propositions, the corollaries and theorems used for this proof.
And finally, we have proven everything that is used for the proof of Theorem 7 from the main paper. Here is the graph of dependency presenting the corollary and the theorem used for this proof.
D PROOFS OF SECTION 5
The following theorem relies on both the notions of parity game and parity automaton [14, 64, 65] (see also [26, 45]). Parity games are perfect-information two-player turn-based games of infinite duration, usually played on finite directed graphs. Their vertices, called positions, are labelled by natural numbers, called priorities, and are assigned to one of two players, namely 0 and 1. The game starts at a given position and, during its evolution, players can take a move (an outgoing edge) only at their own positions. The moves selected by the players induce an infinite sequence of vertices, called play. If the maximal priority of the vertices occurring infinitely often in the play is even, then the play is winning for player 0, otherwise, player 1 takes it all. Similarly, the states of a (non-deterministic) parity automaton are labelled with natural numbers (priorities) and an infinite word given in input is accepted by the automaton iffthere exists a run induced by such a word, for which the maximal priority seen infinitely often along it has even parity.
Theorem 10 (Satisfiability Game). For every behavioral
Let \(\varphi = {\wp} \psi\) be a behavioral
The deterministic automaton \({\mathcal {D}} [\psi ]\) recognising models of \(\psi\) can be obtained in a standard way, by first constructing a non-deterministic Büchi automaton \(A_\psi\) that recognises models of \(\psi\), using the Vardi-Wolper construction [81], and then by determinising \(A_\psi\) (via a Safra-like determinisation procedure [69]) into an equivalent deterministic parity automaton \({\mathcal {D}} [\psi ]={\langle {Q},{q_0},{\Sigma },{\delta },{\text{Acc}}\rangle }\), where
Q is the finite set of states,
\(\Sigma = {\rm Val}(\text {ap} {{\wp} })\) is the alphabet,
\(\delta : Q\times \Sigma \rightarrow Q\) is the transition function,
\(\text{Acc}: Q\rightarrow {\mathbb {N}}\) is the parity condition.
Now, the parity game \({⅁} _\varphi\) associated with \(\varphi\) is a pair \({⅁} _\varphi \triangleq {\langle {{\mathcal {A}}_\varphi },{{\rm Wn}[\varphi ]}\rangle }\), where:
\({\mathcal {A}}_\varphi \triangleq {\langle {{\rm P}_{{\rm S}_{\sf E}}^{\varphi }},{{\rm Ps}_{\sf A}^{\varphi }}, {v_I^{\varphi }}, {Mv^{\varphi }}\rangle }\) is the arena;
the set of positions \({\rm P}_{\rm S}^\varphi \triangleq {\rm P}_{{\rm S}_{\sf E}}^{\varphi } \uplus {\rm Ps}_{\sf A}^{\varphi } = Q\times ({\rm P}_{{\rm S}_{\sf E}}^{{\wp} ,\psi } \cup {\rm Ps}_{\sf A}^{{\wp} ,\psi })\) contains exactly the pairs consisting of a state of the automaton \({\mathcal {D}} [\psi ]\) and a valuation \({\chi} \in {\rm Val}\) which is a position of \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\) ;
the set of Eloise’s positions \({\rm P}_{{\rm S}_{\sf E}}^{\varphi } \subseteq {\rm P}_{\rm S}^\varphi\) only contains the positions \((q,{\chi}) \in {\rm P}_{\rm S}^\varphi\) where \({\chi}\) is an Eloise’s position in \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\) ;
the initial position \(v_I^{\varphi } \triangleq (q_0,{⦰})\) is just the initial state of \({\mathcal {D}} [\psi ]\) paired with the initial state of \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\) ;
the move relation \(Mv^{\varphi } \subseteq {\rm P}_{\rm S}^\varphi \times {\rm P}_{\rm S}^\varphi\) contains exactly those pairs of positions \(((q_1,{\chi} _1), (q_2,{\chi} _2)) \in {\rm P}_{\rm S}^\varphi \times {\rm P}_{\rm S}^\varphi\) such that:
–
\(({\chi} _1,{\chi} _2)\) is a move in \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\) ;
–
if \({\chi} _2 = {⦰}\) then \(q_2=\delta (q_1,{\chi} _1)\), otherwise, \(q_1=q_2\);
the winning condition \({\rm Wn}[\varphi ]\) is deduced from the accepting condition of the automaton \({\mathcal {D}} [\psi ]\). More precisely, the priority of a position \((q,{\chi}) \in {\rm P}_{\rm S}^\varphi\) is defined as the priority \(\text{Acc}(q)\) of q, i.e., \({\rm Wn}[\varphi ]((q,{\chi})) = \text{Acc}(q)\) for all \((q,{\chi}) \in {\rm P}_{\rm S}^\varphi\).
We want to show that there is a strategy for Eloise to win \({⅁} _\varphi\) if and only if there is a strategy for her to win \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\) .
Towards the definition of a correspondence between Eloise’s strategies in \({⅁} _\varphi\) and Eloise’s strategies in \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\) , we define now a bijection f between initial paths on \({⅁} _\varphi\) (denoted \({\rm {Pth}} _\text{init}({⅁} [\varphi ])\)) and initial paths on \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\) (denoted \({\rm {Pth}} _\text{init}({\Game}^{\psi}_{\wp})\)). Given two sets \(S,S^{\prime }\) and a pair \((x,y) \in S \times S^{\prime }\), we let \(\mathit {proj_1} (x,y) = x\) and \(\mathit {proj_2} (x,y) = y\), that is, functions \(\mathit {proj_1}\) and \(\mathit {proj_2}\) return the first and the second element of their argument, respectively. Furthermore, we denote by \(\tau \odot \pi \triangleq ((\tau)_0, (\pi)_0)((\tau)_1, (\pi)_1) \ldots\) the pairing product of two sequences. Let \(\pi \in {\rm {Pth}} _\text{init}({⅁} [\varphi ])\), with \(\pi\), be an initial path on \({⅁} _\varphi\). Function f maps \(\pi\) into the initial path on \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\) obtained by projecting on the second component of each position of \(\pi\), that is, \(f(\pi) = \langle \mathit {proj_2} ((\pi)_i) \rangle _{i \in {[0,|{\pi} |)}}\). The fact that f is a bijection, as stated in Corollary 5, is an immediate consequence of the following claim.
For every initial path \(\pi \in {\rm {Pth}} _\text{init}({\Game}^{\psi}_{\wp})\) there is exactly one sequence of automaton states \(\tau \in Q^{\infty }\) such that \(|\pi | = |\tau |\) and \(\tau \odot \pi \in {\rm {Pth}} _\text{init}({⅁} [\varphi ])\).□
The claim follows from the fact that, according to the definition of \(Mv^{\varphi }\), the first component of each position of a path on \({⅁} _\varphi\) is univocally determined by the second component of that position and by the previous position in the path (the fact that \({\mathcal {D}} [\psi ]\) is deterministic plays an important role in this). More formally, \(\tau\) is constructed inductively as: \((\tau)_0 = q_0\) is the initial state of \({\mathcal {D}} [\psi ]\) and, for \(i \in {\mathbb {N}}\), with \(i \gt 0\):
\((\tau)_{i} = \left\lbrace \begin{array}{ll} (\tau)_{i-1} & \text{if } (\pi)_{i} \ne {{⦰} } \\ \delta ((\tau)_{i-1} , (\pi)_{i-1}) & \text{if } (\pi)_{i} = {{⦰} } \end{array} \right.\)
Clearly, \(\tau \odot \pi \in {\rm {Pth}} _\text{init}({⅁} [\varphi ])\) since \(\pi\) is a path on \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\) and \(\tau\) closely follow the move relation \(Mv^{\varphi }\). It is also easy to see that for any other \(\tau ^{\prime } \in Q^{\infty }\), with \(\tau ^{\prime } \ne \tau\), it holds that \(\tau ^{\prime } \odot \pi \notin {\rm {Pth}} _\text{init}({⅁} [\varphi ])\). Indeed, assume, towards a contradiction, that \(\tau ^{\prime } \odot \pi \in {\rm {Pth}} _\text{init}({⅁} [\varphi ])\), and let i be the smallest index such that \((\tau)_i \ne (\tau ^{\prime })_i\). If \(i=0\), then \(((\tau ^{\prime })_i, (\pi)_i)\) is not the initial position of \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\), thus contradicting the assumption; if \(i \gt 0\) and \((\pi)_{i} \ne {{⦰} }\), we have: \((\tau)_i = (\tau)_{i-1} = (\tau ^{\prime })_{i-1}\), which implies \((\tau ^{\prime })_{i-1} \ne (\tau ^{\prime })_i\), and thus \((((\tau ^{\prime })_{i-1} , (\pi)_{i-1}), ((\tau ^{\prime })_{i} , (\pi)_{i}))\) is not a move of \({⅁} _\varphi\), according \(Mv^{\varphi }\), and the assumption is contradicted; finally, if \(i \gt 0\) and \((\pi)_{i} = {{⦰} }\), we have \((\tau)_i = \delta ((\tau)_{i-1} , (\pi)_{i-1}) = \delta ((\tau ^{\prime })_{i-1} , (\pi)_{i-1})\), which implies \((\tau ^{\prime })_i \ne \delta ((\tau ^{\prime })_{i-1} , (\pi)_{i-1})\), and the assumption is contradicted once again, since \((((\tau ^{\prime })_{i-1}\), \((\pi)_{i-1})\), \(((\tau ^{\prime })_{i}\), \((\pi)_{i}))\) is not a move of \({⅁} _\varphi\) for any \((\tau ^{\prime })_i \ne \delta ((\tau ^{\prime })_{i-1} , (\pi)_{i-1})\), according \(Mv^{\varphi }\).□
Function \(f: {\rm {Pth}} _\text{init}({⅁} [\varphi ])\rightarrow {\rm {Pth}} _\text{init}({\Game}^{\psi}_{\wp})\) is a bijection.
We define now a bijection \(\kappa\) from strategies (for both Eloise (\({\sf E}\)) and Abelard (\({\sf A}\))) in \({⅁} _\varphi\) to strategies in \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\) . For \(\alpha \in \lbrace {\sf E}, {\sf A}\rbrace\), let \({{\rm {Hst}} _\alpha }({⅁} _\varphi)\) and \({{\rm {Hst}} _\alpha }({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ])\) be the sets of histories for \(\alpha\) (i.e., the sets of finite initial paths terminating in an \(\alpha\)-position) in \({⅁} _\varphi\) and \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\) , respectively, and let \({\sigma _{\alpha }}[\alpha ]({⅁} _\varphi)\) and \({\sigma _{\alpha }}[\alpha ]({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ])\) be the sets of strategies for player \(\alpha\) in \({⅁} _\varphi\) and \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\) , respectively. Observe that \({{\rm {Hst}} _\alpha }({⅁} _\varphi) \subseteq {\rm {Pth}} _\text{init}({⅁} [\varphi ])\) and \({{\rm {Hst}} _\alpha }({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]) \subseteq {\rm {Pth}} _\text{init}({\Game}^{\psi}_{\wp})\). We define \(\kappa : {\sigma _{\alpha }}[\alpha ]({⅁} _\varphi) \rightarrow {\sigma _{\alpha }}[\alpha ]({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ])\) as follows: for every \(\sigma \in {\sigma _{\alpha }}[\alpha ]({⅁} _\varphi)\) and every history \({\rho} \in {{\rm {Hst}} _\alpha }({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ])\), we set \(\kappa (\sigma)({\rho}) = \mathit {proj_2} (\sigma (f^{-1}({\rho})))\). Intuitively, \(\kappa (\sigma)\) acts like \(\sigma\) restricted to the second component of positions.
Function \(\kappa : {\sigma _{\alpha }}[\alpha ]({⅁} _\varphi) \rightarrow {\sigma _{\alpha }}[\alpha ]({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ])\) is a bijection.
In order to see that \(\kappa\) is injective, we show that \(\sigma \ne \sigma ^{\prime }\) implies \(\kappa (\sigma) \ne \kappa (\sigma ^{\prime })\), for every \(\sigma , \sigma ^{\prime } \in {\sigma _{\alpha }}[\alpha ]({⅁} _\varphi)\). Let \(\sigma , \sigma ^{\prime } \in {\sigma _{\alpha }}[\alpha ]({⅁} _\varphi)\) and let \({\rho} \in {{\rm {Hst}} _\alpha }({⅁} _\varphi)\) be such that \(\sigma ({\rho}) \ne \sigma ^{\prime }({\rho})\). We first prove that \(\mathit {proj_2} (\sigma ({\rho})) \ne \mathit {proj_2} (\sigma ^{\prime }({\rho}))\). Let \({\rho} = {\rho} (q,{\chi})\) with \({\rho}\) potentially empty. Let \(\sigma ({\rho}) = (q^\star ,{\chi} ^\star)\) with \(q^\star = q\) if \({\chi} ^\star \ne {⦰}\) and \(q^\star = \delta (q, {\chi})\) otherwise. Toward contradiction, suppose that \(\mathit {proj_2} (\sigma ({\rho})) = \mathit {proj_2} (\sigma ^{\prime }({\rho})) = {\chi} ^\star\). Then, by definition, \(\mathit {proj_1} (\sigma ({\rho})) = \mathit {proj_1} (\sigma ^{\prime }({\rho})) = q^\star\) and then \(\sigma ({\rho}) = \sigma ({\rho} ^{\prime })\) which is a contradiction. Then, we have \(\kappa (\sigma)(f({\rho})) = \mathit {proj_2} (\sigma ({\rho})) \ne \mathit {proj_2} (\sigma ^{\prime }({\rho})) = \kappa (\sigma ^{\prime })(f({\rho}))\), and therefore \(\kappa (\sigma) \ne \kappa (\sigma ^{\prime })\).
In order to show that \(\kappa\) is surjective as well, let \(\sigma \in {\sigma _{\alpha }}[\alpha ]({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ])\). We build a strategy \(\sigma ^{\prime } \in {\sigma _{\alpha }}[\alpha ]({⅁} _\varphi)\) such that \(\kappa (\sigma ^{\prime }) = \sigma\). Intuitively, \(\sigma ^{\prime }\) returns a pair (a position in \({⅁} _\varphi\)) whose second component is chosen according to the output of strategy \(\sigma\) in \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\), and whose first component is univocally determined (thanks to Claim 11) by the choice of the second component and the argument history. Formally, for every \({\rho} \in {{\rm {Hst}} _\alpha }({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ])\) we denote by \(\mathit {ext}({\rho})\) the initial path of \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\) obtained by appending to \({\rho}\) the output the strategy \(\sigma\) on \({\rho}\) itself, i.e., \(\mathit {ext}({\rho}) = {\rho} \cdot \sigma ({\rho})\); notice that \(f^{-1}(\mathit {ext}({\rho})) \in {\rm {Pth}} _\text{init}({⅁} [\varphi ])\). Thus, we define \(\sigma ^{\prime }\) as: \(\sigma ^{\prime }({\rho}) \triangleq {\sf {lst}} {f^{-1}(\mathit {ext}(f({\rho})))}\), for every history \({\rho} \in {{\rm {Hst}} _\alpha }({⅁} _\varphi)\). It is not difficult to see that \(\kappa (\sigma ^{\prime }) = \sigma\): indeed, it holds that \(\kappa (\sigma ^{\prime })({\rho}) = \mathit {proj_2} (\sigma ^{\prime }(f^{-1}({\rho}))) = \mathit {proj_2} ({\sf {lst}} {f^{-1}(\mathit {ext}({\rho}))}) = \mathit {proj_2} ({\sf {lst}} {f^{-1}({\rho} \cdot \sigma ({\rho}))}) = \sigma ({\rho})\), for every \({\rho} \in {{\rm {Hst}} _\alpha }({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ])\). This concludes the proof.□
The next claim states that the bijection \(\kappa\) preserves the possible plays resulting from the application of a strategy by Eloise in \({⅁} _\varphi\) and its image in \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\), modulo the correspondence between plays of \({⅁} _\varphi\) and \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\) established by the bijection f. Let \({\sf {Play}} ({⅁} [\varphi ])\) be the set of plays of \({⅁} _\varphi\).
\({\pi}\) is compatible with \(\sigma\) iff\(f({\pi})\) is compatible with \(\kappa (\sigma)\), for every \(\sigma \in {\sigma _{\alpha }}[{\sf E}]({⅁} _\varphi)\) and \({\pi} \in {\sf {Play}} ({⅁} [\varphi ])\).
It is easy to verify that a play \({\pi} \in {\sf {Play}} ({⅁} [\varphi ])\) is compatible with a pair of strategies \(({\sigma _{\sf E}} , {\sigma _{\sf A}}) \in {\rm Str}_{\sf E}({⅁} _\varphi) \times {\rm Str}_{\sf A}({⅁} _\varphi)\) if and only if \(f({\pi})\) is compatible with \((\kappa ({\sigma _{\sf E}}), \kappa ({\sigma _{\sf A}}))\). The thesis immediately follows.□
As a final ingredient in our proof, we establish a correspondence g between plays of \({⅁} _\varphi\) that are won by Eloise and models of \(\psi\), recognised by \({\mathcal {D}} [\psi ]\). Function \(g:{\sf {Play}} ({⅁} [\varphi ])\rightarrow {\rm Val}(\text {ap} {{\wp} })^{\omega }\) is defined as: \(g({\pi}) \triangleq {\sf obs}(f({\pi}))\) for every \({\pi} \in {\sf {Play}} ({⅁} [\varphi ])\). The correctness of such a correspondence is stated in the next claim.
\({\pi}\) is won by Eloise in \({⅁} _\varphi\) iff\(g({\pi})\) is recognised by \({\mathcal {D}} [\psi ]\), for every \({\pi} \in {\sf {Play}} ({⅁} [\varphi ])\).
By the definition of \({⅁} _\varphi\), if we restrict a play \({\pi} \in {\sf {Play}} ({⅁} [\varphi ])\) to those position \((q,{\chi}) \in {\rm P}_{\rm S}^\varphi\) where \({\chi} \in {\rm Val}(\text {ap} {{\wp} })\) (thus discharging partial valuations, which do not assign a truth value to all propositions occurring in \(\psi\)), we obtain a sequence \({\pi} ^{\prime }\) that encodes to the unique run of \({\mathcal {D}} [\psi ]\) on \(f({\pi})\), where the sequence \(({\pi} ^{\prime })_{|_1}\) of first components of each position (i.e., \(({\pi} ^{\prime })_{|1} \triangleq \langle \mathit {proj_1} (({\pi} ^{\prime })_i) \rangle _{i \in {\mathbb {N}}}\)) corresponds to the states visited by the automaton while reading the word \(({\pi} ^{\prime })_{|_2}\) corresponding to the sequence of second components of the positions in \({\pi} ^{\prime }\) (i.e., \(({\pi} ^{\prime })_{|_2} \triangleq \langle \mathit {proj_2} (({\pi} ^{\prime })_i) \rangle _{i \in {\mathbb {N}}}\) – recall that \({\mathcal {D}} [\psi ]\) is deterministic). Importantly, notice that such word \(({\pi} ^{\prime })_{|_2}\) is exactly \(g({\pi})\). Additionally, observe that the projections of \({\pi}\) and \({\pi} ^{\prime }\) on the first component of each position, i.e., \(({\pi})_{|_1} \triangleq \langle \mathit {proj_1} (({\pi})_i) \rangle _{i \in {\mathbb {N}}}\) and \(({\pi} ^{\prime })_{|_1}\) respectively, are equal if we ideally merge together consecutive occurrences of the same state. This means that, since the winning condition \({\rm Wn}[\varphi ]\) of \({⅁} _\varphi\) mimics the acceptance condition \(\text{Acc}\) of \({\mathcal {D}} [\psi ]\), the sequence of priorities corresponding to \({\pi}\) is the same as the one corresponding to the run \({\pi} ^{\prime }\) of \({\mathcal {D}} [\psi ]\) on \(g({\pi})\). Therefore, \(g({\pi})\) is recognised by \({\mathcal {D}} [\psi ]\) if and only if run \({\pi} ^{\prime }\) is accepting if and only if play \({\pi}\) is won by Eloise.□
Finally, from Claim 13 and the following one, whose proof makes use of Claim 14, it follows that there is a strategy for Eloise to win \({⅁} _\varphi\) if and only if there is a strategy for her to win \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\). Thanks to this last equivalence and to Theorem 4 we conclude that for every behavioral
\({\pi}\) is won by Eloise in \({⅁} _\varphi\) iff\(f({\pi})\) is won by Eloise in \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\), for every \({\pi} \in {\sf {Play}} ({⅁} [\varphi ])\).
Consider a play \({\pi} \in {\sf {Play}} ({⅁} [\varphi ])\). Thanks to Claim 14, we know that \({\pi}\) is won by Eloise iff\(g({\pi})\) is accepted by \({\mathcal {D}} [\psi ]\) which means that \(\texttt{wrd} [][-1](g({\pi}))\models \psi\), which, in turn, is equivalent to say that \(g({\pi}) \in {\rm Wn}[{\wp} ][\psi ] = \texttt{wrd} (\Psi)\), that is, \(f({\pi})\) is won by Eloise in \({⅁} [{\wp} ][\psi ]\), since \(g({\pi}) = {\sf obs}(f({\pi}))\).□
The automaton \(A_\psi\) has a size exponential in the size of \(\psi\) [82]. The procedure to transform it into a deterministic parity automaton adds one exponential [69]; thus \(|{\mathcal {D}} [\psi ]|=2^{| {2^{| {O{|\psi |}}{\cdot }}}{\cdot }}\). It is easy to see the number of positions of the quantification game is \(O{2^{| {|{\wp} |}{\cdot }}}\). Thus, we conclude that game \({⅁} _\varphi\) we have just defined has size in \(O{2^{| {|{\wp} |}{\cdot }} \cdot 2^{| {2^{| {O{|\psi |}}{\cdot }}}{\cdot }}}=2^{| { 2^{| {O{|\varphi |}}{\cdot }}}{\cdot }}\). The game has the same number of priorities as the automaton \({\mathcal {D}} [\psi ]\) which is in \(2^{| {O{|\psi |}}{\cdot }}\).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for the many suggestions which helped to considerably improve the earlier version of the manuscript.
Footnotes
1 By Borelian property we mean an arbitrary set of assignments (possibly, but non-necessarily, induced by an
FootnoteLTL formula \(\psi\)) corresponding to a set in the Borel hierarchy built upon a suitable Cantor topological space [68]; we recall that, starting from the open sets in the space (e.g., eventuality properties, such as, those induced byLTL formulae of the form \(\sf{F} p\)), the hierarchy is uniquely built by applying the operations of countable union, countable intersection, and complementation.2 As usual, \({{\chi} _1} \subseteq {\chi} _2\) denotes the inclusion between functions, i.e., \({\sf dom}{{\chi} _1} \!\subseteq \! {\sf dom}{{\chi} _2}\) and \({{\chi} _1}(x) \!=\! {\chi} _2(x)\), for all \(x\!\in \! {\sf dom}{{\chi} _1}\).
Footnote3 The Herbrandization process [7, 80] is the dual of the well known Skolemization process and transforms a logic formula of the form \(\exists x\forall y.\psi (x, y)\) into the equivalent (higher-order) formula \(\forall {\sf F}\exists x.\psi (x, {\sf F}(x))\), where \({\sf F}\) is the Herbrand function for the universally-quantified variable y. The deHerbrandizing process is the inverse transformation from \(\forall {\sf F}\exists x.\psi (x, {\sf F}(x))\) to \(\exists x\forall y.\psi (x, y)\). Note that here the process is applied at the meta level of the proof.
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Index Terms
- Good-for-Game QPTL: An Alternating Hodges Semantics
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