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Self-Respect Paternalism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 October 2022
Abstract
According to the influential disrespect account of what paternalism is, and why it is wrong, paternalism involves an anti-egalitarian, disrespectful attitude on the part of the paternalist: X (the paternalist) assumes an attitude of superiority when interfering in Y's matters for Y's good. Pace this account, the article argues that an important, although somewhat overlooked, form of paternalism is not, all things considered, insulting. This form of paternalism focusses on people's occasional lack of appropriate self-respect or their failure to see themselves as equals or to stand vis-à-vis others as such.
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References
1 Dworkin, Gerald, Paternalism, in Morality and the Law, ed. by Wasserstrom, Richard A. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1971), pp. 107–26Google Scholar. Reprinted in The Monist, 56 (1972), 64–84.
2 Cf. Enoch, David, What's Wrong with Paternalism: Autonomy, Belief, and Action, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 116 (2016), 21–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 Quong, Jonathan, Liberalism without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), ch. 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Shiffrin, Seana Valentine, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 29 (2000), 205–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar, are the two most influential contributions that support this view.
4 Anderson, Elizabeth S., What Is the Point of Equality?, Ethics, 109 (1999), 287–337CrossRefGoogle Scholar (esp. pp. 301, 319, 329–30).
5 Important exceptions to the implied neglect in the literature include: Richard J. Arneson, Paternalism, Utility, and Fairness, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 43 (1989), 409–37 (pp. 431–32); Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund, Mitigating Servility: Policies of Egalitarian Self-Relations, British Journal of Political Science (2021) doi:10.1017/S0007123420000629; Danny Scoccia, Paternalism, International Encyclopedia of Ethics (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013). Arneson's and Scoccia's essays point to the sort of paternalism I am interested in. However, they do not elaborate on it. For example, they do not consider the point that it may be respectful all things considered. Unlike my argument, Hojlund's argument does not appeal to self-respect as an important condition for people's autonomy.
6 I owe this example to an anonymous reviewer for the journal. Cf. Dahl, Malte and Nyrup, Jacob, Confident and Cautious Candidates: Explaining Under-representation of Women in Danish Municipal Politics, European Journal of Political Research, 60 (2021), 199–224CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hojlund, Mitigating Servility (esp. pp. 8–9); The Wrongs and Remedies of Political Inequality (unpublished paper).
7 One of the prominent proponents of this view, Shiffrin, includes in her understanding of paternalism acts not intended by X (the paternalist) to promote Y's well-being (see, Shiffrin, Paternalism, p. 217). It suffices, she thinks, that X acts to influence matters within the legitimate control of Y on the basis of beliefs such as those stated in condition (iii). I happen to agree, but I bracket this here because it is a minority view and immaterial to the argument that I shall put forward.
8 Cf. Hausman, Daniel M. and Brynn Welch, Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 18 (2010), 123–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Scoccia, Danny, In Defense of Hard Paternalism, Law and Philosophy, 27 (2008), 351–81 (p. 352)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Some, I should note, believe that even certain forms of rational persuasion may be paternalistic. See Tsai, George, Rational Persuasion as Paternalism, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 42 (2014), 78–112CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This need not concern us here, though. I think that self-respect paternalism could easily be reformulated to capture this broad understanding of paternalism. Yet it would add unnecessary complexities to try to do so here.
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14 Cf. Shiffrin, Paternalism, p. 213.
15 I take it that Shiffrin would concur that although paternalism need not violate distinct autonomy rights paternalism is always in tension with autonomy (and equality) considerations. Yet I acknowledge that this exegetical point is disputed.
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27 The phrase is originally due to Ronald Dworkin. See, for example, his Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977), pp. 180–81.
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30 Cf. Bou-Habib, Paul, Compulsory Insurance Without Paternalism, Utilitas 18 (2006), 243–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar (p. 245, fn. 6); Hill, Servility and Self-Respect, pp. 90, 95. The person in question need not fail to have an appropriate understanding of their equal rights, and they certainly do not decide to set aside their interests out of “laziness, timidity, or some minor advantage [to themselves].”
31 Cf. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 372.
32 See, Dworkin, Paternalism, 1972, p. 84.
33 Cf. Wellman, Christopher H., Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation, Ethics, 111 (2001), 735–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar (p. 745).
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35 Eidelson, Discrimination and Disrespect, pp. 144–45.
36 Eidelson, Discrimination and Disrespect, esp. ch. 4.
37 Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, p. 301.
38 Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, pp. 330–31.
39 I take it that Anderson would agree that policies such as mandatory participation in an insurance scheme infringe people's autonomy in a relevant sense. She says, for example, that the liberty being limited here is significant, and that those whose liberty is restricted in this way are owed a dignified explanation. See Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, p. 302.
40 As I shall suggest below, the strength of respectful egalitarian rationales varies relative to their proximity to the abstract egalitarian thesis that people should be treated with equal respect and concern. Accordingly, a rationale is all things equal stronger if it is justified on the ground that people have equal worth than if it is (only) justified because it is consistent with such a ground.
41 I should say that Anderson does not deny that certain paternalistic policies such as helmet and seatbelt mandates might be reasonable and non-insulting (or at least that it is not a “great insult” to citizens if the state adopts such policies). See What Is the Point of Equality?, p. 301. For discussion, see Hojlund, What Should Egalitarian Policies Express? The Case of Paternalism, The Journal of Political Philosophy 29 (2021), 519–38.
42 See, for example, Dahl and Nyrup, Confident and Cautious Candidates; Dillon, Self-Respect, esp. pp. 235–36; Hojlund, Mitigating Servility, esp. pp. 8–9.
43 Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper, Could Friends of Relational Autonomy be Relational Sufficientarians Rather than Relational Egalitarians?, in Autonomy and Equality, ed. by Stoljar, Natalie and Voigt, Kristin (New York: Routledge, 2021), pp. 57–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar (p. 65). Italics in original. I take it that it is integral to this view that autonomy also requires certain capacities that make it possible for the agent to have (autonomy-congenial) beliefs and desires. Cf. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 372.
44 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 386.
45 For the importance of this to autonomy, see Raz, The Morality of Freedom, pp. 373–77.
46 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed., p. 386.
47 Cf. Serena Olsaretti, Endorsement and Freedom in Amartya Sen's Capability Approach, Economics and Philosophy, 21 (2005), 89–108 (esp. 98–100). For discussion, see Arneson, Human Flourishing versus Desire Satisfaction, Social Philosophy and Policy, 16 (1999), 113–42 (esp. sec. XIV).
48 Of course there may – in addition to the well-being-related reasons for being concerned with people having an appropriate conception of their own worth – be non-well-being-related reasons for such a concern. See, for example, O'Neill, Martin, What Should Egalitarians Believe?, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 36 (2008), 119–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar (p. 130). For contributions concerned with the importance of self-respect in the well-being related sense see, for example, Crisp, Roger, Mill: On Utilitarianism (London, 1997), esp. chs. 2–3Google Scholar, and pp. 195–97; Kymlicka, Will, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), ch. 2Google Scholar; Søren Flinch Midtgaard, Non-Renounceable Rights, Paternalism, and Autonomy, Utilitas, 27 (2015), 347–64.
49 Peter de Marneffe, Avoiding Paternalism, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 34 (2006), 68–94 (p. 87).
50 Michael Blake, Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 30 (2002), 257–96 (p. 282).
51 I owe this suggestion to an anonymous reviewer for this journal.
52 Hojlund, Mitigating Servility, p. 3. Cf. Lippert-Rasmussen, Relational Autonomy, p. 66.
53 Cf. Tadros, Victor, Consent to Harm, Current Legal Problems, 64 (2011), 23–49 (pp. 32–33)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
54 Dillon, Self-Respect, p. 229.
55 See, for example, Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, p. 312; Hill, Servility and Self-Respect, esp. sec. IV; Hojlund, Mitigating Servility, p. 5; David Miller, Equality and Justice, in Ideals of Equality, ed. by A. Mason (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 21–36 (p. 31); O'Neill, What Should Egalitarians Believe?, p. 130. For useful distinctions between various forms of goodness (badness) see Dworkin, Gerald, Paternalism, Moral, Law and Philosophy, 24 (2005), 305–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar (pp. 307–08).
56 Cf. Susan Hurley, The “What” and the “How” of Distributive Justice and Health, in Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality, ed. by Nils Holtug and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 308–34 (pp. 330–31); Nagel, Thomas, Mortal Questions (London: Cambridge University Press), p. 108CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
57 This qualification is necessary in that, as I indicate below (see, fn. 60), there are certainly policies that may be characterized as self-respect paternalistic but are not justifiable or non-insulting all things considered. My claim is that self-respect paternalism has egalitarian features that make it easier to justify than traditional paternalism.
58 This function of institutions regulated by egalitarian principles of justice is a recurrent theme in Rawls’ work.
59 An anonymous reviewer for this journal suggested this case to me.
60 Plausible measures might include, for example, public campaigns and educational measures. Measures that prevent people from practicing certain anti-egalitarian religions or seek to remove them from cultures in which such religions are practiced are not, I think, likely to be conducive to people's self-respect and may be problematic for other reasons.
61 Cf. Benson, Paul, Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization, Social Theory and Practice, 17 (1991), 385–408CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
62 Cf. Hellman, Deborah, When Is Discrimination Wrong? (Cambridge, MA, and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2011), ch. 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pedersen, Viki M. L., Respectful Paternalism, Law and Philosophy, 40, 429–42Google Scholar (pp. 426–427) quoting Hanna, In Our Best Interest, p. 68.