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Domestic Investment Laws and State Capitalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2023

Xu Qian Open the ORCID record for Xu Qian [Opens in a new window]
Xu Qian*
Affiliation:
Associate Professor & Hundred Talent Program Fellow, Zhejiang University Guanghua Law School, China
*
Email: qianxuxu@zju.edu.cn
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Abstract

State capitalism and the liberal economic order have had an antagonistic relationship. While the international economic law rules have sought to reduce the role of the state in the economy, state-controlled entities have more recently increased in size and importance – both domestically, as well as internationally. In this connection, the article analyses the effects of state capitalism's expansion simultaneously with the domestic investment law of States. The article analyses the underlying principles of state capitalism in an effort to answer the question of whether domestic laws promoting investment – as defined in the special issue – are positive, negative, or neutral to state capitalists. The article further interprets the trends spawned by the propagation of the liberal international economic order as states realize their development targets and envisage to actively contribute to the regulation of international trade and cross-border transactions globally.

Keywords

Economic globalizationinternational economic orderinvestment screening mechanismsstate capitalism
Type
Original Article
Information
World Trade Review , Volume 22 , Special Issue 1: Domestic Investment Laws and International Economic Law in the Liberal International Order , February 2023 , pp. 133 - 146
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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10 Domestic investment laws are specialized legislations that have been enacted by national legislatures to attract/encourage and/or facilitate investments in their respective countries. J. Chaisse and G. Dimitropoulos, ‘Domestic Investment Laws and International Economic Law in the Liberal International Order’, this special issue; see also J. Hepburn (2018) ‘Domestic Investment Statutes in International Law’, American Journal of International Law 112(4), 658; G. Dimitropoulos (2020) ‘National Sovereignty and International Investment Law: Sovereignty Reassertion and Prospects of Reform’, Journal of World Investment & Trade 21(1), 71; S. Puig and G. Shaffer (2018) ‘Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law’, American Journal of International Law 112(3), 361.

11 J. Chaisse and G. Dimitropoulos, ‘Domestic Investment Laws and International Economic Law in the Liberal International Order’, this special issue.

12 Ibid.

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23 Ibid. S. Bernstein, J. Lerner, and A. Schoar (2013) ‘The Investment Strategies of Sovereign Wealth Funds’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 27(2), 220.

24 Ibid.

25 D. Darcet, M. du Jeu, and T.S. Coleman (2010) ‘Managing a Sovereign Wealth Fund: A View from Practitioners’, in U.S. Das, A. Mazarei, and H. van der Hoorn (eds.), Economics of Sovereign Wealth Funds – Issues for Policymakers. International Monetary Fund.

26 J. Chaisse (2015) ‘Demystifying Public Security Exception and Limitations on Capital Movement: Hard Law, Soft Law and Sovereign Investments in the EU Internal Market’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 37(2), 583; L.C. Becker (2009) ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory Chameleons: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Global Governance Through Private Global Investment’, Georgetown Journal of International Law 41, 2.

27 J. Chaisse and G. Dimitropoulos, ‘Domestic Investment Laws and International Economic Law in the Liberal International Order’, this special issue.

28 See Alami et al., supra n. 5.

29 KPMG, ‘Foresight – Ten Emerging Trends in 2016’, KPMG, January 2016, https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/01/foresight-emerging-trends-2016.pdf (accessed 18 April 2022).

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., 43.

32 L.C. Becker (2009) ‘Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State Owned Enterprises and the Chinese Experience’, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 19, 1; S. Schindler and J. Miguel Kanai (2021) ‘Getting the Territory Right: Infrastructure-Led Development and the Re-Emergence of Spatial Planning Strategies’, Regional Studies 55(1), 40–51. China's policy banks are three government-backed banks that have been established since 1994 as the primary channels of financing the major infrastructure projects in China. They are the Chinese Development Bank (CDB), the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC), and the China Export Import Bank; The China Bond Team, ‘China Insights – Policy Banks’, Eurizon SLJ Asset Management, 29 April 2021, www.eurizonsljcapital.com/china-policy-banks/ (accessed 18 April 2022).

33 Q. Truong and C. Rowley (2014) ‘Vietnam: Post-State Capitalism’, The Oxford Handbook of Asian Business Systems, https://philarchive.org/archive/TRUVPC (accessed 18 April 2022).

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35 H.M. Knutsen and D.T. Khanh (2020) ‘Reforming State-Owned Enterprises in a Global Economy: The Case of Vietnam’, in A. Hansen, J.I. Bekkevold, and K. Nordhaug (eds.), The Socialist Market Economy in Asia. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore: Springer, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-6248-8_5 (accessed 18 April 2022).

36 A. Deshmukh (2021) ‘FDI in Vietnam: A Year in Review and Outlook for 2021’, Vietnam Briefing, 17 February 2021, www.vietnam-briefing.com/news/fdi-in-vietnam-year-in-review-and-outlook-for-2021.html/ (accessed 18 April 2022).

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 See Investment Policy Hub, supra n. 13.

40 Dezan Shira & Associates, ‘Vietnam's Free Trade Agreements – Opportunities for your Business’, Vietnam Briefing, 31 March 2021, www.vietnam-briefing.com/news/vietnam-free-trade-agreements-opportunities-for-your-business.html/ (accessed 18 April 2022).

41 K. Przemyslaw, M. Büge, M. Sztajerowska, and M. Egeland (2013) ‘State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications’, OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 147, Paris: OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/5k4869ckqk7l-en (accessed 18 April 2022).

42 N.H. Hoang and T.Q. Hoan (2019) ‘Vietnam and the CPTPP: Achievements and Challenges’, ISEAS Perspective 41, www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2019_41.pdf (accessed 18 April 2022).

43 Ibid.

44 ‘SOE divestment a priority in CPTPP era’, Vietnam Investment Review, 30 January 2019, www.vir.com.vn/soe-divestment-a-priority-in-cptpp-era-65586.html (accessed 17 April 2022).

45 M. Khor, ‘The New CPTPP Trade Pact is Much Like the Old TPP’, Inter Press Service, 7 March 2018, www.ipsnews.net/2018/03/thenew-cptpp-trade-pact-is-much-like-the-old-tpp/ (accessed 18 April 2022).

46 See N.H. Hoang and T.Q. Hoan, supra n. 38.

47 M. Solís, ‘Why Vietnam will shape the future of the TPP’, Brookings, 19 May 2017, www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/05/19/why-vietnam-will-shape-thefuture-of-the-tpp/ (accessed 18 April 2022); As for how the new Asian regionalism has emerged amid the Third Regionalism and contributed to the New Regional Economic Order, which reinvigorates the role of developing countries in shaping international trade norms; see general P.L. Hsieh (Forthcoming 2022) New Asian Regionalism in International Economic Law. Cambridge University Press.

48 Pasha L. Hsieh, ‘New Investment Rulemaking in Asia: Between Regionalism and Domestication’, this special issue. In trade agreements, the parties can inscribe their commitments and exceptions in their schedules according to two different techniques – using a positive list or a negative list. Positive list means that a trade partner has to explicitly list the sectors in which it undertakes market access and national treatment commitments. Under the negative list, all sectors that are not listed are, by default, open to foreign service suppliers under the same conditions as for domestic service suppliers; see general European Commission, ‘Positive and Negative Listing’ (European Commission), https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/positive-and-negative-listing (accessed 18 April 2022).

49 P.L. Hsieh, ‘New Investment Rulemaking in Asia: Between Regionalism and Domestication’, this special issue.

50 J. Chaisse and G. Dimitropoulos, ‘Domestic Investment Laws and International Economic Law in the Liberal International Order’, this special issue.

51 A.Y. Chen (2009) ‘China in Africa Project: China's Role in Infrastructure Development in Botswana’, Occasional Paper 44 SAIIA, www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/China_s_Role_in_Botswana.pdf (accessed 18 April 2022).

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 K.P. Gallagher and A. Irwin (2015) ‘China's Economic Statecraft in Latin America: Evidence from China's Policy Banks’, Pacific Affairs 88(1), 99–121.

55 A. De Jonge (2017) ‘Perspectives on the emerging role of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’, International Affairs 93(5), 1061–1084.

56 See Alami et al., supra n. 5.

57 A.E.A. Garzón (2020) ‘From State-Controlled Enterprises to Investment Screening: Paving the Way for Stricter Rules on Foreign Investment’, Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) 6, www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2775 (accessed 18 April 2022) (Looking at investment screening laws and relevance of domestic legislation in determining legal status of SCEs). For a detailed discussion, see J. Chaisse and G. Dimitropoulos, ‘Domestic Investment Laws and International Economic Law in the Liberal International Order’, this special issue.

58 According to UNCTAD, at least 11 countries have introduced new laws for the screening of foreign investment since 2011, while 41 significant amendments in 15 jurisdictions have taken place during the same time, and even more are forthcoming; see UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report: SEZs’, UN 2019, 94. J. Chaisse and G. Dimitropoulos, ‘Domestic Investment Laws and International Economic Law in the Liberal International Order’, this special issue.

59 See B.J. Cohen (2009) ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and National Security: The Great Tradeoff’, International Affairs 85(4), 713–731.

60 Z.T. Chan and S. Meunier (2021) ‘Behind the Screen: Understanding National Support for a Foreign Investment Screening Mechanism in the European Union’, Review of International Organizations, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3726973 (accessed 2 October 2022).

61 Consolidated Version of the Treaty of Functioning of European Union [2008] OJ C115/13, art 64.

62 Ibid, art 65.

63 P.M. Gadocha (2020) ‘Assessing the EU Framework Regulation for the Screening of Foreign Direct Investment – What Is the Effect on Chinese Investors?’, Chinese Journal of Global Governance 6(1), 36.

64 K. Alert, ‘New EU Foreign Direct Investment Regulations Take Effect’, Kirkland & Ellis, 29 October 2020, www.kirkland.com/-/media/publications/alert/2020/10/new-eu-foreign-direct-investment-regulations-take.pdf (accessed 18 April 2022).

65 See also G. Dimitropoulos (2020) ‘National Security: The Role of Investment Screening Mechanisms’, in J. Chaisse, L. Choukroune and S. Jusoh (eds.), Handbook of International Investment Law and Policy. Springer, 507.

66 UNCTAD (2018) World Investment Report 2018: Investment and New Industrial Policies. Geneva: United Nations Publication, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2018_en.pdf (accessed 18 April 2022).

67 Reuters Staff, ‘Germany stalls Osram unit sale to Chinese buyers: WirtschaftsWoche’, Thomson Reuters, 27 October 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-osram-licht-m-a-idUSKCN12R1PW (accessed 18 April 2022).

68 OECD (2015) OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises. Paris: OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264244160-en (accessed 18 April 2022).

69 The layout of the guidelines is following: ‘The Guidelines presented in the first part cover the following areas: (I) Rationales for State's State Ownership; (II) The State's Role as an Owner; (III) State-Owned Enterprises in the Marketplace; (IV) Equitable Treatment of Shareholders and Other Investors; (V) Stakeholder Relations and Responsible Business; (VI) Disclosure and Transparency, and (VII) The Responsibilities of the Boards of State-Owned Enterprises. In the second part, the Guidelines are supplemented by annotations that contain commentary on the Guidelines and are intended to help readers understand their rationale’; see OECD, supra n. 62.

70 From the survey of 31 countries, 2/3rd of them have duly maintained transparency and ensured public disclosure. 2/3rd of them were professionalising the company management, and 1/2 of them ensured equitable treatment of shareholders and investors; OECD (2020) Implementing the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: Review of Recent Developments. Paris: OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/4caa0c3b-en (accessed 18 April 2022).

71 IFSWF, ‘Santiago Principles’, www.ifswf.org/santiago-principles-landing/santiago-principles (accessed 18 April 2022).

72 Ibid. The following areas are covered: ‘legal framework, objectives, and coordination with macroeconomic policies; – institutional framework and governance structure; – investment and risk management framework.’

73 Investment incentives are a central element in facilitative domestic regulations which raise several legal issues, see A. Gourgourinis, ‘Domestic Investment Incentives in International Trade Law’, this special issue.

74 D.A. McCarthy, ‘State Capitalism and Competitive Neutrality’, APCAC US–Asia Business Summit, 2 March 2012, https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2012/181520.htm (accessed 18 April 2022).

75 J. Chaisse (2016) ‘Untangling the Triangle: Issues for State-controlled Entities in Trade, Investment, and Competition Law’, in J. Chaisse, T.-Y. Lin (eds.), International Economic Law and Governance: Essays in Honour of Mitsuo Matsushita. Oxford University Press, 233–258.

76 J. Ahrens, H.W. Hoen, and M.C. Spechler (2016) ‘State Capitalism in Eurasia: A Dual-Economy Approach to Central Asia’, in M. Brusis, J. Ahrens, and M.S. Wessel (eds.), Politics and Legitimacy in Post-Soviet Eurasia. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 47–71.

77 J. Chaisse and G. Dimitropoulos, ‘Domestic Investment Laws and International Economic Law in the Liberal International Order’, this special issue.

78 The investment flows are categorized into four main categories being commercial loans, official flows, foreign direct investment, and foreign portfolio investment. See UNCTAD (2015) World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance. Geneva: United Nations Publication, http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1245, (accessed 18 April 2022); see general, J. Chaisse and G. Dimitropoulos, Domestic Investment Laws and International Economic Law in the Liberal International Order, this special issue.

79 K.-C. Chan (2020) ‘Elephant in the Room: On the Notions of SCEs in International Investment Law and International Economic Law’, Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) 6, www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2768 (accessed 18 April 2022).

80 L.C. Becker (2006) ‘Economic Globalization Ascendant: Four Perspectives on the Emerging Ideology of the State in the New Global Order’, University of California, Berkeley La Raza Law Journal 17, 1.

81 J. Chaisse and G. Dimitropoulos, Domestic Investment Laws and International Economic Law in the Liberal International Order, this special issue.

82 Ibid.

83 See Kai-Chieh Chan, supra n. 73; see J. Chaisse, supra n. 2.

84 See Recruitment, ‘State-Owned Assets Supervision and Admin. Comm'n of the State Council’, SASAC, 28 June 2004, http://en.sasac.gov.cn/nl461859/cl463576/content.html (accessed 18 April 2022).

85 See R.J. Gilson and C.J. Milhaupt (2011) ‘Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons for Developing Democracies’, American Journal of Comparative Law 59(1), 227.

86 M.C. Jensen (1986) ‘Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers’, American Economic Review 76(2), 323.

87 J. Chaisse and C. Bellak (2015) ‘Navigating the Expanding Universe of Investment Treaties-Creation and Use of Critical Index’, Journal of International Economic Law 18(1), 79.

88 G. Sacerdoti (2013) ‘BIT Protections and Economic Crises: Limits to Their Coverage, the Impact of Multilateral Financial Regulation and the Defence of Necessity’, ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal 28(2), 351–382.

89 M. Pargendler et al. (2013) ‘In Strange Company: The Puzzle of Private Investment in State-Controlled Firms’, Cornell International Law Journal 46, 569.

90 OECD (2004) Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law. OECD Working Papers on International Investment, Paper No. 3. OECD Publishing, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/675702255435 (accessed 18 April 2022).

91 J.W. Salacuse (2010) ‘The Emerging Global Regime for Investment’, Harvard International Law Journal 52, 427, 446.

92 Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Award (December 29, 2004), 13 ICSID Rep. 183 (2008).

93 Tulip Real Estate Investment v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Award (March 10, 2014).

94 International Law Commission (2001) ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries’, UN GAOR 56th Session Supp 10, ch 4, UN Doc A/56/10 (ARSIWA).

95 C. de Stefano (2022) ‘Attribution of Conduct to a State’, ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 37, 20–50.

96 See also Compa ñía de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal SA v Argentine Republic (formerly Compa ñía de Aguas del Aconquija, SA and Compagnie Générale des Eaux v Argentine Republic) (Vivendi I), ICSID Case No ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment (3 July 2003), para. 110.

97 Ibid., para 16.

98 Hrvatska Elektroprivreda v. Republic of Slovenia, ICSID Case No ARB/05/24, Treaty Interpretation, TT 6-15 (12 June 2009).

99 Tulip Real Estate Investment v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Award, para. 289 (10 March 2014).

100 Electrabel v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, para. 7.95 (30 November 2012).

101 Telenor Mobile Communications v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, Award, para. 97 (13 September 2006).

102 Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Award (29 December 2004), 13 ICSID Rep. 183 (2008).

103 Global Trading Resource Corp. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/11, Award, para. 46 (1 December 2010).

104 See Julien Chaisse, supra n. 2.

105 G. Dimitropoulos, ‘The Right to Hospitality in International Economic Law: Non-Discrimination and Dispute Settlement in Domestic and International Economic Law’, this special issue.