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Modus Ponens and the Logic of Decision

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Abstract

This article presents and discusses a prima facie counterexample to modus ponens. To appropriately theorize the case, I argue for conceptualizing the notions of logical consequence and logical commitment in “normative” terms, so that logical commitment does not attach to the premises of a spurious dominance argument—and, more generally, does not attach to unreasonable decision states, or to syntactically specified classes thereof. I also suggest that there is a logical motivation for the restriction to “well-formed” decision states that is characteristic of Savage-style logics of decision.

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Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (435-2015-0423) Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (435-2020-0329)

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, M5R 2M8, Canada

    Nate Charlow

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Charlow, N. Modus Ponens and the Logic of Decision. J Philos Logic 52, 859–888 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-022-09690-4

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