Abstract
The present study reconsiders Husserl’s method of eidetic variation and Schütz’s critique. The method of eidetic variation describes a complex process through which the eidos of empirical objects is obtained. This process has different steps, one of which is the free variation that is conducted by the act of free phantasy. According to Husserl, it is through this act that the transcendental consciousness can surpass the boundary established by empirical generalities and uncover the full extension of eidos as pure generality. However, in Schütz’s analysis, he leaves a series of questions regarding the limitations of the free variation, which potentially leads to a serious consequence: eidos and type (empirical generality) are merely different in degrees. After examining Husserl’s account of the method and Schütz’s analysis, it appears that, although Husserl has noticed the potential questions posed by Schütz and provided an answer to them, the method still fails to provide a way to reveal the eidetic basis of variants. To solve this issue, I argue that an additional step is required for the method to succeed, which involves the act of productive phantasy that enables one to exclude the empirical influences of types.
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Notes
According to Schütz, the equivocal relation between type and eidos is due to the fact that for Husserl, “the notion of typicality…and even the notion of ideation…are widely used…as mere operative schemata of a highly equivocal character…” (Schütz, 1959, 147).
Though Husserl uses “phantasy” (Phantasie) and “imagination” (Einbildung) interchangeably, I prefer the former over the latter in order to emphasize its phenomenological sense and avoid a reference to the cognitive functions that are considered characteristic of “imagination” by philosophers such as Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, etc.
In Logische Untersuchungen (LU), according to Lohmar, ideation is regarded as “a particular form of categorial intuition,” which “is founded on the simple intuition of individual objects” and is carried out through ideating abstraction (Lohmar, 2019, 109, 112; Husserl 1970a>, Vol. 2, § 52). In Ideen I, ideation is the “essential insight,” whose object is “the corresponding pure essence or eidos.” (Husserl, 2012a, 11).
Husserl also gave a brief account of the method of eidetic variation in Formale und Transzendentale Logik (henceforth FTL), § 98. Husserl’s account of eidetic variation in FTL does not simply focus on explicating its complicated methodological process; rather, he is concerned with the “constitutional problem” of eidetic variation and emphasizes that a static analysis of the eidos of constituted objects must be complemented with a subsequent inquiry into the “a priori genetic constitution” (Husserl, 1969, 250).
Husserl has already noticed the close relation between ideation and possibility in Ideen I: “Empirical or individual intuition can be transformed into essential insight (ideation)—a possibility which is itself not to be understood as empirical but as essential possibility” (Husserl, 2012a, 11).
Zwittereinheit has only two appearances in Husserl’s discussion regarding the method of eidetic variation, one in EU, the other in Husserl 2012b, 191. The description in the two texts are almost identical.
To be sure, one must distinguish between the identical substrate for the constitutions of variants, and the substrate for the intuition of eide. The former refers to the unthematic, eidetic element by virtue of which all individuals are possible at all, while the latter refers to the foundation that enables the intuition of eide to proceed.
As such, we can also see that the reason why Husserl refers to the Zwittereinheit as the correlate of “a unique consciousness with a unique content” (Husserl, 1973, 345): on the one hand, it is formed on the basis of the incompatibility of the variants, which indicates that it is characterized by the shifting and somewhat chaotic appearances of the variants; on the other hand, regardless of the conflicting nature of its basis, the Zwittereinheit somehow manages to integrate the manifold appearances of variants by virtue of their eidetic difference and present itself as a unity that can function as the basis for the intuiting of eidos.
In addition, the first part of Schütz’s paper, which is concerned with the idea of type, ends with a brief account of type as it appears in Krisis (Schütz, 1959, 156–158); in Krisis, Husserl enlarges the notion of typicality and argues for an all-encompassing, typical unity of sense—the typicality of life-world. According to Schütz, “by a universal causal regularity everything that co-exists in the world has the character of belonging together on the ground of which the world is not merely a totality but a total totality…” (157). Within this all-encompassing unity, one can further distinguish between specific typicality and the more general ones, specifically, the regional typicality that regulates specific typicality, which “can be revealed only by an eidetic method” (158; see Husserl, 1973, §§ 92–93).
After all, one only realizes that one is implicitly confined to certain limitations when one has more or less stepped out of them; yet it is precisely this very revelatory moment in which consciousness distances itself from the types and is motivated to explore further that we are looking for.
In addition, Levin extends Schütz’s critique and argues that, from the epistemic perspective, eidetic variation and empirical induction are merely different in degrees as well, since eidos is something contingent and mistakable, something similar to empirical concepts abstracted through induction that inevitably fails to reach the ideal of adequacy and apodicticity (Levin, 1968, 15; Belt 2021, 4; Kasmier 2010, 33–34).
In addition, the role of unthematic types in free variation is also recognized by Aldea, who emphasizes that types are the “historically sedimented epistemic and normative resources” that guide the constitutions of variants (21, 30–33; Belt 2021, 25–26). In her study, Aldea argues that eidetic variation and the teleological-historical reflection in Krisis are compatible since types in fact play an important role in eidetic variation. Nonetheless, she also recognizes that “while able to guide the formation of variants, the type…does not alone suffice for the delineation of necessary as opposed to contingent properties. Variation must draw from other resources in order to perform the shift to the invariant.” (Aldea, 2016, 40).
To be more specific, even if the mutually incompatible determinations of the houses are preserved in the unity of incompatibility, which signifies that a house could be white, black, round, square, pentagonal, cement, wooden, etc., one still fails to capture eidetic, general laws that regulate the region “house” such as the limitations of their colors, the eidetic relations between their shapes and materials, or whether the eidetic aspects of house mainly lie in its structure or function.
Under the circumstances, as stated by Schütz, it might be the case that empirical type and pure eidos are only operative concepts that are used for distinguishing different levels of generalities that have different necessity and universality; as such, eidetic variation never enables one to surpass the limitations of this world, but rather introduces one to empirical possibilities that are at the fringe of the real possibilities, which are relative to the ontic-beliefs about this world and can be regarded as pure only in the sense that they are not immediately bound to this world but rather derivatively.
To be more specific, this set of eidetic rules depicts the general conditions and minimum requirements for an object to be what it is; on that basis, the empirical types can motivate the consciousness to form the concrete individuals that are regarded as factual existents with specific determinations.
It is worth mentioning that this approach does not radically reshape the methodological structure of Husserl’s method of eidetic variation. As argued by De Santis, the procedure of the method of eidetic variation is in line with “the traditional zig-zag movement pertaining to every phenomenological investigation” (De Santis 2012, 37). According to De Santis, the zig-zag movement of the method of eidetic variation indicates that, to surpass the limitations of actuality, one must again and again return to the very process of variation, recognizing the underlying influences of empirical generalities, and finally turn toward “the emergence of the ideally identical” (38).
In Phantasie, Bildbewusstein, Erinnerung (Husserl, 2005), Husserl uses the term “productive phantasy” to describe a mental capacity performed by empirical scientists such as historians and psychologists (Husserl 2005, 3–4, 6), which is not what I mean. Rather, I follow Geniusas’ account and refer to it as “a relative term, whose meaning derives from its opposition to reproductive imagination” (Geniusas, 2020, 136). However, I believe that productive phantasy possesses certain functions that exclusively belong to it and are not mentioned in Geniusas’ study. In this section, I will explain these functions.
Aldea and Jansen mention that “If unclear phantasies can be described in the ways Micali does, then they potentially challenge the methodic authority of the imagination for eidetic investigations, albeit in a way that differs from the wide-spread skepticism concerning eidetic seeing” (Aldea & Jansen, 2020, 207). However, I believe that the protean and unclear characters of phantasy are actually a merit, in terms of the epistemic function of phantasy. Precisely because phantasy objects and their protean appearances appear in a way that is radically different from objects in actual experiences, we are able to constitute functional objects such as “Zwittereinheit,” which is of great help in eidetic inquiries.
The reason why the protean appearances can only be the potential presentations of certain individual objects, rather than the actual presentations of them, is that, even though, as argued by Micali, “these fluctuating and overdetermined appearances are changing and fluctuating to such an extent that they can be referred to any object” (Micali, 2020, 226–227), they inevitably remain general and indeterminate that no object can actually be realized and individuated. As such, in a sense, protean appearances could be the potential presentations of anything in a general sense, yet they could never be the actual presentations of anything in the proper sense.
In addition, the following analyses of protean appearances must not be seen as the analyses of protean appearance in general, but rather the analyses of the protean appearances of the variants in free variation; these protean appearances are the mere appearances of the variants which present themselves in their original and intuitive forms, without being affected by any sense-bestowing acts motivated by certain empirical types. This is because, in order to uncover the eidetic rules for certain objects that regulate some of the appearances in the field of pure phantasy, we need certain guiding clues that can lead us to the appearances that are regulated by these rules.
The three levels of protean appearances refer to the different manners in which the subject can cognize and reflect on the different aspects of the protean appearances. The first level of protean appearances is concerned with the manners in which the sensuous elements of protean appearances fluctuate and replace each other in accordance with certain general rules. The second and the third levels of protean appearance are concerned with the similarities and differences between protean appearances with respect to the objects that could potentially be presented in them. To be sure, in the field of pure phantasy, there is no individual object in the proper sense, that is, an object that is fully individuated and located in an absolute temporal position (Lohmar, 2020). However, this does not mean that there is no object at all in protean appearances; rather, protean appearances are given to the subject not only as presentations with certain senses, but as presentations of something, even though this something is ultimately indeterminate.
Specifically, in the first level of protean appearance, the conscious subject is concerned with how the sudden or even discontinuous changes of sensuous features such as color, shape, and sound, are presented in successive, that is, in the quasi-temporal succession of the field of pure phantasy. For example, in the first level of the protean appearances, the subject focuses on how a certain combination of certain colors shapes, and extensions, can fluctuate into other combinations in a sudden way; by contrast, in the second level of the protean appearances, the same series of appearances are grasped with respect to the potential presentations that could be brought forth on the basis them.
To be sure, although these requirements are not prescribed by certain empirical generalities of dogs, they are still related to actual experiences of dogs in a specific sense—the protean appearances in which these requirements are found are not purely fictitious and are devoid of ontological values; instead, these appearances are the mere appearances of variants constituted in the free variation, which contain within themselves the original and intuitive manners in which dogs are given to the subject and are characterized by their eidetic features, but at the same time remain indeterminate and are open for more determinations with respect to certain empirical types. Thus, it is in this sense that the eidetic requirements entailed from the protean appearances can preserve their roots in actuality and also free themselves from the influences of empirical generalities.
Nonetheless, the protean appearances are not radically disconnected from the actuality, otherwise they would be devoid of any ontological values and nothing eidetic can be found in them. On the contrary, as anticipated in Sect. 3.2, the protean appearances have their roots in actuality in a specific sense: as the mere appearances of variants, they present the original ways in which the appearances of certain objects are given, before any empirical generality steps in and applies certain forms to them.
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Lee, CY. Reconsidering Husserl’s Method of Eidetic Variation: The Possibility of Productive Phantasy. Husserl Stud 39, 179–205 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-023-09326-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-023-09326-8