1 Introduction

In 2018, the worst particulate matter 2.5 (PM2.5) concentration level since 2015 was recorded in Seoul (Ko, 2018). A year later, smog once again engulfed the Republic of Korea (Korea) with a “very bad” level of air pollution (Ko, 2018). Similarly, Singapore typically experiences haze during the southwest monsoon season between June and October. In September 2019, air pollution reached an “unhealthy level for the first time since 2016” (Yong & Menon, 2019). Although the lockdowns during the outbreak of COVID-19 temporarily improved air quality in 2020, air quality appeared to deteriorate again in 2021 (Sarmadi et al., 2021).

In response to air pollution, Korea and Singapore implemented domestic measures on the one hand and initiated environmental cooperation with their neighboring countries on the other hand. Korea introduced environmental measures, for example by assigning driving days for odd–even vehicle plate numbers and banning high-emission vehicles in 2018 (Kim, 2019). As part of their intergovernmental cooperation efforts, in 2014 the Korean Ministry of Environment (MOE) and the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and Environment agreed to share data on air pollutants, conduct joint research on developing forecast models for air pollution, and exchange researchers (MOE, 2014). The two countries also launched the Sino-Korean Air Quality Forum in 2019 (MOE, 2019a) and the 2017–2020 “Clean Sky” Project (MOE, 2017). Similarly, Singapore engaged with its neighboring countries to reduce the effects of haze spreading across the Southeast Asian region. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries signed the Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution in 2002, and the Indonesian government was the last to ratify the Agreement in 2015. However, because the agreement did not prevent recurring haze, Singapore introduced an environmental law, the Transboundary Haze Pollution Act (THPA), in 2014, making it possible to sue companies that cause environmental pollution (Republic of Singapore, 2014).

Despite various efforts at the intergovernmental and domestic levels, the problem of transboundary air pollution has remained unresolved, as we have seen smog or haze days recur in every season. How do domestic factors shape governmental policy actions within environmental cooperation agreements in the cases of Korea and Singapore? By employing a process-tracing method, I identify the interests and values of domestic actors and analyze their influence over governmental policies on air pollution from the late 1990s to 2019. I examine primary sources, including newspaper articles, publicly available governmental and nongovernmental organizations’ documents, and secondary sources. I select domestic actors, including environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs), news media, public, and industry, in both Korea and Singapore, as these actors are more directly concerned with affecting how environmental measures are implemented. For instance, ENGOs and the public’s views on environmental problems play an important role in shaping governmental environmental policy in both democratic and authoritarian regimes (e.g., Forsyth, 2014; Johnson, 2010). Similarly, industries can affect environmental policy if there is strong support for environmental policy (Cheon & Urpelainen, 2013).

I choose to compare Korea and Singapore based on the most similar systems design method, where “cases are similar on specified variables other than [variables of interests]” (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 298). While I acknowledge the practical difficulties in holding all potential explanatory factors constant (Anckar, 2008), I find that the selected cases are as similar as possible in key aspects of potential explanatory variables. First, both countries have suffered from transboundary air pollutants. As the sources of origin for air pollutants are at the heart of debates in domestic politics, I do not intend to specify the origins of these pollutants. Instead, I focus on the domestic dynamics shaping such contestations and, ultimately, policy implementation. Second, both countries are characterized as East Asian newly industrialized countries (i.e., Singapore, Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong), becoming high-income economies in the early twenty-first century. Economic development matters in domestic policy implementation because it indicates the potential capacity to deliver on environmental commitments.

Although I highlight the domestic factors influencing the implementation of effective air pollution policies, I do not reject the impacts of international factors. However, by employing a domestic politics approach, I analyze the preferences of governments in policy implementation prior to considering international factors (Schirm, 2020). In doing so, I argue that the competing interests and values of domestic actors reduce the effectiveness of domestic policies on air pollution. While environmental cooperation agreements are optimal at one point in time, they may become less than optimal in the future (Hovi et al., 2009). For instance, governments may neglect implementing policies included in agreements when strong enforcement mechanisms are lacking (Hurley & Lee, 2021). This neglect implies that interests or ideas that are dominant at one point may lose their influence in the future, and consequently, other domestic actors who did not agree on cooperation can challenge the implementation of the agreements.

This study contributes to the literature by highlighting the implementation of domestic policies in the framework of intergovernmental environmental cooperation. While current research focusing on either Northeast Asia or ASEAN regions has provided valuable insight into the economic and political landscape of persisting transboundary air pollution, it has been difficult to apply these studies’ scattered findings to other cases given the unique domestic institutions and relations among domestic actors. Therefore, comparing Korea and Singapore uncovers prevailing impediments to the effective implementation of policies on air pollution.

2 Missing pieces in intergovernmental efforts to mitigate persisting transboundary air pollution

This section provides (1) An overview of current research, investigating the factors hindering regional or intergovernmental environmental agreements on transboundary air pollution and (2) A framework to consider governmental preferences as missing pieces to explain ineffective pollution interventions at the national level.

Past studies have attributed the ineffective impact of intergovernmental cooperation on air pollution to several factors in single cases of transboundary air pollution: the interface between science and policy, economic and political considerations, normative factors, and international factors (e.g., Lee & Paik, 2020; Yoon, 2007). First, the fragmentation of an epistemic community has inhibited intergovernmental environmental cooperation (Kim, 2007; Yarime & Li, 2018). An epistemic community can play a role in defining national interests to engage in regional environmental cooperation by providing scientific results to policymakers. Indeed, experts who are part of an epistemic community must reach a consensus outside of political pressures. Otherwise, it is difficult for them to deliver coherent scientific information to policymakers. For instance, when discussing transboundary air pollution, scientists in the East Asian region have tended not to collaborate with their regional partners to produce scientific evidence for policymakers. Instead, they have engaged in their own research without much collaboration, and consequently, their diverging findings and research activities have not provided effective and coherent policy recommendations (Yarime & Li, 2018).

Second, economic and political interests have also influenced the cooperative behaviors of countries at the regional level. On the one hand, higher costs associated with the mitigation of environmental degradation have prevented countries from committing to environmental cooperation or implementing domestic environmental measures (Sprinz & Vaahtoranta, 1994). In the Northeast Asian region, elevated economic and political costs have deterred governments from engaging in environmental cooperation (Kim, 2007). Instead, these governments have preferred nonbinding environmental cooperation that protects their sovereignty and economic interests (Yoon, 2008). In the ASEAN countries, elite-driven policy priorities have safeguarded the economic interests of owners of oil palm plantations and consequently led to ineffective implementation of regional environmental cooperation agreements (Varkkey, 2014). On the other hand, countries with technological and enforcement capacities are likely to encourage and lead regional cooperation when transboundary environmental pollution causes health and economic damage to their major industries (Dent, 2001).

Third, normative factors can influence intergovernmental coordination in reaching the level of cooperation, which is impossible to establish through the lone pursuit of self-interest. In the ASEAN countries, the norm of noninterference in domestic affairs has constrained collective efforts to reduce transboundary air pollution (Aggarwal & Chow, 2010). In this sense, the “identity-building that ASEAN has sponsored” has not favored “authoritative environmental agreements,” which may penetrate domestic policies; therefore, the ASEAN countries have preferred “weak or soft regionalism” (Elliott, 2003, p. 48). As such, the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution was carefully designed to align with the ASEAN countries’ norm and identity.

Finally, international factors affect how environmental cooperation is designed. Countries engage in diplomatic activities (including acts of persuasion) to serve their own environmental needs (Carroll, 1990). Hence, the configuration of power influences how much these countries can advance their own policy goals through environmental cooperation. For instance, Korea initiated the establishment of transnational institutions in Northeast Asia to mitigate the transboundary pollution that has severely impacted its territory. However, Korea’s status as a “middle power” in the region has limited its opportunities to take the lead in environmental cooperation (Kim, 2014).

2.1 Dynamics of domestic actors in the process of policy implementation

While current research has investigated the impetus for regional or intergovernmental environmental agreements on transboundary air pollution, it has not explained how governmental preferences are shaped at the country level and how these preferences consequently influence policy implementation. Furthermore, because domestic actors have diverse interests that affect the shaping of governmental preferences, it is important to examine how domestic actors as a whole advance their interests and values rather than limiting the focus on single actors (Downie, 2014). To fill this research gap, I examine the dynamics of domestic actors during policy implementation and gain a deeper understanding of the factors that facilitate or preclude effectiveness in the implementation of policies.

Domestic politics theory suggests that governmental preferences “do not automatically maximize fixed, homogenous conceptions of security, sovereignty, or wealth per se” and are shaped by “societal ideas, interest, and institutions” (Moravcsik, 1997). Domestic actors constantly compete against each other to advance their interests and ideas. In this ongoing battle among domestic actors, the government acts as a “cash register that totals and then averages the preferences of the political power of societal actors” (Krasner, 1984, p. 227). That said, the theory does not imply that all interest groups influence governmental policies equally (Moravcsik, 1997). Some domestic actors may have more power to access the government, while others are less likely to obtain the chance to influence the government. In this sense, foreign policies (whether economic, environmental or security-driven) represent the outcome of processes driven by societal forces, considered as “mass preferences translated via elections,” or of the representation of dominant “interest groups” (Moravcsik, 1997).

While this approach emphasizes the impact of domestic actors, it also brings the structure of domestic institutions into an explanation of the determinants shaping domestic policy preferences (da Conceicao-Heldt, 2013). Institutions refer to laws and regulations that coordinate domestic political and socioeconomic interactions (Schirm, 2020). They range “between theoretical extremes of tyranny and democracy… each of which privileges particular demands” (Moravcsik, 1997). For instance, under democratic institutions, nongovernmental organizations may have more opportunities to express their ideas and interests, whereas it might be difficult to have such opportunities under authoritarian institutions. Domestic institutions, along with domestic actors’ interests and ideas, create a political landscape that empowers or diminishes the impact of particular domestic actors.

The focus on domestic politics does not set aside other factors such as power distribution, international institutions, and interdependent relationships between countries, societies, and private actors (Schirm, 2020, p. 3). Instead, an approach based on domestic politics highlights domestic dynamics as a core variable in shaping governmental preferences and thereby entails that the impact of domestic actors should be examined prior to analyzing international variables (Schirm, 2020). In fact, existing studies using domestic politics theory have examined how various governmental preferences interact with each other in the context of international institutions (da Conceicao-Heldt, 2013; Schirm, 2016).

Domestic politics shapes governments’ policy preferences during bargaining and the implementation process of intergovernmental cooperative agreements. These agreements face supporters and opponents because they create “winners and losers domestically” (Milner, 1997). During the bargaining process, governments consider how the outcome of negotiations may influence domestic politics—for instance, how the outcome may influence voters’ support in future elections and the ratification process after the signing of cooperation agreements—in addition to considering the extent to which negotiating partners may concede (Keohane & Milner, 1996; Putnam, 1988). Similarly, domestic politics can play a crucial role in domestic implementation. Even after bargaining and the ratifying of cooperative agreements, the distribution of costs and benefits among domestic actors remains an issue when governments do not introduce redistribution schemes. For this reason, domestic actors may still advance their interests and ideas while agreements are implemented domestically, and such domestic cleavage is likely to lead to ineffectiveness in the implementation of cooperation.

In this study, I argue that the fragmentation among domestic actors is likely to lead to incoherent implementation, thereby posing a challenge to policy implementation. Domestic actors can nevertheless present their causes and interests to the government even after negotiations have ended (Gulbrandsen, 2003). Although the terms on which environmental cooperation agreements are built may constitute optimal choices at one point, these terms may become less than optimal after the agreements are finalized (Hovi et al., 2009). This problem implies that interests or ideas that were at one point dominant may lose their influence in the future, and consequently, other domestic actors who did not agree with the particular cooperation agreements can then challenge their implementation. On the one hand, the manufacturers with overseas production sites may be strongly opposed to an environmental cooperation agreement between their home country and a partner country that may introduce new environmental regulations. On the other hand, domestic environmental groups and the public may push for regional environmental cooperation in response to the worsening of transboundary air pollution. Consequently, policy implementation may not proceed as promised in environmental cooperation agreements.

3 Korea: Where do air pollutants come from?

The Korean government introduced policies not only to tackle domestic sources of fine dust particles but also to cooperate with China in the mitigation of transboundary air pollution. To carry out the environmental cooperation commitments made in 2013 and through the summits uniting China and Korea in 2014, both countries signed a memorandum of understanding specifying plans for mitigating air pollution (2015). Since then, bilateral cooperation has focused on joint research projects on air quality, the exchange of information on measurements about air quality, the development of forecast technology, and collaboration on developing air pollution reduction technology. The 2019 Clean Sky project incorporated these bilateral efforts (Choi, 2021). Meanwhile, in December 2013, Korea first implemented the Comprehensive Plan for Mitigating Fine Dust Particles, which included a new system of air pollution alerts, a commitment to environmental cooperation between China and Korea, and domestic measures to reduce air pollutants (MOE, 2013). Furthermore, additional measures were introduced in June of 2016 (the Special Measures for Managing Fine Dust Particles and the Special Policy Implementation on related Projects), which included commitments to reduce domestic air pollutants, promote green industries, cooperate with neighboring countries and update the system of air pollution alerts (Gong, 2017).

Nevertheless, smog conditions have exacerbated, especially during the winter in Korea. While these policies have been ongoing and their outcomes will be seen in the long run, ambiguity surrounding the sources of air pollution has created difficulties in implementing effective policies arising from the Sino-Korean cooperation. Furthermore, some research findings have added complexity in the determination of the sources of origin of this air pollution, which may vary across seasons (Yonhap, 2019).

3.1 ENGOs

ENGOs have been interested in eliminating coal power plants; this interest has led these organizations to focus on domestic sources of air pollution. In 2015, Greenpeace claimed that the fine dust particles swamping Korea came from domestic sources, with Korea’s coal-fired plants considered to be responsible for over half of these dust particles (Lee, 2015). Similarly, local ENGOs (i.e., the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM)) have focused on reducing domestic sources of air pollutants, especially those emanating from coal power plants (KFEM, 2019a). These ENGOs have proposed eliminating coal power plants and promoting renewable energy as a way to address the problem of fine dust particles (KFEM, 2019a). For instance, the largest Korean ENGO, KFEM, launched a campaign in January 2019 to shut down coal power plants to reduce airborne air pollutants, especially fine dust particles. According to KFEM, coal power plants constitute the main sources of air pollutants, including fine dust particles and greenhouse gases, and thereby threaten public health and the environment. However, although the domestic coal power generation has reached its apex, the government has not completely abandoned coal plants (KFEM, 2019b).

Similarly, a few months before that campaign, other ENGOs, including Solutions for Our Climate, Greenpeace, Green Korea United, Worldwide Fund for Nature, the Coalition for Addressing Fine Dust Particles, Energy Transition Korea, and Political Mamas, joined the movement called “Stop Coal for Children” to push for anti-coal efforts (KFEM, 2019c). Those advocating against using coal began their action in 2015 by urging the Korean Ministry of Industry to implement measures to reduce emissions from coal power plants and withdraw plans to build additional plants; they also called for the government to aggressively invest in renewable energy (KFEM, 2016). In addition to pressuring the government, the campaign also targeted Korea’s major conglomerates for their reluctance to limit the amount of air pollutants originating from their production sites (KFEM, 2019d). The industry was criticized for its inaction, and political patronage was condemned as leading to the weak implementation of emission measurement policies (KFEM, 2019e).

An alliance of local ENGOs—“We Act”—launched a public education campaign to promote ways to reduce fine dust particles in February 2018. For instance, the campaign promoted green public transportation, planting forests and identifying schools and other vulnerable areas in which to specifically reduce fine dust particles. Other local ENGOs argued for the implementation of policies mandating that people not drive their vehicles every other day and for the elimination of aging coal-fired plants (Jeon, 2019).

By advocating a reduction in the number of coal-fired plants, these ENGOs pressured the government and domestic industries to implement appropriate regulations to decrease air pollutants. Their campaign did not imply that they denied the possibility of transboundary air pollutants coming in from China; instead, they focused their attention on domestic sources rather than on foreign sources. For instance, an international ENGO, Greenpeace, claimed that coal power plants in Korea were more likely to be partly responsible for an increase in PM2.5 and condemned Korea’s plan to build additional coal-powered plants by 2021. Greenpeace’s argument does not reject the claim that China also played a role in PM2.5 air pollution in Korea. Instead, Greenspace argued that Korea has also significantly contributed to pollution (Jung, 2015).

3.2 News media and public opinion

While ENGOs have highlighted the role of domestic air pollutants, news media and public opinion have appeared to mostly assume that China is the main source of air pollution in Korea. First, the media have emphasized that transboundary air pollutants from China have contributed to prolonged smog days. According to a 2018 survey conducted by MOE and its partner, 57.1 percent of the public responded that fine dust particles came into Korea from China, while 30.3 percent believed these particles originated domestically; the remaining 18 percent invoked other factors, such as climate change, to explain the presence of smog (MOE, 2018a).

The ongoing security tension between China and Korea about the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) has further affected public opinion about the responsibilities linked to air pollution. The dispute over the deployment of THAAD has led to animosity between Korea and China. While 31 percent of Korean respondents were not favorable to China in 2015, this number increased to 61 percent when the THAAD deployment agreement between Korea and China became controversial in 2017. In 2019, the percentage of people who did not favor China increased to 63 (Pew Research Center, 2020). Another survey conducted in 2017 reported similar results about Koreans not favoring China (Kim et al., 2017). While these tensions between China and Korea did not directly relate to transboundary air pollution, the increasingly negative view about China played a broader role in placing blame on that country for air pollution in Korea.

In March 2019, the Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that air pollutants in Korea came from China (Sul, 2019). “To alleviate public concern about transboundary air pollutants,” the government released emergency measures for improving air quality; these measures included cooperating with China on environmental issues (MOE, 2019b). In response, the Chinese Minister refuted such a claim and argued that there was no scientific evidence to support Korea’s claim (Shin & Jeon, 2019). This contestation did not support domestic measures to tackle air pollution. The public attributed the exacerbation of smog in Korea to transboundary air pollutants from China (Choi, 2018) and therefore, pressured the government to address the issue in cooperation with the Chinese government rather than through the introduction of new domestic policies on air pollution.

3.3 Industry

Korean industrial actors have had the capacity to influence governmental policies. A few large private firms, referred to collectively as a chaebol, were major contributors to industrial development in Korea in the 1970 and 1980s with the support of the Korean government (Kuk, 1988; Lim, 2012). While the development of this chaebol has decelerated and paused to some extent since the 1997/98 financial crisis, it has continued to exercise influence on market policies, particularly as the former chaebol CEO Lee Myung Bak has taken over the administration (2008–2013) (Kalinoswki, 2009). The degree to which industrial actors can exert power over governmental policies, especially those that are unfavorable to their businesses, may vary over time depending on leadership types (You, 2021). However, it appears that the chaebol and industrial actors have persistently engaged in activities to shape the government’s policies in their favor. For instance, after the financial crisis, the chaebol’s lobbying activities were directed at weakening governmental regulations—including environmental regulations—to generate low-cost production and increase profits (You, 2021).

In 2019, the Korean government strengthened environmental regulations to reduce PM, specifically those emitting large amounts of fine dust, including coal-fired plants and petroleum refining plants, and steel and cement manufacturing industries (MOE, 2018b). Manufacturing companies, in a 2020 survey, responded that these stringent environmental regulations imposed higher compliance costs and excessive administrative procedures (KCCI, 2020). To address this issue, a coalition of Korean businesses (i.e., the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI)) asked the government to expand its support, for example through an increase in tax reduction for environmental facilities and through the stacking of telemonitoring systems (KCCI, 2020). In fact, in July of 2017 the government had announced the plan to eliminate PM by 30%. As part of this plan, coal-fired plants were required to use green fuels such as liquefied natural gas, which led to strong opposition from industrial actors that were then required to incur higher production costs (Jeon, 2017). Furthermore, additional environmental regulations that are part of Sino-Korean cooperation agreement are likely to have significant impacts on a large percentage of Korean industrial actors (i.e., in the form of higher production costs) because China is Korea’s main exporting partner (International Monetary Fund, n.d.). For this reason, Korean industrial actors prefer that further environmental measures not be added to the Sino-Korean cooperation agreement.

4 Singapore: Economic interests and mitigating transboundary air pollution

Singapore has faced transboundary air pollutants as early as the late 1990s. From July to November 1997, fires in Kalimantan and Sumatra, Indonesia, played a major role in making the air unbreathable in Singapore and other countries in the region. Other Southeast Asian areas, such as the Malaysian and Bruneian parts of Borneo, also contributed to the thick haze (Sastry, 2002).

The Singaporean government has taken the lead in haze monitoring. In the Third Meeting of the 25th ASEAN Standing Committee, the ASEAN countries endorsed the plan to build the ASEAN Meteorological Centre (ASMC) hosted by the Singaporean Meteorological Service Division. The ASMC monitors and provides information on forest fires and transboundary haze over the ASEAN region (National Environment Agency, 2022). The Singaporean government began releasing to the Singaporean public daily assessments of air pollutants. The Pollutant Standards Index publishes information on a four-level air quality scale based on the measurement of sulfur dioxide (SO2), particulate matter (PM10), fine particulate matter (PM2.5), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), carbon monoxide (CO) and ozone (O3).

In 2002, ASEAN member countries signed the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution to resolve transboundary haze pollution in the region. Although the agreement has been criticized for its insufficient enforcement mechanisms, its legal bindingness suggests that the ASEAN countries began to engage in collaboration (Nguitragool, 2011). In 2014, Singapore introduced the THPA, allowing for the prosecuting of companies causing haze pollution in Singapore. The Act represented Singapore’s willingness to prevent transboundary haze while adhering to the ASEAN norm of noninterference.

4.1 Nongovernmental organization (NGOs)

Singaporean NGOs have had a less intense autonomous relationships with the government compared to their counterparts in Korea. The Singaporean government has engaged NGOs to mitigate transboundary air pollutants (Francesch-Huidobro, 2007). These NGOs have appeared to act as policy instruments in support of the government’s position, for example for the elimination of forest-burning practices that have contribute to transboundary haze.

The Singapore Environmental Council (SEC) has been one of the NGOs that have acted with the government’s support (Columbus, 1998, p. 171). In 1997, in response to the haze problem, the SEC coordinated the International Policy Dialog on the Southeast Asian Fires in June 1998, where representatives of international, regional and local NGOs, governments, international institutions, and the private sector came together to discuss ways to reduce air pollution (SEC, 1998). Following the Dialog, the SEC actively participated in the ASEAN meeting and advised on a range of policies that could be implemented in Singapore, such as the issuing of certifications for environmentally sustainable products (Francesch-Huidobro, 2007).

The SEC plays a central role in limiting forest-burning practices by pressuring companies to engage in environmentally sustainable products. In October 2015, the SEC initiated a movement for companies to publicly declare when they use pulp and papers that are not alleged to be responsible for the haze (as indicated by the Singaporean National Environmental Agency (NEA)) (Law, 2015). Furthermore, the SEC suspended the use by an Indonesian company, Asia Pulp and Paper (APP), of the eco-label certification under the Singapore Green Labeling Scheme. International NGOs (Wetlands International, Eyes on the Forest and Rainforest Action Network, Greenpeace), the Associated Press, NEA criticized APP, the world’s largest pulp mills, as one of the main companies associated with the haze caused by fires in 2017 (Tan, 2017). This scrutiny has led to the removal of products using APP papers from retailers in Singapore. Furthermore, the SEC began to endorse palm oil-based products in February 2016 based on the newly developed criteria for responsibly grown palm oil (SEC, n.d.). To regain the label, APP released information about its supply chain and wood pulp, and the company was audited by the SEC. In 2019, APP was able to regain the label from the SEC, restoring its access to the Singaporean market (Zhuo, 2019). The experience of this company shows that the actions of the SEC were effective in indirectly deterring forest-burning practices.

Similarly, the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), with the Singaporean government’s support, has engaged stakeholders ranging from the Indonesian government to international organizations. For instance, the SIIA has published reports to promote cooperation and inclusive governance with the Indonesian government based on public lectures delivered by Indonesian-based environmental experts in 2002. Furthermore, the SIIA initiated the “We breathe what we buy: Xthehaze” campaign with other NGOs, including WWF Singapore and the People’s Movement to Stop Haze (PM Haze) (Lee & Yi, 2015). Other activities have included convening panel discussions with environmental experts and NGOs such as “Haze and Singapore Perspectives” in 2013 and “the Singapore Dialog on Sustainable World Resource” in 2014 (Angela & Hikam, 2019).

4.2 News media and public opinion

Although Singaporeans have known about the cause of haze, the media have not been able to openly report on transboundary air pollutants coming from Indonesia (Varkkey, 2020). The newspapers have had discussions on the health and economic impact of fires, which have been considered to be the consequence of climate change. The public’s reluctant response to haze has been constrained by the ASEAN norm of noninterference. In the 2010s, the government did not directly address the role of Indonesia on days haze was serious (Varkkey, 2020). However, the media has gradually shifted the narrative to criticize palm oil companies and the Indonesian government’s negligence in ratifying the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (Forsyth, 2014).

4.3 Industry

The connection between large companies and forest-burning practices is a well-known fact. Political patronage between Singaporean palm oil companies and Indonesian local governmental officers has been indicated as one of the sources of transboundary haze pollution (Varkkey, 2012). However, the Indonesian government has not been eager to track down the main players in burning practices because the Indonesian economy heavily relies on palm oil production as an important contributor to economic growth. The companies accused of forest fires have been linked to Singaporean investments and banks (Taylor, 2019). For instance, Greenpeace identified plantation companies with concessions in Malaysia, where fire hotspots were observed during haze days in September 2019. Of the 52 companies identified, 40 had headquarters, were registered, or had financial connections to shareholders, or financing and loaning institutions in Singapore (Greenpeace Southeast Asia, 2019). Major financiers of the palm oil industry in the Southeast Asian region have included Singaporean banks (PM Haze, 2018). Additionally, a US environmental lobby accused Olam and a related Singaporean state-owned investment company, Temasek, of unsustainably burning forests in 2016 (Islam, 2016). Similarly, the media reported that three Indonesian companies related to haze-belching fires—Hutan Ketapang Industri, Asia Pulp and Paper (APP) and April—were accused of having connections in Singapore when haze reoccurred in September 2019 (Tan, 2019).

In response to forest fires in Indonesia, the governments of Indonesia and Singapore and an NGO took action against irresponsible plantation companies over the years. For instance, Indonesian police closed down plantations owned by 42 companies (Yulisman, 2019)—representing over 6,000 ha—and arrested 185 individuals accused of initiating the fires in September of 2019 (Soeriaatmadja & Leong, 2019). Similarly, the Singaporean government initiated legal action against Indonesian companies that caused transboundary haze (“Singapore launches legal action against five Indonesian firms over city-blanketing haze” 2015) and offered assistance to Indonesia to mitigate haze in 2019 (Jamrisko, 2019). In January of 2019, PM Haze urged Singaporean companies to use sustainably produced palm oil (Taylor, 2019). Most importantly, the Singaporean government enacted the THPA in 2014 to sanction foreign investors for causing fire hotspots in concession boundaries. However, the government’s attempts to cease the annual burning practice seems to have been ineffective, as Singapore has continuously suffered from haze originating from fires in Indonesia (BBC, 2015).

5 Domestic dynamics in policy implementation

Although Korea and Singapore signed environmental cooperation agreements with neighboring countries, transboundary haze continues to affect both countries. The fragmentation of domestic interests has hindered policy implementation and prevented the tackling of transboundary air pollution, while the issues leading to domestic fragmentation have differed in Korea and Singapore. In Korea, the origin of air pollution has been an issue shaping domestic fragmentation and ultimately hindering policy implementation. In Singapore, domestic dynamics have emerged from relations between Singaporean investments and Indonesian companies engaged in forest-burning practices (Table 1).

Table 1 Comparison between Korea and Singapore
Full size table

In Korea, the cause of air pollutants has been extensively debated among the public, media and ENGOs, and consequently, this contestation has impeded the effective implementation of domestic policies despite the ongoing efforts of Sino-Korean cooperation. The public has perceived China as a polluter, pressured the government to cooperate with the Chinese government instead of introducing new policies on air pollution. In particular, bilateral tensions arising from the THAAD deployment have created a broader context reinforcing public opinions. Meanwhile, campaigns led by Korean ENGOs against coal-fired plants have highlighted domestic air pollutants as major sources of poor air quality. On this issue, the Korean industry has seemingly not taken a clear position on identifying the source of air pollution in Korea. Additionally, industrial stakeholders have already incurred higher costs for complying with stringent environmental regulations in Korea. These higher costs have implied that the industry has not apparently favored the implementation of additional environmental regulations. This debate has narrowed the scope of domestic policy to a focus on identifying the sources of air pollution rather than engaging in actions to reduce transboundary air pollution. In this sense, the Korean government has not been able to move forward with implementing domestic policy measures that potentially could emerge from bilateral cooperation beyond exchanging information or sharing technical knowledge.

Forest burning in Indonesia, along with other places, has been the main cause of haze days in Singapore, in contrast to the situation in Korea. Despite better knowledge about the origin of the haze and regional efforts aiming at mitigating transboundary haze pollution, economic interests linked to forest-burning practices have created difficulties in implementing effective domestic policy on the ground in Singapore. Singaporean investments in Indonesia have been accused of enabling forest-burning practices that maintain their financial interests, while NGOs with government ties and the public have formed movements to endorse sustainable palm oil products that involve zero burning practices. Amid this domestic fragmentation, the haze arising from forest fires has persisted and affected Singapore’s air quality. In response, the Singaporean government enacted the THPA, intending to act against companies engaging in unsustainable burning practices without violating the ASEAN norm of noninterference. However, domestic fragmentation, entangled with transboundary economic interests, continues to contribute to transboundary haze every year.

Additionally, I find that the distinctive role of NGOs illustrates the impact of institutional structures on the empowerment of domestic actors in policy implementation. The relationship between state and nonstate actors in Singapore has involved a two-way approach (bottom-up and top-down approaches), where Singaporean NGOs have supported the government’s position by providing information about a list of polluting companies. Meanwhile, Korea’s ENGOs have advocated their interests as grassroots organizations. This advocacy has meant that Singaporean NGOs with government ties have been more effective in supporting policies, as they have been able to pressure companies and deter their direct or indirect engagement with burning practices. Hence, the Singaporean government has been able to adhere to the noninterference norm by utilizing NGOs that have acted in alignment with the Singaporean government’s domestic measures.

6 Conclusion

This study explores how domestic factors undermined the implementation of domestic air pollution policies arising from environmental cooperation in Korea and Singapore. Using a domestic politics approach, I find that competing interests and values among domestic actors have played a key role in inhibiting the effective implementation of environmental policies derived from intergovernmental cooperation. Furthermore, some Singaporean NGOs have supported the implementation of governmental policies partly due to their ties with the government.

This study contributes to the existing scholarship on intergovernmental environmental cooperation. First, indeed, it shows that domestic politics matter in the policy implementation processes. By shifting the focus to domestic politics in the implementation process emanating from cooperative negotiations, this study offers insights into how domestic fragmentation can hinder effective policy implementation after the signing of cooperation agreements. As illustrated, the issues leading to domestic fragmentation are different in Korea and Singapore. However, in both countries, domestic fragmentation has challenged the effectiveness of policies implemented as part of environmental cooperation agreements. Second and relatedly, the domestic dynamics can explain the ineffective policy implementation of intergovernmental environmental cooperation in other parts of the Asian region. By comparing the cases of Korea and Singapore with unique domestic institutions and relations among domestic actors, this study highlights the generalization of the role of domestic factors in other political contexts. This finding suggests that governments can utilize policy tools to facilitate domestic enforcement of environmental cooperation agreements. In doing so, governments could create responsive and flexible policies that engage domestic actors in environmental cooperation. In this sense, domestic politics can play an important role in building long-lasting regional environmental cooperation.

Future research can aspire to investigate how the power difference among domestic actors influences the contents of the cooperation differently and delve deeper into the role of transnational actors (such as international ENGOs and multinational companies) in the domestic policy implementation of environmental cooperation agreements.