Revolutions of the mind, (threats of) actual revolutions, and institutional change

“What do we mean by the Revolution? The war? That was no part of the Revolution; it was only an effect and consequence of it. The revolution was in the minds of the people, and this was effected from 1760 - 1775, in the course of fifteen years, before a drop of blood was shed at Lexington.”

-John Adams letter to Thomas Jefferson, 1815, cited in Bailyn (1992, p. 1).

Abstract

I construct a simple theoretical model that incorporates the role of ideas and contested persuasion in processes of institutional change, specifically democratization. The model helps reconcile the view that extensions of the franchise in Western Europe tended to occur as a response to the threat of revolution with the view that these occurred based on a change of social values due to the Enlightenment. In particular, the model puts forward the argument that institutional changes become possible once ideological entrepreneurs –the carriers of an alternative worldview– win an ideological contest against the holders of traditional ideas so that the rest of society adopts their worldview, and a revolutionary threat becomes credible. The model shows that the preferences of the ideological entrepreneurs are key. A revolution takes place only if they prefer it to a peaceful transition. Also, the model predicts that actual revolutions occur only when the probability of them being successful is either low or high. Finally, the ideological benefits associated with adhering to a specific ideology affect whether institutional change is peaceful or not. A strong traditional ideology generating large psychological benefits of adhering to the status quo makes it more likely that democratization occurs through revolution. On the contrary, a strong alternative ideology favoring the extension of the franchise makes it more likely that democracy emerges but has an ambiguous effect on the likelihood of a revolution.

Appendix A Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1

Given the structure of utilities in the different states, the elite’s preferred outcome is the status quo. Hence, democracy is only possible under the threat of revolution. From Assumption 2, a necessary condition for a revolution to be feasible is that the entrepreneurs prefer it to the status quo. This occurs if $q > q^*$. It is also necessary that the poor prefer a revolution to the status quo, i.e., that $V_p^R(I^E) > V_p^N$, or that $q > \frac{y_p^N}{y_p^R+I^E\bar{y}} = \frac{y_p^N}{y_v^R+I^E\bar{y}}$, where the last equality follows from the assumption that the poor and the entrepreneurs share income equally in a revolution. Now, the fact that $y_v^N > y_p^N$ implies that $q^* > \frac{y_p^N}{y_v^R+I^E\bar{y}}$ (see eq. (10)), and thus if $q > q^*$ the poor’s revolutionary constraint is automatically satisfied. The proposition thus follows. $\square$

Proof of Proposition 2

Recall from Assumption 1 that peaceful democratization occurs only if both the elite and the vanguard choose to extend the franchise. Assumption 4 implies that $q^* < q^{**}$. Also, from eq. (11), the entrepreneurs prefer a peaceful democratization to revolution as long as $q^* < q \le q^{**}$. If $q > q^{**}$, they prefer a revolution. Finally, from eq. (12), the elites prefer a peaceful democratization as long as $q \ge {\hat{q}}$; and they prefer a revolution otherwise.

Thus, when ${\hat{q}} < q^{**}$, $\exists$ q s.t. ${\hat{q}} \le q \le q^{**}$ for which both the elite and the vanguard prefer to extend the franchise. The first inequality guarantees that the elites prefer a peaceful democratization, while the second one guarantees that the vanguard prefers this outcome. Peaceful democratization thus follows. The range of q for which a revolution takes place follows directly from eqs. (11) and (12). This concludes the first part of the Proposition.

The second part of the Proposition follows simply from noting that when ${\hat{q}} \ge q^{**}$, there is no q for which both the elite and the vanguard agree to extend the franchise. As a consequence, only a revolution is possible. $\square$

Proof of Corollary 1

The first part follows directly from Proposition 2. The second part follows from eq. (12). From here it is clear that $\frac{\partial {\hat{q}}}{\partial I^T\bar{y}} = \frac{y_e^D}{(y_e^R+I^T{\bar{y}})^2} > 0$. In words, an increase in $I^T\bar{y}$ leads to an increase in ${\hat{q}}$. Recall, however that the range of q for which a peaceful democratization is possible is given by ${\hat{q}} \le q \le q^{**}$. Thus, when ${\hat{q}}$ increases, this range becomes smaller. $\square$

Proof of Proposition 3

The poor’s decision rule and the application of Bayes’ rule to the determination of the poor’s posterior beliefs that E is the right ideology as given in eq. (16) imply that: $\frac{\pi h_v}{(1-\pi )h_e + \pi h_v} > \gamma$. For any given prior $\pi$, this can be written as: $\pi > \frac{\gamma h_e}{(1-\gamma )h_v + \gamma h_e}$. Given our assumption that the elite and the vanguard have a uniform distribution about $\pi$, the probability of the poor supporting the vanguard ($p_S^E$) is thus given by:

$$\begin{aligned} p_S^E&= Prob\left( \pi > \frac{\gamma h_e}{(1-\gamma )h_v + \gamma h_e}\right) \\&= 1 - \frac{\gamma h_e}{(1-\gamma )h_v + \gamma h_e}\\&= \frac{(1-\gamma ) h_v}{(1-\gamma )h_v + \gamma h_e}, \end{aligned}$$

which is eq. (17). $\square$

Proof of Proposition 4

The poor choose $S^{E,R}$ if and only the utility derived from this choice is greater than the utility derived from choosing $S^{T,R}$. From (18) and (19), they thus choose $S^{E,R}$ iff:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi '(qy_p^R + I^E{\bar{y}}) + (1-\pi ')(qy_p^R)&> \pi '(y_p^N) + (1-\pi ')(y_p^N + I^T{\bar{y}}) \\ \pi '(I^T + I^E){\bar{y}}&> y_p^N + I^T{\bar{y}}-qy_p^R \end{aligned}$$

The condition in Proposition 4 follows directly from here. $\square$

Proof of Proposition 5

Note first that for $q > q^*$, the ideological entrepreneurs are willing to use resources to persuade the poor. Given the structure of the ideological contest, it follows that in this case the elite is also willing to use resources for persuasion. An ideological conflict thus takes place for this range of q.

Now, persuasion is only relevant as long as $0< \gamma ^R < 1$, or, equivalently, as long as $\underline{q}< q < {\bar{q}}$, where $\underline{q} \equiv \frac{y_p^N-I^E{\bar{y}}}{y_p^R}$ and ${\bar{q}} \equiv \frac{y_p^N+I^T{\bar{y}}}{y_p^R}$.

Comparing first $\underline{q}$ and $q^*$, $\underline{q} \ge q^*$ iff $\frac{y_p^N-I^E\bar{y}}{y_p^R} \ge \frac{y_v^N}{y_v^R+I^E{\bar{y}}}$, or iff

$$\begin{aligned} y_v^R(y_p^N-y_v^N) + I^E{\bar{y}}(y_p^N - y_p^R) - (I^E\bar{y})^2 \ge 0, \end{aligned}$$

where in the LHS I have switched $y_p^R$ and $y_v^R$ appropriately, since they are assumed to be equal. Since $y_p^N < y_v^N$ and $y_p^N < y_p^R$, the LHS in this inequality is negative, leading to a contradiction. It thus follows that $q^* > \underline{q}$.

Comparing $\bar{q}$ and $q^{**}$, ${\bar{q}} \le q^{**}$ iff

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{y_p^N + I^T\bar{y}}{y_p^R} \le \frac{y_v^D + I^E\bar{y}}{y_v^R + I^E\bar{y}}. \end{aligned}$$

From Assumption 3, $y_p^N + I^T\bar{y} > y_p^R$ (assuming $q=1$) and thus in the above equation the $LHS > 1$. On the other hand, from Assumption 5, $y_v^R > y_v^D$ and thus the $RHS < 1$, leading to a contradiction. Thus, $q^{**} < \bar{q}$.

Therefore, the thresholds $\underline{q}$ and $\bar{q}$ for which persuasion is relevant are not binding. $\square$

Proof of Proposition 6

Follows directly from the comparison of the utilities in eqs. (27) and (28), as was done for the revolutionary case. $\square$

Proof of Proposition 7

As in the revolutionary case, persuasion is relevant for $0< \gamma ^D < 1$. Let us look first at the lower bound. $\gamma ^D > 0$ iff $y_p^N + I^T\bar{y} > y_p^D$. From Assumption 5, $y_v^R > y_v^D$. But, since $y_v^R = y_p^R$ and $y_v^D > y_p^D$, it follows that $y_p^R> y_v^D > y_p^D$. This result along with Assumption 3 imply that $y_p^N + I^T\bar{y} > y_p^D$, and thus that $\gamma ^D > 0$.

For the upper bound to be satisfied (i.e., $\gamma ^D < 1$), it must be the case that $y_p^D + I^E\bar{y} > y_p^N$. This is always satisfied since $y_p^D < y_p^N$ and $I^E\bar{y} > 0$.

Thus, the thresholds for persuasion to be relevant are also non-binding in the case of peaceful democratization. $\square$

Proof of Proposition 8

Follows directly from Propositions 1-7. $\square$