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A Polynomial-Time Algorithm for 1/3-Approximate Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Games

Published:08 August 2023Publication History
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Abstract

Since the celebrated PPAD-completeness result for Nash equilibria in bimatrix games, a long line of research has focused on polynomial-time algorithms that compute ε-approximate Nash equilibria. Finding the best possible approximation guarantee that we can have in polynomial time has been a fundamental and non-trivial pursuit on settling the complexity of approximate equilibria. Despite a significant amount of effort, the algorithm of Tsaknakis and Spirakis [38], with an approximation guarantee of (0.3393+δ), remains the state of the art over the last 15 years. In this paper, we propose a new refinement of the Tsaknakis-Spirakis algorithm, resulting in a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a \((\frac{1}{3}+\delta)\)-Nash equilibrium, for any constant δ > 0. The main idea of our approach is to go beyond the use of convex combinations of primal and dual strategies, as defined in the optimization framework of [38], and enrich the pool of strategies from which we build the strategy profiles that we output in certain bottleneck cases of the algorithm.

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    • Published in

      cover image ACM Transactions on Algorithms
      ACM Transactions on Algorithms  Volume 19, Issue 4
      October 2023
      255 pages
      ISSN:1549-6325
      EISSN:1549-6333
      DOI:10.1145/3614237
      • Editor:
      • Edith Cohen
      Issue’s Table of Contents

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      New York, NY, United States

      Publication History

      • Published: 8 August 2023
      • Online AM: 8 July 2023
      • Accepted: 15 June 2023
      • Received: 28 September 2022
      Published in talg Volume 19, Issue 4

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