Motto: “Bilderberg meetings often feature future political leaders shortly before they become household names. Bill Clinton went in 1991 while still governor of Arkansas, Tony Blair was there two years later while still an opposition MP. All the recent presidents of the European Commission attended Bilderberg meetings before they were appointed. This has led to accusations that the group pushes its favored politicians into high office.” (BBC, 29.9.2005).
Abstract
This article is the first systematic examination of the proposition that politicians can foster their careers through affiliations with transnational elite clubs. Focusing on the Euro-Atlantic Bilderberg Group, I provide preliminary evidence in support of the proposition. I argue that politicians invited to the exclusive meetings gain valuable contacts, insider information and probably some backing. Still, most politicians who participated at Bilderberg conferences were never later elevated. But 133 were and sometimes even shortly after their appearance at the gatherings. Of these mainly European politicians, 42 became prime ministers, presidents, or top representatives of international organizations like EU, NATO, IMF. However, I mostly found correlation, not causation. Only in several cases, there are additional indicia which suggest that “factor Bilderberg” was really one of the reasons for career advancements. On the other hand, the suspicion of the Bilderberg Group's direct influence on personnel policy cannot be confirmed.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
A certain exception is Bond (2012), who mapped elite club affiliations among members of the House of Lords. Yet, he focused only on national (British) clubs (Athenaeum, Brooks's, Carlton etc.) and did not touch on the question of how clubs help in careers.
This number, as well as the following two in the same paragraph, is rounded down in order to obtain conservative calculation.
The Ford Foundation also subsidized the Bilderberg Group (Aubourg 2003: 96–97).
In a sense, to large extent, elites even managed to keep (semi)secret the whole phenomenon of the Bilderberg Group, or at least to maintain low profile of this network. Even many graduates of sociology and IR do not know much about the Bilderberg Group, since mainstream syllabuses usually overlook it. Similar concealment of sensitive information is successfully practiced in the field of security/intelligence studies. Many (aspects of) covert (US) intelligence and military sites, operations, capabilities and projects are not (regular) part of literature, research and teaching, as Krishnan (2013) summarized (I thank one of the reviewers for drawing my attention to this article). In fact, various kinds of secrecy are so important that scholars from several disciplines recently launched new specialized journal Secrecy and Society.
Or as Mills (1956: 317) put it: “Authority formally resides 'in the people,' but the power of initiation is in fact held by small circles of men.”
References
Aubourg, Valerie. 2003. Organising Atlanticism: The Bilderberg Group and the Atlantic Institute, 1952–1963. Intelligence and National Security 18 (2): 92–105.
Bilderberg. http://bilderbergmeetings.org (official website of Bilderberg Group)
Beigbeder, Yves. 2021. Fraud, Corruption, and the United Nations’ Culture. In: Dijkzeul, Dennis – Salomons, Dirk (eds.). International Organizations Revisited: Agency and Pathology in a Multipolar World. New York: Berghahn Books, p. 191–222.
Best, Heinrich – Higley, John (eds.). 2018. The Palgrave Handbook of Political Elites. Palgrave Macmillan
Bilderberg gathering envisions top job for Kristalina Georgieva. Euractiv.com, 10.6.2016 https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/bilderberg-gathering-envisions-top-job-for-kristalina-georgieva/
Bilderberg Staff Make Last Nervy Tweaks Before Arrival of the Rich and Powerful. The Guardian, 8.6.2016 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/08/bilderberg-staff-last-nervy-tweaks-arrival-rich-and-powerful
Bond, Matthew. 2012. The Bases of Elite Social Behaviour: Patterns of Club Affiliation among Members of the House of Lords. Sociology 46 (4): 613–632.
Burris, Val, and – Staples, Clifford L. 2012. In search of a Transnational Capitalist Class: Alternative Methods for Comparing Director Interlocks Within and Between Nations and Regions. International Journal of Comparative Sociology 53 (4): 323–342.
Carroll, William K. 2010. The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Class: Corporate Power in the 21st Century. London: Zed Books.
Ce que Macron a dit au groupe Bilderberg en 2014. Le Journal du Dimanche, 2.12.2017 https://www.lejdd.fr/Politique/ce-que-macron-a-dit-au-groupe-bilderberg-en-2014-3509507
Colonnelli, Emanuele, and – Prem, Mounu – Teso, Edoardo. 2020. Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations. American Economic Review 110 (10): 3071–3099.
Cox, R.W. 1983. Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: an Essay in Method. Millennium 12 (2): 162–175.
Emmanuel Macron’s Rothschild Years Make him an Easy Election Target. Financial Times, 28.3.2017 https://www.ft.com/content/9bd62502-12cf-11e7-b0c1-37e417ee6c76
Fitzsimmons, Terrance W., and – Callan, Victor J. 2016. CEO Selection: A Capital Perspective. The Leadership Quarterly 27 (5): 765–787.
Gijswijt, Thomas W. 2007. Uniting the West. The Bilderberg Group, the Cold War and European Integration, 1952–1966. PhD thesis, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg
Gill, Stephen [2009] (1990). American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (3rd edition)
Graz, Jean-Christophe. 2003. How Powerful are Transnational Elite Clubs? The Social Myth of the World Economic Forum. New Political Economy 8 (3): 321–340.
Herman Van Rompuy Wins Race to Become European Council president. The Guardian, 19.11.2009 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/nov/19/tony-blair-european-council-president
Higley, John. 2010. Elite Theory and Elites. In: Leicht, Kevin T. – Jenkins, J. Craig (eds). Handbook of Politics: State and Society in Global Perspective. Charm : Springer, p. 161–176.
Hirsch, Joachim, and – Wissel, Jens. 2011. The Transformation of Contemporary Capitalism and the Concept of a Transnational Capitalist Class: A Critical Review in Neo-Poulantzian Perspective. Studies in Political Economy 88 (1): 7–33.
Inside the Secretive Bilderberg Group. BBC, 29.9.2005 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4290944.stm
Kantor, Lukas. 2017. Bilderberg Group and Transnational Capitalist Class: Recent Trends in Global Elite Club as Vindication of neo-Marxism. Critique 45 (1–2): 183–204.
Kendall, Diana. 2008. Members Only: Elite Clubs and The Process of Exclusion. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
Korsnes, Olav, et al. (eds.). 2017. New Directions in Elite Studies. London: Routledge.
Krishnan, Armin. 2013. Teaching about “Area 51”? How to Cover Secret Government Technology and Capabilities in Intelligence Studies Courses. Journal of Strategic Security 6 (3 Suppl.): 187–196.
Lawson, George, and – Shilliam, Robbie. 2010. Sociology and International Relations: Legacies and Prospects. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 23 (1): 69–86.
Levine, Daniel J. – Barder, Alexander D. 2018. After First Principles: The Sociological Turn in International Relations as Disciplinary Crisis. In: Gofas, Andreas – Hamati-Ataya, Inanna – Onuf, Nicholas (eds.). The SAGE Handbook of the History, Philosophy and Sociology of International Relations. India: Sage Publications, p. 296–310.
Lin, Nancy, and – Cook, Karen – Burt, Ronald S., eds. 2017. Social Capital: Theory and Research. New York: Routledge.
Macartney, Huw. 2009. Variegated Neo-Liberalism: Transnationally Oriented Fractions of Capital in EU Financial Market Integration. Review of International Studies 35 (2): 451–480.
Marshall, Andrew G. 2014. Global Power Project: Is the Bilderberg Group picking our politicians? Occupy.com, 26.11.2014 https://www.occupy.com/article/global-power-project-bilderberg-group-picking-our-politicians#sthash.XCyMvdnO.dpbs
Martín Jiménez, Cristina. 2017. Interrelación Entre el Poder Socio-Político-Mercantil y el Poder Mediático Mercantil: El “Club Bilderberg” (1954–2016). PhD thesis. University of Sevilla.
Martins, Pedro S. 2020. Jobs Cronyism in Public-Sector Firms. GLO Discussion Paper, no. 624, Global Labor Organization (GLO), Essen.
Mills, C. Wright. 1956. The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press.
Moon, Terry - Schoenherr, David. 2022. The Rise of a Network: Spillover of Political Patronage and Cronyism to the Private Sector. Journal of Financial Economics 145 (3): 970–1005.
Murray, Joshua. 2014. Evidence of a Transnational Capitalist Class-for-itself: The Determinants of PAC Activity Among Foreign Firms in the Global Fortune 500, 2000–2006. Global Networks 14 (2): 230–250.
New IMF leader Kristalina Georgieva must smash the system that gave her the job if she wants to truly help the world. South China Morning Post, 3.10.2019 https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3031085/new-imf-leader-must-smash-system-gave-her-job-if-she-wants-truly
Oikonomou, I. 2011. EU–US Military Relations and the Question of the Transnational Capitalist Class. Rethinking Marxism 23 (1): 135–144.
Parizek, Michal. 2017. Control, Soft Information, and the Politics of International Organizations Staffing. The Review of International Organizations 12 (4): 559–583.
Parizek, Michal, and – Stephen, Matthew D. 2021. The Long March Through the Institutions: Emerging Powers and the Staffing of International Organizations. Cooperation and Conflict 56 (2): 204–223.
Parmar, Inderjeet. 2017. Elites and American Power in an Era of Anti-Elitism. International Politics 54 (3): 255–259.
Phillips, Peter. 2018. Giants: The Global Power Elite. New York, NY: Seven Stories Press.
https://publicintelligence.net/bilderberg (repository of lists of participants and topics of Bilderberg Group's conferences)
Richardson, Ian N., and – Kakabadse, Andrew P. – Kakabadse, Nada K. 2011. Bilderberg People: Elite Power and Consensus in World Affairs. USA: Routledge.
Robinson, William I., and – Harris, Jerry. 2000. Towards a Global Ruling Class? Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class. Science and Society 64 (1): 11–54.
Ronson, Jon. Who Pulls the Strings? The Guardian, 10.3.2001 https://www.theguardian.com/books/2001/mar/10/features.weekend
Rothkopf, David. 2008. Superclass: The Global Power Elite and the World They Are Making. Straus and Giroux: Farrar.
Scoppa, Vincenzo. 2009. Intergenerational Transfers of Public Sector Jobs: A Shred of Evidence on Nepotism. Public Choice 141 (1–2): 167–188.
Seibert, Scott E., and – Kraimer, Maria L. – Liden, Robert C. 2001. A Social Capital Theory of Career Success. The Academy of Management Journal 44 (2): 219–237.
Sener, Meltem Y. 2007. Turkish Managers as a Part of the Transnational Capitalist Class. Journal of World-Systems Research 13 (2): 119–141.
Shore, Cris. 2005. Culture and Corruption in the EU: Reflections on Fraud, Nepotism and Cronyism in the European Commission. In: Haller, Dieter – Shore, Cris (eds.) Corruption: Anthropological perspectives. London: Pluto Press, p. 131–155.
Sklair, Leslie. 2001. The Transnational Capitalist Class. Oxford: Blackwell.
Takase, Hisanao. 2014. The Transnational Capitalist Class, the Trilateral Commission and the Case of Japan: Rhetorics and Realities. Socialist Studies 10 (1): 86–110.
Tashjean, John E. 1972. Mosca Revisited: Exegesis of an Elitist Argument. Revue Européenne Des Sciences Sociales 10 (27): 123–126.
The Network that Ursula Built. Politico, 11.7.2019 https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyen-power-network/
Thompson, Peter. 1980. Bilderberg and the West. In Sklar, Holly (ed.) Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management. Boston: South End Press, p. 157–189.
Top candidate debates EU tax at elite dinner. Euobserver.com, 16.11.2009 https://euobserver.com/institutional/28993
van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan. 2000. Transnational Class Agency and European Governance: The Case of the European Round Table of Industrialists. New Political Economy 5 (2): 157–181.
van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan. 2014. The European capitalist class and the crisis of its hegemonic project. Socialist Register 50: 189–206.
van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan – de Graaff, Naná. 2016. American Grand Strategy and Corporate Elite Networks: The Open Door since the End of the Cold War. USA: Routledge.
Wedel, Janine R. 2011. Beyond Conflict of Interest: Shadow Elites and the Challenge to Democracy and the Free Market. Polish Sociological Review 174 (2): 149–165.
Wedel, Janine R. 2017. From Power Elites to Influence Elites: Resetting Elite Studies for the 21st Century. Theory, Culture and Society 34 (5–6): 153–178.
Wendt, Björn. 2016. Die Bilderberg-Gruppe. Wissen über die Macht gesellschaftlicher Eliten. Göttingen: Optimus Wissenschaftsverlag
Wiersema, Margarethe F., and – Nishimura, Yoichiro – Suzuki, Katsushi. 2018. Executive Succession: The Importance of Social Capital in CEO Appointments. Strategic Management Journal 39 (5): 1473–1495.
Wilford, Hugh. 2003. CIA Plot, Socialist Conspiracy, or New World Order? The Origins of the Bilderberg Group, 1952–55. Diplomacy and Statecraft 14 (3): 70–82.
Zieliński, Aleksander M. 2017. The Bilderberg Conferences: A Transnational Informal Governance Network. In: Salas-Porras, Alejandra – Murray, Georgina (eds.). Think Tanks and Global Politics: Key Spaces in the Structure of Power. Palgrave Macmillan, p. 107–132.
Acknowledgements
My biggest thanks go to the journal's editors (especially Michael J. Williams) and the anonymous reviewers for their highly constructive approach to my manuscript. I am also grateful to Ondrej Lansky, Martin Buchtik, Petr Drulak and Michal Parizek, from whom I also received some valuable comments. Yet, all potential mistakes and oversights are my own.
Funding
This work is dedicated to the Cooperatio Program, research area POLS.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of interest
The author declares that he has no conflict of interest.
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Appendix
Appendix
The tables below enumerate all politicians who were elevated after their attendance at some of the post-Cold War Bilderberg conference. This chronological evidence is a necessary—but not sufficient—condition for corroborating the proposition that participation at Bilderberg gatherings can yield career benefits.
The names of the politicians are drawn from lists of participants at Bilderberg conferences from 1990 to 2019. These lists are stored at “international, collaborative research project” called Public Intelligence (https://publicintelligence.net/bilderberg). This website seems to be reliable and has been cited in respected academic journals and mainstream media outlets.
However, Public Intelligence warns that the lists of participants at Bilderberg conferences from 1990 to 2006 are “unofficial and may contain inaccuracies.” So, this is the main caveat of the following dataset. Therefore, the tables perhaps do not provide precise exhaustive statistics. Yet, at least, they offer basic overview, which is sufficient for the purpose of this examination.
I counted the number of politicians who participated at Bilderberg conferences. At the same time, the tables show how many of these politicians were later elevated, to what function and when. Following people were counted as politicians: diplomats, mayors, members of parliament (MP) and government, presidents, monarchs, governors of US states, high employees (secretary, chief of staff) of public offices, military, and intelligence officers (because they serve politicians), party leaders, representatives of international governmental organizations and central bankers (because they are appointed by politicians and central banks are state institutions).
As elevation I took significant career advancements, especially from MP to member of government, from minister to prime minister (PM), from MP or minister to high representative of international organization, and from governor of one US state to president of the United States. So, for instance: Manuel Valls attended Bilderberg gathering in 2008 as MP (see Table 19) and in 2012 he became minister and in 2014 PM. Therefore, he is counted among political participants of Bilderberg conference in 2008 who were later elevated.
Importantly, the category “later elevated politicians” include only those politicians who after their first Bilderberg experience reached (significantly) higher position(s) than they held any time before Bilderberg experience. Therefore, the tables do not list some people who nonetheless can also support the examined proposition. Prominent examples are Michel Barnier and Mark J. Carney.
Barnier attended Bilderberg conference for the first time in 2006. On the list of participants, he is presented as “former minister” of France. In 2010, Barnier became EU commissioner (for Internal Market) and in 2016 EU chief negotiator for Brexit. Seen from this perspective, he reached significantly higher position(s) after Bilderberg experience. Yet, Barnier was EU commissioner (for Regional Policy) already before 2006, so for this reason, he is not counted among “later elevated politicians.”
Nevertheless, Barnier can also support the proposition of career benefits of affiliation to Bilderberg Group, because after his participation at Bilderberg meeting, Barnier was allowed to return to international politics (a higher level than national politics). Plus, Barnier is additional proof of the personnel overlaps between EU and Bilderberg Group.
Carney attended his first Bilderberg conference in 2011 as governor of Canadian central bank. In 2013, he became governor of British central bank. So, Carney did not reach higher position after Bilderberg experience (and therefore is not mentioned among “later elevated politicians”), but he got the same top job in another country, which is unusual. Moreover, in Britain, Carney was appointed by another Bilderberger George Osborne, which is further indicia that “factor Bilderberg” could play some role in his impressive career.
As already indicated, many promoted politicians appeared at numerous Bilderberg conferences. Yet, they are counted only once into the category “later elevated politicians.” For example, Dutch minister Ad Melkert attended Bilderberg conference for the first time in 1996. In 2002, he became executive director at World Bank. So, in Table 7 about Bilderberg conference in 1996, Melkert is included among “later elevated politicians.” In 2001, he again participated at Bilderberg conference. Yet, in Table 12 about Bilderberg conference in 2001, Melkert is not mentioned among “later elevated politicians,” because each year only new names are counted.
Perhaps, other researchers would choose different ways of counting that could lead to (slightly) different numbers. But that is not decisive, because for my argument, what matters most, are not exact numbers, but general trends. And the tables unveil clear pattern—most politicians who attended Bilderberg conferences were never later elevated. But 133 of them were and sometimes even shortly after their participation at the gathering.
See Tables
1,
2,
3,
4,
5,
6,
7,
8,
9,
10,
11,
12,
13,
14,
15,
16,
17,
18,
19,
20,
21,
22,
23,
24,
25,
26,
27,
28,
29 and
30.
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Kantor, L. Elite clubs as career elevator? Mixed evidence from the Bilderberg Group. Int Polit 60, 1209–1247 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-023-00477-1
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-023-00477-1