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Power Relations in Malawi’s Social Cash Transfer Programme: The Flip Side of Domination

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Abstract

The Sustainable Development Goals call for nationally appropriate social protection systems. However, development partners and governments might disagree over what is appropriate, who to protect, how to do this, and who should pay for it. This paper explores how power relations between national and international stakeholders shaped Malawi’s Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP) by tracing its design and implementation. It draws on novel empirical data from 47 in-depth interviews with key stakeholders. Data are analysed drawing on literature around power relations, political settlements, and decision making. It finds that development partners’ power to shape the SCTP generates resistance among Malawian politicians and enables them to pursue its own priorities. The paper shows how power relations work in practice and argues that power relations are complex, entangled, and that decisions which appear rational can result in outcomes that are detrimental to developing nationally owned, sustainable, social protection systems.

Résumé

Les Objectifs de Développement Durable appellent à des systèmes de protection sociale appropriés au niveau national. Cependant, les partenaires de développement et les gouvernements peuvent être en désaccord sur ce qui est approprié, qui protéger, comment le faire, et qui devrait payer pour cela. Ce document explore comment les relations de pouvoir entre les acteurs nationaux et internationaux ont façonné le Programme de Transferts Monétaires Sociaux (PTMS) du Malawi en retraçant sa conception et sa mise en œuvre. Il s'appuie sur de nouvelles données empiriques provenant de 47 entretiens approfondis avec des acteurs clés. Les données sont analysées en s'appuyant sur la littérature autour des relations de pouvoir, des accords politiques, et de la prise de décision. Il constate que le pouvoir des partenaires de développement pour façonner le PTMS génère une résistance parmi les politiciens malawites et leur permet de poursuivre leurs propres priorités. Le document montre comment les relations de pouvoir fonctionnent en pratique et soutient que les relations de pouvoir sont complexes, enchevêtrées, et que les décisions qui semblent rationnelles peuvent aboutir à des résultats qui sont préjudiciables au développement de systèmes de protection sociale durables et appartenant au niveau national.

Resumen

Los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible piden sistemas de protección social apropiados a nivel nacional. Sin embargo, los socios de desarrollo y los gobiernos pueden discrepar sobre qué es apropiado, a quién proteger, cómo hacerlo y quién debería pagar por ello. Este documento explora cómo las relaciones de poder entre los actores nacionales e internacionales dieron forma al Programa de Transferencias Monetarias Sociales (SCTP) de Malawi, rastreando su diseño e implementación. Se basa en datos empíricos novedosos de 47 entrevistas en profundidad con actores clave. Los datos se analizan a partir de la literatura sobre relaciones de poder, acuerdos políticos y toma de decisiones. Se descubre que el poder de los socios de desarrollo para dar forma al SCTP genera resistencia entre los políticos malauíes y les permite perseguir sus propias prioridades. El documento muestra cómo funcionan las relaciones de poder en la práctica y argumenta que las relaciones de poder son complejas, enredadas, y que las decisiones que parecen racionales pueden resultar en resultados que son perjudiciales para el desarrollo de sistemas de protección social sostenibles y de propiedad nacional.

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Notes

  1. Development partners is a term frequently used to describe a heterogenous group of stakeholders comprised of bilateral and multilateral donors, UN-agencies, International Non-Governmental Organisations, and international consultancy firms.

  2. If the EU supported Karonga rather than Zomba it would have completely followed Malawi’s poverty ranking.

  3. This is the parliamentary committee responsible for overseeing the SCTP.

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Acknowledgements

The author thanks the colleagues of the research team he was a part of for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. Dr. Charmaine G. Ramos also deserves special mention for the input she has provided, as do those who provided comments during the 2018 African Studies Association conference and the 2019 Development Studies Association conference in the United Kingdom. Finally, much gratitude is extended to the anonymous reviewers for their supportive and insightful comments.

Funding

This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council and Department for International Development from the United Kingdom [ES/M009076/1].

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  1. University of Dundee, Scotland, UK

    Roeland Hemsteede

  2. IOD PARC, Sheffield, UK

    Roeland Hemsteede

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Hemsteede, R. Power Relations in Malawi’s Social Cash Transfer Programme: The Flip Side of Domination. Eur J Dev Res 36, 194–215 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41287-023-00598-6

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