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Scientism and the value of scientific evidence for religious belief

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 September 2023

Jack Warman  and
Leandro De Brasi Open the ORCID record for Leandro De Brasi [Opens in a new window]
Jack Warman
Affiliation:
Department of Social Sciences, University of La Frontera, Temuco, Chile
Leandro De Brasi*
Affiliation:
Department of Social Sciences, University of La Frontera, Temuco, Chile
*
Corresponding author: Leandro De Brasi; Email: leandro.debrasi@ufrontera.cl
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Abstract

This article presents a novel argument against an application of evidential scientism to religious belief. In particular, our target is those arguments at whose core lies the claim that it ought to be the case that, if one holds religious beliefs, then those beliefs are based on the best scientific evidence. Moreover, rather than focussing on the philosophical puzzles that usually fall within the purview of philosophers of religion, we are interested in the mundane beliefs of ordinary believers about their everyday interactions with God. Our argument combines recent work on epistemic partiality in close personal relationships with insights from analytic theology on the personal nature of believer's relationships with God. We argue that it's inappropriate for believers who take themselves to have a personal relationship with God to base their religious beliefs about God's nature on scientific evidence. In particular, it's precisely because these believers are in a personal relationship with God that it's sometimes inappropriate for them to form their beliefs about God's nature on the basis of scientific evidence.

Keywords

scientismscientific evidencereligious beliefepistemic partialityGod
Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , First View , pp. 1 - 14
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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