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Busy CEOs and audit fees: evidence from Indonesia

Iman Harymawan (Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Business, Center for Environmental, Social, and Governance Studies (CESGS), Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya, Indonesia)
Fiona Vista Putri (Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Business, Center for Environmental, Social, and Governance Studies (CESGS), Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya, Indonesia)
Melinda Cahyaning Ratri (Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Business, Center for Environmental, Social, and Governance Studies (CESGS), Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya, Indonesia)
Mohammad Nasih (Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Business, Center for Environmental, Social, and Governance Studies (CESGS), Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya, Indonesia)

Accounting Research Journal

ISSN: 1030-9616

Article publication date: 15 September 2023

Issue publication date: 27 November 2023

343

Abstract

Purpose

A company needs to use auditing procedures to ensure the reliability of financial statements while also providing transparency to stakeholders. The extent of risk associated with the company depends on the directors’ involvement in its daily operations. This paper aims to study the relationship between busy chief executive officers (CEOs) and audit fees.

Design/methodology/approach

This study uses 1,037 data samples from companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2010 until 2018. It adopts the ordinary least squares method to test the hypothesis. Furthermore, this study performs robustness tests, such as propensity score matching (PSM) and Heckman’s two-stage least square tests (Heckman, 1979), to address the endogeneity issues.

Findings

This study finds that the appearance of a busy CEO in a company will significantly increase the audit fee. It also concludes that a long tenure of a busy CEO will substantially weaken the positive relationship between the CEO and the audit fee. However, this study discovers that, in a company with a busy CEO, a monitoring mechanism through the independent commissioner and risk management committee will only help to maximize the firm’s practical risk evaluation a little. This result is robust because the PSM and Heckman tests display consistent results, so it is free from endogeneity issues.

Practical implications

This study is valuable for theoretical and practical development in Indonesia. Due to the minimum regulation about multiple positions on boards in Indonesia, the shareholders must be aware of the need to choose a board with more skill and commitment to improve the position of the company. This result also warns the C-level of the company to pay more attention to its risk-monitoring process to make it more effective and efficient.

Originality/value

Indonesia is one of the countries that have implemented the two-tier governance system. With the minimum regulation about multiple directorships in Indonesia, this study offers new insights into how a busy CEO will be related to the audit outcomes.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

The authors thank all the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions on the paper. The authors would also like to express their gratitude to Professor Grantley Taylor for his positive feedback and to the authors’ supervisors for their guidance in making this paper publishable.

Citation

Harymawan, I., Putri, F.V., Ratri, M.C. and Nasih, M. (2023), "Busy CEOs and audit fees: evidence from Indonesia", Accounting Research Journal, Vol. 36 No. 6, pp. 497-514. https://doi.org/10.1108/ARJ-01-2023-0003

Publisher

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Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2023, Emerald Publishing Limited

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