Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-p2v8j Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-02T04:12:19.526Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Egyptians, Aliens, and Okies: Against the Sum of Averages

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 September 2023

Christian Tarsney Open the ORCID record for Christian Tarsney [Opens in a new window] ,
Michael Geruso  and
Dean Spears
Christian Tarsney*
Affiliation:
Population Wellbeing Initiative, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA
Michael Geruso
Affiliation:
Population Wellbeing Initiative, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA
Dean Spears
Affiliation:
Population Wellbeing Initiative, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA
*
Corresponding author: Christian Tarsney; Email: christian.tarsney@gmail.com
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Grill (2023) defends the sum of averages view (SAV), on which the value of a population is found by summing the average welfare of each generation or birth cohort. A major advantage of SAV, according to Grill, is that it escapes the Egyptology objection to average utilitarianism. But, we argue, SAV escapes only the most literal understanding of this objection, since it still allows the value of adding a life to depend on facts about other, intuitively irrelevant lives. Moreover, SAV has a decisive drawback not shared with either average or total utilitarianism: it can evaluate an outcome in which every individual is worse off as better overall, even when exactly the same people exist in both outcomes. These problems, we argue, afflict not only Grill's view but any view that uses a sum of subpopulation averages, apart from the limiting cases of average and total utilitarianism.

Type
Replies
Information
Utilitas , Volume 35 , Issue 4 , December 2023 , pp. 320 - 326
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Arrhenius, G. 2000. An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiology. Economics and Philosophy 16, pp. 247–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blackorby, C., Bossert, W. and Donaldson, D. J. 2005. Population Issues in Social Choice Theory, Welfare Economics, and Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CCOL0521825512CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D. 1984. Social Criteria for Evaluating Population Change. Journal of Public Economics 25(1–2), pp. 13–33.10.1016/0047-2727(84)90042-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broome, J. 1992. Counting the Cost of Global Warming. Strond: White Horse Press.Google Scholar
Cain, J. 1995. Infinite Utility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73(3), pp. 401–4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cowen, T. 2007. Caring about the Distant Future: Why It Matters and What It Means. The University of Chicago Law Review 74(1), pp. 5–40.Google Scholar
Grill, K. 2023. The Sum of Averages: An Egyptology-Proof Average View. Utilitas 35(2), pp. 103–18.10.1017/S0953820822000450CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keeping, J. 2015. Once a Slight, Okie Now is Source of Pride for Many. The Oklahoman. URL: https://www.oklahoman.com/story/news/columns/2015/04/07/once-a-slight-okie-now-is-source-of-pride-for-many/60754921007/. Accessed 21 March 2023.Google Scholar
McMahan, J. 1981. Problems of Population Theory. Ethics 92, pp. 96–127.10.1086/292301CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ord, T. ms. On Ranking Alternatives With Different Populations.Google Scholar
Paggi, R. 2016. Okie: An Insult or a Badge of Honor? The Bakersfield Californian. URL: https://www.bakersfield.com/opinion/okie-an-insult-or-a-badge-of-honor/article_ece50dd3-0b1f-5d9d-88aa-b434e254bf09.html. Accessed 21 March 2023.Google Scholar
Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Scovronick, N., Budolfson, M. B., Dennig, F., Fleurbaey, M., Siebert, A., Socolow, R. H., Spears, D. and Wagner, F. 2017. Impact of Population Growth and Population Ethics on Climate Change Mitigation Policy. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114(46), pp. 12338–43.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Thomas, T. 2022. Separability and Population Ethics. In Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics edited by Arrhenius, Gustaf, Bykvist, Krister, Campbell, Tim and Finneron-Burns, Elizabeth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 271–95.Google Scholar
Wilkinson, H. forthcoming. Aggregation in an Infinite, Relativistic Universe. Erkenntnis.Google Scholar