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The Liar Paradox and “Meaningless” Revenge

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Abstract

A historically popular response to the liar paradox (“this sentence is false”) is to say that the liar sentence is meaningless (or semantically defective, or malfunctions, or…). Unfortunately, like all other supposed solutions to the liar, this approach faces a revenge challenge. Consider the revenge liar sentence, “this sentence is either meaningless or false”. If it is true, then it is either meaningless or false, so not true. And if it is not true, then it can’t be either meaningless or false, so it must be true. Either way, we are back in a paradox. This paper provides a detailed and exhaustive discussion of the options for responding to revenge on behalf of “meaningless” theories. Though I attempt to discuss all of the options fairly, I will ultimately opt for one specific response and discuss some of its challenges. Various technical and logical matters will be discussed throughout the paper, but my focus will be philosophical, throughout. My overall conclusion is that the “meaningless” strategy is at least as well off in the face of revenge as any other approach to the liar and related paradoxes.

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    Jared Warren

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Warren, J. The Liar Paradox and “Meaningless” Revenge. J Philos Logic 53, 49–78 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-023-09719-2

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