Abstract
While knowledge of mere possibilities is difficult to understand, knowledge of possibilities that are actual seems unproblematic (as far as we know the actual world). The principle that what is actual is possible has been near-universally accepted. After summarizing some sporadic dissent, I present a proposal for how the validity of the principle might be restricted. While the principle certainly holds for sufficiently inclusive objective and epistemic possibilities, it may not hold when the accessibility of possibilities is contextually restricted.
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Dohrn, D. Ab Esse ad Posse Non Valet Consequentia. J Philos Logic 53, 391–409 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-023-09735-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-023-09735-2