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Conflict mitigation or governance choreographies? Scaling up and down state-criminal negotiations in Medellin and lessons for Mexico

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Abstract

In the mid 2010s discussions about the pertinence of negotiating with criminal groups increased in Latin America. Although controversial, such negotiations are more common than often thought. This article asks: can negotiations reduce violence and generate peace? I argue that the homicide reduction potential of negotiations depends on the cohesion of the state and on the cohesion and hierarchical control of criminal groups. This in turn generates two challenges for peacebuilding: the challenge of scaling up and down security gains beyond homicide reduction, and the challenge of creating three-way arrangements that include civilians and navigate the blurry boundaries between states, civilians, and criminal actors. To conceptualize these challenges, I also distinguish top-down and bottom-up negotiations and argue that addressing these challenges requires bridging a divide between peace building principles emphasizing the importance of local contexts, and peace processes literature focusing on objective power considerations. I substantiate the theory using evidence from long term fieldwork, archival analysis, and forty-three interviews conducted for this project in Medellín-Colombia and extend the insights to assess the potential for peace negotiations in Mexico.

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Notes

  1. I use pseudonyms to protect the identity of my interviewees.

  2. All interviews are referred to in the text with an alphanumeric code. Appendix provides interview details.

  3. I refer to territorial control as an organization’s ability to assert supremacy over other organizations in a territory, and to enforce its authority within the organization.

  4. Corruption and illegal activities also exist in civil wars, and communities can be as reluctant to negotiate with an insurgency engaged in illegal activities as they are to negotiate with drug traffickers or gangs. Yet the relation between economic and political motivations is not zero sum, and profit incentives do not automatically eliminate political motivations. Thus, if one thinks of armed group engagement in illegal activities as a continuum, then it is plausible to think that the more an armed group engages in illicit activities without having a political agenda, the higher the corrupt incentives and the legitimacy price a state must pay to negotiate.

  5. Calculations based on INDESOL data.

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Acknowledgements

The research associated to this article has been presented at the University of Notre Dame, UCSD, Northwestern University, Boston University, the ICIP in Barcelona, Fescol in Colombia, the Universidad del Rosario in Colombia, and meetings of APSA and LASA. I thank Luisa Mejia and Ivan Ramirez for their research assistance, and Gema Santamaria, the special issue editors, and two anonymous reviewers for their extensive feedback. All errors remain my sole responsibility.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Massachusetts-Lowell, Lowell, MA, USA

    Angélica Durán-Martínez

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  1. Angélica Durán-Martínez
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Correspondence to Angélica Durán-Martínez.

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This article reflects research conducted for a project funded by the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation. The author has no other financial on non-financial interests to disclose.

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The research for this project was reviewed and approved by the University of Massachusetts-Lowell IRB board, approval: 18–126.

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Appendix to Beyond Coreographies of Governance

Appendix to Beyond Coreographies of Governance

List of Interviews conducted by author

  

  ES-1

8/9/18

International NGO workers involved in the peace process in El Salvador (conducted in Bogotá)

  ES-2

1/31/20 

International NGO worker involved in the peace process in El Salvador

Medellín

  ME-1

5/8/19

Former militia member and dialogue broker

  ME-2

5/8/19

Staff, Medellín Security Secretariat

  ME-3

6/8/19

Former paramilitary commander

  ME-4

6/8/19

Staff, Ombudsman Office in Medellín

  ME-5

6/8/19

Staff, Medellín Security Secretariat

  ME-6

6/8/19

Staff, Medellín Secretariat for Human Rights

  ME-7

8/8/19

Member Sinergia

  ME-8

8/8/19

Former militia member and dialogue broker

  ME-9

8/8/19

Former paramilitary commander

  ME-10

8/8/19

Former paramilitary commander

  ME-11

8/9/19

Former staff Medellin Reconciliation Office

  ME-12

8/9/19

Staff, NGO

  ME-13(Bogota)

8/13/19

Former advisor Peace and Coexistence office

  ME-14 (zoom)

7/21/20

Former staff Peace and Coexistence Office

  ME-15 (zoom)

7/23/20

Former High level staff Mayor’s Office

  ME-16 (zoom)

7/24/20

Former staff Presidential Council for Medellín

  ME-17 (zoom)

7/27/20

Adjunct professor, member alliance Medellín Como Vamos

  ME-18 (zoom)

7/28/20

Former staff Peace and Coexistence Office

  ME-19 (zoom)

7/31/20

Former staff Presidential Council for Medellín

  ME-20 (zoom)

8/4/20

Security advisor for Medellín local government

  ME- 21 (zoom)

8/5/20

Staff, Human Rights NGO

  ME-22 (zoom)

8/6/20

Former staff Peace and Coexistence Office

  ME-23 (zoom)

8/7/20

Former staff Presidential Council for Medellín

  ME-24 (zoom)

8/11/20

Staff, Human Rights NGO

  ME-25 (zoom)

8/12/20

Former staff Peace and Coexistence Office

  ME-26 (zoom)

8/14/20

Former staff Presidential Council for Medellín

  ME-27 (zoom)

8/14/20

Former militia member, staff for No Matarás program

  ME-28 (zoom)

8/17/20

Former staff Peace and Coexistence Office

  ME-29 (zoom)

8/20/20

Social leader

  ME-30 (zoom)

8/21/20

Former militia member, staff for No Matarás program

  ME-31 (zoom)

8/25/20

Staff NGO

  ME-32 (zoom)

8/28/20

Staff NGO

  ME-33 (zoom)

8/8/20

Former Medellín Procurator

Interview Protocol

  All interviews were semi-structured with the following protocol. Interviewees were identified starting with known contacts and snowball sampling.

  • Are you aware of the process of dialogue between [describe specific event here]? If so, can you tell me what you know about this process?

  • How did this process start? What were some difficulties in carrying this process out?

  • What factors do you think affected the successes and failures of the process?

  • Are you aware of other attempts of dialoguing with armed actors as a way to mitigate violence and direct impacts on civilians? If so, how do these processes compare to the episode we talked about before?

  • Overall, do you think this type of public negotiation is something that should be considered as a violence reduction strategy? If so, under what circumstances and at which level (national, local, neighborhood)?

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Durán-Martínez, A. Conflict mitigation or governance choreographies? Scaling up and down state-criminal negotiations in Medellin and lessons for Mexico. Crime Law Soc Change (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-023-10128-4

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