Semiotic approach of strategic narrative: the news discourse of Russia’s coronavirus aid to Italy

5.1.1 The main stories and actors in Russian-language media

In Russian-language media, coverage of the coronavirus outbreak in connection with Italy could be detected starting from early March. It intensified by mid-March when Italy became the epicentre of the coronavirus outbreak in Europe. In addition to reporting on the statistics of corona victims, the news stories also shaped the context of the difficulties accompanying the outbreak: “What is worse is that the number of infected persons is growing daily and the hospitals do not have sufficiently many ventilators.”^[2] However, even on March 15 the news still spoke of a coronavirus outbreak that had hit the whole Europe, also referred to in the title “How is Europe coping with the coronavirus epidemic,” while there was no separate focus on the difficulties Italy was facing in the coronavirus crisis.

The characteristics of the conflict and the parties of the narrative connected with the Russian aid dispatch started to become clearer starting from March 21, that is, the day when Russia made an announcement about delivering aid to Italy. The main components of the basic dictionary included an aggressive coronavirus and its results, the main sufferers from the epidemic, and formation of an antivirus alliance. What stands out in addition to highlighting Italy as the state that suffered most from the virus is the representation of the European Union as a party in the conflict that is mostly constructed from two aspects. On the one hand, there is an emphasis on Italy being part of the EU, a member of a common family; on the other hand, it is shown how the EU has neglected Italy in its fight against the coronavirus. This is pointed out on the level of the titles, e.g., “EU leaving Italy alone in fight with killer virus”,^[3] “Each man for himself: Coronavirus tests the idea of united Europe”,^[4] as well as the content level of the articles that speak of the insufficiency of the aid coming from the EU and delivery restrictions on masks and medicines established by specific EU member states, which is presented rhetorically as a selfish action. A change in representing the coronavirus itself stands out as an important rhetorical device: it is a “killer virus” that is attributed subjectivity and activity that Italy is to combat on its own while having been abandoned by others.

On the evening of March 21, the original news on the Russian Federation’s aid dispatch to Italy was broadcast, in which Russia appears as the central power in constituting the narrative. The article’s title quotes Russia’s President Vladimir Putin: “Putin: Russian Federation will help Italy to fight coronavirus.”^[5] In the news of the same day also the motives behind Russia’s delivering the aid are given that stress the humanitarian considerations behind Russia’s aid package. The Kremlin’s press representative Dmitrij Peskov clarifies the humanitarian background to the aid: “At the moment almost all countries in the world are facing a serious coronavirus threat. To overcome the virus we need to join all means and efforts. It is only so, together, that all countries will be able to check the spread of the virus.”^[6],[7]

In his announcement Peskov points at the need to provide worldwide help, which, considering the general tone of the news that first and foremost reflects the EU’s indifference in helping Italy, makes Russia’s action stand out as an exception. In addition, the Italian humanitarian aid action bears the name “From Russia with Love,” which also accentuates only unselfish (“love”) motives and stresses Russia’s active role.^[8] In addition to the help sent from Russia, the NTV news of March 22 point at China as an active participant in the war with the coronavirus that has also decided to help Italy in the battle with the virus. Similarly with the Russian aid dispatch, the aid sent from China is contextualised in a framework undermining the unity and solidarity of the EU: “The Italians, who currently face the gravest difficulties, were aided not by their European neighbours, but by China. Beijing is sending a plane with doctors and equipment to the Apennines.”

We can see that in addition to informing the target audience about China’s aid action, the function of the Model Reader is (1) creating a context describing the EU’s incapacity and (2) introducing an image of China and Russia as an alliance of states that proceed from humanitarian considerations.

5.1.2 The main stories and characters in the Kremlin’s English-language media

The English-language media of the Kremlin sketched a similar basic dictionary (i.e. the main protagonists/antagonists of narrative). The aid narrative started with the news from March 21 that spoke of the aid Putin was offering to Italy.^[9] On the following days, articles were added that specified the extent of the aid delivery and gave a detailed account of the process of delivery. In addition to Russia, RT also refers to the People’s Republic of China as a donor of aid to whom the Italian government has turned together with Spain and other European countries.^[10]

The anti-EU accusation narrative is being supported in the news by different spokespersons’ points of view; thus, on March 24, RT expressed the view of Franco Frattini, Italy’s former foreign minister: “The EU’s initial response to the massive outbreak of coronavirus in Italy was largely “inadequate,” and a lack of European solidarity opened the doors for Russia and China”^[11] without specifying what was meant by “inadequate.” In order to add credibility to the message, use is made of the label “former,” which is a typical textual device of strategic information manipulation (Silverman 2015) as the reader’s attention is caught first and foremost by Frattini’s erstwhile position as the Italian foreign minister, which adds authority to his message.

To sum up, the circle of protagonists on the surface of the narrative was similar both in the Kremlin’s Russian-language as well as English-language media. In shaping the Model Reader Russia and its ally China were used as the protagonists. The latter’s activities were not shown as coordinated with Russia, but China’s aid dispatched to Italy put it in the same camp with Russia’s. They were juxtaposed with the inconclusive European Union and its member states that stood for their own interests, which is why no unified EU politics emerged in the battle against coronavirus. The coronavirus that hit the world in early 2020 transformed into the core of the problem around which different conflicts started to take shape that strategic actors could employ in order to serve their geopolitical interests. Both English-language and Russian-language media coverage represented Italy as the main innocent victim of both the coronavirus and the EU’s policy.

5.1.3 The analysis of the main stories and characters in the deep level of narrative

In the news texts, the episodes were connected in a way that emphasised an impression of Russia as an energetic political actor in an era of crisis. Proceeding from Greimas and Courtés’ differentiation of modalities (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 149), the actants on the narrative’s deep level functioned in different modalities. The actant subject, whose role in the news constituting the surface structure of the narrative was fulfilled by different actors (Putin – the Kremlin – the Russian Armed Forces – the Russian people or Russia as a whole), can be described as a “potent subject.” In different Italian news stories on humanitarian aid Russia was represented as an actor that wants to achieve an aim (to help Italy), thereafter recognizes the possibilities of achieving this aim (relevant aid is to be delivered), and at the same time it has the ability to achieve this aim (aid delivery and alleviation of corona issues). The positive impression of the Model Author of the Russia of the narrative was amplified by the comparison with the bureaucratic machine of an indecisive European Union that proved inefficient in deterring the spread of the virus. That is, the EU that was in the role of the antagonist lacked the will to help Italy (standing for its own interests), amplified by the inability to offer aid (bureaucratic restrictions).

Via the textual strategies (e.g., basic dictionaries, metaphors etc.) used in the Kremlin media (e.g., Russia as a positive actor; negative evaluations of the activities of the EU; representation of the coronavirus as a killer virus, etc.) a Model Reader was constructed with the aim of directing the audience towards an interpretation in a framework that amplified an impression of a decline in European unity, undermined the solidarity between the EU states, and in narrative deep structure Russia was a represented as a unified active actor, as an actant subject (see also Götz and Merlen 2019; Pomerantsev and Weiss 2014; Yablokov 2015).

5.2.1 The connecting of episodes in Russian-language media

In this case study, the war scenario appeared as the main underlying logic in representing the conflict. The Model Reader was constructed in the texts in a manner that aimed at directing the reader towards employing the war scenario in interpreting the whole discourse: the phrasing of the news led the reader towards interpreting the conflict as a relentless battle in which the actors of the narrative were often determined by characteristics typical of war. Above, I already referred to some uses of the lexis connected with the topic of war (e.g., “battle,” “victory” in Peskov’s pronouncement, “killer virus” in the headlines, etc.). The delivering of the aid by the Russian medics is described as a similar war scenario: “Russian army doctors began a march to Bergamo, Italy, to help local doctors fight the coronavirus epidemic. Our specialists have to cover a distance of 600 km, accompanied by the carabinieri.”^[12]

Both the words “march” as well as “fight” refer to the basic dictionary of a war scenario, not to mention the article’s title that refers to Russian army doctors as the protagonists of the narrative. This was supported by the visual organization of the news by photos and videos that showed columns of army vehicles decorated with Russian flags driving through the narrow streets of an Italian city. Also, on several occasions the loading of medical equipment on Russian transport aircraft and unloading it in Italy in the presence of high-standing representatives of the Italian government, who would express their gratitude and praise, was covered.^[13],[14]

In addition to the war scenario of the Model Reader, that wished to direct the audience into interpreting the dispatch of the humanitarian aid as Russia’s militarised action and a manifestation of its capability, the episodes in the news were connected in a way that created a seeming cause-and-effect relationship between different episodes. First and foremost, this was manifested in describing the results of the actions of the protagonists and the antagonists. Thus, on March 24, the third day after Russia’s aid dispatch, there were reports on the progress in the fight with the coronavirus in Italy: “Already for the second day, encouraging news is coming from Italy. The number of infection cases is decreasing and the country’s citizens thank Russia for the aid. Some Italians even swap the EU flags for the Russian flag close to their homes.”^[15]

First, the reader is informed that the situation in Italy is changing for the better, while the second half of the same sentence speaks of the Italians’ gratitude towards Russia. One of the manifestations of the gratitude is hoisting the Russian flag on the walls of Italian homes, replacing the EU flags that used to be displayed earlier. Although no statistics or any other evidence has been presented that would corroborate a connection between the aid from Russia and the decrease in infection numbers, and there is no direct claim that the Russian humanitarian aid is a direct reason for the advances made in the fight with the coronavirus, a seemingly logical connection of the kind is created in the texts. The changing of EU flags for the Russian colours marks the weakness of the EU and the common people’s distrust of the institution, at the same time shaping a positive image of the Model Author – Russia.

5.2.2 The connecting of episodes in the Kremlin’s English-language media

In the English-language media coverage by RT, the war scenario emerged even more intensely: it was pointed at in the titles of news items such as “Russian military support ‘much needed’ in Italy’s ‘critical’ battle against Covid-19 – Lombardy VP”,^[16] using the phrasing “critical battle,” that in its turn was accompanied by separate links to videos covering the Russian military formations: “WATCH Russian Army deliver medical aid at airbase near Rome as Moscow rallies to help coronavirus-ravaged Italy.”^[17],[18] The news gave detailed descriptions of the scope of the aid, the collaboration of Russian army doctors with Italian colleagues in the “battle” with the coronavirus, and showed grateful survivors of the “war” – the patients. With such news and additional video materials and links, a Model Reader was shaped whose aim was to demonstrate to the audiences the capability and superiority of the Russian army, as aid was being delivered to a member state of NATO and the EU. In addition to the war scenario uniting the episodes, the texts attempted to create a link between the problems the European Union had in tackling the corona crisis and a liberal world view that supposedly had destroyed the mechanisms of decisive policy-making in the EU:

As nobody is interested in geopolitics, geostrategy, or even politics anymore … well, we discover that the king is naked and that, when there’s a pandemic situation, liberalism can’t rule, because old things come back: sovereignism, borders that need to be closed, the sovereign state, the ability of the head of state to choose, the power of the police and the military … It’s fantastic. I’ve been saying for twenty years that those things are essential. Because of the situation, sovereign ideals are coming back in style.

In this quotation by the French philosopher Michel Onfray that derives from his interview on the French-language RT and has been presented in full also in the English-language RT we can see how the key words constituting Russian political discourse (geopolitics, strong leader, the strength of the military and the police, etc.) are just the qualities represented as lacking in European countries and the EU. Thus, the above-mentioned ideological inferences (Eco 2005: 91) have been used here, which, in addition to representing the weaknesses of the EU, also points at the advantages of Russia’s political regime (see also Keating and Kaczmarska 2019). The aim of such a device is to create a positive image of the Model Author in the discourse – an image of Russia that also coincides with the preferences of a target audience that sees a future for the ideals of Russia’s political order even in Europe (see also Dockery 2020). The speaker’s position is no less important: criticism of the European Union is presented as coming from a recognized French intellectual, with the aim of disguising the manipulative intentions of the Model Author of the strategic narrative.

In summary, the main devices of organizing the episodes of the surface of the narrative were similar in the Kremlin’s Russian-language and English-language media: a war scenario was used to bring together different news stories into a coherent whole for the reader. On the narrative’s surface structure the actant role of the Russia is personified as a figure of an energetic, but peaceful (e.g., “From Russia with Love”) warrior. This connects the topics consisting of the different role of the actant or isotopes that Greimas (1970: 188) defines as a set of repeating semantic categories that make a smooth reading of the story possible. In the media reports of the analysed period stories appeared that, in addition to covering the transport of medicines, also transmitted news of various other activities that Russian military personnel carried out in pandemic-ravaged Italy.

5.2.3 The connecting of episodes in deep level of narrative

In the deep level narrative analysis the figure of a peaceful warrior is a trope that has become rooted in the cultural memory of the Russian audience, having taken different discursive shapes under different political regimes, ranging from the “soldier-liberator” and “saviour from fascism” in the post-WWII-rhetoric to the “decent people” without military insignia who carried out the annexation of the Crimea. The narrative is supported by various legal acts that glorify this heroism. These include the 2020 constitutional amendments which prohibit “diminishing the significance of the heroism of the people in defence of the Fatherland,” and the 2014 and 2020 amendments to the Russian Criminal Code, criminalizing the public dissemination of “knowingly false information” about the activities of the USSR during the Second World War (Mälksoo 2022: 8).

Today, militarism has become part of the state ideology in Russia. According to several Russian military theorists, military history had to be used for military patriotic education of the population, highlighting the uniqueness of Russian military art and the heroism of the national military history. Russia’s military past could become the foundation for the formation of the Russian “national idea,” its spiritual core (Gareev 2008; Zelenkov 2001; Zolotaryov 2004). The holy role of the Great patriotic War in Russian ideology is a vivid example of this.

For a foreign audience, a war scenario and the figure of a warrior and its different signifiers can be a sign of the strength of the Russian armed forces. With the help of these, a Model Reader is constructed for the English-language audience, with the semantic repercussions of advancing a positive image of Russia on the one hand, and functioning as a deterrence, i.e., intimidation by the power of the Russian army on the other hand.

In the surface structure of the narrative such figures and isotopes help to construct a Model Reader whose aim is to direct the audience towards interpreting news on the humanitarian aid to Italy according to Russia’s more general strategic aims: to present the EU as morally depraved and oppose it to a peaceful Russia as a bearer of general human values. In such stories the Western and the Russian “worlds” are described as lying in a permanent situation of conflict. On the deep structure of the narrative the core worldview, imposed by the Russian media news, is fairly simple – Russia is stable and peaceful, but military strong, while the West is unstable and aggressive (see also Götz and Merlen 2019; Marmura 2020).

5.3.1 Temporal representation of actors and events in the Kremlin’s Russian-language media

As was shown in connection with the first focus, Russian-language media presented a Russia that delivered aid to the Italians and took upon it the obligation of the EU and NATO to help the member states that had suffered most, thus emerging as the main hero. If a Russia that has long-term friendly relations with Italy^[19] was shown as an active problem-solver, the EU and its member states were represented as passive and catering to their own interests: “The Italian government was crying out for help in the very sense of the word. In the Northern part of the country (Lombardy) there is a catastrophic lack of masks, medicines and, what is most important, ventilators. Ordinary Italians expected their neighbours to help them.”

The scope of the danger and the EU’s indifference in dealing with the coronavirus and helping Italy is amplified with phrases such as “was crying out for help in the very sense of the word.” At the same time, there is no discussion of the reasons why the EU could not immediately answer the request for help nor of the later aid dispatches to Italy from the neighbouring countries.

The united Europe came crumbling down in a few days, as soon as the European bureaucrats from Brussels stood face to face not with a mythical, but a real danger – the coronavirus … The coronavirus destroys the flimsy structure that is called the European Union. The house that was built more than 50 years ago has been declared condemned.

We can see that in the news discourse of the Russian humanitarian aid, the representation of the pandemic in Europe emphasises the weakness of the European Union and its looming collapse in near future. In addition, it is stressed that the European Union is first and foremost a haven for politicians (“the elite”) and bureaucracy (“European bureaucrats from Brussels”), not a union serving the interests of ordinary people (cf. Russia as connected with Italy by informal friendship relations). At the same time, the news item points out that often the EU institutions have fought against imaginary (“mythical”) dangers. Although the extract does not specify what exactly is considered to be a “mythical” danger, the Russian-speaking readers can fill the “gap” on their own: in Russian media, Russia is unequivocally depicted as unjustly punished by sanctions established by the European Union and the Russian danger appearing in Western media is represented as a myth spread by Russophobes.

Such passivity of the EU was presented as an inherent behavioural pattern of the institution, caused not solely by the extraordinary pandemic situation, but also as characteristic of a longer process. The Model Reader was organized in a way that aimed at directing the reader towards seeing the EU as an institution plagued by internal controversies, whose eventual downfall would be hastened by the coronavirus crisis. To illustrate this standpoint, (often anonymous) comments from local Italians – as a rule expressing their dissatisfaction with the EU and gratitude towards Russia – were often added to the news, reinforcing the same impression: “I am happy that finally the face of the European Union could be seen without a mask. In such a very difficult situation, during a crisis, Europe will not take a single step in the name of one of its constituent states.”Other expressions of gratitude from simple Italian people were also described, e.g., thanking Russian army doctors in Russian,^[20] Italian performers’ post-pandemic thank-you concerts in Russia, making borscht for the Russian medics to thank them,^[21] etc.

5.3.2 Temporal representation of actors and events in the Kremlin’s English-language media

The Kremlin-minded media targeting English-speaking audiences involved representation of the story’s protagonists in the surface of the narratives similar to that in the Russian-language media. The positive image of Russia and the negative image of Western institutions, first and foremost the EU and NATO, were clearly outlined. In representing the results of the battle with the coronavirus, a basic lexicon familiar to the audience and rhetorical encoding was used in creating the Model Reader: the abandoning of Italy to its own devices is a symptom of the failure of the integration of the EU. An RT news story from 24 March summarises this as follows:

The EU clearly underestimated the virus, blaming the outbreak in Italy on its national healthcare system flaws, according to the two-time foreign minister and OSCE representative (Franco Franttini – the author’s comment). As a result, Brussels, which preaches pan-European solidarity, failed to act when this solidarity was needed in the face of a crisis that eventually affected the entire bloc.^[22]

In addition to suggesting that the European Union is the biggest source of failure in the battle with the coronavirus in Europe (by mentioning Brussels as the unofficial capital of the EU), accusing Italy on behalf of other European countries and the EU can be seen in the quoted extract (“blaming the outbreak in Italy on its national healthcare system flaws”). Such blame games mark the tensions between EU institutions and the Italian government that needs help. It is important that the pretend nature of the common values of the European Union is referred to, using the words of Italy’s former foreign minister, i.e. even erstwhile representatives admit that the EU is a project to be found “on paper” only.

To sum up, both the Russian-language and the English-language media coverage was characterised by amplifying the conflict that was often presented on the surface level of the narrative with an underlying logic of an antithetical conflict. The parties of the conflict and their actions were represented in a mirror projection in the Model Reader – a positive identity feature of the one means a corresponding negative identity feature of the other: the self-effacing humanitarian aid coming from Russia is opposed to the European Union’s total indifference and acting on the principle of “each man for himself.” At the same time, the EU’s indifference is represented as a long-term institutional alienation from the people and from the constituent member states that in the end will lead to its dissolution. Such representation of a conflict as a mirror projection is often characteristic of a Model Reader based on a war scenario, as it makes it possible to determine clearly the adversaries in the conflict and has polarisation of the audience as an aim.

5.3.3 Temporal representation of actors and events in deep level of the narrative

On the deep level the temporal relating of the actors and the events represented in the narratives points at the historical conflict between the West and Russia. Such an antithetical conflict becomes particularly evident in Russian-language media, e.g., on the level of titles. As the scholar of international relations Vera Tolz has put it, historically the ultimate “Other” of the Russian national identity has been the West, which is often represented as “one undifferentiated unit” (Tolz 2001: 70). The use of appealing to such a deep structure intensified only in Putin’s second presidency, when anti-Western, particularly anti-American, narratives that demanded isolation from the West started to spread in Russia’s public information space. The core of these ideas lied in the understanding that ordinary Russians need to become consolidated with the power (the Kremlin) in order to meet Western hostility and make Russia a world power again after a period of decline that accompanied the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Yablokov 2018: 4). As Yablokov points out, this isolationist ideology contains elements from the traditional anti-Western narrative of Imperial Russia as well as the Soviet narratives of the Cold War (2018: 4).

In constructing the strategic Model Reader a layer in the Russian audience’s cultural memory is appealed. On surface level of the narrative the role of the “other” actant can be filled by different actors at different times, yet the main organizing principle of the deep level of the narrative remains the same: Russia as a fortress is surrounded by enemies who need to be resisted in a military mode. In this context, several authors have been speaking of the Russian strategic culture as a set of discursive expressions and narratives related to security-military affairs. “These discursive expressions and narratives are rooted in socially constructed interpretations of history, geography, and the domestic traditions” (Götz and Staun 2022: 482; cf. also Poulsen and Staun 2021). The Russian strategic culture is characterised by two central attributes (or non-discrete principles by Lotman): one is a deep-seated sense of vulnerability, especially vis-à-vis “the West”; the other strand revolves around a feeling of entitlement to a high-power status. A central component in Russia’s great power vision is the right to have a sphere of “privileged interests” in its Eurasian neighbourhood (Götz and Staun 2022: 483).

5.4.1 The appropriation of stories and counternarratives in Russian-language media

In Russian-language media two main topics can be pointed out that have such a function of weakening the main narrative of positive coverage of Russian humanitarian aid. Firstly, the means taken by the European countries and the US to fight the coronavirus were discussed. However, these were mostly presented as domestic means, not as aid to Italy. Also, the topic of humanitarian aid coming from China was repeatedly addressed in the context of aiding Italy, which on the one hand can be seen as diminishing Russia’s role as the single provider of aid, but, on the other hand, a strategic ally relationship between Russia and China is thus created on the discursive level.

What caught more attention was the doubting of Russia’s disinterested motivation behind the aid dispatch that was repeatedly expressed in the Western media. To dispel the accusations that the aid was a Russian propaganda performance, a counterattack was made on the level of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation: “Russia’s aid to Italy in the battle against the coronavirus is humanitarian in essence and is not related to any political action plan. This was claimed in a briefing by the press representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry Maria Zahharova.”^[23]

Attempts to represent the aid in another manner than as a humanitarian action received criticism in the media. The press representative of the Russian Federation’s Foreign Ministry Maria Zahharova commented on the position of the Secretary General of NATO on the aid Russia had given to Italy, saying that each member state of NATO decides independently whom to ask for help and from whom to accept help, with an emphasis on the generally humanitarian: “All countries need to help one another in principle.”^[24]

5.4.2 Appropriation of stories and counternarratives in the Kremlin’s English-language media

In the English-language media supported by Russia, the defence of the humanitarian aspect of the aid dispatch turned out to be one of the most important narratives in which the Russian media was depicted as an active party in the narrative. Several news stories of the RT accused the Western media of slander and lying (Dockery 2020; MacDonald 2020a, 2020b), with the aim of spreading Russophobia and using this as a cover-up of the EU and NATO’s own shortcomings.

In addition, Western media was accused of Russophobia in other RT news stories covering Russian aid packages. For example, the media uproar accompanying Russia delivering aid to the US was described in a similar critical key: “Russophobic pundits and red-baiting blue-checkmarks are gasping in horror and floating bizarre theories as Moscow sends a planeload of much-needed medical supplies to the US amid its worsening coronavirus epidemic.”^[25]

At the same time, an article appeared in RT that admitted the propagandist aim of Russia’s aid to Italy, as well as the other member states of the EU aiding Italy:

Let’s be clear from the outset, there was undoubtably a strong PR, as well as practical, element to Russia’s assistance… That said, it’s also worth mentioning that some other Europeans states have tried to help the Italians. Germany and France, in particular, took patients and sent supplies, despite dealing with outbreaks of their own. Yet, many in Italy feel they haven’t done enough. (MacDonald 2020a)

However, the last sentence in the quote diminishes the contribution of other European countries, as it clearly states that in the eyes of ordinary Italians the aid coming from the member states of the EU is insufficient (see also footnote 21). Similarly to the quoted paragraph, also other articles consider the aid to be lacking and point out that the EU is attempting to blame Italy on reacting to the coronavirus, particularly emphasising a characteristic of Italians as a nation – disobedience: “Many said it was all because of the Italian habits, because Italians do not respect the rules. Suddenly, they realized all the other countries were equally affected.” The second sentence in the paragraph clearly indicates that it is not the specificity of Italians that is to blame, but the whole of Europe has met the same fate, which means that the scapegoat should be looked for elsewhere.

5.4.3 Appropriation of stories and counternarratives in the deep level of narratives

It can be claimed that the appropriation of narratives and suggesting counternarratives displayed the greatest difference between the Russian-language and English-language coverage of the aid given to Italy by Russia. At the same time the stories toning down the main narrative (aid coming from other EU countries, Russia’s PR-flavoured aims, etc.) were presented in a manner that coincided with an image of the Western media as engaged in an information war that keeps fanning Russophobia. The actual term “Russophobia” was first time introduced in the works of Russian poet, diplomat and member of His Imperial Majesty’s Own Chancellery Fyodor Tyutchev in 1867 but the history of accusation of anti-Russian sentiment goes back to time of Peter The Great. In the deep level of narrative the accusation of Russophobia is functioning as a mythological archetypal core around which different versions of the texts can be created. Several researchers have pointed out that accusations of Russophobia have become an effective rhetorical device in labelling all kinds of reproof coming from an (either domestic- or foreign-politics-related) opposition as hostile (Ramsay and Robertshaw 2019; Ventsel et al. 2021), redirecting the criticism addressed towards the power elite to embrace Russia as a whole, its inhabitants and culture (Darczewska and Żochowski 2015: 20–21). The counternarratives that had been constructed in the Model Reader as strategic mechanisms of creating a reality effect – and were meant to leave the audience with an impression of the neutrality of the news discourse – counterintuitively functioned in support of the other, major narrative.