Abstract
Natural disasters and related prevention policies can affect voter decisions. In this study, we analyze how the occurrence of natural disasters changes voter behavior in municipal elections and how prevention policies can mitigate the impact of such catastrophic events on budget accounts and might potentially be rewarded by citizens in upcoming elections. We exploit original data on French municipalities where incumbents sought re-election between 2008 and 2020. To estimate the probability of re-election at the municipal level in the event of a natural disaster we apply a Heckman model based strategy to avoid selection bias. We find that the occurrence of a natural disaster significantly decreases the chances of re-election of incumbent mayors. However, although we show that natural hazard prevention plans can mitigate the impact of catastrophic events on budget accounts, they are not rewarded by citizens in upcoming elections. The myopia hypothesis is confirmed by our findings: voters reward incumbents for delivering investment spending or decreasing debt but not for investing in disaster preparedness.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
The mayor of La Faute-sur-Mer in France received a 2 year prison sentence for manslaughter following storm Xynthia which resulted in the deaths of 29 inhabitants.
According to article 1 of the July 13, 1982 law, “the effects of natural disasters should be regarded as direct non-insurable material damage caused by the abnormal intensity of a natural agent as its determining cause, where the usual measures to be taken to avoid such damage could not prevent its occurrence or could not be taken”. Source: Ministry of the Interior.
Inter-municipal communities are unions of several municipalities to enable collective financing and management of some local public services. Currently, all French municipalities are grouped within larger jurisdictions (known as ‘Etablissements Publics de Coopération Intercommunale’ or EPCI in French).
We use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation which allows minimum loss of data during the transformation.
We assume that since in 2008 very few municipalities (6,713 i.e. 20% of municipalities) had an NHHP, natural hazard prevention had not become a major issue for local residents.
References
Achen, C. H., & Bartels, L. M. (2016). Chapter five. Blind retrospection: Electoral responses to droughts, floods, and shark attacks (pp. 116–145). Princeton University Press.
Achen, C. H., & Bartels, L. M. (2013). Blind retrospection: Why shark attacks are bad for democracy. Working Paper. Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions: Vanderbilt University.
Ashworth, S., Bueno de Mesquita, E., & Friedenberg, A. (2018). Learning about voter rationality. American Journal of Political Science, 62, 37–54.
Beatriz, M. (2019). Le cycle des élections municipales: Quels effets sur l’investissement public, l’emploi et la production? Insee, Note de Conjoncture.
Bechtel, M. M., & Hainmueller, J. (2011). How lasting is voter gratitude? An analysis of the short- and long-term electoral returns to beneficial policy. American Journal of Political Science, 55, 852–868.
Bovan, K., Banai, B., & Banai, I. P. (2018). Do natural disasters affect voting behavior? Evidence from Croatian Floods. PLoS Currents.
Callaway, B., & Sant’Anna, P. H. C. (2021). Difference-in-differences with multiple time periods. Journal of Econometrics, 225, 200–230.
Cassette, A., Farvaque, E., & Héricourt, J. (2013). Two-round elections, one-round determinants? Evidence from the French municipal elections. Public Choice, 156, 563–591.
Cox, G. W., & Munger, M. C. (1989). Closeness, expenditures, and turnout in the 1982 US House elections. American Political Science Review, 83, 217–231.
Foucault, M., Madies, T., & Paty, S. (2008). Public spending interactions and local politics. Empirical evidence from French municipalities. Public Choice, 137, 57–80.
Gallego, J. (2018). Natural disasters and clientelism: The case of floods and landslides in Colombia. Electoral Studies, 55, 73–88.
Garrett, T. A., & Sobel, R. S. (2003). The political economy of FEMA disaster payments. Economic Inquiry, 41, 496–509.
Gasper, J. T., & Reeves, A. (2011). Make it rain? Retrospection and the attentive electorate in the context of natural disasters. American Journal of Political Science, 55, 340–355.
Healy, A., & Malhotra, N. (2009). Myopic voters and natural disaster policy. American Political Science Review, 103, 387–406.
Klomp, J. (2020). Election or disaster support? The Journal of Development Studies, 56, 205–220.
Leeson, P. T., & Sobel, R. S. (2008). Weathering corruption. The Journal of Law and Economics, 51, 667–681.
Leeson, P. T., & Sobel, R. S. (2011). Race, politics, and punishment. European Journal of Law and Economics, 31, 265–285.
Lumbroso, D. M., & Vinet, F. (2011). A comparison of the causes, effects and aftermaths of the coastal flooding of England in 1953 and France in 2010. Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences, 11, 2321–2333.
Masiero, G., & Santarossa, M. (2020). Earthquakes, grants, and public expenditure: How municipalities respond to natural disasters. Journal of Regional Science, 60, 481–516.
Masiero, G., & Santarossa, M. (2021). Natural disasters and electoral outcomes. European Journal of Political Economy, 67, 101983.
Morvan, C. (2022). Municipalities’ budgetary response to natural disasters. In Working paper GATE, 2022-06 (pp. 1–40).
Olden, A., & Møen, J. (2022). The triple difference estimator. The Econometrics Journal, 25, 531–553.
Proverbs, D. & Lamond, J. (2017). Flood resilient construction and adaptation of buildings. In Oxford research encyclopedia of natural hazard science.
Skoufias, E. (2003). Economic crises and natural disasters: Coping strategies and policy implications. World Development, 31(7), 1087–1102.
Sobel, R. S., & Leeson, P. T. (2006). Government’s response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis. Public Choice, 127, 55–73.
Strezhnev, A. (2023). Decomposing triple-differences regression under staggered adoption. arXiv preprint: arXiv:2307.02735.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. MIT Press.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Frédéric Jouneau, Benjamin Monnery, Benoît Mulkay, and the three anonymous referees. We would also like to thank all the participants at seminars and conferences at which this paper was presented for their valuable comments.
Funding
The author(s) received no specific funding for this work.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of interest
The author(s) declare that they have no no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Appendices
Appendices
1.1 Descriptive statistics
See Appendix Table 3.
1.2 Additional results: effect on municipal accounts
1.2.1 Two way fixed effect model
See Appendix Table 4.
1.2.2 Placebo test and common trend
See Appendix Figs. 3, 4 and Table 5.
1.2.3 Intensity analysis
See Appendix Fig. 5 and Table 6.
1.2.4 Type of shocks
See Appendix Table 7.
1.3 Additional results: electoral outcomes
1.3.1 Sensitivity analysis
See Appendix Tables 8, 9 and 10.
1.3.2 Heterogeneity analysis
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Morvan, C., Paty, S. Natural disasters and voter gratitude: What is the role of prevention policies?. Public Choice 198, 427–465 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01137-x
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01137-x