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Re-contracting intergovernmental organizations: Membership change and the creation of linked intergovernmental organizations

  • SI: The Power of the Weak
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Abstract

How do intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) evolve? Cooperation through IGOs is difficult to maintain, as membership dynamics change dramatically over time, leading to dissatisfaction with the status quo. This paper argues that IGO members states create new affiliated bodies, which I call linked intergovernmental organizations (LIGOs), to “re-contract” their cooperation. This helps IGOs adapt to changing membership dynamics, including the addition of new members and shifting constellations of power and preference. LIGOs are particularly useful for weak or formerly weak states seeking to alter the institutional status quo. Several features of LIGOs incentivize their creation: (1) they bypass difficult-to-enact reforms at existing IGOs; (2) flexible design features increase the voice of dissatisfied constituencies; and (3) they are politically viable for dissatisfied and status quo members of IGOs. To test my argument, I analyze original data on 1,200 LIGOs created between 1945 and 2012. Multivariate statistical analyses show that LIGOs are created in response to shifting membership environments that create demands for change at existing IGOs. I complement the quantitative analysis with case studies of two significant LIGOs: The International Development Agency (IDA) and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). My theory suggests a dramatic rethinking of how international cooperation evolves and has broad implications for global governance in an increasingly multipolar world.

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Data availability

All data generated and analyzed during this study are included in the Supplementary files.

Notes

  1. Aside from several well-known examples, such as the UK withdraw from the EU, exit is rare. According to von Borzyskowki and Vabulas, withdraw happens in about 0.04% of IGO-member-years, which they note means that “most states actually remain in the IGOs they join and withdraw rarely” (2019, p. 339). Moreover, work on the death of IGOs finds that few major IGOs have died in the post 1945 era (Gray, 2018; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2020).

  2. There exists considerable variation in LIGO design. In some cases, member states or territories who are not members of the IGO are allowed to have a voice in the LIGO. In other cases, states must opt-in via another procedure such as the signature of a separate treaty or accession document.

  3. “Emanations” as a category seems to have originated as one of the 15 categories of intergovernmental organization used by the yearbook of international organizations (YIO), but actual usage seems to vary.

  4. UN System expenditures broken down by agency: https://unsceb.org/fs-revenue-agency.

  5. Many datasets on IGOs that claim to exclude LIGO-like entities nevertheless include organizations such as IDA which shares the same staff and governing body as the IBRD.

  6. Veto power over amendments to the UN Charter is specified in Articles 108 and 109. At founding, amendments to the IBRD and IMF’s Articles of Agreement required 80% of the total vote of the board of governors, giving the US effective veto power. Both were subsequently amended, at the behest of the US, when the US vote share dropped below 20%. Now amendments require 85%.

  7. The WTO requires that amendment proposals be reached by consensus and then, depending on the article/section, requires either a 2/3 or 3/4 vote to approve.

  8. UN members regularly call conferences on specific topics, which can be used to establish a LIGO directly via treaty, or they can use them to negotiate the terms of a LIGO which they then present to another body, often the General Assembly, for a vote.

  9. https://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=101&oid=001&aid=0004229565.

  10. Research suggests that IGO membership can take up a large portion of countries’ foreign affairs budgets (See Gray, 2018). Moreover, studies show that negotiations for new institutions can take years (Lechner & Wüthrich, 2018). Finally, headquarters buildings and other infrastructure costs are often immense. The new IRENA headquarters reportedly cost over $200 million, and recently China has financed millions of dollars for the building of IGO buildings in Africa such as the new ECOWAS headquarters, which cost over $30 million, and the AU headquarters which cost $200 million. https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-build-new-ecowas-headquarters-abuja.

  11. The COW 3.0 data includes several IGOs that I categorized as LIGOs; I discard these as well as IGOs that die before 1945.

  12. Approximately 982 LIGOs have a first order connection. This correspondence is not 100% for two reasons: (1) some LIGOs have a primary linkage to an IGO that is not included in the COW IGO, (2) some LIGOs start as IGOs but become linked at a later date.

  13. The distinction between what I call first order and second order LIGOs is discussed in the Appendix.

  14. HHI indices are commonly used to indicate how concentrated market power is in industries. Formally, an HHI index is defined as \(H=\sum\nolimits_{i=1}^{N}{s}_{i}^{2}\), where \({s}_{i}\) is the market share and N is the number of firms. In the current case, \({s}_{i}\) is the power share of the country (or GDP, population, or military expenditure share) in each IGO and N is the number of members in the IGO.

  15. To confirm I ran an auxiliary regression to test the null hypothesis that V[yi|xi] = E[yi|xi] versus the alternative that V[yi|xi] = E[yi|xi] + alpha(E[yi|xi])^2. The p-value was 0.000. Additionally, a likelihood ratio test of alpha = 0 is statistically significant at conventional levels.

  16. See Carter and Signorino (2010).

  17. This is effectively a subset of larger, more important IGOs, which suggests that the findings are not driven solely by unique features of less consequential IGOs.

  18. Original proposals by the US and UK called for 32 states. Additionally, the General Assembly dismantled the Governing Council in favor of a new “United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA)” with universal participation by all members (see DeSombre, 2017 p. 11).

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Acknowledgements

Many people helped in the development of this project. I would like to give a special thanks to Todd Allee, Scott Kastner, Jennifer Hadden, Virginia Haufler, Duncan Snidal, Thomas Hale, Julia Morse, Manfred Elsig, Bernhard Reinsberg, and Sam Rowan, as well as editors and reviewers at The Review of International Organizations. I also owe a special thanks to many participants at the 2022 Political Economy of International Organizations conference and the 2021 International Studies Association Meeting. All errors are my own.

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Lugg, A. Re-contracting intergovernmental organizations: Membership change and the creation of linked intergovernmental organizations. Rev Int Organ (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-024-09533-8

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