1 Introduction

National bans on oil exploration and production are an emerging policy pathway states pursue to align with the Paris Agreement’s aim to limit global temperature increase to 1.5 °C (Carter & McKenzie, 2020; Le Billon & Kristoffersen, 2019). The “first-mover” states that implement these “keep it in the ground” (KIIG) policies demonstrate the climate and socio-economic benefits of phasing out oil production. Yet, we lack a coherent understanding of how and why states create and enact these transformative policies and how the experiences of early adopters can be leveraged globally. To address this gap, here we focus on the case of Denmark, a prominent KIIG first mover.

Denmark is the first major oil-producing state—the largest oil producer in the European Union (EU) to date—to withdraw from future oil production. In 2020, the Danish Parliament passed the North Sea Agreement (NSA), which established 2050 as the end date for all offshore oil and gas production and, at the same time, cancelled the eighth licensing round and all future tender rounds for hydrocarbon exploration and extraction. While many states that have enacted bans on fossil fuel production have only a small oil and gas sector, Denmark’s sector is well developed, and the country has significant fossil fuel reserves. Denmark, therefore, could serve as a model for other states reliant on oil and gas extraction that seek to align energy policy with climate objectives. Moreover, Denmark has brought its national ban to the international stage by co-leading the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance (BOGA). As such, Denmark’s KIIG policy has become a keystone in advancing global supply side climate policies and norms.

Using the framework developed by Carter and McKenzie (2020), this analysis traces the development of Denmark’s NSA by attending to core interacting political-economic and socio-cultural conditions. These include the role of broad-based constituencies supporting leaving fossil fuels in the ground with backing from international organizations (IOs), policy actors leveraging political opportunities and using domestically resonant message framing around the risks and benefits of phasing out oil production, as well as well-placed norm entrepreneurs lending legitimacy to supply side climate policy. We also note unfolding political-economic trends—mounting evidence of a declining oil sector, success developing an offshore wind sector, and a comparatively weaker pro-oil lobby—that facilitated Denmark moving early to phase out oil production. We conclude with both the challenges of Denmark’s supply side climate policy leadership, as well as how it has contributed to burgeoning global “anti-fossil fuel norms” (AFFNs) prohibiting fossil fuel development (Green, 2018). While the conditions surrounding Denmark’s ban are not easily transferable to all oil-producing states, understanding Denmark’s experience directs attention towards key issues where policy advocacy and action are needed to amplify further phase out initiatives: diversifying the economy, analysing the risks of status quo oil production dependence, and loosening the hold of the pro-oil lobby.

2 The rise of national bans

Global governance institutions and frameworks coordinating decarbonization efforts, led by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), have primarily focused on demand side emission reductions, mainly via carbon taxes and cap-and-trade schemes (Green & Denniss, 2018). This approach holds states responsible for greenhouse gases (GHG) emitted primarily in their own territory. As Newell and Carter outline in the first article of this issue, until very recently, UNFCCC negotiations have focused on controlling emissions where fossil fuels are consumed and have been silent on fossil fuel supply. Curbing emissions associated with fossil fuel extraction have been left to the market (Aykut et al., 2017; Muttitt et al., 2016). However, markets have been slow to respond to the urgency of climate change, and global carbon emissions have continued to rise. Instead, oil and gas firms make unprecedented profits, fossil fuel firms' lobbying capacity and ability increase, and the industry’s stronghold on the global energy landscape intensifies (Carroll, 2021). This is seen by, for example, the increasing participation of fossil fuel delegations at United Nations (UN) climate conferences and public relations efforts to entrench further “petro cultures” in major producing states (Daggett, 2018; Szeman, 2019). But simply, fossil fuel firms have an outsized influence on climate policy.

Yet despite these barriers, communities have contested fossil fuel production to protect health and sovereignty and, more recently, out of concern for the climate crisis (Carter & McKenzie, 2020). Community efforts have motivated a growing wave of national bans (outlined in Fig. 1), starting in 2002 with Costa Rica’s moratorium on hydrocarbon exploration. Furthermore, these national efforts are consolidated through international initiatives like the BOGA and Fossil Fuel Non-proliferation Treaty (see Fig. 3) that disrupt the fossil fuel industry’s stronghold on the public imagination. These global initiatives open new normative and policy spaces in international climate debates.

Fig. 1
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National bans and moratoriums on fossil fuel exploration and extraction

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3 Origins of Denmark’s supply side climate policy leadership

The decision to phase out oil and gas production in Denmark originated in great part from the country’s strengthening climate ambition (Madsen et al., 2023). In 2013, the Danish government released the Climate Policy Plan to reduce GHG emissions by 40 percent in 2020 compared to 1990 and outlined the proposal for the government’s first Climate Change Act, which the Danish Parliament adopted in 2014. The Act established a 40 percent emissions reduction target by 2020 and the general goal of becoming a “low-emission society” by 2050 (IEA, 2020). These early targets inspired actual reductions: Denmark reduced emissions by 23 percent between 2005 and 2018, surpassing the emissions reductions of the EU as a whole (Climate Change Performance Index, 2023; Morgado Simões & Andreo Victoria, 2021).

Then, following the drought in the summer of 2018, along with local and international climate strikes taking place in 2019 (more on this below), for the first time in Danish history, climate change was the top concern in the 2019 federal election, with polls indicating that 46 percent of voters ranked climate change as their top priority (Holstein, 2019; Madsen et al., 2023, p. 2).Footnote 1All parties brought forward platforms foregrounding strong climate targets. After being elected, the Social Democrats led the development of the Climate Act, passed in 2020, introducing binding targets to reduce domestic GHG emissions to 70 percent below 1990 levels by 2030 and for carbon neutrality by 2050 (Climate Act, 2020), a target it is likely to achieve (Fig. 2). Denmark’s emission reduction commitments surpass even the European Commission’s ambitious proposal to enhance emission reductions under its REPowerEU Plan, which aims to reduce emissions by 58–60 percent below 1990 levels by 2030 (Climate Action Tracker, 2022).

Fig. 2
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Denmark’s actual and target CO2 emissions per year

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To meet its emission goals, Denmark has aggressively targeted fossil fuel use and production, addressing both emissions from energy demand and supply. In this way, Danish decarbonization efforts involve both increasingly progressive climate goals and shifts in the energy sector (Jørgensen et al., 2017; Meibom et al., 2013). In 2012, Denmark’s Energy Agreement included a 2050 target of 100 percent renewable energy in the transportation and energy sectors (IEA, 2020). Then, in 2018, Denmark committed to phase out coal-fired electricity by 2030 (Powering Past Coal Alliance, 2021)—it was an inaugural member of the Powering Past Coal Alliance, formed in 2017 (Powering Past Coal Alliance, 2022).

Yet Denmark’s road to decarbonization requires more than building out renewable energy or phasing out coal-fired power: it also requires curtailing the supply of oil and gas, both domestically and internationally. As one interviewee noted concerning the NSA, “We are a small country, but we have an ambition to influence climate policy on the planet. So, if we want that, it’s not enough to build wind turbines. We are good at that, but we also need to take other important steps, and if we don’t do it—if we give this round [the eighth licensing round for oil and gas in the North Sea]—we will be giving licenses going into the [20]50 s and maybe even [20]60 s, after we've decided to become carbon neutral” (interviewee #16).

Foregrounding supply side climate policy and in tandem with the 2020 Climate Act, the Danish Parliament approved the 2020 NSA and subsequent amendments to the Danish Subsoil Act, cancelling the eighth licensing round and all future rounds (Danish Ministry of Climate, Energy & Utilities, 2020; Act Amending the Act on the Use of Denmark’s Subsoil, 2021). The Climate Act served as a foundation for the NSA. As Interviewee #3 explains, “[We] got a broad spectrum of parties to support the Climate Act, which put the 70 percent target into law. But above the 70 percent target, it also put into law that we need to be a zero-emission country by no later than 2050. When it comes to the 2050 target, new [oil] drillings would impact that target. So, there is a huge leverage, a huge level of pressure on the parties, who [had all] adopted the 2050 target.”

Political parties and civil society organizations pressured Danish government officials for decades, actively opposing oil production and additional licences given the intensifying climate crisis (interviewees #2, #3, #16). Upon taking office in 2019, Minister of Climate, Energy and Utilities Dan Jørgensen—who was personally concerned about the environment, aware of this public pressure, and willing to take bold climate action within the already ambitious framework that led to the Climate Act—took the unprecedented decision to pause the eighth oil and gas licensing round. Until this point, licencing rounds were habitually approved and had never been questioned or revoked by a Minister (interviewees #8, #15, #16). The pause allowed time for the ministry to conduct an in-depth economic and environmental assessment of the consequences and trade-offs of pursuing further exploration and extraction permits and hold a formal discussion about it, incorporating input from the Prime Minister and various other vital ministers, such as the Minister of Finance (interviewees #8, #11, #15). As one interviewee who had worked closely with the Minister observed, “[Jørgensen] wanted to know what the facts are. How many people are employed? What are the tax implications? That really deep analysis of what is actually happening in the North Sea to see whether a ban would be possible… And there were two issues. One was the ban in the long run, and the second part was that there was an ongoing licensing round [the eighth round] that was open and had not been closed yet” (interviewee #15).

In response to the evidence gathered, Minister Jørgensen cancelled the eighth licensing round and, through the 2020 NSA, cancelled all future rounds for hydrocarbon exploration and extraction and committed to cease all offshore oil and gas production by 2050 (see Fig. 3 for key moments in Denmark’s supply side policy progression, overlaid with ongoing international and regional milestones). This was no small decision, given how Denmark’s economy had benefited significantly from its oil and gas sector. Between 1972, when Denmark started producing fossil fuels, and 2020, the state received approximately DKK 544 billion in revenue from the oil and gas sector (Nordsøfonden, n.d.). Moreover, the country has considerable oil and gas reserves—400 million barrels in proven oil reserves and 1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves (BP, 2021, pp. 16, 24)—with substantial public revenue potential. Due to the NSA, the Danish government is estimated to be abdicating approximately DKK 13 billion in unrealized state revenue from oil and gas production (Krawchenko & Gordon, 2022, p. 7). What led to Denmark’s globally unprecedented decision to leave significant oil and gas reserves, and therefore public revenue, in the ground? And how might Denmark’s process inform supply side policy in other major producing jurisdictions around the world?

Fig. 3
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National, regional, and international milestones relating to Denmark’s KIIG policy progression

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4 Analytical frameworks and methodological approach

Global decarbonization acceleration literature advances a series of interrelated concepts helpful in understanding why rapid transformation and transitions occur. This relatively recent theoretical and analytical research explores how interacting socio-cultural, political-economic, and technological interventions can trigger broad shifts that might ensure climatic stability by 2050, with noteworthy contributions emphasizing the politics of deep decarbonization (Bernstein & Hoffmann, 2018; Hamid et al., 2022; Otto et al., 2020; Rosenbloom & Meadowcroft, 2022; Rosenbloom & Rinscheid, 2020). Decarbonization is theorized to be aided by unpredictable and often exogenous conditions, such as energy insecurity generated from geopolitical disruptions like the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, ambitious emissions reductions arising from external actors, the emergence of politically or culturally influential norm entrepreneurs, or rapidly shifting landscapes, such as citizen responses to an abrupt ecological crisis. Each of these conditions could provide opportunities for shifts in comparative power, spur the evolution of ideas, and create new spaces for developing innovative policies at the national and international levels. Empirical work that seeks to identify the characteristics of initiatives that can be—and are being—used to advance system-wide decarbonization shifts and changes, particularly supply side climate policies such as national bans on fossil fuel exploration and extraction, has built on this theoretical research.

To identify the conditions under which national bans are developing with the aim to amplify them globally, we used a comparative framework created by Carter and McKenzie (2020). After surveying the burgeoning supply side climate policy literature, Carter and McKenzie identified KIIG-enabling conditions. KIIG policies likely originate from small-scale, locally oriented campaigns focused on a singular impact or issue. Moreover, support for broad KIIG policy is likely to be coordinated via diverse organizations across society, some of which are connected to IOs with more resources and tested strategies. These horizontally connected (across a constituency) and vertically integrated (with IOs) coalitions could then seize—or create—political openings for policy influence. This could mean intervening in predictable or institutional processes, such as elections or consultation processes, amplifying exogenous unpredictable openings, such as climate disasters or the release of new research, or shifting political attention via organizing large-scale protests or civil demonstrations. In this framework, national KIIG policies are also fostered by “norm entrepreneurs”: well-placed, influential individuals who originate and lend legitimacy and credibility to AFFNs forward by social movements (Carter & McKenzie, 2020; Green, 2018; Piggot, 2017). These entrepreneurs can offer enhanced political access to particular organizations and coalitions within the broader KIIG movement (Jørgensen et al., 2017; Meibom et al., 2013). Essential throughout these movements and policies is an emotionally resonant framing of the KIIG issue, with messages that amplify a collective sense of (in)justice, emphasize local risks, and offer a clear, straightforward solution with a vision of an optimistic post-fossil fuel future (Green, 2018; Healy et al., 2019).

We also engage with Green’s AFFN framework (2018) to understand what Denmark’s KIIG policy means for Denmark in the future, how the conditions that led to Denmark’s ban develop AFFNs, how such norms are being spread, and how they may be affecting other states. While Carter and McKenzie provide a useful framework for understanding the domestic unfolding of national bans on oil and gas exploration and extraction, Green’s theoretical contribution illuminates how national-level AFFNs are amplified, spread, and ultimately influence other states and the broader climate regime and energy landscape. Exploring the amplification of AFFNs via domestic and international mechanisms, such as BOGA, is useful in understanding how Denmark is leveraging the NSA to institutionalize a phase out of oil and gas beyond its borders. AFFNs are likely to spread throughout the international system via alliance-building and network formation as a pathway for international socialization, having an important effect on how states conduct their rational calculations or their identity around their role in limiting the production of fossil fuels. Examining Denmark as a case study through Green’s norm-based theory helps uncover the NSA's discursive, ideational, and symbolic dimensions and the amplification of AFFNs through their institutionalization within the climate regime.

Together, these frameworks serve to understand how national bans such as Denmark’s can spur change across a heavily interconnected system and, when stabilized by government policies, can be scaled to other levels of influence (Otto et al., 2020). These frameworks help develop an understanding of how intervention at the state and local level can also be diffused across other levels of influence, creating guidelines and standards to boost ambitions within any given jurisdiction and beyond.

These theoretical foundations inform the mixed-methods approach used for this research, which combined literature reviews and qualitative research via semi-structured interviews. Beginning in 2021, we developed a profile of Denmark and a chronology of Danish energy and climate policy. We created a compilation and analysis of over 200 relevant reports and data from the Danish government, those operating in the climate governance space, civil society, researchers, media, and industry sources since the early 2000s related to Denmark’s energy and climate landscape. The literature review included compiling and analysing relevant government, industry, and civil society statistical data (i.e. on fossil fuel production, revenues, and economic activity from the sector, and on fossil fuel proponents, civil society organizations, and green sector associations), and conducting a media review of issue coverage (gathering key articles from relevant traditional and media outlets), looking for key themes and factors that lead to the enactment and implementation of the Danish ban. Additionally, through the literature review, we identified critical actors in the development of the 2020 NSA, whom we contacted for interviews.

In 2022, we conducted virtual and in-person interviews with a diverse sample of 17 experts as they relate to state and international climate and energy policy and the fossil fuel industry, such as lead policy actors, policymakers, researchers, civil society members, activists, and industry and labour representatives (see Table 1 for an outline of interviewees’ primary affiliations). These interviews, with questions focused on the origins and development of the NSA, aimed to understand the factors that encouraged or hindered the development of Denmark's ban on future fossil fuel exploration and extraction and its global impact. Additionally, these interviews assisted in gaining a first-hand understanding of the relationship between the various stakeholders in Denmark’s climate and energy landscape, as well as the political context and the institutional characteristics that enabled the ban. Though vulnerable to interviewer bias and social desirability bias (Sovacool et al., 2018), this method for data collection allows for a more interdisciplinary perspective, permitting access to individual understandings, explanations, and meanings of fossil fuel production and phase out.

Table 1 List of Interviewees
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5 National conditions for a globally inspiring ban

Denmark became a leading global example of transitioning away from oil and gas production to meet ambitious decarbonization goals by implementing a ban on production through a constellation of conditions identified in Carter and McKenzie (2020) (captured in Table 2). First, the ban emerged from more localized campaigns against fossil fuel extraction that originated in part from longstanding Danish campaigns opposing nuclear energy. Anti-nuclear campaigns active in the 1970s and 1980s informed Denmark’s anti-fracking movement, demonstrating bottom-up victories characterized by scientifically founded critiques, political dialogue, non-partisanship, and peaceful demonstrations. Anti-fracking campaigns, growing in 2015 over concerns about public health, primarily fracking’s threats to groundwater quality, in turn, laid the groundwork for the NSA. Danish activists leading anti-fracking campaigns enlarged that movement to denounce fossil fuel extraction more generally, arguing that continued production clashed with Denmark’s “green” reputation and prevented the country from meeting its climate commitments.

Table 2 Ban-supporting conditions, as per Carter and McKenzie (2020)
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Second, proposals to ban fossil fuel extraction were advanced by a diversity of grassroots initiatives that were, as a third condition, also connected to IOs. Within Denmark, lead groups included student organizations such as the Green Student Movement and the Danish 92 Group, a growing coalition of environmental and development non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These networks applied increasing pressure on the newly elected government to prove their climate ambitions by ending oil and gas exploration (Pedersen et al., 2019; Seidelin, 2020). Meanwhile, Denmark’s ban was fostered by connections between these domestic networks and IOs. Groups advocating a fossil fuel ban, such as Greenpeace and NOAH, maintained close ties with their European and international counterparts and acted as a conduit to external resources and a bridge to IOs, such as 350.org, Oil Change International, and Greenpeace International. These connections were exemplified in the Danish Climate Movement becoming a member of 350.org and sections of NOAH joining German actions around anti-fossil fuel extraction efforts. These IOs offered support to policy actors at essential moments in the ban’s progression. For example, a 2019 report from Oil Change International that examines the role of Danish oil and gas production in a Paris-aligned global carbon budget was used by political parties, such as the Alternative party, to argue the incompatibility of North Sea oil and gas extraction with climate obligations before the Minister of Climate, Energy and Utilities. Reasoning that if Denmark failed to curtail its North Sea extraction, it would either (a) export oil and gas, creating overseas emissions that would overshadow any success in domestic emissions reductions or (b) not meet its emissions targets and increase domestic consumption of oil and gas that would not be Paris-aligned (Tucker, 2019), the report served as vital substantiation for the cancellation of the eighth licensing round.

Fourth, local campaigns and coordinating groups capitalized on critical processes and moments that helped bring the idea of a ban to the forefront of policy debate. Such moments include leveraging the collective disappointment over the outcomes of the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP) hosted by Denmark in Copenhagen in 2009 to pressure the Danish Government to restore its climate reputation with increasingly ambitious climate commitments. Another event that took place that was utilized by local campaigns and groups was the drought in the summer of 2018. The direct experience of extreme heat and its health and economic impacts—example, the Danish agriculture industry enduring a direct loss of DKK 4.1 billion attributed to unseasonably hot weather (Schou, 2019)—raised public awareness across Denmark about the need to take aggressive action to reduce emissions. Additionally, as student climate strikes took place worldwide in 2019, Danish campaigns and groups were using the messaging and international coverage to attract local attention and garner civic engagement around such events to make clear to politicians how highly climate change issues were a top priority.

Fifth, norm entrepreneurs added to this momentum. An outstanding example is Minister Dan Jørgensen, Denmark’s Minister for Climate, Energy and Utilities at the time of the ban. Minister Jørgensen has not only driven the transition based on Danish issues of climate, employment, and economics but has looked for opportunities to leverage the Danish example internationally via the BOGA. Danish business community leaders were also notable. Under the leadership of then CEO Anders Eldrup, the Danish Oil and Natural Gas (DONG) company—formed initially to lead Denmark’s oil and gas development in the North Sea and focused exclusively on oil and gas extraction—announced in 2008 that it would transform itself into a renewable energy company focused on offshore wind. By 2017, the company had ended its oil and gas business lines to work solely in green energy and became Ørsted.

Sixth, the ban in Denmark was spurred by resonant ideas that appealed to the Danish people. These include an emphasis on the local risks of waning demand and profits from fossil fuels as global energy systems shifted, leaving the country exposed to threats to jobs, the economy, and the environment. At the same time, political actors advancing the notion of banning oil and gas extraction noted the opportunity to grow domestic jobs in the near-to-long term by leveraging existing workforce skills and competitive strengths while positioning Denmark at the centre of international politics, setting a vital example for how small and oil-dependent states can make a big difference. Denmark has decades of experience with wind energy—one interviewee noted that turbines are “a part of us”: “There is a DNA going 40–50 years back” (interviewee #6). Refocusing on that strength in the face of an increasingly precarious oil and gas sector was, therefore, a salient argument for advancing this policy.

This constellation of conditions identified by Carter and McKenzie (2020) explains in great part the rise of KIIG policies in Denmark. Curtailing Denmark’s oil and gas production arose from movement scale-up, which was supported by horizontally and vertically integrated constituencies that seized critical leverage points, such as political openings and opportunities. Well-placed norm entrepreneurs aided these efforts and were also bolstered and sustained by resonant messaging and ideas. However, case analysis highlighted other conditions that were fundamental to the development of Denmark’s globally outstanding ban on oil and gas production: responses to energy security challenges occurring over several decades, which included the development of a strong wind energy sector, as well as evidence of a decline in Denmark’s oil and gas sector that posed threats to public revenue and employment. These two factors also opened space for Denmark’s ban on future oil and gas extraction via the NSA.

The origins of Denmark’s ban could be traced back to early efforts to decarbonize the country’s energy. In response to the 1970s oil crisis, Denmark focused on transitioning to renewable energy that would be economically viable and create jobs and other community benefits (interviewees #4 and #16). This was particularly salient for the Port of Esbjerg, where most oil and gas activity and jobs are centred, and which has already undergone a major transition from fishing to oil and gas production and is now actively transitioning to be a domestic and global supplier of wind energy and renewable expertise. As one interviewee explained, Esbjerg has moved from fish to energy—fossil based, then renewable. Early movement into new energy sectors gave the country a competitive edge. It delivers economic benefits to Denmark: “We industrialized these industries ahead of other states and so are able to export them. In Esbjerg, we see the first movement of wind going from being a local Danish thing, to being a European thing, to now a global thing” (interviewee #6). Today, Esbjerg is the primary site of the country’s unprecedented large-scale offshore wind project activity.

Denmark was able to draw on its historical experience with wind energy to refocus the energy sector from oil and gas to wind—a pivot that was urgently needed given the trajectory of the oil and gas sector. While Denmark has long been a major oil and gas producer and benefited enormously from the revenues of that sector, in recent years, policymakers became aware that continuing to depend on this sector was an economic risk. Combined oil and gas production in Denmark peaked in 2005 (Hall, 2020, p. 4). Oil production has decreased on average 10 percent per year since 2005, contracting by 16 percent in 2017–2018 (OECD, 2023). In 2017–2018, gas production declined 15 percent after decreasing steadily since 2010 by an average of 10 percent (OECD, 2020, 2023). Over the next 15–20 years, Denmark’s low oil and gas production was forecasted to continue falling, with existing fields to be largely depleted by 2040 (Danish Energy Agency, 2018a, 2018b, pp. 6–9; Sperling et al., 2021).

Firms were also withdrawing from Denmark’s offshore oil sector. Before the cancellation of the eighth licensing round in 2020, oil companies were already hesitating to pursue new contracts in the Danish North Sea. In response to the eighth licensing round opening for applicants in 2018, the Danish Energy Agency received only 5 applications from 4 companies (Danish Energy Agency, 2019)—a considerable drop in interest from the previous licensing round in 2014, which garnered 25 applications from 15 companies (Danish Energy Agency, 2014). Then, by 2020, prior to the eighth licensing round being formally cancelled, only one party, Ardent Oil, was poised to submit two applications; Lundin Norway and Mol Dania had followed Total’s earlier example and had withdrawn their applications (Falkengaard & Kristensen, 2020).

Declining production and fluctuating oil prices translated into sustained reductions in state revenue from oil and gas production (Danish Energy Agency, 2020). In 2014, state revenue was down by almost 15 percent from the year prior, a trend projected to continue with diminishing productivity and persistent price volatility (Danish Energy Agency, 2020). The Danish Ministry of Finance’s, 2019 report estimated that oil and gas revenue would continue to decline (Danish Ministry of Finance, 2019). Similarly, employment in the sector was falling (Sperling et al., 2021, p. 20).

Waning firm interest in future exploration and production in the North Sea and declining jobs and public revenues solidified public and political support for Denmark’s focus on developing renewable energy and transitioning oil and gas workers to that growing sector (Madsen et al., 2023). In contrast with the economic declines and volatility of Denmark’s oil and gas industry, its renewable energy sector was growing to the point of more than offsetting losses from oil and gas in terms of public revenue and employment, as well as contributing significantly to energy supply. Just before the NSA, the wind industry was contributing substantial revenues to the state, with DKK 13.8 billion in 2018 (State of Green, 2021). In 2019, Denmark’s wind industry alone directly employed 33,159 people, compared to only 1565 employed in the oil and gas sector (State of Green, 2021; Statista, 2022). As oil and gas employment was projected to continue falling, the renewable energy sector is anticipated to add 50,000 jobs annually until 2050 (Mathiesen et al., 2015, p. 139). As for energy supply, in 2021, fossil fuel sources comprised less than 30 percent of Denmark’s electricity production, while renewable energy production increased by approximately 300 percent, with wind sources making up the largest share in both primary energy consumption and electricity (IEA, 2021).

At the same time, given firms’ gradual withdrawal from the sector, policymakers in Denmark were not exposed to the kind of pro-oil and gas lobby that inhibits ambitious climate policy and transitions in other major producing states (Carroll, 2021; Madsen et al., 2023). The industry association Oil Gas Denmark (OGD)Footnote 2did argue against the NSA across media platforms, noting how the ban would result in Denmark foregoing DKK 250 billion in revenue and arguing that the overall contribution of Denmark’s fossil fuel industry to the global climate crisis is virtually negligible compared to other states (Blædel Lorenzen, 2019; Næsby, 2019). Also used to substantiate the continuation of Denmark’s oil and gas production was the claim that climate change requires a global rather than national response, citing the need for demand side policy. However, as pressure for supply side climate policy grew alongside evidence of a declining oil and gas sector, support for status quo fossil fuel production was not defensible. Even OGD rebranding itself to Danish Offshore to reflect the shift.

6 Conclusion: challenging—and leveraging—Denmark’s ban

Since the 2015 Paris Agreement—which made no mention of fossil fuels, the leading contributors to global GHG emissions—a growing wave of states and subnational actors have moved to curtail fossil fuel production. Denmark’s ban is outstanding among them, yet it is not without caveats. The NSA is limited in two ways, arguably making it incompatible with the Paris Agreement (Greenpeace International, 2020; Severin Hansen et al., 2022). Correcting these limitations is an opportunity for Denmark to extend its leadership in global oil phase out policy.

First, Denmark’s 2050 end date for oil and gas production is considered too late to align with climate goals. Climate activists and organizations, such as Oil and Gas International, advocate existing production ending earlier than 2050—at least by 2042—to be aligned with the Paris Agreement (Severin Hansen et al., 2022; Sperling et al., 2021). The NSA indicates a non-negotiable 2050 end date (Danish Ministry of Climate, Energy & Utilities, 2020) to provide predictability and time for firms, workers, and other stakeholders to transition (Madsen et al., 2023). This glide path to 2050 was a key condition to securing widespread consent for the NSA in parliament with minimal pushback from firms already operating in the Danish North Sea (interviewee #16). Indeed, the NSA created favourable conditions for firms with existing licenses already operating in the Danish North Sea.Footnote 3 It effectively created a monopoly for only these firms to continue oil and gas activity (with the potential to expand their production—more on this below) until 2050. Given the political negotiations required around the NSA, adjusting the 2050 end date would no doubt be contentious. However, as supply side climate policy continues to advance globally and as public demand for bold climate action continues to grow (notably, in 2022, the Canadian province of Québec ended new and existing oil and gas production with firm compensation), it is not difficult to imagine growing pressure for policymakers to strengthen the NSA to include an expedited phase out date (Severin Hansen et al., 2022).

Second, although the NSA cancelled the eighth licensing round and all future licensing rounds, fossil fuel companies currently operating in the Danish North Sea can still expand production. Though the NSA resulted in the decommissioning of the Åben Dør area between the west coast of Jutland and the bidding round around the council,Footnote 4 effectively removing an area of 23,380 km3 from further exploration and extraction, via Denmark’s “open-door” procedure under the Subsoil Act (Danish Energy Agency, 2018a), developers continue to be able to apply for new fossil fuel ventures. This procedure permits exploration and extraction within a defined license area in the Danish North Sea, where fossil fuel discovery was previously made. An example is the Elly and Luke finds, estimated to hold gas volumes worth DKK 5.2 billion.

This gives developers relative flexibility to decide on location, production capacity, and infrastructure. Moreover, “mini-rounds” of oil and gas licences allow for unsolicited applications from a project developer—a developer can initiate an application for a license in a currently unlicensed area within a designated perimeter of the Danish North Sea, while “neighbour-block” procedures allow an existing licensee to bid for an area adjacent to a current license when a geological or production-related reason exists. Together, these procedures allow for continued fossil fuel exploration and expansion in the Danish North Sea until 2050, even while new licensing rounds for future production are banned. Civil society, activists, environmentalists, researchers, and NGOs argue Denmark must close these loopholes and revoke existing licenses to ensure its ban is aligned with the Paris Agreement (Madsen et al., 2023; Severin Hansen et al., 2022).

These are important criticisms of Denmark’s supply side climate policy and signal opportunities for the country to ramp up its leadership on sunsetting oil production. Yet even so, Denmark’s NSA undoubtedly makes an important contribution to global climate policy as it helps build a global moral norm around curtailing oil and gas production, that is, anti-fossil fuel norms (AFFNs). Denmark’s ban in itself challenges and enlarges what constitutes appropriate climate policy and opens new terrain for climate mitigation (Green, 2018, pp. 103–104): it is a globally unprecedented ban, particularly given Denmark’s status as a major oil-producing nation. Yet the importance of leveraging Denmark’s ban far beyond its borders is widely acknowledged across the community of policy actors advocating the ban. Because while the ban is politically important in Denmark, as one interviewee noted, “Denmark only matters when we are part of the bigger ecosystem” (interviewee #13). From the outset, the NSA aimed to exert global change. Indeed, the NSA specifically leverages domestic policy on the international stage, contributing to the global socialization of these norms. The agreement includes a commitment for Denmark to co-leading the BOGA, a historic multilateral initiative forwarding national and subnational oil and gas extraction bans. The formation of “climate clubs” is critically important to driving Paris-aligned climate and energy policy (van Asselt and Newell 2022).

Denmark can now expand its supply side climate policy leadership, further enacting AFFNs, by establishing fossil-free zones (FFZ): geographical areas completely absent of any exploration, extraction, transportation, treatment, and consumption of fossil fuels that are protected, enhanced, and expanded through national law and international agreements (Green, 2022, p. 1357). Intended to be complementary to the global anti-fossil fuel efforts already being undertaken by Denmark via BOGA, FFZs offer a new opportunity to advance decarbonization policy.

Denmark is vital in rejuvenating global energy and climate policy for a Paris-aligned world. As documented here, this case analysis highlights the ban-supportive conditions—conditions that could inform the adoption of these policy innovations in other jurisdictions. These included the dynamics of (1) a diverse civil society movement across Denmark that was (2) informed by earlier anti-nuclear and anti-fracking campaigns that were scaled up to fossil fuel production generally. These movements (3) reached out to IOs for support to advance phase out policy and (4) seized on critical political openings, notably an election after droughts and climate strikes. This movement was joined by (5) well-placed leadership within and outside government who similarly (6) framed the need for phase out in a way that resonated with the Danish people. The broader political-economic context also opened space for the ban. On one hand, the Danish government sought to understand and acknowledge the growing evidence that the oil sector was in decline—oil production was sliding, and firm interest in new investment was waning, threatening public revenue and jobs. On the other, Denmark’s decades-long effort to find non-oil energy security, in great part by developing a strong wind energy sector, provided a clear path to economic renewal post-oil. Meanwhile, the Danish government’s efforts to phase out oil production were not blocked by a strong oil and gas lobby. Indeed, firms wholly focused on fossil fuel production, like Ørsted, pivoted to invest in renewables.

The Denmark case shows that civic and norm entrepreneur engagement with phase out policy unfolding in particular political-economic circumstances facilitated the adoption of oil production phase out policy. Is this constellation of ban-supportive conditions replicable in other oil-producing jurisdictions? Diverse civil society movements calling for oil bans, supported by experienced IOs, are growing globally and are connecting with norm entrepreneurs who provide legitimacy to their domestically resonant justifications for phase out. Yet Denmark is perhaps uniquely positioned to phase out oil production thanks to its particular historical experience with transitioning to wind energy: a non-oil-dependent economic path was already evident and credible, not speculative. Also, the pro-oil lobby in Denmark was relatively weak or easily appeased, and major oil firms had already decided to pivot to renewable energy. Other oil-producing states may not yet share these advantages. Denmark’s trajectory is instructive in underscoring the importance of (1) analysing and raising public awareness about the fate of the oil sector, particularly in light of the imminent decline in global oil demand (Dusyk et al., 2023); and the impact of these trends on public revenue and jobs; (2) developing non-oil sectors that can credibly replace the revenue and jobs from oil; (3) reducing or overcoming the entrenched power of oil proponents (aided by the rise of a competing non-oil sector). Denmark’s experience is, therefore, helpful in directing attention to where precisely policy action should be focused to amplify phase out initiatives further.